Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
I don't believe you understand the concept of 'clear, hold, build'.

(Take a look at FM 3-24, 5-50 to 5-80)
The manual actually illustrates what I'm saying quite well. Of course the manual refers to an operation "executed in a specific, high-priority area experiencing overt insurgent operations", but you could argue that the US sees Afghanistan as a whole in exactly that way, and the progression described in the manual is reflected in the overall US strategy.

The manual's section on the "clear" side is short and concise. The basic description is this:

Clear is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area (FM 3-90). The force does this by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of insurgent combatants.
That's a clear objective and it's an objective suited to achievement by armed force. It's a reasonable mission to assign to an army.

Move on the manual's description of "hold", and suddenly it all goes nebulous. Commanders are told that success depends on "effectively reestablishing a HN government presence at the local level" and "increasing popular support", while at the same time they must control the populace with actions like imposing curfews, limiting travel, setting up pass systems. They are told to "Establish a firm government presence and control over the area and populace" and to "Establish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent apparatus." They are recommended tasks as diverse as picking up traqsh, digging wells, building schools.

In short, they are told to exercise governance functions, all the while relying on a hypothetical "host nation government" that may be unable to undertake any of the functions assigned to it, if it exists at all.

Are those reasonable jobs to hand to an army?

Seems to me that the moment we assigned the army to perform governance duties, we opened the door to a COIN operation that we never needed to be in, and could have avoided by leaving without trying to govern a "nation" that is fundamentally ungovernable, at least in any way that would be remotely compatible with western political expectations.