I will let another speak as to the effectiveness of these changes:Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...rmy-chief.htmlLord Dannatt, former head of the Army, says 20 per cent defence cuts mean Britain will not be able to fight wars such as Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time in future.
davidbfpo
Three alternative views plus a cartoon
More commentary today, some good, some expected, you decide which they are.
Ex-Para officer, now a Labour MP:http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/ju...-cheap-britain
An ex-brigadier, now at IISS:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...ighting-future
More a strategic comment by an academic:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2012/07/no-...-vital-organs/
Finally try this cartoon:http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/car...l-defence-cuts
Apologies my IT skills are not enough to cut & paste this into a post.
davidbfpo
UK Army 2020
This may have flown under the radar but I have seen that the British army has adopted a completely different future organisation than that which has been announced previously. Army 2020 remedies a number of problems I have personally had with the Bde based army (notably permanent Div HQ). It also innovates by providing three different organisations inc. a specialised logistics (or force troops) entity. It maintains a "heavy" div for high intensity ops well as keeping the stabilisation ops option with a several Bde div. My main issue is the reduction of armour from 5 reg/Bns under the previous proposal to just three in the current one (I would have thought that the adaptable forces would have at least two independentt Armoured reg/bn). But alas that is not so. I think, personally, that its a much better structure than the previous proposal of five Bdes with a hodge-podge of capabilites and units. The creation of permanet div HQ also facilitates so called stabilisation ops esp. when one considers that in Afghanistan Bdes were largely left to their own divices in theatre with regards COIN ops. Now a permanet Div can help smooth the transition during roulement and allow startegic objectives to be translated into tactial missions without distrupting operations because of redeployments (however, the LACK of a strategy was probably the real problem in Afghanistan).
What do the honourable members of this here council think? Your comments and observations would be much appreciated.
Germany did split its army (and to some degree also its air force) into crisis reaction and other forces. It sucked.
Budget was tight, so crisis reaction forces got adequate personnel and almost adequate material funds, but the rest was neglected and atrophied.
NEVER establish a two-class military under the umbrella of the same GHQ. Separate active and reserve forces, united only at the level of ministry - acceptable. Divided army - not acceptable.
2nd; why bother with a single Div HQ if so many brigades are in the army? The would all be deployed in a big war, so simply call it a Corps HQ and design it as such.
3rd; looks like only three tank battalions for the entire UK army to me - that's approx. 200 Chally2 including driving training tanks and tanks in major repairs etc. That is hardly enough; the UK army would not be capable of mobile warfare against a real, capable army.
4th; helicopters overrated, as usual.
A lot of the detail about how this structure will be resourced and trained is still to appear, in particular how the Reserve element will be integrated.
What is very apparent is that the UK will almost certainly never deploy a division in the field again. Despite UK protestations to the contrary this capability is paper thin - literally.
The structure makes the best of a bad deal. The structures were entirely driven by the requirement to reduce the UK military size due to financial imperatives. That is a reasonable enough course of action, but there was no corresponding change in UK national security ambitions so effectively the structural changes have happened in something of a strategic vacuum. I am also lead to understand that the initial reforms presented by the 'Carter team' which led the process for the army were viewed as too radical and rejected by the government.
When the UK stated it could put a division in the field it struggled to put a brigade. By stating that it will aim to put a Bde in the field I suspect that increasingly even this level will be hollowed out.
The loss of heavy armour is not for me as much of an issue as the lack of RAF capability. The bdes are Armoured Infantry and not Armoured brigades. The role of armour is increasingly seen as enabling decisive infantry ops. This is predicated on the fact that it is regarded as highly unlikely that we will fight a parity or near parity opponent in the near to medium future. But this assumption is based on the assumption that the UK and it's Allies will retain technological dominance resulting in air and PGM dominance. I think this is a dangerous assumption based on both the shift in economic power away from the West and the increasing rate of technological diffusion.
My personal view is that the UK defence review should have reduced the UK army much more significantly in order to maintain viable Air and Maritime capabilities.
RR
"War is an option of difficulties"
The fact that UK bdes operated in effect autonomously for too long in Afghanistan is a failure of the ISAF and UK chain of commands. In theory the structures were in place to enable operational oversight. The lack of strategy didn't help either...Originally Posted by Tukhachevskii
The problem with the A2020 structures is that there are two divisional HQs, but no divisional enablers (arty, sigs, ISTAR, logistics).
RR
"War is an option of difficulties"
Good points all round. Personally I would have liked to see the expansion of the Royal Marines to two bdes with associated naval assets and the army reduced to three large(ish) bdes (each about three inf, one-two tank and two arty bns) but I doubt the regimental ethos and traditions of our armies would permit it (and let's not even get started with the Scots regts!). What really galled me was that the SDSR mentions UK commitments to allies yet our commitments to pacific nations doesnt even get a mention. To boot the SDSR outlines a REDUCTION in royal marine strength by 1,800! Definitely a document written by a committee if ever I saw one.The fact that UK bdes operated in effect autonomously for too long in Afghanistan is a failure of the ISAF and UK chain of commands. In theory the structures were in place to enable operational oversight. The lack of strategy didn't help either...
