What we support and defend

[gute]

Well, I don't want to be too obtuse. My points are simple:

1. The constitution specifies very different duties to congress for raising and funding Armies vice sustaining a Navy. I don't see where that distinction is given much notice in modern debates.

2. Our Ends-Ways-Means of national strategy are IMO way off base in each of those categories and need to be reined back in to be less ideological, less controlling, less militarized.

3. Power has shifted over the years from the Congress to the Executive, most notably in terms of the modern Cold War and post Cold War conflicts that the existence of a large peacetime standing army has enabled.

4. Historically our peacetime Army has been very small and the US has never suffered due to that. Yes, "first fights" have often been difficult, but the US has never been seriously threatened by an armed foe. On the other hand, by having a large army on the shelf ready to go it has allowed the US to dive into all manner of wars of choice, from Vietnam to Iraq. The President can launch the force and then put huge pressure on the Congress to "support the troops" in combat to keep funding what the President started.

This disrupts our historic balance where a President was required to go to Congress and ask for the Congress to fund and raise an Army in order to go on such an adventure. This allows time for a national debate to occur, for emotions to stabilize, and for more appropriate COAs of full DIME to be developed and employed.

Yes, the US needs a small peacetime Regular force. This was a force that varied from 25,000 to 28,000 during the period from the Civil War to the Spanish American War. Of note, the Indian tribes fought on the frontier were a far greater threat, conducting far more egregious atrocities against American citizens and interests than anything AQ has been able to muster. The Cheyenne alone make AQ look like a bunch of Girl Scouts.

As I recall this number bumped up to closer to 90,000 during the next peace time era leading up to WWI. Britain with their vast Empire is better model for the US today, with around 225,000. France and Germany were well over 500,000, and Russia was something like 6 million (probably including reserves).

Bottom line is that regardless of what the final number is for the Army in peace, lets get the mission right, lets be in synch with Constitution, lets re-empower Congress and let's get serious about coming to a more appropriate overall strategy for the world as it exists today. We exaggerate VEOs and "rogue states" and are falling quickly into new era of Containment with China that completely ignores their own sphere of influence and clearly stated Red Lines.

We have 60 years of inertia pushing us on a crash course with reality, and the sooner we seek to regain control over that the better.

I agree 100% - well said.

Sven,

We will never know if its a myth. The United States supposedly subsidizing European powers is probably like many other 'myths' - over stated, but not untrue.

[Entropy]

Interesting thread so far. A few points:

Bob's World,

12: To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

13: To provide and maintain a Navy;

and

1. The constitution specifies very different duties to congress for raising and funding Armies vice sustaining a Navy. I don't see where that distinction is given much notice in modern debates.

This part of the Constitution is OBE today because of modern budgeting. Congress appropriates money annually (mostly), so the two-year limit is never reached. Even though the Congress hasn't passed a budget, it did pass a Defense Authorization Act on Dec. 31 2011.

The purpose behind the distinction is to give Congress firm control over the size of the Army - it doesn't disallow a standing Army and it doesn't disallow a large standing Army (however one defines "large). It simply means that in order to have a standing Army (of whatever size - size is irrelevant here), the Congress must come back at least every two years and appropriate money for it. I'm speculating here, but I suspect it isn't a coincidence that Congressional elections are also every two years.

Today we plan equal cuts to the Army and the Marines, but the fact is that the entirety of those cuts should fall upon the Army if we follow the constitution. In fact, the Navy could make a case that to cut the Marines while leaving Army forces on the books is arguably unconstitutional.

I think you're reading something into the Constitution that isn't there. The only restriction is that funds for an Army expire after two years and must be reauthorized. There's nothing specific to suggest the the Navy must be bigger or have more resources than the Army or anything else actually.

I think the reality is that the US population isn't as fearful of a standing Army as it once was and Congress is reflecting that reality.

Having a standing Army for the past several decades has, I believe, contributed significantly toward shifting the intended balance of power in our government from the Congress to the Executive.

and

3. Power has shifted over the years from the Congress to the Executive, most notably in terms of the modern Cold War and post Cold War conflicts that the existence of a large peacetime standing army has enabled.

