From German experience during WWI and WWII: A few weeks (3-6) training are enough for units, which have received their "green" replacements, to let the units regain cohesion. This training could be done near the front.Originally Posted by Steve Blair
The key is to avoid a continuous influx of replacements.
Quite. And that's often what happened in the Pacific. It didn't happen to the same degree in Europe. Vietnam was a mixed bag, with much often left to individual divisions to determine. Some did it well, some were ok, and others were not very good.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Thats probably the ideal scenario in a conventional war environment.
The problem of the US was that the initial (production line) training was very basic and that of replacements was even less. This was a significant problem it itself.
You want to avoid the need for a continuous flow of replacements? Don't take the casualties. Not that easy in war. Easier if you have smart officers and tough and experienced NCOs and troops. Also not that easy.
Back to point...
...your man von Schell said back in 1933:
Big difference in approach to that of the US.The German troops were young and had only undergone a short period of training. They had entered the army in October, 1915 and therefore had but three months of training behind them. However, they were intermingled with men who had already had some war experience, and who at least knew those first impressions that war brings. These veterans regarded themseleves as instructors to their young comrades; they felt a certain responsibility for them. Because of this feeling the value of the old soldiers was markedly increased,while the inexperienced men developed rapidly under their instruction. Although only one-fourth of the men were experienced , their influence was sufficient to give the entire organization a veteran character. I watched the same influence at work later in the war and it always had the same result.
I think it was considered better to let units shrink due to losses and work with these smaller units as long as possible - a depleted unit which has strong coherence was better than a larger units which lacked it - then bring them back to authorized strength when you have the opportunity to incorporate the replacements, i.e. training time is available, more a "batch" approach in contrast to the "continuous flow".
IIRC the same approach was used by the British army in the Napoleonic era.
OK, I'm essentially in agreement on this... but lets make sure we agree on the semantics.
First, don't introduce new troops (FNGs) directly into battle. Rather attach a full platoon or company from an experienced unit the unit can be rotated for training and the assimilation of replacements in a structured manner.
If one waits for a unit to rotate out of the line before replacements are brought in then only a batch (or the required number of replacements) system can work.
In the COIN context of Rhodesia in the RLI we trained our own recruits throughout and fed them into the operational subunits as each course was completed. These replacements were for National Servicemen (conscripts) standing down, replacing regular soldiers whose contracts were up, and of course for casualties. This was a continuous trickle feed - in the sense that every two months we had ins and outs. Seldom would a troop (platoon) receive more than one or two on these occasions. These would be placed with the sergeant and the senior corporal but importantly 'buddied up' with an experienced troopie who was tasked to 'teach him the ropes'. They were also termed 'fresh-pussy' (or words to that effect) until they had been in a contact and done well and then another new guy or pair of new guys arrived - when they shed the 'fresh pussy' title and bought the troop a crate of beers (24) when like Brookes (in the article quoted above) they became full (and trusted) members of the group (like how I mentioned some time ago boys get membership of the club house built in a tree). It a troopie did something stupid later he would be 'fined' a crate of beers by the other troopies. There was never any shunning or ostracism of the 'fresh pussy' as it was in our interests to get them to the level of being able to be relied upon by their mates. As the troop commander for three years I saw this first hand many times.
To assimilate new replacements in ones and twos per platoon is pretty simple in this particular scenario. This is what I see as continuous flow - when it really is a couple of guys in and out of each platoon every few months.
IIRC a successful approach was to give easy missions to green troops first. A battalion would do the job of a platoon, a company would do the job of a platoon and finally platoons would be expected to do their job. Not sure about the first step, though.
Anyway, the idea was to create confidence and experience under most favourable conditions - an acclimatisation to battle.
Interesting. Do you have examples of which war and which armies?
I know Bill Slim used this with the XIV Army against the Japanese as a means to overcome the myth of Japanese military invincibility in Burma (in WW2). (Defeat into Victory page 189, paperback)
The Germans did it in WW2 on the Eastern Front if possible, but it wasn't possible most of the time.
The Eastern Front 1942-1944 on German side is a long and bloody story about the difference between insight and practical ability.
Kids learn in spite of poor teachers; good units can transcend poor support...
Was and is -- we have gotten no smarter...Sadly, our approach is driven by a personnel system that is designed and operated to serve itself and its operators. It does a very poor job of supporting the Army.Big difference in approach to that of the US.
It simply wants to produce Round Pegs, small Round Pegs, that will fit in any hole regardless of the size or shape that is an optimum fit for the hole in question. It is not solely the fault of the Personnel folks; the Army leadership and, more importantly, the Congress support, even demand, that approach. Sad...
It is noteworthy that two of the most successful Divisions in the US Army in World War II, the 3d Infantry and the 82d Airborne both ordinarily refused to accept any replacements other than Privates and Second Lieutenants, both ran excellent training programs all through the war and both were great at promoting from within -- the 82d often declined even 2LTs. There were other good Divisions -- the 88th comes to mind, pure wartime raise and fill with a large number of draftees but they generally excelled because they had exceptionally talented Commanders, not because the 'system' was designed to properly support them.
