Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
The Taliban did not try to suppress opium production until they were in full control, and appear to have only done so in 2001 as part of their drive to get UN recognition as Afghanistan's legitimate government. Prior to their ban on opium production, they derived enormous revenue from taxing and sale of the crop, and continued to do so after the ban as 2000 had been a bumper crop. Some observers assert that the ban was more to restrict supply and increase profits for opium shippers, avoiding a glut on the market. In 2001, prior to September, they had authorized Afghan farmers to plant opium again (as seen in the record crops after their fall).
This supports the argument that opium production is an important source of funding for the Taliban.

I draw your attention to this source: How Opium Profits the Taliban

I quote two short extracts from this 2009 paper:

NATO commanders and donor nations have tended to view Afghanistan’s opium trade as a law enforcement issue, often not considering its broader implications for trade, security, and development. The insurgency, meanwhile, is treated as a military matter. This division has stymied efforts to build a comprehensive strategy toward southern Afghanistan, where a more holistic approach could prove more successful.

...

… , this study will demonstrate that insurgent actors in many Afghan villages today behave more like mafiosi than mujahideen. More than 80 percent of those surveyed for this project believe Taliban commanders in the south now fight for profit rather than religion or ideology. And according to recent NATO military intelligence, as few as 5 percent of insurgent commanders now fight for ideological reasons.
This brings us back to 120mm's earlier post and highlights where the problem lies... being if both the generals (and their political masters) and the troops on the ground don't have a clue about what they are dealing with on the ground then quite frankly there is no hope.

So this then links into another thread here: Time to hold the US generals accountable for Afg. and Iraq. I believe that regular purges of the general staff is a good thing - short of (in Stalin style) shooting them out of hand as that is a little extreme - where they certainly lose all pensions and benefits and in deserving cases would face criminal charges.

The criminal negligence of how the US and Brit commanders have approached the opium matter in Afghanistan should be dealt with the military justice system where I'm sure charged framed broadly under 'dereliction of duty' could see a number put away for ten years or more. That would be justice seen to be done.

My comments some time ago that a number of seats on aircraft out of Afghanistan should be reserved for those (across the rank structure) who get (or should get relieved) and need to go were met with derision in some quarters but it certainly needs to be not just be considered but implemented without delay for in theatre commanders who haven't got the smarts to simply connect the dots (when it comes to the integration of the Afghan insurgency and opium production).

As for the methods? That's pretty simple. The Taliban had Pakistan on their side and had established a government that has a monopoly of force over the Afghan countryside.

So ... we should win the war first?
No... the Taliban probably said something like... "if we see poppies growing we will get the farmers to first destroy their crop then we will shoot them." Its all about the KISS principle... keep it simple and unambiguous and let the ANA enforce it. Life is cheap in Afghanistan.

Win first? Does this question indicate that you don't see how inextricably interwoven poppy production and the insurgency are?