COIN comes home to assist policing

[tripleoption]

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

At the risk of sounding liberal, I agree with your comment. There appears to be a great emphasis on SWAT type take downs and the over use of stun guns, and much less emphasis on using psychology and engaging the public, or so it appears. A SWAT capability is worthwhile for those situations where it is required, but it shouldn't replace community policing.

Borrowing our COIN doctrine is in my view a potentially real bad idea for policing our neighborhoods, but that doesn't mean they can't borrow some of the TTPs.

Taking COIN and modifying for a civilian model makes sense if you think of the gang members as replacing the insurgents. There are many similarities, and both use the civilian population as active or passive participants in their terrorist activities.

In a neighborhood where a criminal posse was driving down city streets on mini-bikes with SKS rifles slung across their backs and nobody calls the cops, this makes sense. Some of these people had bullet holes in their doors and when asked if they reported it, they had not because "it happens all the time."

The important distinction is that the public are not the enemy, the gang members are. The public absolutely loves the police in this area now, where the relationship was previously adversarial at best.

The hammer is there, and it comes in the form of gathering intel and executing operations to clean out the gang members and put them away for good. When those times come, even when group of residents are faced with an elevator full of SWAT geared cops with rifles they respond with a thumbs up and a smile. After an op where troopers and officers flood the area and there are SWAT vehicles, a helicopter etc members of the public will approach the cops and thank them for what they had done.

That just did not happen previously in this area.

[Bill Moore]

Tripleoption,

I agree it is COIN like, and that street gangs (1st, 2d, and 3d generation gangs) present growing challenge that we can't simply "arrest our way out of; " however, since you brought up "underlying causes," in your view what are the underlying causes that lead to these gang problems, and how can the police or community at large address them? I realize it is often different in each case, but if you're familiar with a particular problem set I would like to see your views on it.

[davidbfpo]

Welcome aboard Tripleoption and I have slightly edited your quote below

Originally Posted by tripleoption

Under Community Policing, the cops were required to do the work and solve all the problems. Due to the financial crisis PD's are not equipped to flood the problem areas...With this methodology, the people are provided with the tools to help and they are expected to work with the police, not sit back and watch....This is necessary because the usual police response it to attempt to "arrest out of" the gang and other problems. This COIN based methodology attacks the root causes of the problems.

'Community Policing' is alas nowadays a slogan and can mean different things within a few miles, as we can find here - in England - between the inner-city and the suburbs, let alone rural areas. No doubt definitions vary too.

What is important about 'Community Policing' is that it is a partnership between the public / community in a clearly defined area and the police. In my experience and supported in the UK by polling data there is rarely agreement on priorities. Indeed one can argue the police service provided to the British public is what senior officers (known as ACPO) and national politicians alongside civil servants (in the Home Office) decide upon.

The best single advice on partnership working I found that to a British Army Colonel's presentation at an Oxford University conference, which he'd found written by a fire brigade and is attached.

[Bob's World]

It should not surprise anyone that many of the tactics developed for what we have been calling "COIN" operations overseas in the support of the COIN efforts of other nations apply domestically for us as well. After all, much of insurgency is simply an illegal political challenge to governance by a populace that feels it has few effective legal options to address their concerns.

Certainly this is true for revolutionary insurgency, where the objective is political in nature and rising from some (or multiple) populaces in a state to force changes the the government has proven unwilling to take on. That form of insurgency is largely a civil emergency, and the best COIN is largely a matter of the government demonstrating that it believes those populaces are important and listening to their reasonable concerns.

Resistance insurgency is another matter. Resistance is much more a continuation of war, where the government and the military have surrendered or been defeated and only the populace is still left in the fight against that foreign power. Separatist insurgencies tend to appear more of a blend, being like war at times, and like civil emergencies at other times.

Good COIN when faced with revolution is good governance. Good COIN when one wants to enforce the effects of their invasion and occupation is good warfare. Our problem is that we face blends of revolutionary, resistance and separatist insurgencies and apply a once size fits all approach.

Like many of those Colonial powers who wrote the books we derive so much of our doctrine and operational designs from, we cannot see ourselves in the same light as seen by the affected populace. The revolution in Afghanistan moved into full swing shortly after we codified the Northern Alliance under Karzai and their Constitution and dedicated ourselves to enforcing that US solution onto that country. The resistance is what we engage though, within the largely apolitical populace who simply want us to leave them to their own self-determined designs.

