Syria: a civil war (closed)

[Dayuhan]

the question is "how does Syria get to a form of governance that serves a larger percentage, and that is more in synch with the expectations of a larger segment of the populace"?

That may be "the question" for Syrians, though it seems they are defining "the question" more in terms of whether or not Assad should go. I see no reason why it should be "the question" for the US to ask, nor any reason why it should be our business to define "the question" for Syrians.

I think Assad's effort to conduct constitutional reforms is a smart move. I believe it should be accompanied by processes that allow the people to feel like they had a voice in what those reforms should address and that a new ROE would open the door to allowing more foreign governments to lend their support to the reform process.

What "reform process" would that be, and what business would any foreign government have with it? I don't see any evidence of any "reform process" of any kind. This isn't about the Constitution, it's about Assad, who will do as he wishes regardless of what the Constitution says, until and unless he's overthrown.

As to the Saudis? They play a dangerous game, and I believe their direct involvement is a powerful indicator of just how nervous they are. Conditions of insurgency are very high in the Kingdom, and who knows what spark will set events in motion that overcomes the powerfully effective internal security mechanisms that keep them in check now.

I don't ee any connection between Saudi involvement in Syria and audi domestic politics. Seems to me the Saudis just see an easy low-risk chance to stick it to the Iranians indirectly, and want to exploit that opportunity. How would Saudi involvement in Syria alleviate any domestic issues? In fact the Saudi are relatively secure at home at this point - one reason why they're being a bit adventurous outside the borders - and the supposed "conditions of insurgency" are a lot lower than they were in the late 90s. That's less a function of internal security mechanisms than of the prosperity brought by high oil prices and by a widespread view among Saudis that disorder is scarier than tyranny. It's not an unreasonable view: they know they're sitting on something that everybody wants, and that internal instability would likely draw in the vultures. While the royals may not be popular, they do enjoy an intrinsic popular perception of hereditary legitimacy (incomprehensible to an American, but our opinions are irrelevant), and few alternatives have emerged hat have any popular support at all.

For the US, Saudi stability has long been a priority pillar for sustaining our interests in the region. The "ways" applied to secure that interest in the past are inappropriate for the emerging environment. Our Ends need to be stated simply as "stability" and we need to be much more flexible as to who leads the nation or how they lead the nation, so long as they maintain a more natural form of stability.

We need to be more flexible as the who leads the nation?? How is it any of our business? We don't decide who leads Saudi Arabia. For better or worse, the Saud family leads Saudi Arabia. They don't need our approval or help to maintain that rule, and our influence over how they rule is slim to none.

We are at the point where many governments must evolve and make compromises. Governments don't like that. Assad must compromise internally. Saudis must compromise internally. The US must compromise externally. The people are speaking, and governments can no longer discount those voices.

I suspect Assad is beyond the point of compromise. We can say what we will about what the audis "must" do, but they won't listen to us and we can't compel or persuade him to do anything they don't want to do, so there's little point in discussing it. As for us... well, people are indeed speaking, but they're saying a whole bunch of different things, many of them contradictory... as anyone reasonable would expect. As always, we'll listen to those who tell us what we want to hear, which makes compromise complicated.

The media in Homs are clearly trying to generate a "Benghazi moment", but I doubt that it'll work, at least not if "working" means generating direct foreign intervention. I don't think the US gives a rats ass about what the Russians or Chinese think, but the administration does have to notice what the voters think. Another military commitment would not go down well with Obama's base, and there's an election coming up... and without US participation it's difficult to see overt intervention happening. If it's gonna be covert, better let the Saudis do it.