3 Generals Spurn the Position of War "Czar"

[jcustis]

“One of the things that we’ve heard from Republicans and Democrats is that we need to go a step further in Washington and have a single point of focus, someone who can work 24/7 on the Washington end of executing the strategy we’ve put in place for the next 22 months,” to the end of Mr. Bush’s term.

And my frustration grows Tom, as I read this and wonder aloud, "Why the hell aren't we worried about executing the strategy until it has successfully run it's course?" Screw being concerned about election timelines.

Someone, regardless of party, is going to get a nice squishy ball of wax to play hot potato with.

I nominate Odom for czar!!!

[BScully]

Gentleman,

I'm a relatively young, federal civil servant with no combat experience, so I typically lay low and learn from the conversations that take place here rather than contribute. However, I think the wrong lessons are being drawn from the articles you've read and discussions to date.

The issue that needs to be addressed is that the interagency system is seriously broken. There needs to be serious reform before any administration will be able to count on the entire federal government working together in an effective manner. There are any number of different reforms and directives that have tried to solve this problem since 9/11 (and before for that matter). They just haven't worked. The system needs to be fixed. And until its fixed, future Administration's will continue to have the same issues.

Operating under the reality that the system is broke, but we cannot succeed without effective interagency cooperation, what are the options available? Obviously someone needs to figure out how to fix the system. But that is a longer term solution and will not take effect for years (Look at how long jointness under Goldwater-Nichols took). In the short term, there is only one effective answer that I'm aware of and that is what Hadley suggests. Have one person, with staff, entirely focused on making sure the interagency supports the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan 24/7...that's all they work on.

Several of you have said that Hadley should be focused on Iraq and Afghanistan. That is just unrealistic. There are numerous National Security issues that the National Security Advisor and his staff must pay attention to...Iran, North Korea, China, Sudan just to name a few. I personally think it would be extremely irresponsible for the National Security Advisor to focus all of his time on Iraq and Afghanistan at the expense of the many other issues/crisis facing the U.S..

In many ways, I give Hadley credit for giving up some of his turf on one of the most critical issues facing the nation to someone else and admitting it's just too much for him to handle. How often does that happen in Washington? Normally I'd go on a long diatribe about how we expect our leaders to be perfect and then criticize them when they admit mistakes or changes in policy/tactics based on lessons learned...but I've already written too much.

While I certainly don't have any answers to the problem, I do know a few things. First, many administrations have tried to address the lack of interagency cooperation over the years and all have been unsuccessful. Second, even after Bush and Hadley are long gone, National Security Advisors will continue to deal with poor interagency cooperation until the entire system is blown up and rebuilt.

Take care,
Brian

[jcustis]

I'm a relatively young, federal civil servant with no combat experience, so I typically lay low and learn from the conversations that take place here rather than contribute. However, I think the wrong lessons are being drawn from the articles you've read and discussions to date.

Scully,

In a subtle way, you validate the expansion of the board. I'm glad you are here, regardless of the capacity in which you participate. Keep up the good fight.

[Tom Odom]

Scully,

You will get no argument from me that the interagency process needs fixing.

You will get an argument when you tell me I am missing the point by not seeing that the process needs work. I have seen it and I have worked it inside the beltway and outside downrange where it is very personal.

Mssrs Hadley and company have for the past several years worsened the interagency process by turf fighting in the extreme. DOD was the lead culprit--especially when it came to the issue of going to war in OIF and then failing to plan for the aftermath. True enough that Hadley has many things on his plate; he sat down at the table and top two items of the menu read, Iraq and Afghanistan. If it takes 2 years to understand that he could not handle the meal, that is too long, especially after serving as Rice's deputy for the previous 4.

Best

Tom

PS

What really makes all of this even more frustrating is that the very subject--the need to focus on Iraq--was covered extensively in Bob Woodard's book, State of Denial, concerning 2003-2005. And Hadley played a large role in pushing for greater focus from the key players, including his boss at the time National Security Advisor Rice.

