Iraq war will haunt west - Emma Sky

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Right across the Board.

Options: Take out Saddam and his main deck of cards, and you are actually left with a mixed army including Kurds.

Kurds, however, were only one possible leverage point. Shia opposition? Internal Sunni dissent? Pressure through those that influence various parties in Iraq?

I, for one, believe that the attacks on Kurds and Shia were so virulent that absent us "Doing Something" Iran (and other neighbors) would have been drawn into that fight, and that a regional conflict was an important unrecognized consideration. The flip side of that is that these regional players were also leverage points.

I know, how stupid. Back Saddam to attack Iran, than spur Iran to attack Iraq.

Back to Dayuhan's point about what exactlyis our legacy in the ME. Divide and conquer? Play all sides against the middle? Whatever.

Lots of options, all of which evaporated once we went in.

[Dayuhan]

Originally Posted by Steve the Planner

Back to Dayuhan's point about what exactlyis our legacy in the ME. Divide and conquer? Play all sides against the middle? Whatever.

"Our legacy in the ME" is a work in progress, and I wouldn't want to venture a guess on what it will eventually be. My point was that the specific legacy of the Iraq war and local perceptions of that war are likely to be irritants and stumbling blocks for some time.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Originally Posted by Bob's World

Come on, just because the people don't have a say in their governance, it does not mean it is not "their country." That is a dangerous bit of rationalization.

You are misreading what I wrote. I was responding to Dayuhun's assertion that engaging the people becomes extraordinarily difficult when the engagement begins with you invading and conquering their country. I would argue that how difficult engaging the people is situation dependent. We had no problems working with the French after Normandy. Each case has to be looked at as a unique situation.

Originally Posted by Bob's World

"We had to destroy the country to safe the country" Right? This is an easy trap to fall into, and we are better served by admitting that we did than we are by rationalizing away our most important lessons that we should be learning from this.

No, not saying that.

Originally Posted by Bob's World

There is a WIDE range of options between "sit on the sidelines and do nothing" and "Invade and occupy."

This is EXACTLY what I am saying (although, apparently very ineptly). There is a continuum between the two extremes and each situation has to be examined to determine what, if anything can be done. Then once those options are fleshed out determine what, if anything should be done, based on our interests.

Originally Posted by Bob's World

All the lessons learned I am seeing being captured are about how to do the wrong thing better. It is time we start putting a bit more wattage into thinking about how we could have done better things.

Agree, but we will never go there if our answer is "We should never do this again". That is the kind of cookie cutter solution I take issue with. That was the point of my comment.

I am not saying that "invade and occupy" was the right solution. But I will not concede that "invade and occupy" is the primary reason we are where we are in Iraq today. We did not need to apologize to every Iraqi for invading. We did need to have had a better plan for how we were going to occupy and how the transition was going to occur. It needed to take into account the various religious, ethnic, and economic variations and historical animosities. We could have split the country up into three separate nations rather than try to compound a mistake made when the lines were drawn by the British. We could have not engaged in DeBathification. Who knows if any of these would have worked better. But I do believe that we can learn from mistakes made after the invasion rather than see the invasion as the primary error and therefore dismiss everything that occured after as the natural cascade of events that occur as the result of that mistake.

[Steve the Planner]

Ciurmudgeon:

Thanks to Joel Wing (Musings on Iraq), I was just re-reading his re-pubs of the SIGIR stuff on the planning for war part of Iraq. Everyone had a different picture, some had facts (that got left on the floor), some had Expat "opinions."

Reality, as we should have known, is that the entire Infrastructure and Public Systems of Iraq could be knocked over with a feather. Weapons of mass destructions? C'mon, they could hardly make a public food delivery, across a functioning bridge to a store with lights and power.

There were just so many options open under these systems level scenarios without even going down the road of mining dissidents and internal opposition.

The Kurds swept down on March 19, 2003 virtually un-opposed---ie, there were many "parts" of Iraq that could have been "liberated" leaving others to die on the vine.

How do you get revenue to Baghdad/Saddam, if the oild flows from Diyala to Basra, where those two areas are not under Saddam's control. Either he defends the Capital from Sadr, or he defends the oil revenue at threat from further erosion.

Just one dumb little thread that should have been abundantly obvious.

So many different options to play out. Water under the damn....

[davidbfpo]

As the tenth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq looms the UK press has had a series of articles, mainly historical and once more Emma Sky writes an article:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...s-intervention

Lesson one: interventions require legitimacy

Lesson two: interventions need to have limited, clear and realistic goals – and be well resourced

Lesson three: the collapse of the state leads to communal violence

Lesson four: an inclusive elite agreement is critical to gain widespread support for the new order

Lesson five: elections do not necessarily bestow legitimacy on the new order

Lesson six: interventions inevitably have unintended consequences

Almost tempted to use this as a check-list for Mali.