There are parallel threads which have some items on this campaign:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15471 and: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15619
There are parallel threads which have some items on this campaign:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15471 and: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15619
Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-14-2013 at 01:16 PM. Reason: grammar
davidbfpo
A "lurker" has identified a hitherto unknown academic dissertation 'The Dhofar War and Its Significance' by a British Army Lt. Col. John McKeown, from 1981, the author was an engineer officer and was able to get officers serving in Oman to talk. The paper is available via, scroll down list to McKeown, it is 140 pgs long, so about 1 Mb and appears to be cited with permission (see copyright notice):http://55fst-ramc.org.uk/FRONT%20PAG...P_SOURCES.html
You will note an extensive list of sources on this small war, some of which are not cited in the thread.
The website itself has a primarily medical focus, as the site refers to a thirteen man 55 Field Surgical Team (FST) and on a quick glance has more to offer:http://55fst-ramc.org.uk/index.html
davidbfpo
From memory this is the same report as I originally linked to (in substance at least):
The Dhofar Campaign & How Its Lessons Can Be Applied To Afghanistan
RR
"War is an option of difficulties"
First up, an excellent SWJ article 'Six Requirements for Success in Modern Counterinsurgency', from the Abstract:Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...nterinsurgencyIn recent counterinsurgency operations, Western military forces have been slow to adapt, and slow to adopt lessons learned in comparable prior conflicts. By undertaking a detailed study of two such conflicts – the Algerian Revolution of 1954-1962, and the Dhofar Rebellion of 1970-1976 – six overarching lessons for success and failure in COIN operations were revealed. In the following essay, these lessons are detailed, informing recommendations for both policy-makers and warfighters engaged in future conflicts of these and other comparable types.
Which has a bibliography, but misses this 2011 book on the Mirbat battle: 'SAS Operation Storm: Nine Men Against Four Hundred in Britain's Secret War' by Roger Cole and Richard Belfield:http://www.amazon.com/SAS-Operation-...peration+Storm
davidbfpo
Somehow I missed this book, as have I expect others. It was published in 2007, so thanks for the pointer via Twitter to Dr. Simon Anglim, of Kings War Studies recommendation:Link:http://www.warcouncil.org/warbooks/2...r-simon-anglimOman's Insurgencies by JE Peterson
The closest thing to an official history of the Sultan's Armed Forces of Oman, this book shows how insurgencies can be beaten and how a country
teetering on the edge of civil war can not only be pulled back from the brink, but put on the path to success and prosperity. The secret is political leadership honest and courageoous enough to address the real issues feeding an armed revolt not the ones it wants to address, and military leadership capable of applying the minimum necessary force in pursuit of this agenda.
This review points out he was the Omani forces official historian:http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mej/sum...4.1.allen.html
It is available in the UK in print and on Kindle:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Omans-Insurg.../dp/0863564569
In the USA:http://www.amazon.com/Omans-Insurgen.../dp/0863564569
Neither Amazon has any reviews.
Contents list:http://jepeterson.net/sitebuildercon...f_Contents.pdf
davidbfpo
Now that would be an interesting 'staff ride':A reminder that most of this war was conducted on foot:In July and October 2014 I visited Oman in support of a battlefield tour of Dhofar, which gave me the opportunity to see the ground over which the SAF, 22 SAS and their local allies (the firqat forces militia), the Iranians and the PFLO fought.Link:http://defenceindepth.co/2015/02/04/...und-in-dhofar/The second was to appreciate how tough the terrain was for the combatants, particularly because prior to the arrival of the Iranians in December 1973 the SAF were always short of helicopters. Without an efficient road network the Sultan’s Omani and Baluchi troops – and the British officers who commanded them – often had to manoeuvre and fight on foot.
davidbfpo
Another update via Defence-in-Depth (Kings War Studies @ UK Staff College aothors) by Geraint Hughes:He concludes, with my emphasis:Thanks to the declassification of British government archives under the 30 Year Rule we now have greater knowledge of the covert operations conducted during this conflict, in the form of cross-border raids conducted into the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), otherwise known as South Yemen.Link:http://defenceindepth.co/2015/04/15/...yemen-1972-75/from the documentary evidence available British officials in Oman or London did not expect that the cross-border attacks would have any strategic effect against the insurgency in Dhofar itself. Operation Dhib was ultimately conducted as a limited action to satisfy Sultan Qaboos’ wish to punish South Yemen for backing the PFLO, and in this respect it was a covert operation intended to influence an ally, rather than an enemy.
davidbfpo
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