[wm]

Rather than just note the failure of inter-agency cooperation with regard to the efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq, perhaps we ought to try to understand why this failure has occurred. If one looks at the basic structure of American government, I believe that understanding should be fairly easy to attain.

(Sorry for the Pol. Sci. 101 rehash, but we often seem to forget the basics.) The fundamental principle that underlies our government is a separation of powers to provide a system of checks and balances for the whole structure. The separation is not just limited to the three main branches of government. It also exists within each branch. As an example, consider the Federal budget process. Three different Congressional groups are involved in deciding how to spend the taxpayers' dollars--the budget committees, the authorization committees, and the appropriations committees (and they need the approval of the two houses of Congress to boot). The history of the United States is a history of the struggle of the nation to work through these checks and balances to achieve results. The process is the reason that governmental reform efforts achieved results very slowly and in very small increments.

Before we look for a solution to the current lack of interagency cooperation, we might do well to ask what we would give up were we able to resolve the problem. In Democracy in America, De Tocqueville prognosticated that the United States would not survive for long because of the many small interests competing in the country. As it turns out, America has probably survived for as long as it has because of those many conflicting special interests. They have prevented the nation's being overwhelmed by a tyranny of the majority. Contrast our country’s relatively peaceful internal disagreements with the struggle in Iraq between Shia (empowered majority) and Sunni (largely disempowered minority). Attribution of the conflict to religious differences is, I believe, largely a misapprehension of the social dynamic--conflict is almost always about power.

When American special interest groups have disputes, talk show hosts are suspended. When Iraqi special interest groups have disputes, Parliament’s cafeteria is bombed.

Fixing the interagency process may well be possible. However, to do so may run contrary to the very spirit of the American political process as expressed in the Federalist papers and other places, like the Constitution.

[Tom Odom]

Wm,

Your points are valid and part of the US culture. That is why the Army has no General Staff and why about three or four decades ago Congress made it known that the Army was not to adopt the beret like other militaries, because it looked "too professional."

But the position of National Security Advisor and the National Security Council was created to better inter-agency cooperation in the first place. Fixing it in my mind means making it work, not kicking the can down the road with "Czars" and late blooming realizations that a war that has cost so much in lives and money is indeed important.

I would further submit to you that we fought a much harder war, fielding millions of Soldiers, Airmen, Marines, and Sailors, created almost from scratch the most technologically advanced functional military forces of the day, and we won WWII in less time than has elaspsed since 9-11. All of that was done before we reorganized the national security structure, a redesign that added levels of bureacracy.

I guess I would say to you fundamentally that culturally and constitutionally mandated separation of powers is not a defense for sluggish, amateurish floundering.

Now I am stepping off my soap box...

Best

Tom

[Tom Odom]

The point of this thread was basically to discuss the administration's plan to have a War "Czar." My opinion is that until the interagency system is fixed, a War "Czar" is required (though I'd call it something else). I believe the longer we focus on Hadley and his colleagues in the Administration, the longer it will take for us to actually solve the real problem -- both short term and long term.

Brian,

Agree and understand. I too believe that the system must be reworked.

Keep trying to fix it! Or at least keep shooting the damn alligators until someone drains the swamp

best

Tom

[tequila]

Gotta say, this has been one of the better threads I've read anywhere.

In Democracy in America, De Tocqueville prognosticated that the United States would not survive for long because of the many small interests competing in the country. As it turns out, America has probably survived for as long as it has because of those many conflicting special interests. They have prevented the nation's being overwhelmed by a tyranny of the majority. Contrast our country’s relatively peaceful internal disagreements with the struggle in Iraq between Shia (empowered majority) and Sunni (largely disempowered minority). Attribution of the conflict to religious differences is, I believe, largely a misapprehension of the social dynamic--conflict is almost always about power.

Note that we cannot forget our own history here. A mere 25 years after de Tocqueville published, the U.S. fought a rather massive civil war that was, so far, much bloodier than what has gone on in Iraq (assuming you do not subscribe to the Lancet). The aftermath of this featured decades of racial terrorism against African-Americans throughout the South. I trust that the history of Native Americans does not have to be rehashed here as well - let us just note that Phil Sheridan would not have had many quibbles with Ali Hassan al-Majid in his methods in crushing uppity natives.

