Syria: a civil war (closed)

[Dayuhan]

What if our only objective is to begin a dialog with the rebels, who, if successful, will begin to form a new government? What are our options for initiating contact and providing limited assistance to build good will with them? Or should I just assume that this is already happening.

I think that's probably happening. I don't think it's unreasonable to talk to the armed opposition, the unarmed opposition, even members of Assad's faction who might turn away. Building limes of communications and assessing the individuals concerned isn't intervention. Actively assisting any given faction would have to be considered more carefully.

I don't have any real objection to having CIA work with the Saudis and Qataris to try to keep their arms aid from going to radical Islamists. Of course that effort won't be 100% effective and may not be effective at all, but the arms will flow anyway and it's worth making an effort to keep them from flowing to the worst of the worst.

Does it matter if the dead are a result of our (outsiders') action or inaction?

I don't think it's possible to say that outside action caused the deaths, unless someone can present a convincing case for some outside action that could have reduced the death toll.

The artificial structures of power shaped post-WWI by the Europeans, and post-WWII by the US are being thrown off by populaces across the Middle East.

In some places perhaps, but I don't think you could reasonably classify the regime of an Assad or a Gadaffi as shaped by the Europeans or the US.

To me it looks like a bar fight. You could stand back and watch, and the black eyes and loose teeth that result could hardly be considered your fault. Or, you jump in for the party without any need to and the fun could quickly turn into bad time.

Of course if you're a police officer with jurisdiction over the area where the bar is located, you have an obligation to intervene. We are not that, and I think it's worth reminding some of that fact. Too often we hear the chorus of "something must be done, where are the Americans", as exemplified by the rather amusing piece on Obama and Russia that JMA linked to earlier. Then of course if The S does a cannonball leap into the $#!thole and predictably spatters the stuff around the vicinity, the same people criticize the US for doing it wrong, without any hint of how it might have been done right. Better to ignore the chorus and act according to our own perception of our own interests.

[davidbfpo]

A rather lurid headline for a story that refers to a new RUSI report on Syria, which I've started to read. So for the report itself: http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/SyriaBriefing.pdf and the short newspaper edition:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-collapse.html

Today I cannot see any coalition intervening in such numbers.

Citing an earlier post on Libya by Taabistan is a salutary reminder:

I'm constantly amazed by westerners and their inability to understand what is a very simple concept: keep out of the affairs of other nations.

Libya is neither an enemy of the United States nor is it a threat to Europe and North America.

I am, however, disgusted by the constant need to interfere either in the name of "peacekeeping" or "regime-change". Call it what you will. It's breaching the sovereignty of our nations.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I don't have any real objection to having CIA work with the Saudis and Qataris to try to keep their arms aid from going to radical Islamists. Of course that effort won't be 100% effective and may not be effective at all, but the arms will flow anyway and it's worth making an effort to keep them from flowing to the worst of the worst.

On this we agree. At least part of the fight there involves Islamic extremists whose activities (particularly their tactics, connections, and ability to obtain and transfer weapons) are of direct concern to the US and Britain. Efforts we make, as limited as they may and should be, potentially provide a direct benefit to us. It is also in our interest to try to ensure that those extremists do not end up running the country after the transition.

I don't think it's possible to say that outside action caused the deaths, unless someone can present a convincing case for some outside action that could have reduced the death toll.

Those are two different arguments, but they both highlight an interesting point. For the sake of argument over whether outsiders have an interest in intervening in the internal affairs of another country, why should it matter that people are dying? As pointed out people are going to die in forcible political transitions anyway. People are dying right now. Why does it matter to outsiders? Unless it constitutes genocide or a war crime (those time when Westerners are willing to sidestep the idea of sovereignty for jurisdictional purposes yet not really willing to actually do anything until well after the fact) this question should not be part of our debate as to whether we should get involved.

Yet it comes up again and again. Interesting...

[JMA]

But of course...

What I've already said on this thread has been consistent to the point of repetitiveness, and I don't see any particular point in repeating it yet again. Maybe later I can go back and cut and paste the key points for your review; I'm going to ride the bike before the afternoon rains come in.

