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  1. #1
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    Why quitting Siachen will be disastrous

    Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi

    In 1984, having received hard intelligence that the Pakistani army was about to secure the area, the Indian army, in a preemptive move, occupied the Saltoro Ridge, which constitutes the watershed and runs parallel to the length of the Siachen Glacier on its western side. It has been called the Actual Ground Position Line since. The Pakistani army made many attempts to throw us back, but all such attacks were repulsed. Having failed militarily, Pakistan decided negotiations were a more pragmatic option....

    The important myths and realities are discussed below.

    First, the contention that Siachen and Saltoro have no strategic value is wrong. If Saltoro had not been occupied by our troops, Pakistan from the west and China from the east would have long since linked up, with the strategic Karakoram Pass under their complete control. The illegal ceding away of the Shaksgam Valley by Pakistan to China has completed the encirclement of this crucial area. It is only our occupation of Saltoro that has driven a wedge between the two. By controlling Saltoro, we have also retained the option of negotiating with China over Shaksgam valley at the appropriate time.

    Second, the Pakistani stance that since India is the aggressor, it should vacate the area, is a travesty of truth, as what our troops did in April 1984 was to occupyour own areas; no border or line was crossed as the entire area, not having been delineated, belongs to India.

    Third, it is stated that unnecessary casualties are being incurred on account of the treacherous terrain and climate. This is no longer the case with us, as the Indian army has learnt its lessons.

    Fourth, an additional reason stated is that Rs5 crore is being spent every day on our troops there. While the figure may be disputed, should sovereignty be measured in this manner?....

    We seem to have fallen for the Pakistani ploy of looking at Siachen as a separate issue, unrelated to the LoC, when de facto it is an extension of the LoC. Pakistan’s compulsion on the issue must not translate into a sellout by India, for it will be an unmitigated disaster if it happens.

    The most important point we have to keep in mind is that while it suits Pakistan to get our troops to vacate the commanding heights of the Saltoro Ridge, we would lose them permanently if we do so, as regaining them would be militarily extremely difficult. Despite this, if there is a compulsion to resolve the issue, then the first action must be to delineate the AGPL, before any shifting of troops takes place. Pakistan has so far refused to accept this, perhaps with an ulterior motive of occupying it at some future date!

    Pakistan has been proposing that both sides should withdraw to positions that existed prior to the occupation of the Saltoro Ridge, but this must not be accepted as our troops will take longer to return to their positions, should this become necessary, on account of the difficult terrain on our side. There is also a need to work out a detailed joint mechanism to ensure that the terms of the resolution are strictly adhered to.

    The writer is a former vice chief, Indian Army
    http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/col...strous_1679834

  2. #2
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    Pakistan's glacier disaster: fallout yet to be felt

    For the Pakistan Army, the high costs have to be borne and are worth it. The Army accords the highest priority to the civilian relatives of the soldiers posted in this area. As these people are essential to the morale in the armed forces, the Pakistan Army spares no effort to keep them happy.

    The 6 NLI (Northern Light Infantry) of the Pakistani Army has many Shias from the Gilgit-Baltistan region and it played a key role in the Kargil War. Yet, despite everything that the NLI did in Kargil, the Pakistani Army sought to deny the involvement of this unit in the war. In order to support the fiction that Kargil was the work of Kashmiri separatists, the Pakistan Army initially refused to accept the bodies of dead NLI soldiers from India.

    Quite naturally, there was great anger in the region and the Pakistan Army backpedalled. It converted the NLI into a regular infantry unit and awarded its war dead proper recognition by conferring posthumous gallantry awards and other honors. Because of this history, today, until the bodies of the buried NLI soldiers are found and returned with honour to the families, the animosity and latent hostility towards the Pakistan Army in the region will remain.

    Usually, after a natural disaster in Pakistan, international donors pour in aid money. These funds are deftly sucked up by corrupt Army men and politicians. Unfortunately for Ghyari, there are no international donors. The only funds -- when provided -- are likely to come from the emergency funds in the Pakistani treasury. This is as bad an option, as Pakistan constantly risks defaulting on its international debt obligations. Digging into the civilian budget to respect General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s vow of recovering every body will make the politicians very unhappy and could lead to internal fights. The financial costs aren’t quite as acceptable to the civilians.

    As the realisation that Pakistan spends a much higher fraction of its GDP on the Saltoro war than India slowly sinks into the public mind, a cascading blame-game will begin. At present, the Pakistan Army may come across as a more caring and sensitive entity than its civilian counterparts, but deeper questions about the exact nature of accountability in the country are likely to surface in the internal debate. Given the terrible state of the economy, it is only natural for the civilian leadership to ask whether or not to incur the costs of rebuilding the capacity lost at Ghyari -- and such a question will be the veritable red rag for the bruised Pakistan Army.

    A bruised Pakistan Army ego may seek to redeem itself by resorting to intimidation and putting the civilian politicians in their place with a coup or pull another utterly unnecessary Kargil-style stunt on the Saltoro range. Either way this plays out, given the state of the Pakistani economy, it is difficult to a see a future where the Ghyari disaster does not exacerbate civil-military tensions in Pakistan and adversely affect the peace process with India.

    New Delhi’s initiatives on Siachen should take Ghyari-related developments into account.

    http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=sl&nid=2700

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