[wm]

Wm,

Your points are valid and part of the US culture. That is why the Army has no General Staff and why about three or four decades ago Congress made it known that the Army was not to adopt the beret like other militaries, because it looked "too professional."

But the position of National Security Advisor and the National Security Council was created to better inter-agency cooperation in the first place. Fixing it in my mind means making it work, not kicking the can down the road with "Czars" and late blooming realizations that a war that has cost so much in lives and money is indeed important.

I would further submit to you that we fought a much harder war, fielding millions of Soldiers, Airmen, Marines, and Sailors, created almost from scratch the most technologically advanced functional military forces of the day, and we won WWII in less time than has elaspsed since 9-11. All of that was done before we reorganized the national security structure, a redesign that added levels of bureacracy.

I guess I would say to you fundamentally that culturally and constitutionally mandated separation of powers is not a defense for sluggish, amateurish floundering.

Now I am stepping off my soap box...

Best

Tom

Tom,
I'm glad you brought up WWII as an example of how to make things work. I suggest that we were successful because the folks who did the coordinating were good at it and had the charisma to make it happen.
The NSC leadership role requires some like a George Marshall or a Dwight Eisenhower to make it work. When someone like Brent Scowcroft sat in that chair, the organization did the things it was supposed to do. I know little about the incumbent, but it seems like we do not the right guy running the show.
I agree that there is no excuse for floundering and half-stepping by the holder of position that was created to beat down the roadblocks. My point was that we might not get much else these days because our rising leadership generation does not have the background and experience to force compliance on a playground where all the kids think they get to make their own rules and no one has to play the same game.
Back in the early days of the Roman Empire, they ruled the known world with about 400 civil servants. By the time of Constantine (about 300 years) that number had swelled to over 40,000. iI about 100 more years, the city of Rome was sacked by the Goths.

[Rob Thornton]

Originally Posted by Tom Odom

I would further submit to you that we fought a much harder war, fielding millions of Soldiers, Airmen, Marines, and Sailors, created almost from scratch the most technologically advanced functional military forces of the day, and we won WWII in less time than has elaspsed since 9-11. All of that was done before we reorganized the national security structure, a redesign that added levels of bureacracy.

I agree with Tom - The nation was at war during WWII - the whole nation. Driven by a sense of purpose that allowed political leadership to focus national will and resources, and the system worked because of it. Given that most of the nation is currently at the mall, and more worried about why Sinjia has not been voted off then if we prevail in Iraq and Afganistan (or for that matter anywhere) I don't think it would matter if you make a czar or not. If people are unwilling to work together and find solutions they will wait you out, or expend vast ammounts of energy to circumvent the best of efforts. Thre are too many people who don't want to be uncomfortable.

Until our political leadership can harness the full will and resources available, the position of czar is an empty hat. No wonder its been declined by some very talented retired generals.

[Tom Odom]

Tom,
I'm glad you brought up WWII as an example of how to make things work. I suggest that we were successful because the folks who did the coordinating were good at it and had the charisma to make it happen.
The NSC leadership role requires some like a George Marshall or a Dwight Eisenhower to make it work. When someone like Brent Scowcroft sat in that chair, the organization did the things it was supposed to do. I know little about the incumbent, but it seems like we do not the right guy running the show.
I agree that there is no excuse for floundering and half-stepping by the holder of position that was created to beat down the roadblocks. My point was that we might not get much else these days because our rising leadership generation does not have the background and experience to force compliance on a playground where all the kids think they get to make their own rules and no one has to play the same game.
Back in the early days of the Roman Empire, they ruled the known world with about 400 civil servants. By the time of Constantine (about 300 years) that number had swelled to over 40,000. iI about 100 more years, the city of Rome was sacked by the Goths.

Maybe if the French Canadians sack DC, we can start over

Your point on leadership is EXTREMELY well taken (forgive the caps). Forgive the slight off topic shift but I think it applies here as well. I watched Wolfowitz apologize (and get boo'ed) for giving his Iraqi--correction Tunisian--girl friend a 60,000 dollar raise in the World Bank after he took over.