If were to claim that there were some magic bullet, some option for intervention that could be or could have been taken to resolve this situation, I would of course be obliged to say exactly what I think should be or should have been done. I'd look a complete ass if I didn't explain what I thought should be or have been done, especially if I'd accused others of incompetence for not doing it.

I've made no such claim. You have, notably absent any explanation of what you think should have been done and what effect you think that action would have had.

I have said, ad nauseam, that I do not see any available military intervention option that would meet even the most minimal criteria for probability of success, avoidance of extended commitment, probability of unintended adverse consequences, and domestic political acceptability. If anyone else has such an option great: let's see it. Claiming that an option exists without specifying what it is... not very convincing.

There are non-military options, some of which have been used. I don't think they have much chance of success, largely because, as you say, they are not backed by any credible and politically acceptable military option and everyone in the picture knows it.

It would be wonderful if some outside deus ex machina could simply "fix" Syria. That capacity isn't there. Even if the political will existed, which it doesn't, the effort would be likely to make matters worse and to leave the self-appointed deus ex machina up to their eyeballs in the sheisse.

In short: there are no critical US interests at stake, there's no domestic political support for military intervention, no viable options for military intervention have been presented, non-military options are on the table but probably won't accomplish anything, and there's an excellent chance that anyone who tries to drain that swamp will end up drowning in it. Therefore US involvement IMO needs to be at most peripheral. If anyone else wants a go, best of luck.

I could explain that in more detail, but is it really needed?

Can't you really do any better than that?

[JMA]

A rather lurid headline for a story that refers to a new RUSI report on Syria, which I've started to read. So for the report itself: http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/SyriaBriefing.pdf and the short newspaper edition:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-collapse.html

Today I cannot see any coalition intervening in such numbers.

Citing an earlier post on Libya by Taabistan is a salutary reminder:

David, one hopes that the USians around here take the time to read what you have linked to. It may help to balance their myopic US-centric view of (in this case) Syria.

The US led action in Iraq can be summed up in two words; incompetent, inept.

The handling of the Syrian situation as it slides into civil war can be summed up by; incompetent, impotent.

The key to such situations is not to allow it to slide into civil war because then no one wins.

We have now reached a new level of US diplomatic cowardice and must wait to see if the next 4 years will be more of the same or what will a new guy do.

I think its time for Europe to start to work towards a new relationship with Russia which hopefully will begin a move towards democracy (sooner rather than later). There is a potential win-win situation there in the medium term. Then Europe can let the US wimp itself into isolation if that is what it wants.

[Dayuhan]

Can't you really do any better than that?

Yes, but that seemed sufficient for the purpose. At least I'm not accusing others of incompetence for not doing something and then refusing to say what I think could or should have been done.

The US led action in Iraq can be summed up in two words; incompetent, inept.

The handling of the Syrian situation as it slides into civil war can be summed up by; incompetent, impotent.

The key to such situations is not to allow it to slide into civil war because then no one wins.

We have now reached a new level of US diplomatic cowardice and must wait to see if the next 4 years will be more of the same or what will a new guy do.

None of this means anything if you can't tell us what you think a competent administration could or should have done. How exactly do you propose to stop these situations from sliding into civil war?

I also think the US handling of Iraq was poor. What I think should have been done is quite straightforward: I think we shouldn't have gone into the regime change business there at all. What do you think would have been a "competent" approach?

I think its time for Europe to start to work towards a new relationship with Russia which hopefully will begin a move towards democracy (sooner rather than later). There is a potential win-win situation there in the medium term. Then Europe can let the US wimp itself into isolation if that is what it wants.

Presumably the Russians and Europeans could and would work together if they perceived a common interest in doing so. That's not impossible, but I wouldn't hold my breath waiting for it.

I see no reason to equate a reduced level of intervention with isolation. The US has been more isolated by over-intervention than by under-intervention, and overreach arguably poses a greater threat to the US than a more conservative approach to messing in the affairs of others.

[JMA]

Yes, but that seemed sufficient for the purpose. At least I'm not accusing others of incompetence for not doing something and then refusing to say what I think could or should have been done.

Still waiting for you to produce your reading of the Syrian situation in about 500-600 words. Is that too difficult or do your prefer to sit off top the side and nit-pick other persons posts instead?

