Infantry Unit Tactics, Tasks, Weapons, and Organization

[PsJÄÄK Korte]

Maybe it is similar to the ‘territorial battalion’ of the CF?

These new units are similar in way that they have certain area which they have do defend in war, but they have no peace time functions. They are basicly restructuring of old territorial brigades for something more suitable for modern times.
We have
These as our reserve units with peace time duties of assistance of civil authorities.

[PsJÄÄK Korte]

Greetings.
I was making armed forces for my nation in game "Nation States" and had a though.
Even though grenade launchers are usually used team/squad/platoon(?) level, I thought would it make sense to use them to create "grenadier" platoons for battalion HQ-company or weapons company?
For example something like this:
grendier platoon:
platoon HQ (PL, 2iC, RTO, medic)
3xgrenadier squad with
squad leader
-2xgrenadier section(team leader, 2xgunner (rifle with M203, Milkor MGL etc), 2xassistant gunner/ammunition bearer)
Is this completely stupid idea or invented already.
Thanks in advance.
Korte

[Fuchs]

There's a tendency to distribute man-portable weapons into the small manoeuvre units and to keep the crew-served weapons pooled at a higher level (with tripod machine guns being the water shed that moved into platoons after WW1).

A battalion fire support unit would thus use mortars or crew-served anti-tank weapons rather than a 7 kg MGL.

An exception are snipers which should be in a Bn Sniper Plt, but their employment is very distinct from the normal infantry employment (thus sharpshooters within the infantry).

[PsJÄÄK Korte]

A battalion fire support unit would thus use mortars or crew-served anti-tank weapons rather than a 7 kg MGL.
.

I forgot to add that it would be (possibly) in addition to mortars, crew-served anti-tank weapons and what have you at battalion level.
I am not also sure who in infantry squad would be equipped with it... ...unless I change assistant automatic rifleman to grenadier.
(Squad I came up was sort of horrible chimera of US army infantry squad, finnish infantry squad and german jaeger squad(?) and my additions. At the moment it is squad leader, designated marksman and two fireteams with team leader, automatic rifleman, assistant automatic rifleman and two anti-tank gunners with either M72 or AT-4CS)

[Firn]

I forgot to add that it would be (possibly) in addition to mortars, crew-served anti-tank weapons and what have you at battalion level.
I am not also sure who in infantry squad would be equipped with it... ...unless I change assistant automatic rifleman to grenadier.
(Squad I came up was sort of horrible chimera of US army infantry squad, finnish infantry squad and german jaeger squad(?) and my additions. At the moment it is squad leader, designated marksman and two fireteams with team leader, automatic rifleman, assistant automatic rifleman and two anti-tank gunners with either M72 or AT-4CS)

As Fuchs said, having a grenadier platoon at the battalion would a bit of an oddity. The key question is the overall utility compared for example to (additional) pioneers or personal/assets for the heavy weapon company/platoon, especially for the mortars.

METT-TC is of course once again key, for example in a high-intensity conflict against an enemy using combined arms additional light/heavy AT capability could be far more important. In very difficult terrain, the number of hands per heavy MG or mortar will have to be increased to support them and heavy casualities in the rifle platoons could make it necessary to fill them up again.

To fully exploit an MGL you might need an assistant gunner which carries additional rounds, as the gunner will have already to carry at least the heavy MGL, possibly in addition to a carabine.

While I have no idea how a weapon like the M25 is performing in combat, but it might be, METT-TC permitting, worthwile to incorporate it into the heavy weapon squad of the platoon. Having supposedly good range and a neat thermal sight it might offer good target detection, fire support and target designation, marking accurately targets for the MGs, mortars and heavier assets. This third role doesn't even require complicate time-fuzing.

[JMA]

METT-TC is of course once again key, for example...

Yes this is true. I wonder though if there have been any significant changes in what is carried at section/squad, platoon and company levels (and how they are employed) due to METT-TC in either Iraq or Afghanistan.

[JMA]

Responding to a post from FUCHS containing: "Infantry should be highly agile, a 2 km cross-country run with equipment should be possible at almost any time "

I dare to say that right now there is no NATO infantry unit able to do it as a team in equipment they are required to carry on when outside the wire. It´s beating the same dead horse as we do for some years already.

