My first comment is that changing or re-engineering a command and control system is not going to make for better strategic thinking. “Strategic Thinking” is not the job of planners but it is the job of general officers (and war planning is specifically the COCOM’s job). The US military is getting notoriously bad at strategic thinking. As proof…Viet Nam, Iraq, and Afghanistan…we are now up to three wars that we (the US) has failed to turn tactical victories into strategic victories.
The purpose of JOPES, like any command and control system is to implement the commander’s decisions. JOPES was designed to be a command and control system for the commander…actually, that should read commanders but was never embraced by commanders. JOPES usually stopped at the Joint Service HQs instead of reaching down to the service BN Command level (with one service exception).
It has been a long while but my experience is there was only one service that embraced that concept. Where the old JOPES didn’t work, it usually could be traced back to one of the armed services failure to comply with agreed upon and directed joint procedures. The too complicated excuse is just that, an excuse, reflecting a lack of “strategic thinking” on the part of commanders. When JOPES was replaced with GCCS back in the early 90’s it was specifically downgraded from TS to S to get it out from behind the red re-enforced steel doors so the commanders could make better use of it. Based on what I can reading in this article it sounds like that idea was another failure. If you want to see how effective strategic AP (and it was not called that back then) can work look at Zinni’s “Desert Crossing”.
1. Develop and strengthen strategic thinking skills. It has to start with general officers and not their command and control system. Enough said here.
2. Expand the community. Agree! However, we have been trying to expand the community since Goldwater-Nichols (1986). Waivers were routinely granted to newly promoted officers without joint experience. Promotion boards routinely placed service experience over joint experience. Again, this is a command issue and not a command and control system issue.
3. Break the mold. If you first realize that JOPES is a command and control system based on the current command structure and is intended to be a commander's tool, I would first get everyone to embrace that notation before breaking any molds.
4. Change the process. Agree, the process does needs to be changed. If you are after more effective planning and streamlining, your issues starts at the joint service HQs and moves down the service chain of command.
5. “Red-team” the review. Agree, and this is a wonderful idea but who is going to tell a general officer, a warfighter or service chief, their strategic planning is sub-standard and reflects bad strategic thinking? Again, it ain’t a command and control system issue but it is a leadership problem.
Bookmarks