'Nigeria: the context for violence' (2006-2013)

[jmm99]

Naji's text is so jargonized in "AQese" that it is easy to overlook its more generalized concepts.

My take: The USG seems hampered by not making counter-use of "AQ ideas" in the situations where they can be applied by the US (or by a US client or co-belligerent). In fact, the USG has been reactive to and rejective of "subversive" methodologies during and after the Cold War. Thus, if "AQ" believes it can be successful in a situation of "savage chaos", the kneejerk USG reaction is to demand or attempt to create a situation of "civilized stability" (a "Westphalian-Weberian state").

The first generalized Najism deals with the partial or complete collapse of "Westphalian-Weberian states" [emphasis added in quotes below]:

p.26 pdf

First Topic: Definition of “the management of savagery” and an overview of its historical precedents

We said above that if one contemplates the previous centuries, even until the middle of the twentieth century, one finds that when the large states or empires fell – whether they were Islamic or non-Islamic – and a state did not come into being which was equal in power or comparable to the previous state in its ability to control the lands and regions of that state which collapsed, the regions and sectors of this state became, according to human nature, subservient to what is called “administrations of savagery.” Therefore, the management of savagery is defined very succinctly as the management of savage chaos!!

"Savage chaos" has only resulted where "a state did not come into being which was equal in power or comparable to the previous state in its ability to control the lands and regions of that state which collapsed." The USG "solution" has been to support or try to create a successor state.

Moving back to Naji's earlier pages, we find a longer discussion applicable to post-colonial "Westphalian-Weberian" states, marked by civil-military merger and also delineated by the artificiality of colonial boundaries.

pp.12-13 pdf

Contemplating the previous centuries, even until the middle of the twentieth century, one finds that when the large states or empires collapsed – and even small states, whether they were Islamic or non-Islamic – and a state did not come into being that was comparable in power and equivalent to the previous state with regard to control over the lands and regions of that state which had collapsed, the regions and sectors of this state changed, through human nature, on account of submission to what is called the administrations of savagery.

When the caliphal state fell, some of this savagery appeared in some of the regions. However, the situation stabilized soon after that on account of (the order) the Sikes-Picot treaty established. Thereupon, the division of the caliphal state and the withdrawal of the colonial states was such that the caliphal state was divided into (large) states and small states, ruled by military governments or civil governments supported by military forces. The ability of these governments to continue administering these states was consonant with the strength of their connection with these military forces and the ability of these forces to protect the form of the state, whether through the power which these forces derived from their police or army, or through the external power which supported them.

Here we will not deal with how these states were maintained or how these governments exercised control. Regardless of whether we believe that they obtained control by virtue of their victory over the governments of colonialsm, or by virtue of working secretly with colonial rule and being assigned its place when it withdrew, or a mixture of the two, these states, in short, fell into the hands of these governments because of one or both of these reasons.

Naji's basic proposition in his 268 page monograph is that these post-colonial states will fail (in whole or in part) with resultant areas of savage chaos. "His Islamists" can be the vanguard in causing those state failures, or the failures can be caused (in whole or in part) by non-affiliated groups. Not matter how a state arrives at "savage chaos", it can be managed by a group that knows the peculiar (local) conditions of "savage chaos" and takes advantage of those conditions. Those conditions and what is "managed" are quite basic.

pp.26-27 pdf

As for a detailed definition, it differs according to the goals and nature of the individuals in the administration. If we picture its initial form, we find that it consists of the management of peoples’ needs with regard to the provision of food and medical treatment, preservation of security and justice among the people who live in the regions of savagery, securing the borders by means of groups that deter anyone who tries to assault the regions of savagery, as well as setting up defensive fortifications.

(The stage of) managing the people’s needs with regard to food and medical treatment may advance to (the stage of) being responsible for offering services like education and so forth. And the preservation of security and securing the borders may advance to working to expand the region of savagery.

Why do we call it “management of savagery” or “management of savage chaos” and not “management of chaos”? That is because it is not the management of a commercial company, or of an institution suffering from chaos, or of a group of neighbors in a district or residential region, or even of a peaceful society suffering from chaos. Rather, it is more nebulous than chaos, in view of its corresponding historical precedents and the modern world and in light of wealth, greed, various forces, and human nature, and its form which we will discuss in this study. Before its submission to the administration, the region of savagery will be in a situation resembling the situation of Afghanistan before the control of the Taliban, a region submitting to the law of the jungle in its primitive form, whose good people and even the wise among the evildoers yearn for someone to manage this savagery. They even accept any organization, regardless of whether it is made up of good or evil people. However, if the evil people manage this savagery, it is possible that this region will become even more barbarous!

Of course, if the region becomes even more "savagely chaotic" because of "evil people", it simply gives the "good people" (who "know savage chaotics") another chance - and another chance, etc. It helps to have an unshakeable ideology here.

Besides the "Management of Savage Chaos" (a better title than the "Management of Savagery"), one might think in terms of the "Management of Relative Insecurity" as a parallel term.

I'd be curious what MAL thinks about my take on this more generalized interpretation of Naji.

If this generalization has validity, then those in a region of a "country" headed toward "savage chaos" might consider something less than the "ideal Westphalian-Weberian state". This "lesser" goal might be a logical and more beneficial condition to a majority in that region.

I'm not remotely suggesting that the USG get involved in that process in Nigeria or any other part of Africa.

Regards

Mike