None of this means anything if you can't tell us what you think a competent administration could or should have done. How exactly do you propose to stop these situations from sliding into civil war?

The worst case scenario is for a civil war situation to develop. That it happens indicates rank incompetence. Nothing more needs to be said.

I also think the US handling of Iraq was poor. What I think should have been done is quite straightforward: I think we shouldn't have gone into the regime change business there at all. What do you think would have been a "competent" approach?

Not incompetence... criminal negligence.

As for the rest I would prefer to discuss with a person with a suitable military background. Otherwise it is just a waste of time.

Presumably the Russians and Europeans could and would work together if they perceived a common interest in doing so. That's not impossible, but I wouldn't hold my breath waiting for it.

The main reason for Europe falling into line behind the US is for the protection that brings. While the US is indeed able to provide such protection it appears increasingly unwilling to do so. A US without balls is not worth kow-towing to.

I see no reason to equate a reduced level of intervention with isolation. The US has been more isolated by over-intervention than by under-intervention, and overreach arguably poses a greater threat to the US than a more conservative approach to messing in the affairs of others.

It is not the intervention that has estranged the US from many countries but rather the incompetence of the conduct of past interventions. Quite correctly if the US cant do this stuff competently then better not to do it at all. That is just face-saving and an understandable desire to avoid yet another humiliation.

So - once again - I agree that the US should avoid these military interventions, not because they are undesirable but because there is a near cetainty that they will cock-it-up.

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

As I have said before a number of nations have effectively declined to act: UK, France, USA and maybe some of their Western allies. That leaves Syria's non-Arab neighbours (Israel & Turkey), the Arab League and Syria's allies (China, Iran & Russia) - none of whom appear capable and willing.

Having read the linked RUSI paper I still find it hard to envisage a Western-led uninvited intervention, especially as the Syrian regime retains enough capability to make it difficult - their air defences notably. Secondly the stance of the FSA, jihadist groups and others to a Western intrusion is not guaranteed.

Even external action after the use of CBW is problematical.

The R2P advocates may want action, in my reading none have given an outline of what they would do.

The Arab League has plenty of cash and some military capability. It's time for them to mobilise and prepare for a non-coercive intervention.

Now I shall await some professional military posts on intervention.

[davidbfpo]

A pertinent commentary on what could happen in Syria soon:http://shashankjoshi.wordpress.com/2...r-and-revenge/

Those who live in the region have a stronger memory of what can happen. Whether its Iraq or the Lebanon.

(The author also contributed to the RUSI report).

[JMA]

JMA,

As I have said before a number of nations have effectively declined to act: UK, France, USA and maybe some of their Western allies. That leaves Syria's non-Arab neighbours (Israel & Turkey), the Arab League and Syria's allies (China, Iran & Russia) - none of whom appear capable and willing.

Having read the linked RUSI paper I still find it hard to envisage a Western-led uninvited intervention, especially as the Syrian regime retains enough capability to make it difficult - their air defences notably. Secondly the stance of the FSA, jihadist groups and others to a Western intrusion is not guaranteed.

Even external action after the use of CBW is problematical.

The R2P advocates may want action, in my reading none have given an outline of what they would do.

The Arab League has plenty of cash and some military capability. It's time for them to mobilise and prepare for a non-coercive intervention.

Now I shall await some professional military posts on intervention.

David the RUSI stuff is projecting what will be needed if there is total collapse leading to internecine civil war. There was talk of needing 300,000 troops.

My point is that right at the get-go all the major nations would have been told by their scenario planners what the worst case scenario was.

Therefore to prevent such a collapse was (or should have been paramount).

So when Leon Panetta says the violence in Syria is "rapidly spinning out of control" it is really an admission failure on a grand scale. Once the politicians and diplomats have screwed it up they then dump the baby on the military while effectively tying one hand behind their backs.

So the simple question should be asked... "what allowed Syria to continue to thumb its nose at demands for a cessation of violence and a transition to a democratic dispensation"?

[TheCurmudgeon]

I guess if we are not as interested in controlling the narrative others are...

