Combat Participation

[JMA]

That's a pseudo formula. It multiplies two unknowns.
Show me mathematician who can solve such an equation.

Besides, his methodology in the book was popular, but also flawed. He compared two very different forces instead of comparing multiple different formations of different performance from the same force. He's voluntarily looking at datasets that are much farther away from ceteris paribus than necessary, which clouds the whole approach - and he used practically no advanced empirical tools as (which would be required for such a multi-input dataset). It's a pseudo study that purports to deliver scientific results when in fact it's really only about his opinion.

Ah... but you missed where I placed the word 'study' in bold.

I am not that concerned with his comparison between the krauts and the yanks just as I will not be distracted by the crude comparison in Jorg Muth's book Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Force, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II (when I finally get a copy) ... I will search for the little (often invaluable) gems that one uncovers in studying these books.

We all know (and it just leaves it for the last of the diehard yanks to accept the truth) that the raw cannon fodder divisions the yanks fed into Europe after D-Day were being chewed up by the resource stretched but combat experienced German formations. It was a case of the problem that even though they could chew up and spit out one of these divisions comprising inspired amateurs today, tomorrow there would be another, new full equipped one to replace it... and so it went. Any decent book on D-Day - Keegan or Ambrose - will tell you that story.

I try to look for items of relevance applicable for today.

Of interest to me is that the following characteristics (which van Creveld lists as components of Fighting Power) have assumed a lower level of importance than academic expertise (for officers) and technical ability (for all) among soldiers (certainly in the US). I will look into this further out of personal interest as it may well lead to where the US led NATO armies are going/have gone wrong.

(Fighting Power) rests on mental, intellectual and organisational foundations; its manifestations, in one combination or another, are discipline, cohesion, morale and initiative, courage and toughness, the willingness to fight and the readiness, if necessary, to die.

I have mentioned it a number of times before that the role of the infantry is to "close with and kill the enemy".

Look at any video out of Afghanistan and see that the waddling Michelin men of ISAF and see that this is quite impossible. The go out on patrol... draw fire... call in an airstrike... then waddle back to base. Its all a bit of a sick joke.

van Creveld for all his faults helps us return to first principles and rethink why it is possible for the most technically advanced and supported soldiers ever (yanks and Brits) can get their ass' whipped in combat by guys in sandals carrying an AK (and other basic weapons). For those who are able to think it is an interesting journey.