There was also the conscious decision taken to simply leave divisions in the line. The 82nd was by its nature pulled out of the line often, giving it time and space to train in addition to the policies you mention.
In contrast (in part due to the nature of the Pacific Theater), the Marine Corps preferred whenever possible to pull divisions out of action and give them a refit period. In most cases (with the exception of the botched refit of the 1st Marine Division before Peleliu) this policy seemed to work pretty well. Marine basic training at that time wasn't all that much better than the Army's; the difference was in the training that took place during those refit periods.
Vietnam is difficult to compare because there was a great deal of what I'd call unit-level autonomy, sometimes extending all the way down to battalion level. The 11th ACR by all accounts seems to have had a good system for dealing with new troops, while outfits like the Americal, some elements of the 4th ID, and some Marine units simply dumped new guys into units. You came in through two major processing centers and then were "chopped" wherever the clerks thought you were needed.
And FNG syndrome wasn't unique to Vietnam. It originated with burned-out divisions in the ETO and continued through to Korea. Vietnam's is simply more commonly known. There are even signs of something similar (Green Apples) going back to the Civil War.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
True on the 82d having more 'down' time.
Hoiwever, training during combat is important and several Divisions other than the 3d were good at it. Most of the Armored Divisions did it. The 1st Mar Div in Korea had an excellent combat training, and NCO training program once the line stabilized and they were rigorous in sending people to those programs.
As you note, in Viet Nam it was far more discretionary at unit level. The 1st Bde of the 101st as a Separate Brigade in 1965-67 had in-country training and an NCO course also. It can be done -- should be done -- and good units will do it in spite of the impediments or lack of an overarching system plan.
YES!
Train, train, train.
We rotated back for 10 days every six weeks and wanted to let the troopies have maximum time off so we worked the training in whilst on ops when a troop was in reserve or waiting to be called out (on Fire Force). Troopies being troopies (at 18/19) still needed a sgts size 9 on the ass to motivate them for the training from time to time
Sounds good.
How long were these formations in theatre in which war?
Back to vietnam... I would appreciate your comment an this article:
Vietnam War: The Individual Rotation Policy
The 82nd was first committed to Sicily in 1943 and then Normandy in 1944. Most US airborne units remained in strategic reserve until they were committed to major operations (Market-Garden being one). The 3rd ID started in North Africa in late 1942. Ken's talking about their WW2 service in both cases, I believe.
The original idea for rotations, if I recall correctly, started in Korea (except it was point-based). The Vietnam policy grew in part based on the original TDY nature of the conflict (advisors were considered on temporary duty and too many military cultures are creatures of habit). There were a number of rationalizations for the officer rotation policy, but I think at the end of the day it can really be attributed to the "need" for officers to have their combat command ticket punched. The draft played a role on the EM side, as the linked article points out, although I do think the article's "keep your head down for your year" mantra became much more common after 1968. And "90 day wonders" and "shake and bake" NCOs (not mentioned in that article) were also common in World War II.
But I think the basic answer was that no one in a policy position realized that the war could go on for 6+ years (I measure that in terms of major US ground unit commitments). They developed a system to deal with what was believed to be a short-term commitment and then couldn't adjust the system once it dawned on some of them that it might be harder than first thought.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Please elaborate on 'point-based'.
Wars fought fairly nearly right -- and others...
Both were in North Africa, Sicily / Italy and then northwest Europe in WW II. The 3d Infantry Division was there from Nov 42 until Feb 46, the 82d from May 43 until Jan 46.Thanks for the link. Interesting article, I had not seen it before. It is IMO quite accurate, if anything it understates the damage done by that policy though it does seem to have caught all of them. It was indeed the most flawed personnel policy ever -- and note, we're now rotating units instead of people, so we did learn a little in Viet Nam. Very little. Steve is essentially correct in that the 6 month Officer rotations were for ticket punching purposes though it was as the article saed justified by saying it gave more 'combat experience.' I could never figure how bei8ng the Exchange Officer in Da Nang was combat experience...Back to vietnam... I would appreciate your comment an this article:
Vietnam War: The Individual Rotation Policy
It is of course difficult to believe that the top echelon of general staff (who probably did WW2 and Korea) can prove to be so inept in either/or/both military policy decision making and/or dealing with politicians. Then of course once the freight train starts rolling not much can stop it so the insane rotation of 6-month of platoon commanders continues... as they say like the great Mississippi just keep rolling along.
OK, so were are we now?
SO we agree that deployments should be by unit... but for how long and what size units (by brigade or by battalion)?
Then do we agree that the formation/unit's stateside base provides the replacements?
Now we get to:
Army Unit Cohesion in Vietnam: A Bum Rap
Some interesting stuff there.
As to the last quote I do realise that casualty rates as mentioned are no longer the norm so that argument probably falls away."Prolonged tours during World War II had a devastating effect on
troop morale and the neuro-psychiatric health of infantrymen in particular.