Mr. Wolfowitz apologized at a morning news conference and at the atrium meeting after the staff association disclosed that it had found a dated memorandum from Mr. Wolfowitz to a vice president for human resources at the bank, apparently instructing him to agree to the terms of a raise and reassignment for Ms. Riza.

The transfer and a subsequent raise eventually took her to a pay of $193,590 from $132,660, tax-free because of her status as a diplomat, and exceeding the salaries of cabinet members. “In hindsight, I wish I had trusted my original instincts and kept myself out of the negotiations,” Mr. Wolfowitz said.

“I made a mistake, for which I am sorry,” he added, pleading for “some understanding” of the “painful personal dilemma” he faced when he left the Pentagon to become bank president. Mr. Wolfowitz said he had been seeking to avoid a conflict of interest by having Ms. Riza, with whom he had a personal relationship, transferred from his supervision.

What drove the anger at the bank was not that Mr. Wolfowitz had denied earlier that he had sought Ms. Riza’s transfer, but that he had been less than fully candid in discussing it until documents surfaced showing his direct role. His earlier insistence that he had consulted with ethics officials was disputed by some of them, who say they were not involved in the salary aspect of discussions.

Mr. Wolfowitz, who is divorced, has been close to Ms. Riza for several years, according to people who have worked with them. She was a communications officer in the Middle East and North Africa bureau of the bank when Mr. Wolfowitz arrived in 2005, and was transferred that September to the Middle East and North Africa bureau to help set up a semi-independent foundation to promote democracy in that region.

Her initial supervisor at the State Department was Elizabeth Cheney, whose father, Vice President Dick Cheney, has been a longtime associate of Mr. Wolfowitz. Ms. Riza now serves as a consultant to the foundation, the Foundation for the Future, while drawing her World Bank salary, the State Department said.

I can't wait for my next mandatory ethics class....

Tom

[BScully]

Hi Tom,

I understand what you're saying and don't disagree. The point I was trying to make was that regardless of the mistakes Hadley, Rice, Bush, and all the others may have made, they were set up for failure by a system that is broken. Did Hadley make it worse? I don't know from personal experience and will take your word that he has. What I worry about and what drove me to post was the focus on Hadley as the problem. It's typical Washington and often masks the real nature of what needs to be fixed.

Until we fix the entire system, folks on the ground are going to needlessly suffer. And that is going to occur whether Hadley is the National Security Advisor or it is a future National Security Advisor. All of the interagency issues I've faced have been at a lower level than the NSC and most have been the result of Department vs. Department parochialism, limited resources, and/or lack of proper authority.

It could also be argued that the Administration has been trying to fix the problem, unsuccessfully, for several years (eg: NSPD-44 and other similar initiatives). Clinton tried to do the same thing under significantly less difficult circumstances and it failed.

I've made improving interagency coordination something of a personal mission despite my lowly stature in the world. I've attended numerous courses, conferences, symposium and done a lot of reading. The simple fact is, as you know all too well, this problem has been going on for a long time. And while it may be worse under Hadley, it's been bad under everyone.

The point of this thread was basically to discuss the administration's plan to have a War "Czar." My opinion is that until the interagency system is fixed, a War "Czar" is required (though I'd call it something else). I believe the longer we focus on Hadley and his colleagues in the Administration, the longer it will take for us to actually solve the real problem -- both short term and long term.

Maybe I simply read too much into the posts on here and am concerned for no reason...it has happened before. I just don't want folks to believe that once Hadley (and Bush) are gone things will be better.

Take care,
Brian

[Stan]

And my frustration grows Tom, as I read this and wonder aloud, "Why the hell aren't we worried about executing the strategy until it has successfully run it's course?" Screw being concerned about election timelines.

Someone, regardless of party, is going to get a nice squishy ball of wax to play hot potato with.

I nominate Odom for czar!!!

I second that recommendation, Tom

You should get a sneaky NCO for this