There are assumptions a commander makes when deploying troops and one is the ability to get to where they are required to be with all their fighting kit over various types of terrain and distances.

I wonder if the now weight restricted movement of dismounted infantry is being factored in at Command & Staff Colleges and during other officer training? It seems it is impossible to expect the Michelin Man to conduct even a 10km approach march overnight and be ready to fight from first light.

This would lead to changes in the definition of "full kit" as required for the 2km fitness test FUCHS mentioned.

Would it be naive to assume that as wearing body-armour is now seemingly a non negotiable that it is now worn throughout basic training for recruits and during all field training (including range work) for trained soldiers?

[Fuchs]

Wearing flak vests during all outdoor training was common in Germany in the 90's, but full body armour incl plates? There are training plates that don't break, but it still makes no sense to burden recruits with 'em. Recruits need to build muscle and bone strength first.


I personally don't think that hard plate level IV body armour should be non-negotiable at all. It's a passive protection response to the specific threat spectrum of small wars and occupations.
Inter-state wars include a much much higher fragmentation threat and OPFOR does punish immobile opponents much more as well.
Both points towards a need for a full body fragmentation protection suit.

Likewise, the optimal APC for a large conventional war would probably not exceed the protection levels known from Cold war APCs (when APCs weren't optimised against a specific single threat).

[BushrangerCZ]

Responding to a post from FUCHS containing: "Infantry should be highly agile, a 2 km cross-country run with equipment should be possible at almost any time "



There are assumptions a commander makes when deploying troops and one is the ability to get to where they are required to be with all their fighting kit over various types of terrain and distances.

I wonder if the now weight restricted movement of dismounted infantry is being factored in at Command & Staff Colleges and during other officer training? It seems it is impossible to expect the Michelin Man to conduct even a 10km approach march overnight and be ready to fight from first light.

This would lead to changes in the definition of "full kit" as required for the 2km fitness test FUCHS mentioned.

Would it be naive to assume that as wearing body-armour is now seemingly a non negotiable that it is now worn throughout basic training for recruits and during all field training (including range work) for trained soldiers?

As far as I experienced, body armour is not worn during basic training (not enough plates and carriers), but it is commonly worn during training in regiments.

[Fuchs]

I attempted to draw a kind of genealogy of infantry tactics. It's least impossible for defensive tactics thanks to the relatively greater degree of order.

Too bad my output was utterly Germany-centric. Do you guy have anything to add?


Leading infantry defence concepts

late 19th century till 1914:
single shoulder-to-shoulder line in simple trench

1915:
interlocking machine gun fire with elaborate trenches, rifle fire is secondary

1916-1918:
forward trenches weak, if possible two better-manned rear trenches in up to several kilometres depth (out of range of most hostile field artillery)

1920's:
elastic defence with weak VRV (FLOT), strong HKL (main line of resistance) at up to 10 km depth, some concerns about use of terrain and mines for AT purposes

1939/1940:
Finnish motti tactics and first huge use of ski troops

1941:
hedgehog defence (company strongpoints) on overstretched front-line (due to inability to man it in depth), if possible one continuous patrol trench at VRV (FLOT), dependence on indirect fire support for domination of gaps between strongpoints

early 1950's (1st German Heer structure):
network of platoon strongpoints and squad or fire team resistance nests in between

early 1960's (2nd or 3rd German Heer structure):
network of platoon strongpoints

1960's: U.S. heliborne infantry
extreme mobility in permissive AD environment, but nothing special once on the ground

around 1970: U.S. LRRP
infantry as mobile forward observers / scouts in an environment with huge "blue" excess firepower (offence and defence difficult to separate)

1968 till 1989 Austrian "Raumverteidigung" by infantry militia
defence of key locations to slow down passage of invaders
(Swiss were similar, only that they considered much of their country as key location and emphasised fortifications more)

1970's German (later also Austrian) Jagdkampf
(similar terminology to offensive WW2 counter guerilla patrols, but different concepts) with reinforced platoon-sized Jagdkommandos as forward or even infiltrated skirmishers

