One of the reasons that you actually need more centralized C2 for ASBC is that the concept anticipates that forces will be operating at distance on using shared support, whether that be intelligence, air defense, EW, basing, or air refueling. If you push decisionmaking down too far, there's a greater chance that individual tactical decisions could stretch forces beyond their protection and sustainment - when you're being challenged for air superiority or base access, the plan is going to have to change constantly, and decisions made up front may result in forces being left unprotected, without key supporting coverage, or without enough gas to get to their new alternate base. The other challenge is that in a "scarcity of resources" fight that needs to be tightly synchronized between various forces to accomplish specific tactical actions, it's more difficult to provide mission type orders and expect good results. Your point about manageability is a valid one - it's questionable whether we have the C2 capabilities in tools in place to pull off highly complex ASBC scenarios, and part of the purpose of the concept is to flush these out. But you have to be careful trying to transfer "lessons learned" about decentralization from our recent conflicts, which occurred with much different entering assumptions (i.e. unchallenged air superiority, relatively stable forward based logistics, regional access, etc).