Nonsense. The balance of power appeared to shift because the Congress often defers to the President and rarely brings out its "big guns" against the Executive. Secondly, the Army is a creation of Congress, lent to the Executive and can, therefore, be taken away by Congress. If I buy a car and and let my brother drive it would anyone suggest that the car "contributed significantly toward shifting the balance of power" between me and my brother? No, it's still my car and I could sell it or get another one.

One relatively recent example shows that Congressional authority hasn't gone anywhere. Specifically, Congress shut-down the President's plan (and campaign pledge) to close Gitmo and transfer the detainees to the US. IIRC, both the House and Senate passed amendments to the Defense Authorization Act specifically forbidding the spending of any money to close Gitmo or to transfer detainees to the US. Those amendments passed by substantial veto-proof majorities.

Finally, I think there's a big piece missing from your analysis and this discussion more generally - namely our alliances with other nations. We didn't need a large standing army in the early 19th century because we weren't obligated by treaty to come to the military aid of several dozen different nations. Today we are and for those treaties to have any credibility, the US must have the capability to meet their intent. Yes, the US could greatly reduce the size of the Army and Air Force, but that is putting the strategic cart before the horse. If that is something we choose to do then we need to reevaluate our strategic position and renegotiate our alliances.

To put it another way, we can talk about tearing out a few bedrooms and knocking down some walls to make our house smaller, more affordable and more efficient, but it's probably a good idea to coordinate that with our friends living in those bedrooms be plan on tearing down.

Not that I disagree with the idea (since I think we could, in theory, put the bulk of the Army and Air Force into the reserve as a true strategic reserve), but first things first.

Fuchs,

That's a popular myth among Americans.


Fact is that the U.S. military is so suboptimal for defence of U.S. allies an, so wasteful and so oversized that only a fraction of your military budget is really relevant to the security of U.S. allies.

and

Last but not least: The U.S. Army, three quarters of the U.S. Navy plus the last quarter of its amphibious warfare ships, two thirds of the U.S. Air Force, all U.S.Marines and even 90% of U.S. nukes could disappear today and the security situation of the European allies would not have changed substantially. It's all surplus.

Those are grand, sweeping claims which would, I think, require some pretty substantial evidence before they're taken seriously. I think the Balkans and Libya, to name two examples, would seriously challenge your assertions.

[Fuchs]

I think the Balkans and Libya, to name two examples, would seriously challenge your assertions.

Neither was a threat to us. Moreover, what Americans never seem to get is that their involvement in Bosnia was first and foremost about doing something together for the sake of doing something together.
It's similar with Libya; the European forces weren't even involved enough to move some fighters to forward airfields in Southern Sicily - no wonder that additional aerial refuelling etc was required.
No joint intervention was ever a real stretch for European capabilities. They hardly ever left our comfort zone ever since the French gave up Algeria.


On the other hand, Europe is being defended by two European nuclear power with SSBNs, faces no serious military in its South and a still weakened and rotten Russian/Belorussian military in its East. Even the quickest check of numbers reveals that we're dominating our periphery with a vast military superiority without taking into account a single U.S. soldier.

[wm]

On the other hand, Europe is being defended by two European nuclear power with SSBNs, faces no serious military in its South and a still weakened and rotten Russian/Belorussian military in its East. Even the quickest check of numbers reveals that we're dominating our periphery with a vast military superiority without taking into account a single U.S. soldier.

I suspect that the two nuclear powers mentioned are not defending Europe with their SSBN. Rather they are defending theior own countries, and the rest of Europe just happens to benefit from that fact. The rest of Euiope benefits from French and British nukes in a way similar to that by which the whole of Europe benefits from the US strategic nuclear triad. Whether the French or British would be willing to use their nukes to protect other European nations when either nation was not itself directly threatened is an open question. But, I think an example from history worth considering is the nature of the "defense" of Poland by the French and British from the 1939 German invasion.