Combat in North Africa and in Italy clearly indicated that psychiatric
breakdown in combat units was not a question of who but when, a con-
clusion later substantiated in France and Germany. Based on European
theater casualty rates, postwar researchers determined that 180 days of
combat represented the "burn-out point" for infantry and other front-line
troops. Of equal note was the discovery that after 180 days the neuro-
psychiatric casualty rate of the survivors exceeded that of untested
replacements."
and
"Since a soldier could easily reach burn-out within a year, it
was detrimental to unit efficiency to subject individual personnel to long
tours. Not surprisingly there were 927,307 cases of "battle fatigue" in
World War II, of whom 320,000 were discharged. This exceeded the number
of combat deaths (292,131) ..."
and importantly:
"In contrast to critics of individual rotation in Vietnam, World War II writers considered such tours to be the only solution to high levels of neuro-psychiatric casualties. They did not regard it as detrimental to unit cohesion because in their experience the infantry population of European theater units had been in constant flux anyway. Such units suffered casualties equal to their total personnel authorizations every 85 to 100 days in combat! This meant that the typical infantry unit was "destroyed" at least twice a year. Fifth Army casualty rates, which were average for the European theater, substantiate this estimate. Its infantry battalions possessed less than 18 percent of their original soldiers after 180 days, the majority of whom were cooks, clerks, and other support personnel. Thus there was no point to rotating units because the originals had long ceased to after even one year."
One size cannot fit all...
Combat wise, I'd say Bns -- but the personnel and training systems and organizations would have to be re-tooled to support that. Right now we're really structured and organized to do it by Division but have actually gone to a by-Brigade model, creating in effect a hybrid -- and not totally satisfactory -- situation.I don't think it must the unit's home station; a central replacement system works well enough.Then do we agree that the formation/unit's stateside base provides the replacements?It is that and brings to mind a thought. As a result of that WW II experience and the concomitant major combat induced personnel turnover and the psychiatric casualty effect we also had a one year individual tour effort in Korea. However, there were four significant differences. In my order of importance they were:Some interesting stuff there.
1. In Korea, most of the Officers above Lieutenant (and even many of them) and almost all NCOs above Sergeant had WW II experience and most also engaged in constant mentoring and training of subordinates. That included newly arriving units and most individual replacements through the end of the war. Not only was the experience factor lacking in Viet Nam, there was all too often a strange drop in mentoring and in unit training...
2 There was no six-month rotation of Officers to 'broadening assignments.'
3. There was no Infusion program. This program, so far as I know, was a Viet Nam era aberration that was designed to place 'experienced ' soldiers, NCOs and Officers in newly arriving units during the 1966-67 buildup of forces. It entailed taking some all rank persons in varying percentages from units in country and assigning them to newly arrived units to provide a leavening of experience and to insure the entire unit did not rotate at tour end as a body. At the same time, taking some newly arriving units and assigning them to units already in-country (assuring that the new guys would be labeled as FNG at best...). Unfortunately, there was IMO little coherence to who came and / or went where; no 'sister' or affiliated unit -- it was done on an individual basis and the swaps were NOT always rank / job for same rank / job. It was not a well designed plan and it was also poorly implemented in an unduly bureaucratic mode. As you can envision, it created major havoc in units. I believe that program did far more damage than the six month rotation of Officers. It also I think was the most significant reason for the lack of mentoring / in unit training. What it obviously did was destroy unit cohesion at a critical time and the knock on effects continued after the build up period. ...
4. The Korean 'experience' of rotation, replacement and combat performance essentially lasted from July 1950 through July 1953, thus there were effectively only three 'rotations' (though there were actually more due to far higher early casualties as compared to other, later wars). Further, by July 1951 an effective stalemate existed and the war of movement ceased to be replaced by the tedium but still dangerous though relatively stabilized trench warfare effort -- two very different wars in one, In any event, the short span insured the deleterious effects of time did not evince themselves as they did in Viet Nam. Whether the system would have continued to work reasonably well cannot be known. My guess is it would have been at least slightly superior to that of Viet Nam due to the first three reasons above.
So we did learn a little and have since wisely opted for unit rotations.
To return to your earlier query on tour length, I'd personally opt for indefinite and aim for 18-36 months, type and intensity of combat defined. However, I doubt most democratic legislatures would support that and I think a year is a marginally acceptable compromise -- with the caveat that it be done a whole lot smarter than we did it in Afghanistan and Iraq. Return to the same area of operations should have been the norm but it was deliberately avoided to prove the 'modular' concept would work -- and for other obscure reasons (like too much work for Planners who also rotated at year or so intervals and thus had no memory of what came before...)
I also believe that type of combat makes a major difference in how units are rotated and employed. In a COIN / FID effort, unit stability and continuity are important, casualties will be generally lower and leaving the unit in place and rotating people (in line with some of your suggestions) can be done -- if the legislatures do not interfere too badly. In higher intensity conflict OTOH, a major war of movement against a peer, that continuity is not necessary and the frequent rotation of units in and out of combat can lessen the psychiatric casualty problem; replacements can be received, training undertaken and rest obtained.Yes but casualty rates are very much a function of each individual war and the current "norm" can be quickly replaced by one that approaches Viet Nam -- or Korea, even WW II.As to the last quote I do realise that casualty rates as mentioned are no longer the norm so that argument probably falls away.
No easy answers...
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