~1980: theory: guerilla-like Jäger (Franz Uhle-Wettler's concept)
elusive infantry does not hold terrain, but persist as threat in a designated area of operations. High degree of autonomy, extreme tooth:tail ratio in favour of teeth

~1980's theory: Simpkin's network of Uhle-Wettler's concept
expansion in depth of the concept in order to make entire regions threatened (Uhle-Wettler was more concerned about how easily difficult terrain can be exploited for flanking movements if not guarded, see Ardennes 1940)

sometime 1990's: distributed operations
(this concept of dispersed infantry small units morphed over time into a mere buzzword)

[kaur]

Fuchs, one comment. Iif you mention Finns with skis, then you should mention also first wide scale use of bicycle troops. Germans? Most famous Finns were long range recce troops. Today their mission is called deep operations. During WWII British SAS had same mission, but they used jeeps instead of skis You just have to make compromise between your signature on terrain and mode of transport. Today you should also mention wide use of ATV's where climate favours this. In winter conditions you use snowmobile. Like Finns do.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature...&v=51d3s9FevyY

[Fuchs]

More important in winter than means of transport is logistics. You better always have a heated hut and better not operate far away from such necessities.


Military bicycles appeared in army exercises in the late 19th century, especially folding bikes are quite well-documented (as if carrying a 25+ kg bike on the back was somehow an advantage). It's difficult to pin down the first wide-spread use to me, and it surely wasn't a primarily defensive tactic in German use.
Germans used bicycle troops mostly as cheap cavalry and motorcycle infantry substitute, for example in the battalion plus-sized reconnaissance detachments.

[ganulv]

I’ll beat Ken to the METT-TC punch here. Any Inuit hunter knows the trade-off between snowmobiles and dog teams. Snowmobiles are always better, except when they break down or run out of gas. Then sleeping with them won’t keep you warm and they the parts can’t be used as emergency rations.

My guess is that those Finns don’t go out with on those snowmobiles without skis as part of their survival gear to this day. Also to give them an option of moving without being heard from miles away (snowmobiles are one of the most goddamn noisy things per unit of weight in the world).

More important in winter than means of transport is logistics. You better always have a heated hut and better not operate far away from such necessities.

You can do without in a pinch. Speaking from experience, a snowcave might not keep you warm but it will keep you alive.

[Fuchs]

Speaking from experience, a snowcave might not keep you warm but it will keep you alive.

That's not good enough if you face a tenfold numerical superiority of Russians.

[ganulv]

That's not good enough if you face a tenfold numerical superiority of Russians.

You can only hunker down so many nights in a row, sure, but someone who knows what they are doing and who went out with the right kit and provisions should be just fine for two or three nights. I don’t know a ton about the Winter or Continuation wars (I’ve tried on and off to find stuff as it is of interest to me but it’s not clear to me that there is that much on it in English) but my understanding is that fieldcraft did play a role.

[jmm99]

Where to bury the tenfold number of Russians.

Regards

Mike

[kaur]

If i do understand Finnish solution right, then they are trying to solve the longe range firepower/teeth problem (that once was done by longe range recce skiers) and tenfold Russians with this kind of moves.

http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36...land_12-25.pdf

... and Russians understand this point well if you can read comments here in Russian

http://bmpd.livejournal.com/252280.html

Snowmobiles are within aroured formations that screen the noise

It's all about Ken's METT-TC of course.

PS you can't ignore also this point, than can compensate some comfort deprivation.

http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Fin.../1135245022270

[davidbfpo]

Kaur,

What a find, that last link! Just one example:

During the Winter War a ridiculous amount of drugs came to Finland. By the end of 1940, 1,511 kg. of opium alone was delivered to the military pharmacy in Helsinki. It was supplied mainly by the American Red Cross and the Swedish state.

[ganulv]

Kaur,

What a find, that last link!

I’ve seen passing mention of amphetamine use in the Wehrmacht, as well. Perhaps someone should start a “Combat and the use of performance enhancing substances” thread. I understand why it hasn’t happened, but some frank public discussion of steroid use amongst contemporary military personnel might not be a bad thing.

[Kiwigrunt]

I came across these links while browsing another forum.

An old document on the .280 Enfield.

And this clip on the FN FAL, just for kaks and giggles. I think that JMA may be the narrator.