Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
SO let me understand here. The whole battalion trains together prior to deployment, deploys (fresh) together, stays together and then leaves all together... after a year or so?
I think that's the best compromise -- and virtually all solutions to the issue have to be compromises...
What should we be concerned about? Apart from tropical diseases perhaps that 180 days of combat represented the "burn-out point" for infantry? What represents '180 days of combat'? Sitting in Khe Sanh for 180 days straight qualify? Being stationed at Cam Rahn?
Obviously that last shouldn't count and should be avoided if at all possible. Using the Khe Sanh model is probably militarily effective but also probably bureaucratically and mechanically not possible. That entails another compromise -- some units are just going to have it tougher than others and little can be done about it. The truly exceptional can be catered for, minor excursions will have to be tolerated and what constitutes "minor" will change from war to war,
This is probably the simplified system that would probably have to be used when numbers in the hundreds of thousands are being deployed. A bit like a quality 'lucky-dip' in that you don't know what you are getting, especially when it comes to officers and NCOs.
True, yet another compromise.
If they came through the same regimental system the troopies would probably share at least the same training point of departure, had the same instructors or at least knew them and were able to share similar horror stories about the wrath of the training sergeant major. In other words the new guys arrive at the same standard the older guys were at the same time, with the new guys lacking only in experience and can learn quickly if attached to an older troopies for mentoring.
All true and probably achievable. The better features of the Regimental system can be adopted without picking up some of its less desirable ideas. As an old RSM once said, that system is at one time the strength and the bane of the British Army.
This 'round figure' of a year being settled on despite evidence that it is not time in theatre that is the problem but rather combat exposure that has a deleterious effect on soldiers?
IIRC, there was some sense to it. Tours were variously 16 months, 13 months, and 10 months dependent upon various factors such as the type of unit, probably exposure to the stress of combat -- in a 10 month tour, less than 200 days of actual combat would generally be accrued (and I believe the WW II derived figure was 200 days, not 180). That proved to be both politically untenable (Mothers complained to Congress of unfairness if their son was in a unit that hit the 16 month window while a neighbor's was in a 10 month unit...) and too complex for administration when the casualty rates varied dependent upon operational efforts so a year was settled upon as a compromise -- one the politicians could live with...

One interesting note on Korean War casualties, the US / UN rate varied with the quality of the unit in direct opposition and that was true during the war of movement and the static phase. I believe that was also true in WW II but have not seen much about that factor.
Not surprising... how do inexperienced soldiers mentor others?
That is certainly true but there were other factors as well.
One understands that even with the best intentions mistakes can be made. The trick is to fix the mistakes and move on. What would have worked better?
Unit rotation. We've done that. Now to improve how we do that...
Ok so so maintaining unit integrity is the key. How would one be able to extend tour lengths without compromising unit cohesion?
I think that is very much particular war and operational methods driven; the largest impediment being casualty or other attrition rates.. In Viet Nam and Korea, casualties were the largest number of forced replacement (fewer psychiatric than in WW II), I've heard that currently, human factors (family illnesses or deaths, other personal issues) and physical problems not necessarily combat induced rival and occasionally exceed casualty numbers as a driver of replacements or personnel departures -- many are not replaced because the numbers aren't that high when taken by unit. It'll vary. The key, as you wrote is to adjust, adapt and move on -- bureaucracies are notoriously poor at that. Yet, they're like women; can't live with 'em, can't live without 'em...
And (as per my earlier question) how does one maintain unit cohesion and what replacement system does one use?
Not to be sarcastic but -- only with great difficulty and best according to METT-TC and the particular war.
Not sure about that Ken, what you have summarised in this post would go a long way to making the Afghanistan deployment more effective for starters.
Yes but implementing all that would / will not be easy due to those Politicians and that General Staff...