By the way, numbers do not in themselves demonstrate dominant capability. Consider, for example, the Modoc Indian War in which the Modoc warriors held off a US force over 10 times its size for about a year. Marathon, Plataea, and the Greco-Persian Wars also come to mind.

[ganulv]

By the way, numbers do not in themselves demonstrate dominant capability. Consider, for example, the Modoc Indian War in which the Modoc warriors held off a US force over 10 times its size for about a year. Marathon, Plataea, and the Greco-Persian Wars also come to mind.

Terrain can be a multiplier, it is true. [1] [2]

[Bob's World]

Those Modocs were good Southern Oregon, Northern California men. The Army should have known better...


Oh, and just back from a needed workout, I have to toss Fuchs a point. I may have to agree with him in large part in regards to Europe. The Russian threat is nowhere near the Soviet threat of old. Europe may well have the military it needs for the threats those nations see to their interests based upon their geostrategic realities.

The frustration for the US is that we are on this Global Sphere of influence mission driven by a powerful ideological message that Europeans do not share, seeking to exercise control over outcomes that Europeans see as none of their interest-based business; and applying a brand of militarism that they are unwilling to endorse.

Perhaps Europe is playing this just right. I don't think that is as true in the Pacific. Old documents signed under extremely different conditions must be updated for the world we live in today. Japan, for example, is a great ally, but our agreement with them was made between a victor and a vanquished, while nearby China and Russia were our allies in the region. Times and the situation have changed significantly. Agreements must evolve as well.

[gute]

Terrain can be a multiplier, it is true. [1] [2]

I've been to the museum and walked Captain Jack's Stronghold when I was kid. Not so much with regards to Thermopylae.

[wm]

Terrain can be a multiplier, it is true. [1] [2]

Terrain is not the only item worth considering. Plataea and Marathon were won by better tactics and command. Nothwithstanding that, generally, a force using interior lines (like the Modocs in the lava beds, the Texicans in the Alamo, or any other force undergoing a seige) may be much smaller than its opponent and still be quite effective. And interior lines need not be on a small scale. The Germans had a similar advantage when they went on the defensive during the later parts of the European portions of both world wars. (As did they in Tunisia during the last of the WWII North African campaign.)

Interior lines can also provide an offensive advantage. Much as the Germans were able to shift forces back and forth between the Eastern and Western fronts during WWI to mount successive offensives, the US is naturally disposed to be able to use interior lines to shift between Atlantic-facing and Pacific-facing operations. This potential geographical advantage might be the basis for an argument for withdrawal from forward basing and downsizing, provided, of course, that US policy makers choose to eschew the Truman doctrine and return to something more like the Monroe Doctrine. But, as noted in Entropy's post, such a move would require revisiting/rewriting many currrent treaty obligations.

[Bob's World]

A futurist advised:

"Look back twice as far as you intend to look forward": So to prepare for the next 50 years we'd be wise to look back at the past 100; for the next 100 the past 200. Most don't look into the past any deeper than the middle of the Cold War. I went to a RAND presentation of their recommendations for the future force and they stopped in the paper at the end of WWII and advised we build a force IAW what Ike faced as President in the mid-50s, at something like 3.5 % GDP. When I observed that that was a Cold War force for the threat that no longer exists, and that the emerging world looks much more like the one that existed pre-WWI than the one that existed post WWII it turns out they had run those numbers, 1.5% GDP, but apparently didn't think the customers they were courting at DoD would like them.

Lesson: Being too short sighted or ignoring inconvenient truths are both dangerous.

"Kill your own products and flee into the future" This is the advice on how Apple stays in front of technology pirates and legal rivals. They are unafraid of killing successful products and making a leap to the next thing. We too have many "successful products" such as these alliances and treaties and aircraft carriers and large standing armies, and bombers, and GCCs and rangers that now look like JSOC-lite rather than like amped up infantry, etc.

Here is our query: What must we "kill" of these dated products that served well in their time in order to "flee into the future"?