The problem with the A2020 structures is that there are two divisional HQs, but no divisional enablers (arty, sigs, ISTAR, logistics).
The Royal Marines have somewhat elevated quality ambitions, comparable to the army's paras. It is often advisable to keep the authorised personnel of such quality units few in order to
(1) maintain the quality and
(2) not leech very many promising men from the regular combat troops.
This could be the future for the U.S. but about 5x bigger. I don't have inside information nor a crystal ball - just the winds of change.
Frank Ledwidge's latest offering puts his finger on where (he believes) the real problem lies:
Punching Below Our Weight: How Inter-Service Rivalry has Damaged the British Armed Forces
The blurb is:
Ledwidge's first offering was:In this 5,000-word e-book, the author of the bestselling Losing Small Wars looks at the problem of rivalry between the top ranks of the Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. He argues that senior generals, admirals and air marshals have focused more on empire-building within their own services rather than on the needs of the UK armed forces as a whole, with enormously damaging results. In particular, the UK involvement in Libya was hampered by a total lack of aircraft carriers - sacrificed to preserve the Typhoon, a fighter jet designed for Cold War combat that never happened.
Written with Ledwidge's trademark insight and panache, this is an incisive condemnation of the British armed forces at the very top, and ending with some pertinent suggestions for how the UK could reorient its military priorities.
Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan
Read or watch the RUSI's Director giving his assessment (I'm catching up both made in July):http://www.rusi.org/analysis/comment...4FFA86E865E07/ and six mins podcast:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nBfk3...mber_132352243
I picked out the:Particularly interesting on the reserves role after the discussion on another thread about this regarding active and reservist in the USA:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5136The Reactive force was 10% reservist, the Adaptive was 30% and this meant growing from 16k to 30k reserves....after a six month active operation the Army will have problems....Will this give the young soldier and officer a career that they expected?
davidbfpo
Germany attempted a two-speed military in the 90's until recently.
In the end, the higher readiness, deployable part of the military got about what it needed (normal business) and the rest was starved of resources, usually operating old crap equipment.
I was amazed the Brits could be stupid enough to follow a path proved to be stupid (with the benefit of hindsight !) when I saw those plans for the first time.
Farewell to our warrior nation
A scathing article by Max Hastings on the UK's defence policy; a taster:Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...or-nation.htmlDavid Cameron’s Government is cutting the regular Army to its lowest manpower strength for centuries: 82,000. When the downsizing is complete, more than 20 per cent of our soldiers will have gone. I must confess that I am profoundly sceptical whether it will prove possible to recruit the 30,000 reservists the Defence Secretary promised this week.
Soon, we shall be capable of deploying only a single battlegroup of 7,000–8,000 men for sustained operations overseas. Compare this tiny force to the 35,000 troops deployed in Northern Ireland at the height of the Troubles in the 1970s, or the 30,000 military personnel sent to the First Gulf War in 1991.
davidbfpo
Thanks for sharing David, and while I can emphasize with UK's concerns about whether this is enough capacity based on the current and projected security environment, in my opinion this has significant implications on US strategy also. We have been endeavoring more to pursue "shared" security responsibility with our allies and partners, but the reality is most of our allies and partners have very little capacity to share, and the trend in most cases is downsizing, while potential adversaries such as China and Russia are significantly increasing the size of their militaries, not to mention the continued instability throughout much of the world that we will feel compelled to stick our noses into.
This sounds confused.
The U.S.'s allies have plenty to fill up a sizeable share of "security responsibility".
OK; Luxembourg has only a battalion and some AWACS and Iceland only has bases and a coast guard, but all others have real military forces.
Now what exactly don't they have, what exactly are the Brits going to have less than many are used to?
Ready-to-go land forces for great power gaming in distant places.
Why won't they have them any more in large numbers?
Because they're not worth the expense.
Furthermore; which treaty other than the Charter of the United Nations says that China is relevant to UK security policy? I suppose they don't need to care about East Asia, just as the U.S. could stay at Hawaii and not care about East Asia any more. That's a sovereign option.
Russia "significantly increasing the size of" its military is news to me. Their army converts to a border region crisis quick reaction force, their navy is replacing ships at a rate sufficient only for a coastal navy and their air force will probably need a decade to get substantial numbers of new generation combat aircraft operational.
Posted by Fuchs
I won't debate your point on China primarily because I agree with you. Nations have enduring interests and not all of them are common with their allies, but we do have many shared security interests and NATO's shortfalls that were demonstrated in Libya in my view effectively counter your argument that NATO countries have real militaries. Furthermore, if the US is going to shift more effort to the Asia-Pacific (agree, disagree, or indifferent doesn't matter), then there will be less US capacity and capability in Europe. Capacities and capabilities that the EU and NATO militaries are dependent upon. It is one thing to claim to have a real military and another to actually have that one that can independently conduct combat operations because it has invested in all needed support and enabling systems in addition to the shooters.This sounds confused.