It is the sort of image that has become a staple of the Syrian revolution, a video of masked men calling themselves the Free Syrian Army and brandishing AK-47s — with one unsettling difference. In the background hang two flags of Al Qaeda, white Arabic writing on a black field.

The presence of jihadists in Syria has accelerated in recent days in part because of a convergence with the sectarian tensions across the country’s long border in Iraq. Al Qaeda, through an audio statement, has just made an undisguised bid to link its insurgency in Iraq with the revolution in Syria, depicting both as sectarian conflicts — Sunnis versus Shiites.

Daniel Byman, a counterterrorism expert who is a professor at Georgetown University and a fellow at the Brookings Institution, said it is clear that Al Qaeda is trying to become more active in Syria. As it has already done in Somalia and Mali, and before that in Chechnya and Yemen, the group is trying to turn a local conflict to its advantage. “There’s no question Al Qaeda wants to do that, and they are actually pretty good at this sort of thing,” he said. “They’ve done well at taking a local conflict” and taking it global.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/wo...er=rss&emc=rss

[Dayuhan]

So the simple question should be asked... "what allowed Syria to continue to thumb its nose at demands for a cessation of violence and a transition to a democratic dispensation"?

The simple answer: lack of credible and politically acceptable military options and lack of home-front political support for intervention among potential intervening powers (or, realistically, in the potential intervening power).

Given the lack of attractive military options and the lack of home-front support for military action, The demands for cessation of violence were never going to be backed by anything more than impotent economic sanctions and a lot of talk. The Assads, of course, knew that.

[Dayuhan]

David the RUSI stuff is projecting what will be needed if there is total collapse leading to internecine civil war. There was talk of needing 300,000 troops.

The 300,000 figure was cited as required for "a full scale invasion of Syria to bring about regime change along the lines of the 2003 United States led war in Iraq." The report went on to comment that "It is almost impossible to see the diplomatic and political circumstances under which such an operation would be possible".

[JMA]

The 300,000 figure was cited as required for "a full scale invasion of Syria to bring about regime change along the lines of the 2003 United States led war in Iraq." The report went on to comment that "It is almost impossible to see the diplomatic and political circumstances under which such an operation would be possible".

Perhaps now is your opportunity display your military expertise (in 500-600 words) and lay out the military intervention options for Syria with the troops required for each?

[TheCurmudgeon]

The 300,000 figure was cited as required for "a full scale invasion of Syria to bring about regime change along the lines of the 2003 United States led war in Iraq."

OK, let's clarify the difference between this situation and Iraq. In Iraq the coalition was an invading force sent in to effect regime change over a stable government where there was no active civil war occurring. Any comparison to Iraq is species at best.

Here outsiders are not trying to effect regime change, the population is. Our concern is either based on humanitarian interests or it is based on security concerns about the conflict currently spilling over and igniting a regional conflict or that the resulting regime will pose a threat to future regional or world stability. Our contingencies should be built on those factors not built on an Iraqi style invasion and occupation.

The report went on to comment that "It is almost impossible to see the diplomatic and political circumstances under which such an operation would be possible".

Not really my concern. I abide by the proposition that you use a military as an extension of your foreign policy. Someone else decides the policy. I look at what options are available. Whether people are dying or whether there is political will should not color my work. It also should not keep me from examining options, even if those options are military based but do not actually depend on my military to execute the mission.

[JMA]

... concern is either based on humanitarian interests or it is based on security concerns about the conflict currently spilling over and igniting a regional conflict or that the resulting regime will pose a threat to future regional or world stability.

That was what the concern should have been 16 months ago... to avoid such a worse case scenario developing.

[TheCurmudgeon]

That was what the concern should have been 16 months ago... to avoid such a worse case scenario developing.

... and I suppose 16 months ago we should have started looking at options. Maybe we did. I also should have added the more recent concern of security for WMDs or other weapons systems (like the advanced ADA systems).

I guess, from my perspective, a more constructive discussion would be built on what the military CAN do rather than what it SHOULD do.

Also, as long as we are forward looking, what can we do to assist in the transition if asked. Truth and reconciliation commissions come to mind, but I am not sure how they have worked in the past and what part the military plays in implementing them. Is there even a basis for something like them in a predominately Islamic culture?