This is a scary concept, that is why there is only one Apple. Apple also always remembers their roots as they make those bold leaps forward.

We do the worst of both. We forget our roots and cling to obsolete products and concepts built for a world that no longer exists. We are no Apple when it comes to our national security.
.

[Fuchs]

I suspect that the two nuclear powers mentioned are not defending Europe with their SSBN. Rather they are defending theior own countries, and the rest of Europe just happens to benefit from that fact. The rest of Euiope benefits from French and British nukes in a way similar to that by which the whole of Europe benefits from the US strategic nuclear triad. Whether the French or British would be willing to use their nukes to protect other European nations when either nation was not itself directly threatened is an open question. But, I think an example from history worth considering is the nature of the "defense" of Poland by the French and British from the 1939 German invasion.

By the way, numbers do not in themselves demonstrate dominant capability. Consider, for example, the Modoc Indian War in which the Modoc warriors held off a US force over 10 times its size for about a year. Marathon, Plataea, and the Greco-Persian Wars also come to mind.

Regarding numbers and geography; the no-threat across the Med is held off by the Med. Regarding quality of troops: This time the Germans are with the big alliance, not against it.

Regarding the nuclear umbrella: The French nuclear deterrence is a more credible defence for Europe than is the U.S. one. The U.S. is not involved in an ideologicals truggle concerning Europe any more; distances, culture and economic connections have become more important regarding shared interests than before. The U.S. would likely more easily sacrifice Romania than France would.
On top of that, the Lisbon Treaty has a much stronger choice of words regrding collective defence than the North Atlantic Treaty and the U.S. is a serial violator of the North Atlantic Tretay anyway, remembering it only when it suits its intents.

[davidbfpo]

Just realised this thread is in the 'Strategic Compression' venue, how fitting that Rob should choose this.

Plus the sub-title 'The compression of roles and effects. The Strategic Corporal meets the "turn left" National Security Advisor'.

[Bob's World]

Neither was a threat to us. Moreover, what Americans never seem to get is that their involvement in Bosnia was first and foremost about doing something together for the sake of doing something together.
It's similar with Libya; the European forces weren't even involved enough to move some fighters to forward airfields in Southern Sicily - no wonder that additional aerial refueling etc was required.
No joint intervention was ever a real stretch for European capabilities. They hardly ever left our comfort zone ever since the French gave up Algeria.


On the other hand, Europe is being defended by two European nuclear power with SSBNs, faces no serious military in its South and a still weakened and rotten Russian/Belorussian military in its East. Even the quickest check of numbers reveals that we're dominating our periphery with a vast military superiority without taking into account a single U.S. soldier.

Fuchs points are fare in their rationale, but I question the reality. I do not propose that the US pays for the militaries of foreign nations; but rather that many nations do not take on the full burden of fielding the military they need based upon their geostrategic realities as they rely upon the US to continue to make excessive guarantees of support in treaties designed for a Cold War threat, that as Fuchs points out no longer exists, and for the US to continue to pay for and field far more military capacity than our geostrategic reality demands as we seek to sustain a zenith of post Cold War power, that realistically was beginning to recede to more balanced levels from the very day it was first achieved.

By having excessive views of our own sphere of influence and fielding excessive capacity and strategies (A2/AD; more carriers, F35, etc) to enforce those excesses; we provoke our most powerful competitors by crossing their clear read-lines as we overly work to compress their regional spheres of influence as we seek to expand our own; and we equally enable our most powerful allies to under-invest in their own security.

The end result is an overly burdened US economy, powerful states pushed into war-like postures against what they perceive as US aggression; and allies il-prepared to fight their own fights, let alone assist us in ours. We are not playing this very smart and the entire thing needs a massive overhaul, but instead we simply massage the edges, leaving it largely unchanged.

We continue to race toward some future precipice, chasing our fears and pursued by our demons, we will arrive there all alone, in an unnecessry, fight beyond our capacity in some far corner far from home, with no chance to win. We will not be the first Empire to run up against such a reality, but that historic company will be cold comfort.