The U.S.'s allies have plenty to fill up a sizeable share of "security responsibility".
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/op...le-moment.html
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/ar...ulnerable.htmlPresident Obama, who pressed hard for NATO involvement, rightly insisted that Europe, along with Canada, take the lead. It is reasonable to expect the wealthy nations of Europe to easily handle a limited mission in their own backyard that involved no commitment of ground troops. Reasonable, but, as it turned out, not realistic.
For decades, European nations have counted on a free-spending Pentagon to provide the needed capabilities they failed to provide themselves. The Pentagon is now under intense and legitimate pressure to meet America’s security needs more economically. It can no longer afford to provide affluent allies with a free ride.
And with the U.S. increasingly looking across the Pacific as it reshapes its defence policy to counter China, we may find we have to be more reliant on ourselves — but with very little to rely on. A Labour government defence review in 1998 — before the threat of Muslim extremism was exposed by 9/11, and when Chinese power was far less than it is today — concluded we needed a minimum of 32 destroyers and frigates to be equal to our responsibilities.
We now have just 19.
The Army’s manpower is being cut from 102,000 to 82,000, with the MoD claiming that a boost in the reserves to 30,000 will cover the shortfall. However, it is feared that these part-timers would provide no more than the equivalent of 2,000 full-time soldiers, and that an unsustainable strain would be put on them and their employers.
Concerning "Libya":
I suppose we have a different idea of what a military force is supposed to be capable of.
Extended cruise missile diplomacy does not rank high on my list.
There's something about military power that got lost by small wars-minded people: If you go to war, you mobilise it.
We (Europeans) could have swamped Libya with three million soldiers IF we had been serious about fighting Ghadafi. We were not serious. We pushed him a bit with the left-hand small finger, and this was a political choice - not a limit of our military capability.
As far as I can tell, insufficient mid-air refuelling and guided munition stocks were among the main criticisms during and after the Libya thing. I would be most surprised if such things were taken seriously as sufficient indicators for having a "real" military.
Guess what? The German general staff panicked after the 1939/-9 Poland invasion because ammunition stocks were badly depleted. Three or four weeks of intense military action with France and the Heer would have folded by 1939-11.
Range of German fighters back then? About 500 km.
I have yet to see anyone who asserts that Germany had no "real military" by fall 1939.
Fuchs,
I don't think you're accounting for political reality today, even if you and I don't agree with the general trend of political decisions to get involved in so called small wars, they are a fact of life. Maybe the economic crisis will bring us all to our senses, but in the mean time the challenge is having armed forces sufficiently large enough to support the current enduring occupation and peace keeping missions around the world, and in addition have enough strike capacity to conduct offensive/coercive military operations on short notice. I think you over estimate Europe's capacity to do so.
Of course a nation can attempt to mobilize to go to war, though I wonder how effectively modern, liberal democracies could actually do so if a real mobilization was actually required? Could Britian have sufficiently mobilized its industry to support and sustain major combat operations during WWII without extensive US support? Our industrial mobilization to support the UK and others at that time lifted us out of depression and perhaps enabled the allies to win.
That's what people in government pay are supposed to do; work to make stupid policies work.
It's not a "reality" outsiders need to face. To them, stupid policy is just that and may deserve to be fought against.
_______________
The Western economies have some issues, but even in "old" industries such as steel production we have usually multiple times the output of the 30's.
I suppose a mobilised Western country will rather have training issues and worries about protecting its economy against warfare than actual output issues.
That is, unless you're in the U.S., want to repeat the naval bvuildup of 1942-1945 and face the fact that your shipbuilding industry ranks behind Poland's.
Significant implications for US strategy?
For too long both the UK & USA have leaned on each other; with one major exception when each has used large-scale military force, respectively Suez and Vietnam. Often the UK has made strategic choices to act and since the end of 'The Cold War' intervene simply as the 'Special Relationship' was seen to be at risk if we didn't.
The USA, especially with the historically close military to military relationship, has looked for support from the UK - from the low profile to the high profile, mass support seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Westminster-Whitehall-Cheltenham circles the 'special relationship' is seen as (pause) embedded for ever.
As an aside the differences between the DoD and State Dept in the Falklands War are a good illustration of how this can alter the situation.
In a curious way the UK's downsizing of military capability could enhance 'smart power' and doing more with less for the USA. This I suspect explains why UK SOF and intelligence escaping downsizing (and a few other capabilities).
Politics though come first.
It is easy to see US officials and politicians asking if the UK and others will not share the burden, do we need to engage with them? Engagement of course takes many forms, two examples: intelligence sharing and sales of equipment.
This has happened before: with New Zealand after its stance on nuclear weapons (which has just ended), Canada when its military capability and will evaporated in the 1970's and there's France - with whom the USA has well, a different relationship.
The significant implication for US strategy? Shared and shallow relationships with new partners for the USA, rather than the in-depth embedded 'special relationship' with the UK.
In the interests of contrary views try this:http://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.c...l-warrior.html
davidbfpo
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