Senior leaders talk about how it is a "rural insurgency" rather than a "urban insurgency." True, and equally immaterial. Until we can appreciate what types of insurgency are war and what types are internal emergencies that can only be resolved through internal solutions, we will begin to make some headway. True headway, and not just the false headway that comes from the military suppression or monetary bribes of some people.

In many ways the entire "war on terrorism" is a very real resistance to the virtual occupation of the Middle East with the policies and governments we have created, supported and protected over the years to first wage a Cold War, and then sustained past the expiration date because those autocratic regimes liked the set up and so did we. Too bad no one asked the people. Wait, bin Laden did. So, now there are many nationalist revolutions in various stages bumping along, coupled with an overarching perception of resistance against what is perceived as excessive and inappropriate Western influence.

Step one is to better understand the problem. Like those before us we have a hard time seeing the downside of our actions as perceived by those they affect. We need to get better at that.

[tripleoption]

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Tripleoption,

I agree it is COIN like, and that street gangs (1st, 2d, and 3d generation gangs) present growing challenge that we can't simply "arrest our way out of; " however, since you brought up "underlying causes," in your view what are the underlying causes that lead to these gang problems, and how can the police or community at large address them? I realize it is often different in each case, but if you're familiar with a particular problem set I would like to see your views on it.

Bill,

The real problems in these neighborhoods aren't necessarily the big national gangs (Latin Kings, GD etc...). The problem are smaller local "posse" groups that are selling the heroin and crack to those inside the community as well as those traveling in from the suburbs.

The biggest root cause is passive support. See a drug dealer, a shooting etc...don't call the police. The gangs rely on this; they thrive on it.

If the public is empowered (by the legitimacy of the police effort) and is properly instructed on correctly reporting (street leaders education) then the gangs can't rely on the knowledge that nobody will "snitch" on them.

If the gangs can't sell outside with impunity (we're talking about an area that was literally an open air heroin market, heroin sales on Main St in broad daylight) then they are forced inside and we can pick them off there.

There are other factors and tactics, such as revoking their housing etc but it is much too complicated an issue to fully get into here. I will PM you a website. Check it out and then let me know what you think.

[tripleoption]

NY Times: With Green Beret Tactics, Combating Gang Warfare

[Bill Moore]

Thanks for the article, but without more information it is hard to determine if this approach is having a real impact, and while it co-opts the community, I don't see how it is addressing the underlying issues that facilitated the gang issue in the first place. I'm sure unemployment plays a role, but perhaps not as significant as some suggest. Gangs offer more than employment, they offer easy money in some cases a sense of belonging. How do you address the sense of belonging that often missing these youths' lives? How do you effectively change their moral beliefs so they choose to reject this way of life? If you can do that, then you addressed the underlying issues. Based on the article, it appears they effectively co-opted the community to fight the gangs (all good), but not really address the underlying issues. Thoughts?

[tripleoption]

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Thanks for the article, but without more information it is hard to determine if this approach is having a real impact, and while it co-opts the community, I don't see how it is addressing the underlying issues that facilitated the gang issue in the first place. I'm sure unemployment plays a role, but perhaps not as significant as some suggest. Gangs offer more than employment, they offer easy money in some cases a sense of belonging. How do you address the sense of belonging that often missing these youths' lives? How do you effectively change their moral beliefs so they choose to reject this way of life? If you can do that, then you addressed the underlying issues. Based on the article, it appears they effectively co-opted the community to fight the gangs (all good), but not really address the underlying issues. Thoughts?

Bill,

Bearing in mind that I was not an SF guy nor am I an expert in COIN, I think I can address some of your issues.

I'm not sure that what C3 is trying to address is "why do gangs exist?", it's a complicated issue and I am sure you are right to cite belonging and money as main components of the gang's allure.

What C3 (IMHO) is trying to address is why are the gangs here; a not so subtle distinction. C3 attempts to remove community support from the gangs, both passive and active. The gangs don't feel comfortable operating in the are so they either leave, get out of the business of selling drugs or they get locked up by MSP or SPD. They become low hanging fruit because the community hangs them out to dry. One of the main reasons that gangs thrive in these areas is a fear of the police and general apathy/hostility. Take that away and the gang banger that used to sell drugs on the sidewalk in broad daylight (without a care in the world) is now laying low and running scared.

There are many other components you haven't seen a lot about ( as I am sure you have guessed) involving community programs, jobs etc. These components foster a positive attitude towards the police and their community in general.

This methodology was utilized by ODA 944 in Iraq and Trooper Sarrouf (Capt Sarrouf) and Trooper Cutone (MSgt Cutone) are both assigned to the MSP Special Projects Team and have an incredible amount of input into how the mission is conducted.