[Entropy]

Neither was a threat to us. Moreover, what Americans never seem to get is that their involvement in Bosnia was first and foremost about doing something together for the sake of doing something together.

Wasn't a threat to whom? Maybe not Germany, but it's hard to argue that a civil war in the Balkans wasn't a threat to Italy and bordering nations. Could Europe simply ignore what what's happening on their doorstep, or even in the foyer?

It's similar with Libya; the European forces weren't even involved enough to move some fighters to forward airfields in Southern Sicily - no wonder that additional aerial refuelling etc was required.

The reasons more fighters weren't deployed to southern Italy had to do with airbase capabilities. The bulk of tacair went to Aviano for a reason.

Regardless, European military leaders recognize there are significant gaps in European capabilities that make it very difficult for them to conduct operations like Libya and Bosnia/Kosovo. It's not just a question of "doing something together."

On the other hand, Europe is being defended by two European nuclear power with SSBNs, faces no serious military in its South and a still weakened and rotten Russian/Belorussian military in its East. Even the quickest check of numbers reveals that we're dominating our periphery with a vast military superiority without taking into account a single U.S. soldier.

I don't think there's any question that Europe is able to defend itself from invasions and such (and to deter the same). What's at question is Europe's capability to utilize military force in Europe's near-abroad to defend Europe's interests and there European capability is lacking.

[Fuchs]

Wasn't a threat to whom? Maybe not Germany, but it's hard to argue that a civil war in the Balkans wasn't a threat to Italy and bordering nations. Could Europe simply ignore what what's happening on their doorstep, or even in the foyer?

Slovenia had almost no civil war symptoms, we didn't intervene in Croatia - Bosnia and Kosovo can hardly be counted as neighbours.
The Greeks were not exactly favourable of the Kosovo intervention, so it was apparently not in their interest.

Yugoslavia could have burned down to the last man and the European NATO would not have been affected substantially. No-one from there was about to invade us, ever.

Well, save for the Kosovo-Albanian organised criminals who poured into our countries together with legitimate refugees. We only got them under control when we reduced the police pressure on domestic organised criminals who had better manners.

The reasons more fighters weren't deployed to southern Italy had to do with airbase capabilities. The bulk of tacair went to Aviano for a reason.

Utter complacency.
There were enough roads and enough civilian airports in Sicily. Close that ####, use it for the military. That's MUCH less stupid than to pay billions for additional mid-air refuelling aircraft "just in case".

Regardless, European military leaders recognize there are significant gaps in European capabilities that make it very difficult for them to conduct operations like Libya and Bosnia/Kosovo. It's not just a question of "doing something together."

Yes, European politicians want more toys to play with in stupid adventure games. That's not indicative of our security needs, of course!

What's at question is Europe's capability to utilize military force in Europe's near-abroad to defend Europe's interests and there European capability is lacking.

The total, utter 10000%, obvious, proven cost-inefficiency of such stupid political adventures means that this 'incapability' is EXACTLY as it should be. 'capability' is in this regard = stupidity.

[Bob's World]

Gotta agree with Fuchs on this.

The US is quick to label our concern of the day as "vital" and "universal" and then tell our NATO allies that it is their interest as well and that they must come join us on some grand adventure. That is a song that grew old long ago, and at this point I suspect many are simply starting to tune out altogether.

We declare things as threats and interests that do not even pass the common sense review looking thorugh US lenses; let alone those of our allies. We are making ourselves irrelevant in many regards by this tendency.

[davidbfpo]

Entropy posted:

What's at question is Europe's capability to utilize military force in Europe's near-abroad to defend Europe's interests and there European capability is lacking.

As if to order Bob advises all:

So to prepare for the next 50 years we'd be wise to look back at the past 100; for the next 100 the past 200.