[davidbfpo]

TheCurmudgeon just asked:

what can we do to assist in the transition if asked. Truth and reconciliation commissions come to mind, but I am not sure how they have worked in the past and what part the military plays in implementing them. Is there even a basis for something like them in a predominately Islamic culture?

The role of 'Truth and reconciliation commissions' post-conflict would be a good separate thread topic.

The most famous TRC was in post-apartheid South Africa, although something in my memory says they have appeared in Central and South America.

Here (the UK) we have had a version in Northern Ireland, for the 'Bloody Sunday' shootings, called the Saville Inquiry and for a number of other controversial incidents - invariably for victims who were labelled 'Republican'. Not a very equal process IMO, but for those who I have spoken to there an acceptable price for peace.

There is no such thing as a common Islamic culture IMHO; there is a very different priority or value given to human rights and justice. Curiously the pre-Arab Spring state delivery of safety & security was always marred by injustice, it is just that dissenting voices were quiet, even terrorised and of course labelled as a threat.

In Africa, former Yugoslavia and Cambodia there has been recourse to international criminal court investigations and trials. Not TRC, but an alternative approach.

[Dayuhan]

Perhaps now is your opportunity display your military expertise (in 500-600 words) and lay out the military intervention options for Syria with the troops required for each?

I'll leave that to those who advocate intervention, and who thus need to explain what exactly they advocate, what resources it will require, and what they expect it to accomplish.

Non-intervention IMO requires no justification. In the absence of compelling national interests and viable options, it's the only reasonable course. The compelling interests and viable options need to be specified clearly before intervention is considered. Intervention does need to be justified - given the cost and risk it needs to be very well justified - and the onus is on those who think intervention is or was a desirable option to explain what they think should (or should have been) done and what they think it might have accomplished. It's not as if there was ever some easy and obvious solution; we all know these situations are not at any stage going to be resolved by firing off a few cruise missiles.

... and I suppose 16 months ago we should have started looking at options. Maybe we did. I also should have added the more recent concern of security for WMDs or other weapons systems (like the advanced ADA systems).

I'm sure there's been a continuing stream of studies on potential outcomes and potential options. Given the domestic political environment they would have to be very convincing to be even considered, and it's not surprising that none have been adopted. I'm sure there are options for security of WMDs and other systems on the table, though I doubt that anyone here has enough information to support more than very general speculation on what those options might be.

As a personal opinion... I hate the idea, but I could see how a very limited operation to secure, remove, or destroy WMD or other weapons systems might be desirable in an extreme case. There would have to be a very clear mandate and a very clear insistence that it not transmute into efforts at "nation-building" or "stabilization". Again, opinion.

I guess, from my perspective, a more constructive discussion would be built on what the military CAN do rather than what it SHOULD do.

Both the policy and the possible means to execute policy seem to me relevant. Of course they are interlinked: it would be silly to adopt a policy that you haven't any effective means to implement.

I think it would be safe to assume that the policy constraints imposed on Libyan intervention would apply to any proposed US intervention in Syria: the intervention should not be initiated by the US and must be designed to avoid any possibility of extended US commitment. There are probably many others. Realistically, I don't think any military intervention is going to be considered until after the election. Political suicide is an unattractive option for politicians, especially over a very peripheral issue.

I would also be interested in hearing what the military folks here believe can be accomplished by various options for military intervention, and also what they believe the attendant risks of those options would be.

Also, as long as we are forward looking, what can we do to assist in the transition if asked. Truth and reconciliation commissions come to mind, but I am not sure how they have worked in the past and what part the military plays in implementing them. Is there even a basis for something like them in a predominately Islamic culture?

Every society emerging from dictatorship has to confront the "justice vs reconciliation" issue in its own way. I'm not sure that "Islamic culture" is the key variable in Syria... as in Iraq, extended domination by a minority has left a mix that would be volatile no matter what the prevailing religion. In any event it's something Syrians will need to resolve: A TRC might be an option but I can't see it as something we can do to assist.

OK, let's clarify the difference between this situation and Iraq. In Iraq the coalition was an invading force sent in to effect regime change over a stable government where there was no active civil war occurring. Any comparison to Iraq is species at best.

