Could the CAP concept work in Afghanistan?

[COMMAR]

I understand all sides of Vietnam being a no-win & there were many reasons for that; Political, Cultural, Tactical, & Strategic. I also understand that many of those issues migrate to A'stan. However the CAPs had many successes in their areas of influence w/little serious support. A lot of the Major short comings came fr/things beyond their control.

Here's the rub.
In 2yrs all Combat Forces will.. be.. out. I hear the Negatives: The Gov't of A'stan is CORRUPT, correct. Small Units operating at Distance are vulnerable, also correct, etc. All reasons would be just as valid for leaving no US troops, But thats not an option. Left behind will be MTT, ETT, some CS, & SOF.

There are many USMC Rifle Squads already acting in a CAP role w/relative independence; owning their own Battle-space, developing their own networks, & training their own local militia. All of this is coordinated at the top but it is the Squads & Sqd Ldrs running the show.

Thanks to Programs like Combat Hunter (teaching Profiling, Networking, Man-Tracking, & Advanced Patrolling & Observation Techniques), Squad Fires (bringing the squad the ability to call up to Level II CAS) & DO/ECO the Rifle Squad has many more tools in his Kit than ever before.

EMPLOYMENT

I wouldn't employ them in major or densely populated areas, those are Main Missions, I'd keep those for the ETTs & the ANSF. The CAPs would operate on the Margins.

I would start in the remote areas, in the villages that would most welcome that type of presence. I'd insert them in rural territory the taliban would need to retake to operate comfortably. The Goal wouldn't be to actively hunt the taliban, leave that for SOF, just disrupt & deny. Deny, Deny, Deny.

We can play the long game on the cheap. Let the ETT continue to build & develop ANSF. Let SOF go Kinetic, picking them off 1 raid at a time. Let the SF coordinate & build. And let the CAP Deny on the margins, denying the ability to set up his remote safe havens.

W/a CAP Platoon in many of these remote areas the SF can disperse in much smaller numbers, spread influence, & coordinate across a larger AO. Let SF MSGTs handle the Strategic nature of these relationships. Let the CAP run the day-to-day Local/Tactical end.

They don't need to be nor do I think they should be in the same chain of command. SF's mission is Strategic, the CAPs is Local/Tactical. However operating together (having 2-3man SF tm in the same village) will allow SF to remain fluid & centered on their Strat Goals, leaving village security to CAP, also allowing CAP Ldrs access to Sr. guidance.

Deployment

In 2008 2nd BN, &th Marines deployed to Farah Prov. as a Training BN, under basically the same "Non-Combat" authority as units will have in 2014. It eventually became a Combat/Training BN b/c for the most part(except for SOF) they were alone. They were successful but took a lot of casualties TF-2/7 was stretched over 10,000sq miles & at 1 pt over 16,000sqmi.

In 2014 the USMC can Deploy a 2-3 BN CAP based Special Purpose MAGTF.

Rough Draft: TF-2/7 deployed 70man Reinforced Rifle Platoons most at 70-100mi of dispersion. Each Squad separated to train, advise, & lead its own Police Station in the IDR FDD Programs.

Take 2-3 Infantry BNs & develop a 5-6mth CAP based PTP, similar to the ETT (culture, language, isolation) training-cycle, fr/the squad up start with:

• A 18-20man CAP Plt, pulling fr/Weapons Plt to fill SDM, RTO, CLIC, & Sapper slots

• Similar to TF 2/7 reinforce the Rifle Plt HQ (Plt Cmdr, Plt Sgt, Plt Guide, RTO, Corpsman) w/support Marines & a PSD fr/Weapons Plt & or Company. Rifle Plt HQ operates freely across 3 CAPs & coordinates objectives

• Company HQ operating on the Tenets of Distributed Ops & the BN as well. Weapons Coy is BN QRF. SPMAGTF HQ coordinates w/HHQ