I am quite sure that I am not doing C3 justice, but I am open to further discussion.

[slapout9]

Not real Green Beret Tactics IMO. Real Green Beret Tactics in this situation would be more like the book Killing Pablo which would be highly illegal in the US. Creating a Counter-Gang like Los Pepes would be real Green Beret stuff.

The whole article is more like a Police Public Realtions event IMO. Real Green Berets don't like publicity on real operations....messes up the whole thing.

[tripleoption]

Originally Posted by slapout9

Not real Green Beret Tactics IMO. Real Green Beret Tactics in this situation would be more like the book Killing Pablo which would be highly illegal in the US. Creating a Counter-Gang like Los Pepes would be real Green Beret stuff.

The whole article is more like a Police Public Realtions event IMO. Real Green Berets don't like publicity on real operations....messes up the whole thing.

And what do you know about "real Green Beret tactics"?

I think the two "real Green Beret" SF soldiers that created C3 and work on the SPT every day might disagree.

You know, the guys that have been doing it in the field for 20+ years? Or, I could just take the word of a guy on the internet that read a book once.

Unbelievable.

[slapout9]

Originally Posted by tripleoption

And what do you know about "real Green Beret tactics"?

I think the two "real Green Beret" SF soldiers that created C3 and work on the SPT every day might disagree.

You know, the guys that have been doing it in the field for 20+ years? Or, I could just take the word of a guy on the internet that read a book once.

Unbelievable.

Yes,you are pretty unbelievable and definitely confused. If you had done any checking of previous threads you would have found out we have had pretty extensive discussions on this subject with real Green Berets, real Army Officers(one was a former SWJ editor),and real Police Officers.

[tripleoption]

Originally Posted by slapout9

Yes,you are pretty unbelievable and definitely confused. If you had done any checking of previous threads you would have found out we have had pretty extensive discussions on this subject with real Green Berets, real Army Officers(one was a former SWJ editor),and real Police Officers.

Again, you have "had discussions" online. I work directly with 2 current SF soldiers that are also police officers (as am I).

Your opinions don't sync with what they know for a fact.

Who should I believe? A guy on the internet, or 2 guys with 20 years in the SF teams and 15+ years in Law Enforcement?

It's exceptionally arrogant for you to brand 2 guys who worked on an ODA in multiple wars incorrect because you have read a book and talk online with people on a forum.

[davidbfpo]

Moderator Adds

The last few posts reflect a difference of opinion, as we see on SWC daily and are within the RoE. Now back to the council!

[jmm99]

The website mentioned in post #65, perhaps - MSP C3 Policing, with its most pertinent points defining itself being:

Mission Statement (emphasis added):

The MSP Special Projects Team facilitates unity of effort and criminal intelligence gathering by, with, and through interagency, community, and private enterprise cooperation in order to detect, disrupt, degrade and dismantle criminal activity in North End of Springfield, Massachusetts.

The Origins of C3 Policing

The Avghani Model, Stanley T. Grip, Jr. (Army, May 2008) (ODA 944, 19th SFG) (pdf)

Using the Bob Jones "Flag Test", Avhgani was FID; this C3 Policing (presumably - since it's INCONUS) might be regarded as some form of "COIN" .

Principles of C3 Policing Model



C3 vs Community Policing



My take: LEOs <-> Community (interactive support via the "from the people; back to the people" loop - true rule of law).

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

tripleaction,
First I clearly stated in my first post that it is my opinion (IMO) if you believe me or not is up to you not me,if you think that is arrogant again that is up to you to decide not me but I will try and make myself a little clearer. I don't see the "difference" between what we at SWC have been calling COIN tactics and what you are calling Green Beret tactics?

My point of reference is this. In 1973 I went through what I call the one minute Green Beret Course. For a month I was involved in a war game where 2"A" teams fought each other,one with a guerrilla force and the other with a conventional force. It was called Operation "Cable Alley" and resulted in the death of one member of our Auxillary,which resulted in a lot of paperwork and a lot of documentation that your SF friends could research if you want some type of proof that I am not just some guy on the internet. (If you want names it needs to be taken offline).Those tactics that I learned would be highly successful against any type of Gang in the USA but they would also be highly illegal. So again no disrespect intended but I don't see how those tactics could legally be used against gangs inside the USA.

