What we support and defend

[Sigaba]

Bill, I am talking perception, not express intent. The very fact that you see our Cold War activities as not actively working to contain China in that era demonstrates how much such activities have become part of the American fabric for how we approach the world in general.

The widely held perception is that we were working to contain China before, and that we have just initiated a major effort to increase that program. Agree or disagree with that perception, fine. But to simply ignore it because the official policy is that we are not doing that is very dangerous. We only delude ourselves if that is the case, and self-delusion rarely leads to a good result.

Sigaba, my sources are many, some directly on point and many other merely indirectly reinforcing. Perhaps one of the best ones on the formation of our Constitution is David Stewart's "The Summer of 1787" for those who only have the time or inclination to read a single book to explore that fascinating time and event. But I recognize we all study history through the lens of our background, training, experience, and purpose for study. Most of my study in recent years has been in pursuit of greater understanding of insurgency, and what makes some societies inherently stable, while others remain inherently unstable. As a nation we make as many mistakes as any in our execution of policy, but we got the foundation right, and that sustains us.

I agree with you on the different approaches to history. Because of these different approaches, I don't think that using history to "prove" why one contemporaneous policy preference should be supported over another is politically or intellectually sustainable.

Here's why. Those, such as yourself, who study history for utilitarian purposes (that is, for the "lessons" of history) are likely to have a drastically different approach to the past than those who study history largely for its own sake. For example, professional academic historians are driven by a different set of sensibilities. These sensibilities allow for the reinterpretation of historical events over time as more primary source materials come available and as questions and answers are debated.

In contrast, those who take a "lessons of history" based approach to the past do not have the same flexibility because they're basing their policy preferences upon the "lessons" of the past. If the "lessons" end up being unsustainable, then the intellectual foundation of the preference is compromised.

This current thread provides two good examples of this dynamic in action. While you and carl are on different sides of the issue you've raised, you both use of anachronistic (and/or ahistoric) interpretations of the past to support your positions. A moderately-well trained historian could play serve and volley to raise enough doubts about the "lessons" you two have presented and to raise doubts on your respective views on contemporaneous military policy.

But, please, save me from examples of suffering in Eastern Europe in the trailing years of WWII as an example for why the US should have a warfighting army on the books at all times. How was sustaining the capacity of somehow deterring such events from happening possibly in the vital interests of a United States struggling to get through the hard economic years of the great depression?

With respect, I believe you're misreading my posts. I offering any totalizing generalizations about what the United States should do "at all times." I'm merely taking issue with your use of history to support your central argument, not with your central argument.

In regards to the Second World War, I believe that you're conflating two separate counterpoints to two points that you made.

As to wars, it is not who wins the first battles that matters, it is who wins the final battles. The American approach has served that end well without subjecting our populace to excessive burden of the wars of others.

By my reading, you offered a historical interpretation of military history and a historical interpretation of American military history. In my reply, the use of the Eastern front was in reply to your first interpretation to provide an example of how the shape and tone of a war's initial battles does matter even if the victor in those initial engagements ends up losing the war.

Neither that point and the historiographically sustainable interpretation that the U.S.'s military effectiveness was undermined in World War II because it did not maintain a large (enough) standing army during the 1930s do not mean that there's a "lesson" to be learned for the present and near future. The two points simply mean that you're using interpretations of the past to support your policy preferences, that these interpretations are historiographically controversial, and that by using such controversial interpretations, you shift the focal point of debate from the present to the past. And by making this shift, you weaken unnecessarily an otherwise eloquent argument.

Another, and perhaps more problematic, example of your use of historical interpretations is your discussion of "containment." In a number of posts, you characterize American policy towards the PRC of "containment" without differentiating among different interpretations of that word. (For example, George Kennan's vision of containment was strikingly different than John Foster Dulles's.) Nor do you square your interpretation "containment" with America's pre-existing (and continuing) support for the Open Door, or America's post World War II aim of maintaining a "preponderance of power" that predated the Cold War against the USSR and re-emerged after the Soviet Union's collapse.

Consequently, when you say:

Again, call it what you want, it is what it is, and perceptions are what they are. As to the many senior leaders coming on record to say we are NOT containing China in response to many reasonable queries, I "think they doth protest too much" in their defense.

You raise as many questions about your perception of what "it is" as you do of the "many senior leaders."

Our foundation of governance and our geography are strengths. Our belief that our actions are inherently benign is a weakness. Ignoring both puts us at risk.

MOO, these points--not a collection of highly controversial interpretations of the past-- should be the foundation of your argument.

My $0.02