Syria: a civil war (closed)

[JMA]

I'll go ahead and lay out my view and analysis regarding military intervention, specifically the use of military means toward a political end.

First of all, I think there are three "categories" in which military force could be used:

1. Regime change, by whatever means.
2. Change the balance of power between Assad’s forces and the opposition so that Assad’s forces cannot conduct mass killings.
3. Compel Assad to make a political decision to stop the mass killings or reconcile with the opposition.

Let’s examine the utility of military force in each case:

First, regime change:

• Regime change is something military force can achieve by following, very roughly, the Libya model. Another example is the post Desert Storm counter-factual where the Iraqi Shia rebels receive a proxy air force to finish Saddam off after we decimated his conventional forces. The US does have a lot of experience at this sort of thing - see also Afghanistan in 2001-2002.
• The problem is, however, that whatever the circumstances, we can’t control how regime change occurs or turns out in the end. It’s a pretty big gamble and the odds are good that the result will not be pretty. The stakes are a lot greater in Syria than Libya because Syria is bigger, more populous, better armed, has chemical weapons, is more geographically strategic, and plays an important regional role with it's alliance with Iran and involvement in factional Lebanese politics. It's not clear at all how things would turn out if we upset that apple cart, but I think the result would look a lot more like Iraq circa 2006 than Libya 2011.
• The best case for regime change is a successful coup, but that’s not something we can create or control through military force. It's also not clear that an Alawite successor would view the rebels any differently than Assad and it's highly unlikely anyone but another Alawite could stage a sucessful coup.
• Even if Syria transitions smoothly to a new government, the effect will likely be that Syrians will still die, they'll just be different Syrians. A Marine officer over at Tom Rick's blog said: "Killing several thousand Syrians so they don't kill several thousand other Syrians only to leave the nation knowing that several thousand more will die is not protecting anyone." That sums it up IMO.
• The worst case is an open and brutal civil war in a highly militarized country rife with internal divisions that also happens to have a lot of chemical weapons.

The second option is to use military force to change the balance of power between Assad and the opposition. There are two basic ways to do this.

• First is to create no-fly/no-drive zones, (using the Southern/Northern watch model) or something similar like "humanitarian corridors" which some advocate for. A bigger version of this the Bosnia partition model which would require an enduring ground-force commitment to separate the warring parties. Any of these options could be accomplished militarily, but there are some serious downsides. The most obvious problem is that such measures are inherently temporary. At some point the NFZ or enforced partition will end. Perhaps a political solution could be negotiated while the parties are separated, but that is not likely for a whole host of reasons I won't belabor here. If a political solution isn't reached, and the political will to continue spending resources enforcing the "peace" ends, then the situation would likely return to the status-quo ante.
• The second option involves attriting Assad’s military and security forces while strengthening the opposition so that Assad no longer has the capability to conduct the mass killings even if he still has the intent. This is a task the US military could accomplish, though it would take a long, sustained air campaign. The problem with this option, however, is what then? Either the situation will slide again into Assad’s favor (a return to the status quo ante), or the opposition will be strong enough to overthrow Assad (see regime change), or you end up with a stalemated civil war in which neither side has a decisive advantage. None of these options sound very good to me and they would all involve killing a lot of Syrians, not protecting them.

The third option is to use military force to compel Assad to come to a political solution with the opposition instead of using violence. This seems the least-realistic of the options and the one least-likely to be accomplished with military force. Is Assad the kind of man who can be bullied into compliance? It's possible I suppose, but it would be uncharacteristic for the typical dictator in Assad's circumstances. And if the interventions in Libya and Iraq are any guide, the political mission creep will tend to try to box Assad in and provide no option but to fight until the bitter end. There's also no guarantee that the opposition would accept any offer from Assad (much less agree among themselves), especially since their primary demand is that Assad step down from office. In my judgment, this option is mostly fantasy abetted by wishful thinking.

There is a fourth option which focuses on punishment as the goal. Although it wouldn't prevent mass killings, it would "send a message." I'm talking, of course, about the tried and true punitive raid. For Syria it would have to be pretty big and would likely last a couple of days - look at Operation Desert Fox for an example of what it might look like. The operation would likely strike regime targets and key strategic facilities. It won’t stop the killings, won’t topple the Assad regime, but at least we could be satisfied that we “did something" even if that "something" is counterproductive.

So in the end, I don't think a military intervention is, at this point in time, justified when compared to the risks and consequences, both intended and unintended.

You have put some time and effort into this so I will be gentle.

I ask you again to start at the beginning.

It is the politicians who decide to intervene and generally place a whole string of limitations on such intervention.

The Pentagon (in the case of the US) then usually don't have the balls to say no (meaning that under those circumstances with those limitations the aim is unlikely to be achieved). Its all about not putting one's pension at risk you see.

Then the planning staffs get hold of it and begin to play. And out pops a plan of sorts... think "Bay of Pigs", think "Operation Eagle Claw" think "Son Tay Raid" and any other of the cock-ups these "planners" (or what passes for them) produce. Then the 'fine tuning' starts with input normally from people who have never been exposed to more than Hollywood movies and BB guns.

Then they send the troopies out to die.

After the dead are buried they dish out a gongs (medals) to the survivors and praise the patriotism and bravery of those involved... but never a word of apology for sending soldiers to their death on some incompetently conceived and ineptly planned operation/intervention.

So all that said ... don't plan for options you at your level will not be asked to decide on.

Next I would like to comment on that (idiotic) quote from that Marine officer. (I hope he is a Lt at most otherwise the USMC is in a lot of trouble)

(In Rumsfeld style)... if there are bad guys (which no doubt Assad's military are) killing opposition groups and their families (even if these opposition groups include some nasties) then the killings by the regime of mainly unarmed men, women, children supporter of the opposition is quite simply a crime against humanity.

So if a guardian angel starts to take out 1,000s of the bad guys (being from Assad's political and military hierarchy) is not the same as killings civilians (men, women, children) in Homs with artillery, mortars, armour and then by firing squad.

Now one wonders why a Marine officer can't connect the dots in order to protect civilians (regardless of their religious or political persuasion) from being butchered by Assad's thugs (can't call people who do that soldiers) it is clearly necessary to kill a lot of Assad's thugs. Now this killing of Assad's trigger men must be swift and extremely violent because (as reports state) if they refuse to kill civilians and oppositions groups they themselves will be killed by the regime's enforcers. So to tip the balance in favour or defection/flight/whatever one needs to send them a very serious message.

So ignore that idiot Marine officer. Sadly though he seems to have influenced your thinking because you come up with this: "None of these options sound very good to me and they would all involve killing a lot of Syrians, not protecting them." So think it through again I suggest and understand that to save Syrian civilians a lot of "bad guys" are going to have to be killed.

Finally I suggest that your "gut feel" is not what counts here. When you arrive at what you think will or won't work consider the basis on which you arrived at that decision. In appreciations the deductions and conclusions are not 'plucked' out of the air but are arrived at through your discussion of factors. So "in my opinion" and "but I think" and "the odds are" have no place in an appreciation.

For example your man Wolfsberger states that if Assad is taken out it "would lead to complete chaos". Where did he pluck this from? Sadly he states this opinion (his opinion) as a fact. He gives no inkling as to how he is able to state this with such certainty. You should not fall into this trap as well.