Also, I am retired LE, started in 77 and except for a short detour have been in it ever since. Again this is my opinion but LE cannot solve the gang problem,with or without COIN or Green Beret Tactics or anything else, they can suppress criminal activity but the problem is largely the result of the breakdown of the basic 2 parent Family unit in America. Single parent families do not provide enough supervision and moral guidance for young children and when they get a little older they are prime candidates for recruitment for Gangs. To make matters worse it is not politically correct to have that opinion so I don't see any changes in the future that would help rectify the situation. Again just my opinion.

[Bill Moore]

Slap is right, the tactics are not Green Beret tactics, they're tactics that actually go back many years and are used by both insurgents and counterinsurgents, but these tactics to various levels have been adapted by SF soldiers. The tactics themselves are not magical, sometimes they work, sometimes they don't. The key is to gain understanding/insights about the operational environment and then adapt your approach as needed. I suspect your perps will adapt to your strategy, so you need to stay cognizant of how they're adapting and adjust accordingly.

I'm glad to see the LEA and the military learning from one another. There is much to learn from each other if the strategies and tactics are adapted to fit the world each is operating in. I still have a police tactics book written on street survival by a seasoned Los Angles Police Officer in the 70s that I believe helped me get through some situations relatively unscaved. A lot of good lessons on mind set, situational awareness, weapons retention, etc. I was somewhat surprised when I couldn't find any good policing strategy books ( but I did find a few articles), so if the soldiers and marines coming back from the current fight can help the police organizations in the U.S. to start experimenting with strategies to address serious issues like the gang problem then that is goodness in my opinion.

After reading the article again, I caught the police Lt Col's comment about not being able to arrest our way out the gang problem, and then on the next page the article commented that more arrests were made because the program was successful. I got it, it isn't black and white, and while we say we can't kill our way out of an insurgency, that doesn't mean killing isn't required. Better relations with the community results in better intelligence from the community which results in more arrests, which in turns results in the criminals/gang members viewing that environment as hostile. In that case they adjust their tactics (perhaps becoming more threatening) or leave the area. If they apply harsher tactics to coerce support from the local population, and the population gives into the coercion then the strategy failed and an adjustment will have to be made.

Still begs the question about how to get to the left of the problem, or to prevent it from starting or resurging, and I think Slap hit that one dead on. It appears to be the result of the breakdown of the basic 2 parent Family unit in America. Agree that is probably over simplifying it, but a lot of kids seem to be looking for a place to belong and gangs fill that void.

[Bob's World]

All policing is, IMO, "some form of COIN." Mostly preventative COIN, but preventing conflicts is far better than fighting them. When prevention fails, however, one must be prepared to deal with increased illegality and violence with whatever group might be action out, without sliding into a mindset or family of approaches that is detrimental to that ongoing prevention mission across the larger populace.

In general we do a pretty good job of this at home in our policing efforts, it is when we go to foreign countries and call it "COIN" that we tend to overly militarize and "warify" the problem; and adopt approaches that produce tactical success, but at a tremendous cost in terms of the sovereignty and legitimacy of the very government we seek to assist.

As to this particular list, I see nothing wrong with it on its face, but would caution anyone who is merely handed the list without any additional training and instruction, that the difference between success and failure is in the fine nuance of how such things are approached, and fine nuance is hard when just going off a checklist (or some doctrinal manual, for that matter).

"Legitimacy" for example, is crucial, but this is a word that has two broad meanings, and too often we apply the wrong one. Below is my introductory comments for a class I gave on Legitimacy in Irregular warfare yesterday:

"The most important thing, is to understand what type of war one is in."- Clausewitz.

Conventional war is a contest for legal legitimacy. Irregular warfare, on the other hand, is a contest for political, or popular legitimacy.

The first is external, the second is internal.

The first can be created or destroyed by others, granted or denied, much like an honorary degree from some properly sanctioned body. And like such a degree, legal legitimacy may mean a great deal to strangers, but won't do much to impress ones friends and family at home.

The second is largely impervious to the whim or will of others. They cannot create it, nor can they destroy it. In fact, no government can create popular / political legitimacy. It is a writ from the people, and it must be earned.

Certainly police officers have legal legitimacy, but in this context what they must earn among the populace they seek to influence and understand is the political / popular brand that rests within the perceptions of the populace at hand. Tough, but cortical.

Similarly, as Mike and I have discussed several times, "rule of law" is too often treated as "I'm right and you are wrong, so do what I say and submit to my rule"; where what is really important is if the populace at hand perceives that it is treated with respect and is receiving justice under the rule of law as it is applied to them.

Good stuff. Now that we are learning to apply COIN at home, perhaps we'll learn how to apply it more in a home-like way when we go abroad...

