The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by SJPONeill

Possibly the issue here is that 3-24 is not really about COIN but more related to what the Marines call(ed) Countering Irregular Threats (CIT) and the UK Countering Irregular Activity (CIA - an unhappy acronym if ever there was one), of which COIN is a subset. We reviewed most of the available 'COIN' doctrine in 2007/Early 08 and were already thinking in terms of CIT when we got to 3-24 and in that context it made a ton of sense but was less applicable perhaps to the classic COIN campaign a la Vietnam or perhaps the myths of Malaya and Kenya.

I'd see that 100% in reverse. 3-24 is a "COIN" manual, and that is why it is a woeful publication. It views COIN as a distinct form of military/non-military activity. That is rubbish.
An Irregular Warfare manual, would be useful and would be written in an entirely different way. 3-24 is not an "Irregular Warfare" manual by any stretch.
So called "COIN" manuals have to be theatre specific. -which is why the UK never issued one, until they tried to copy the US, and wrote one.

[SJPONeill]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I'd see that 100% in reverse. 3-24 is a "COIN" manual, and that is why it is a woeful publication. It views COIN as a distinct form of military/non-military activity. That is rubbish.
An Irregular Warfare manual, would be useful and would be written in an entirely different way. 3-24 is not an "Irregular Warfare" manual by any stretch.
So called "COIN" manuals have to be theatre specific. -which is why the UK never issued one, until they tried to copy the US, and wrote one.

Woeful compared to what? At the time it meet the need for Iraq and is a big step up from other 'COIN" pubs from the same time e.g. those from Canada and Australia.

Distinct from what? The mil/non-mil mix is more disitnct in COIN/CIT/CIA than it is conventional force-on-force conflict e.g. the good old Fulda gap. I'm not sure which COIN campaigns you have been following but which did not have a strong mil/non-mil mix? Possibly the Soviet ones in Hungary and Czechoslovakia which were, admittedly successful...

Irregular Warfare is not COIN and vice versa...if anything they might be different sides of the same coin (no pun intended) - that manual that Slap posted is a good read and may serve to illustrate the difference. 3-24 never attempted to present itself as an IW manual and nor should it because it is not - there, we agree on something perhaps...

Yes, there should be theatre/campaign-specific manual produced for each campaign/conflict (uh-oh, agreement again) - our rule of thumb was/is that this should be produced no later than the force generation for the first rotation force to relieve the initial intervention/lodgement force (don't think you can count on the lead time to have this ready before the first lodgement). But that each campaign will have its own unique characteristics does not mean that a more generic higher level, broader focus COIN/CIT/CIA (perhaps all three in a perfect world) manual can not and should not be produced. If nothing else it could start by detailing the differences between COIN/CIT/CIA and the conventional force on force state v state conflict most of us were brought up to deal with, at least until those who were the coy and bn commanders in 03/04 are the 2 and 3 stars of the future.

The UK did produce COIN manuals and quite good ones well before FM 3-24 every appeared on the scene - I don't have my notes to hand so can't real them off but some of them were part of the Review, as was some Aussie 60s doctrine derived from the UK that was pretty fine as well - supporting the statement elsewhere in this thread that way we wrote about these topics 40-50 years ago was at least as good and possibly better than how we do it now.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by SJPONeill

Woeful compared to what? At the time it meet the need for Iraq and is a big step up from other 'COIN" pubs from the same time e.g. those from Canada and Australia.

Woeful as in not needed, overly long, complicated and not useful.

Distinct from what? The mil/non-mil mix is more disitnct in COIN/CIT/CIA than it is conventional force-on-force conflict e.g. the good old Fulda gap.

COIN is not a distinct form or warfare. Fighting an insurgency requires the application of military force. How that force is applied is in the context of Irregular War, not in a "COIN" context. It is very doubtful if the idea of "COIN" as it is currently touted actually withstands any rigour at all.

The UK did produce COIN manuals and quite good ones well before FM 3-24 every appeared on the scene - .