Agreed: the material was quoted purely to provide context for a figure cited from the same report.

Here outsiders are not trying to effect regime change, the population is. Our concern is either based on humanitarian interests or it is based on security concerns about the conflict currently spilling over and igniting a regional conflict or that the resulting regime will pose a threat to future regional or world stability. Our contingencies should be built on those factors not built on an Iraqi style invasion and occupation.

Agreed, though I think "spilling over" is too general a fear to be useful. Contingency planning would have to be based on specific assessments of possible outcomes and what might be done to alter them. What specific "spillover" do we fear?

Not really my concern. I abide by the proposition that you use a military as an extension of your foreign policy. Someone else decides the policy. I look at what options are available. Whether people are dying or whether there is political will should not color my work. It also should not keep me from examining options, even if those options are military based but do not actually depend on my military to execute the mission.

True of course from a purely military perspective, but I think both the ends and the means are legitimate subjects for discussion here.

Is it possible to look at what options are available without knowing what specific policy goal is sought?

[JMA]

I'll leave that to those who advocate intervention, and who thus need to explain what exactly they advocate, what resources it will require, and what they expect it to accomplish.

Non-intervention IMO requires no justification. In the absence of compelling national interests and viable options, it's the only reasonable course. The compelling interests and viable options need to be specified clearly before intervention is considered. Intervention does need to be justified - given the cost and risk it needs to be very well justified - and the onus is on those who think intervention is or was a desirable option to explain what they think should (or should have been) done and what they think it might have accomplished. It's not as if there was ever some easy and obvious solution; we all know these situations are not at any stage going to be resolved by firing off a few cruise missiles.



I'm sure there's been a continuing stream of studies on potential outcomes and potential options. Given the domestic political environment they would have to be very convincing to be even considered, and it's not surprising that none have been adopted. I'm sure there are options for security of WMDs and other systems on the table, though I doubt that anyone here has enough information to support more than very general speculation on what those options might be.

As a personal opinion... I hate the idea, but I could see how a very limited operation to secure, remove, or destroy WMD or other weapons systems might be desirable in an extreme case. There would have to be a very clear mandate and a very clear insistence that it not transmute into efforts at "nation-building" or "stabilization". Again, opinion.



Both the policy and the possible means to execute policy seem to me relevant. Of course they are interlinked: it would be silly to adopt a policy that you haven't any effective means to implement.

I think it would be safe to assume that the policy constraints imposed on Libyan intervention would apply to any proposed US intervention in Syria: the intervention should not be initiated by the US and must be designed to avoid any possibility of extended US commitment. There are probably many others. Realistically, I don't think any military intervention is going to be considered until after the election. Political suicide is an unattractive option for politicians, especially over a very peripheral issue.

I would also be interested in hearing what the military folks here believe can be accomplished by various options for military intervention, and also what they believe the attendant risks of those options would be.

Every society emerging from dictatorship has to confront the "justice vs reconciliation" issue in its own way. I'm not sure that "Islamic culture" is the key variable in Syria... as in Iraq, extended domination by a minority has left a mix that would be volatile no matter what the prevailing religion. In any event it's something Syrians will need to resolve: A TRC might be an option but I can't see it as something we can do to assist.

Agreed: the material was quoted purely to provide context for a figure cited from the same report.

Agreed, though I think "spilling over" is too general a fear to be useful. Contingency planning would have to be based on specific assessments of possible outcomes and what might be done to alter them. What specific "spillover" do we fear?

True of course from a purely military perspective, but I think both the ends and the means are legitimate subjects for discussion here.

Is it possible to look at what options are available without knowing what specific policy goal is sought?

Again I am left wondering why you make no attempt to initiate a particular line of discussion seemingly preferring to dissect and criticise the input of others.

Every time I read one of your posts I am reminded of Teddy Roosevelt's "Man in the Arena" speech of 1910:

It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again; because there is not effort without error and shortcomings; but who does actually strive to do the deed; who knows the great enthusiasm, the great devotion, who spends himself in a worthy cause, who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement and who at the worst, if he fails, at least he fails while daring greatly. So that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.