Many academics, policy officials, and military leaders agree on the complex problem that Iraq in the post-US imperial pull-out represents. Politically, the US is unwilling, incapable, and does not have the political stamina to return with combat troops to Iraq. Outside the city of Hit the reality is increasingly grim. ISIS is gaining ground and poses an existential threat to the government of Iraq.
Media reports show Iraqi soldiers are demanding that US armed forces return to Iraq to fight alongside them rather than the US government trying to deal politically with the incompetent leadership in Baghdad. It is evident that the remaining vestiges of the Iraqi army are close to collapse.
ISIS, on the other hand, shows structure, political and religious indoctrination, and most importantly, its troops are fighting for a cause. The brutality ISIS employs in its efforts to wipe out evil non-believers and terrorize the general population into submission dominates the media landscape. A gloomy picture of foreboding horrors emerges with ISIS becoming a real threat to the stability of the entire Middle Eastern region beyond merely taking control of Iraq.
Strategic blunders aside, what next, oh fearless leader?
President Obama’s pull-out from Iraq was a strategic blunder of colossal miscalculation for political gain. Though the pull-out appeared perfectly justifiable in the economic and political sense, the reality remains that the Maliki administration is as much to blame as the US administration for failing to comprehend the devastation of the Iraqi society that the US occupation wrought and the lack of a credible and sustainable governance of Iraq. Iraq is a failed state.
Claiming otherwise is to court a naïve potpourri of wishful thinking of “mission accomplished” and “no boots on the ground.” Both are failed strategies. It is recognized that staying in Iraq is not economically feasible. But like the Roman Army in Galilee, the US military, and by extension the political leadership in Imperial Washington, is faced with the question of “What next, oh fearless leader?”
Washington does have a few options, one of which is do nothing. But despite the gloomy situation, act it must and act it should. First, airpower, although sexy, is not the solution. Dragging in the Europeans as a whole into the American mess is not going to happen. Thanks to the post-World War II de-militarization of the Euro-zone, Europeans as a whole have no intention of getting dragged into what is essentially still an American problem. Limited air support is not going to make a difference. But, watch the French. We will cover this later.
Second, Special Forces are boots on the ground. They are not just “trainers” but provide air support elements, search and rescue, combat air controllers, and so forth. But a few hundred Special Forces troops are not sufficient to make any real difference. Gathering the leftovers of the disillusioned Iraqi army to stem the fast growing ranks of ISIS will be a difficult, if not impossible, task. Long term muddling in a low-intensity/counter insurgency warfare scenario is militarily a workable solution, but still requires a political strategy.
Third, the US could do nothing and sit back and watch the slow and agonizing death of Iraq as it turns into some bizarre state of hate outranking Iran at the height of its revolutionary madness. Compared to Iran, ISIS will come home to eat its neighbors.
Political ignorance is a strategy; it has served the interest of the United States repeatedly and should come as no surprise. Abandonment of allies has been a fixture in US strategy since Vietnam despite guarantees from the empire. So keeping the region instable is a strategy in and of itself. Abandonment as a regional strategy will keep Iraq’s neighbors Saudi Arabia, Iran, and even Syria on their toes.
Although abandonment is a short-term solution, it will be hardly containable for the long term. ISIS will convert Iraq into an Al Qaeda type of regime that Osama Bin Laden could have only dreamed about. The Sword of the Revolution will reign.
Intervention by force of arms
The new US colonialism is part of 21st century Realpolitik. Denied by the current U.S. administration the imperial realities of the situation in Iraq and the U.S. administration having lost the appetite and the political will to intervene with ground forces to defeat the ISIS threat may come to the conclusion that forceful intervention with a force of arms maybe required to save democracy and may not be such as bad strategy after all. The Anbar province in fact requested intervention by U.S. and coalition forces to prevent the province of being overrun.
The U.S. administration now has the option to deploy its armed forces or wage a proxy war. Whereas the deployment of a brigade size element may not be realistic or sufficient, it might become a tactical necessity in order to protect U.S. interests in Iraq. More forces are, however, required to defeat the ISIS threat.
Enter the French: The Legion Returns
With France, Great Britain, and Australia are coalition partners and the UK and Australia providing boots on the ground, deployment of French ground forces may not be such a far-fetched idea. It is a little known fact that since 1921 the French have had a detachment (and by 1939 a full regiment) posted throughout Syria, Lebanon, and later Tunisia and Algeria until the 1950’s.
The 6eme Régiment Étranger d’Infanterie, 6eme REI, nicknamed “Régiment du Levant” (“Levant” is the historical name of the French Syria and Lebanon territory), numbered almost 3,300 men. Historically, the Levant has been dominated by the French. The Lebanese still speak French as a second language, and the territory of Syria and Iraq provides ideal combat conditions for regiments of the French Foreign Legion. Deploying these regiments to Iraq provides a few strategic advantages.
First, the units of the French Foreign Legion in Afghanistan had one of the best combat fire-power/efficiency ratios. Second, these are combat seasoned regiments. The social mix of Legionnaires in the ranks provides a better social engagement with the local populous that will favor a return of trust for the embattled Iraqi government. And if required, the Legion can be aggressive as needed to deal with threats.
Second, the Legion regiments are combat experienced in fighting Islamic insurgents in Mali and Afghanistan. Returning to the Levant would be in line with their social structure and its historical context. But they are part of the regular French armed forces and subjected to the laws of land warfare. The Legion is, despite the units’ history and perpetuated myths, part of the French Rapid response force capability.
The deployment of the Legion would also reduce the call for mercenaries such as Blackwater returning with a mercenary army, not unlike the Biafra wars in the 1950s. But combat hardened troops being used to fight small unit warfare would be a formidable enemy for ISIS.
Third, Legionnaires are expendable and this is oddly socially expected in the context of the unofficial motto of the Legion: Marche ou crève (March or Die). Unit cohesion is based on allegiance toward the regiment first and is embodied in the official motto of the Legion: Legio Patria Nostra (The Legion is our Fatherland). ISIS has yet to show its true colors if faced with an aggressive combat force fighting irregularly, as the Legion does. To unseat ISIS in Iraq will require both aggressive combat leadership and a force en masse.
The Legion’s combination of modern weaponry, superior fire power, and air support would pack a formidable punch if coupled with US air power and the Special Forces technical expertise. It will provide the embattled Syrian army with breathing space to reform and rebuild their battered morale. Like any other elite fighting regiment, the Legion units need the protective screen of long range weaponry to reach entrenched enemies.
Fourth, Legion units train regularly in desert, urban, and cold weather conditions. The units’ ruggedness is based on a tradition of dealing with tres dur (very hard) conditions. Suffering of men is part of the battle attitude of Legion units going to the battlefield.
And finally, the Legion is expected to face casualties in war. Exhaustion or complete annihilation of units is not uncommon in the long history of the Legion but it is acceptable in both political and military terms.
The use of the French reduces the political issues of U.S casualties at home providing the force needed to combat ISIS operating within the range of a coalition. The units of the Legion are combat units. Tactical defeat, if experienced by the Legion provides strategic space for getting the Iraqi army in order. Death on the battle field is accepted by Legionnaires as a political reality for the general public. So is ISIS in Iraq. This is perhaps a harsh and political uncomfortable position to take but it is a daily reality we experience seeing hundreds of young Iraqi, Syrians or foreigners being beheaded, shot and dumped in the rivers running deep with the blood of a new extremist revolution. Perhaps this type of combat attitude is needed to stem the tide of defeat and unhinge ISIS in the Levant, the traditional home of the French Foreign Legion.
Originally Posted by JMA
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