A bit of history first. In 1956 the USA opposed (rightly) the last big external operation by two European nations, the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt, usually called the Suez crisis. If you exclude Bosnia & Kosovo then Europe, which is wider than NATO & the EU, has not mounted any defence of Europe's interests. The only special case that comes to mind is Cyprus, when individual nations under UN auspices contributed and today very few Europeans want to be there - Cyprus going way beyond it's best by date, as boredom set in.

Incidentally I don't think European leaders (within NATO & EU) should be forgiven for their crazy policies over Bosnia and it was a trilateral-only mission that broke the Bosnian Serbs at Sarajevo. The Dutch, French and British with heavy artillery & mortars being placed on Mount Igman.

Given the generally agreed poor state of a European capability to intervene, the best illustration of this comes with maritime border control; yes, often not a military responsibility. It is common knowledge that the Mediterranean is a major route for illegal migration, well illustrated during the Tunisian and then Libyan crises on the Italian island of Pantelleria. Fast forward to Greece and the ten of thousands of known illegals and refugees stuck in limbo there.

Border control is a European issue - using a broader definition of security.

To Bob's point to look back. Europe is no longer the fulcrum of international politics, as a continent it is "drawing in" and shrinking in many measures of power - with military coercion to the fore. It does have many non-coercive instruments of influence and power, but these remain largely used at a national level.

In some respect Europe and I exclude Russia in this - is in a very similar position to the years before 1914. Other powers were advancing, note Russia was the fastest developing economy pre-1914 and these powers were often in competition with the largest European nations: France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain. With the exception of a handful of countries, yes, the Imperial ones with far-flung and nearby colonies, Europe looked inwards and outwards in very similar proportions. Emigration was then a huge factor and remained so until 1939, for e.g. Italians going to Argentina.

[Entropy]

Yugoslavia could have burned down to the last man and the European NATO would not have been affected substantially.

and

The total, utter 10000%, obvious, proven cost-inefficiency of such stupid political adventures means that this 'incapability' is EXACTLY as it should be. 'capability' is in this regard = stupidity.

Ok, is your opinion shared by most Europeans? Doesn't appear that way to me. If you go back and look at polling at the time, the European consensus doesn't even approach letting Yugoslavia "burn to the last man." Europe was more divided on Libya, which showed in the various restrictions put on member forces, but it seems to me that most of the European public doesn't share your view. So it seems likely, to me at least, that Europe will probably want to engage in what you'd consider to be stupid adventures.

Utter complacency.
There were enough roads and enough civilian airports in Sicily. Close that ####, use it for the military. That's MUCH less stupid than to pay billions for additional mid-air refuelling aircraft "just in case".

Let's assume for a minute it's at all practical to close southern Italy to allow for the military transport of fuel, munitions, maintenance equipment etc. to save a few hundred miles of flight time. I think your assertion that this would somehow be cheaper than IFR is questionable at best, as is the assumption that IFR wouldn't be necessary if all coalition aircraft could be based in, for instance, Sicily.

Regardless, the problem wasn't simply refueling. More than that was ISR and stocks of adequate munitions. There was also the European inability to stand up a fully-staffed and capable air operations center in a timely manner, among other things.

But my point here isn't to take sides in a debate over whether and when Europe should intervene and under what circumstances. That is for Europeans to decide. I'm simply pointing out a discrepancy between what appear to be European desires to militarily influence their near-abroad and actual European military capabilities.

Bob's World,

The US is quick to label our concern of the day as "vital" and "universal" and then tell our NATO allies that it is their interest as well and that they must come join us on some grand adventure. That is a song that grew old long ago, and at this point I suspect many are simply starting to tune out altogether.

I agree, but in Libya it was the other way around.

I also personally agree with a lot of what you've said in this thread regarding where we should be headed. The problem is those proposals don't appear likely to occur anytime soon, if ever. As I get older, I increasingly find it futile to spend time debating what are probably fantasies rather than deal with difficult and unpleasant realities and probable futures. Perhaps that's unhealthy cynicism, but my tolerance for wishful thinking is pretty low.


David,

Good historical perspective, thanks.

