I know...I love that used book function! For an old book worm it is just GREAT!
Yep, I am sure if confronting Gray in a legal boxing match, he would leave marks. Gray also has another book out “The Law of Armed Conflict”… trying to read through it for some time now…I believe it is Mr. Solis’s text book…I keep putting it down to read more fun stuff.
To me, Herrod’s SPCM for UA is also surprising but does reflect his command situation. Good combat leaders work real hard on unit cohesion and Ollie North is one great combat leader regardless of his political issues late in his career. Combat firefights/battles are also tremendous cohesion builders. If you suddenly lose your leader and your unit with a transfer to a different division the “system” support structures have been kick out from underneath you and a sudden UA problem should not be unexpected (and does need to be addressed). Unit SOPs normally set an unofficial standard that the Company CO gets the first NJP offense, the Bn CO gets the second, third offense gets the super NJP option of a summary court and that is the normal route to a SPCM.
OODA Loops and Deming - Boyd theory was never sold as something new…at least not by its author. It was an historical analysis of sorting out and picking what works and then an assembly of those piece parts. Boyd Theory is much richer than just OODA loops. I don’t remember any references to Deming but the list is extensive. The Boyd briefs (slides) are available on line and the USMC Quantico Library now has a copy of COL Boyd delivering the audio portion of those briefs (12 hrs+). If you ever want to spend the time, let me know and I will let you know how to get your very own set Boyd CDs. I personally feel you have to have both (the slides and the audio) to understand Boyd.
Read the reference…it is very good and I am especially impressed by the reference list. Of course, being the dedicated fighter of windmills (besides being a knuckle dragger) I have to state my criticism.
The doc seems to rely heavily on UN and NATO references and that presents, in my opinion, a considerable flaw. I would sum up that flaw with the phase: “its fine, if you are dealing with the villages of Europe, but how does this work in a tribal content, specifically a Muslim tribal content?” In addition, I feel it is a tactical manual that ignores and glosses over some of the strategic realities. I mention that because I believe we are going to add Afghanistan to the now growing list of wars that we have won tactically but lost strategically.
The strategic issue is which ROL do you want to implement? Ours or theirs? Especially, when theirs is culturally very different from our ROL. Either way presents us with a dilemma. Their law, for example, requires that an adulteress woman is publically stoned. In the US, we always have an opposition party. If we attempt to implement a Muslim based ROL, the opposition party (and I am convinced it makes no difference which party is in the minority) will see this as an opportunity to garner power. Another example is President Bush was politically attack for using the LOW to fight the war on terrorist; Eric Holder is being attack for trying to use the ROL. States can legally execute their own citizens, so how will the US public handle the legal and public execution of a convicted adulteress by stoning?
Boyd Strategic Theory states that whatever works for you must also work against the enemy (Boyd’s cheng/chi theme). Clausewitz calls for a balance in the trinity of war …people, government, and the Army. “The theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.”
Of course, my favor windmill that cocks my barber’s bowl sideways, is the separation of the ROL and the LOW. The manual does not address it and therefore, I my mind, it is flawed. It is still a good manual as long as you understand the flaws. I understand that the legal folks view them as the same thing. But as a knuckle dragger, I do not see how I can operate under both; Inter arma silent leges. I still feel that there has to be a coordination point between the two as you transition from the LOW to the ROL. If you mix them, at some point there is going to a sorting out…and the sorting always means someone is going to lose and any loss, either way, means you undermine your own strategy. I recently finished “In the Shadow of Wounded Knee” by Roger Silvestro…and like Haditha, I think it is a great example of mixing them and then sorting it out with winners and lossers demonstrating a flawed strategy.
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