First, consider what the President campaigned on. Secondly, the President doubled the number of troops in Afghanistan as soon as he took office (to about 60k, fulfilling part of his campaign promise). The debate you mention above happened after that increase as part of the policy review. The end, as we all know, was an additional 30k+ troops. I think the bigger problem with the Biden plan was that it contradicted what the President campaigned on and it would be difficult to explain a large reduction in troop levels right after the President just doubled them.I remember a recount from a WH meeting where (supposedly) the Biden plan and a 'surge' were discussed. Obama was undecided so far. He said (supposedly) something along the lines of 'either the military can win this in 18 months with a surge or it won't at all, so we'd need to leave'. Petraeus jumped in and confirmed exactly this; 18 months time to turn AFG around or else it would be the right thing to withdraw after 18 months. Obama accepted and pushed the smaller CT/TF Ranger-style plan aside.
There is also the problem that Presidents and politicians are generally only interested in solutions that are not politically damaging to them. This is a big part of the domestic politics problem that Ken mentioned and, IMO, it becomes the most important factor in wars of choice, which is what this has become. Military advice doesn't exist in a vacuum and military advice which doesn't help the political leadership is usually not welcomed.
So, IMO, this is a war that, for the US, is now driven by domestic politics more than anything else. I think if a course-of-action presented itself that would allow the US to "declare victory and go home," then almost any President would take it. Unfortunately, no such solution is apparent (at least not to me). IMO, that kind of solution is what the President was seeking in his 2009 review. Many options were explored, but few were politically acceptable. And so the President (in my judgment, as I was not a party to any of the internal discussions), went with the "surge" strategy in order to avoid replicate the US domestic political effects of the Iraqi "surge." The Iraq "surge" changed perceptions and provided the political space for the US to declare victory and go home. It was such a successful political strategy that politicians of all stripes try to take credit for it.
Unfortunately, as many of us predicted at the time, the "surge" strategy did not work in Afghanistan (or rather, is not working). If anything, things are worse from a domestic political perspective, especially in light of recent events. I think at this point the military cannot deliver any "solution" in Afghanistan that will be perceived as a "win." Without anything to take credit for, politicians and the elites of this country (like Mr. Rothkopf) will do what they always do, which is seek to shift the blame. So I see Mr. Rothkopf's piece as laying the ground work for that. The narrative will be one of military failure and not strategic or political failure.
JMA,
That doesn't apply to US General officers. Their pensions are already vested by the time they make GO. And, if you look at the history of such things, they are treated with kid gloves compared to lesser ranks. Only egregious crimes result in real repercussions - usually criminal and immoral activity simply forces retirement or, at most, results in a general officer article 15 equivalent which also ends in retirement. These guys aren't afraid of loosing their pensions - they are motivated by other factors.Because the moral courage to speak out and pension stability are incompatible. Soldiers who need/rely on their military pension will fold under pressure.
As is said, pension slavery makes (moral) cowards out of (physically) brave men.
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