[Bob's World]

Go to the link to see this chart of active military size (total and by service) since 1940

http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0004598.html

I'll paste the data as well, but it is easier to read in the chart at the link.

We had to carry a large military on the peacetime books to implement a Containment Strategy. If we had chosen a different strategy we would not have needed this large of a military over the years. But because we had it for so long we have grown used to having it, and have created an entirely new military culture in the US as a result. Within DoD, and within our government and society as a whole in regards to the use of military force to enact our foreign policies.

"Global Leadership" that requires the world's most powerful military to promote and enforce is not a very sophisticated brand of "leadership." Arguably the right numbers for the Army and the Air Force today are at about 250K each in the active force. Yes, that would mean many things would have to change. But that is the point. Many things need to change. Crack addicts don't get better with a big bag of crack in their pocket.

But we'll need a new strategy to go with this new military. Containment must go. Even the new "containment-lite" we are applying to China. Rebublicans and Democrats a like need to get behind such a sea change. Don't wave your pocket copy of the Consttitution at me Congressman, READ IT instead. Then do your duty. Bring home the troops, kill the unnecesary programs and resize the force. But do it will making equal cuts to the "entitlements" audiances, bloated bureaucracies, and failed domestic policies such as "the war on drugs" and "no child left behind."



Active Duty Military Personnel, 1940–20111




Year

Army

Air Force

Navy

Marine Corps

Total



1940

269,023



160,997

28,345

458,365



1945

8,266,373



3,319,586

469,925

12,055,884



1950

593,167

411,277

380,739

74,279

1,459,462



1955

1,109,296

959,946

660,695

205,170

2,935,107



1960

873,078

814,752

616,987

170,621

2,475,438



1965

969,066

824,662

669,985

190,213

2,653,926



1970

1,322,548

791,349

691,126

259,737

3,064,760



1975

784,333

612,751

535,085

195,951

2,128,120



1980

777,036

557,969

527,153

188,469

2,050,627



1985

780,787

601,515

570,705

198,025

2,151,032



1990

732,403

535,233

579,417

196,652

2,043,705



1991

710,821

510,432

570,262

194,040

1,985,555



1992

610,450

470,315

541,886

184,529

1,807,177



1993

572,423

444,351

509,950

178,379

1,705,103



1994

541,343

426,327

468,662

174,158

1,610,490



1995

508,559

400,409

434,617

174,639

1,518,224



1996

491,103

389,001

416,735

174,883

1,471,722



1997

491,707

377,385

395,564

173,906

1,438,562



1998

483,880

367,470

382,338

173,142

1,406,830



1999

479,426

360,590

373,046

172,641

1,385,703



2000

482,170

355,654

373,193

173,321

1,384,338



2001

480,801

353,571

377,810

172,934

1,385,116



2002

486,542

368,251

385,051

173,733

1,413,577



2003

490,174

376,402

379,742

177,030

1,423,348



2004

494,112

369,523

370,445

177,207

1,411,287



2005

488,944

351,666

358,700

178,704

1,378,014



2006 (June)

496,362

352,620

353,496

178,923

1,381,401



2007 (Aug.)

519,471

337,312

338,671

184,574

1,380,082



2011 (Sept.)

565,463

333,370

325,123

201,157

1,468,364


NOTE: Figures for 1998 through August 2007 include cadets/midshipmen.

1. Military personnel on extended or continuous active duty. Excludes reserves on active duty for training.

Source: Department of Defense.


Read more: Active Duty Military Personnel, 1940–2011 — Infoplease.com http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A00045...#ixzz1xTaHiQ9r

[Fuchs]

Ok, is your opinion shared by most Europeans? Doesn't appear that way to me. If you go back and look at polling at the time, the European consensus doesn't even approach letting Yugoslavia "burn to the last man."

There were polls about pop music, best beer and many other things. Opinions voiced in polls do not necessarily prove that something is a necessary act of defence.

As harsh as it may sound; getting involved in Yugoslavia was for entertainment, not a necessity. Maybe we needed involvement (for entertainment), but we didn't need it for security.