[MikeF]

Originally Posted by tripleoption

Bill,

Bearing in mind that I was not an SF guy nor am I an expert in COIN, I think I can address some of your issues.

I'm not sure that what C3 is trying to address is "why do gangs exist?", it's a complicated issue and I am sure you are right to cite belonging and money as main components of the gang's allure.

What C3 (IMHO) is trying to address is why are the gangs here; a not so subtle distinction. C3 attempts to remove community support from the gangs, both passive and active. The gangs don't feel comfortable operating in the are so they either leave, get out of the business of selling drugs or they get locked up by MSP or SPD. They become low hanging fruit because the community hangs them out to dry. One of the main reasons that gangs thrive in these areas is a fear of the police and general apathy/hostility. Take that away and the gang banger that used to sell drugs on the sidewalk in broad daylight (without a care in the world) is now laying low and running scared.

There are many other components you haven't seen a lot about ( as I am sure you have guessed) involving community programs, jobs etc. These components foster a positive attitude towards the police and their community in general.

This methodology was utilized by ODA 944 in Iraq and Trooper Sarrouf (Capt Sarrouf) and Trooper Cutone (MSgt Cutone) are both assigned to the MSP Special Projects Team and have an incredible amount of input into how the mission is conducted.

I am quite sure that I am not doing C3 justice, but I am open to further discussion.

I don't think that passive support is the root cause of the problems of gangs and drugs in a community.

The gangs are present because a demand exist for illegal drugs.

Conducting raids and locking up the lower level drug dealers and users will not decrease the demand for the drug.

[Bob's World]

Certainly the illegal drug market creates a powerful demand signal that gangs have expanded to fill. Take away that demand signal and gangs will retract accordingly, but still exist.

Many factors surely contribute. Man is social. Look at all of the legal "gangs" like the Elks, VFW, Masons; or bowling and softball leagues, etc, etc, etc.

Mike is right though, that what we may be categorizing as a "gang problem" is really a much deeper problem that the gangs are just a symptom of. Fix the domestic policies that feed this response among young men through "indirect approaches" and one likely makes the challenge of dealing with the gangs that currently emerge from that pool of causation much more manageable. Legalization has to be on the table.

This same logic applies to the US's foreign policy challenge of Violent Extremist Organizations and transnational terrorism. At a tactical level these are "threats" but at a strategic level these are merely symptoms of deeper problems that are rooted in the perceptions of a wide range of foreign populaces. These organizations emerge from populaces that feel provoked by the Western foreign policies that they feel inappropriately shape their respective political and economic situations. One can run a counterterrorism program, much like one can run a counter-gang program, and what one is doing is mitigating the symptoms, while likely at the same time making the provocation of the root causes worse in the execution of said programs.

Less is more. Take a hard look at foreign policies and re-tune them to be less provocative in the world we live in today. We evolve slowly, but we need to come up with a new strategy, a new approach, and announce it to the world and make a major change of course to operationalize the same. We likely would give up little, and potentially could gain much.

I cannot help but look to the Great Britain's strong alliance across the Common Wealth that exists today because Britain wisely opted not to ride a desire for Empire all the way into the ground.

The system developed to contain the Soviets was appropriate enough in its day, but that day is long gone. New approaches must be far less ideologically defined, and much more respective of the sovereignty and rights to self determination of the assorted partner members. We can do this. At home in dealing with criminal gangs, and abroad in dealing with political gangs.

[MikeF]

I would suggest exploring the economic costs of raiding and imprisonment. Below is one cost-prison in the state of Massachusetts.


The Cost to Taxpayers

Overcrowding

• MA prisons are at over 140% of their capacity, with many operating at more than 200% of their intended capacity, and some over 300%.
  
• As of March 2011, there were 11,388 inmates in 18 facilities managed by the Department of Corrections. That number is projected to grow 26% — to almost 14,000 – by 2019.
  
• Parole rates in MA have dropped dramatically, from 58% in 2010 to 35% in 2011.

The Cost to Taxpayers

• It costs about $46,000 a year to house just one inmate in MA, 56% more than the national average.
  
• In 2010, MA spent $514.2 million on prisons, up from $408.6 million in 2001.
  
• Inmates are far more expensive than parolees and those on probation. In 2008, prisons cost an average of $79 per inmate per day, while it costs only $3 to $8 per individual per day to administer parole or probation services.
  
• Massachusetts spends nearly $100 million a year on prisoner health care, nearly double the cost from 2001.