Yes, but they were theatre specific. The CATOM for example was for use only in Malaya. -which is why Kitson was forced to write "Low Intensity Operations" in September 1970, precisely because the UK Staff Collage lacked a viable publication on the issue.

[Chris jM]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Woeful as in not needed, overly long, complicated and not useful.

Would you extend this description to FM3-24.2 Tactics In Counter-Insurgency, as well?

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/cointacticsfm.pdf

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Chris jM

Would you extend this description to FM3-24.2 Tactics In Counter-Insurgency, as well?

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/cointacticsfm.pdf

Still flawed, but its a great deal more useful. It has to be asked, how come it's a different manual?

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

It has to be asked, how come it's a different manual?

for 'doctrine writers.' Plus it beefs up the printing, warehousing, distribution and other staffing and budgeting arguments...

We now do process. Not products.

[MikeF]

This Thursday, we're hosting a book signing event for Dr. David Kilcullen's "Counterinsurgency" in Fredericksburg, VA. As I'm framing my own questions, I thought that I'd open it up to the Council.

If you have questions, then post them here. I'll consolidate them, ask what I can, and provide feedback after the event.

I imagine this would be much better than a thread of "Answers by MikeF" .

Thanks

Mike

[davidbfpo]

Does the West / USA / NATO have the strategic patience to campaign against the 'Accidental Guerilla' and those who are closer to the global jihad / AQ?

I am mindful of the overwhelming majority in many NATO countries that are opposed to the deployment of military forces; in the the UK cited at over 80%. How can we engage in COIN when there is little public support.

(At times this theme has appeared in various threads, IIRC not recently; perhaps itself a sign of attrition).

[carl]

Hello Mike.

If you could, can you ask some or all of the following questions for me.

Are all the night raids conducted by our forces a net advantage or disadvantage for us? I wonder this because I have read that the Afghans really hate this tactic, despise us for using it and it is a continuing source of very strong irritation to them.

I have read that the main prison in Bagram is controlled by the Taliban and is a center for their recruiting and radicalizing. Is this true? If it is how did this get to be since one of the things we learned in Iraq is the importance of controlling the prisons and using them for counter-indoctrination so to speak.

Is there any chance at all of a successful outcome in Afghanistan if the Pak Army/ISI continues the level of support they give the Taliban in its various permutations?

If we were to completely abandon the supply line running through Pakistan, would we be able to maintain a viable effort in Afghanistan just depending on the northern supply route and air?

Thank you Mike.

[MikeF]

David/Carl,

I've got your questions written down. If anyone else has questions, then let me know.

Thanks

Mike

[SWJ Blog]

Kilcullen on Libya: U.S. Should be ‘Air Referee’

Entry Excerpt:

Former Petraeus Adviser Kilcullen: U.S. Should be ‘Air Referee,’ Avoid Arming Rebels, in Libya by Rick Klein, ABC News. BLUF: "Kilcullen, an author and former adviser to Gen. David Petraeus, said the U.S. should think about its role as 'kind of like the air referee. Oversee what's going on on the ground from the air and ensure that nobody, regardless of what their political orientation is, takes it out on civilians...'”



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Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

Prompted by the SWJ Blog article 'Meet An Urban Planner For Cities That Don't Yet Exist' and link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mee...dont-yet-exist I found that two hundred threads contain Kilcullen and nine threads specifically contain his name in the title, so before I merge them to this 'Collection' thread they were:

1. In 2008 'Killcullen Briefing' a link to another website
2. In 2008 after his book was published 'Kilcullen article' on defeating the Taliban
3. In 2009 announcing a speaking slot 'David Kilcullen at the Pritzker Military Library'
4. In 2009 a link to an Australian TV debate 'Kilcullen debates the ethics and tactics of contemporary warfare'
5. In 2009 a thread after 'Accidental insurgent' was published 'Recovering David Kilcullen'
6. In 2006 'Kilcullen -- New Theories for a New Way of War'
7. In 2010 'Deconstructing Kilcullen's Counterinsurgency'
8. In 2010 seeking questions for a meeting 'Questions for Dr. David Kilcullen'
9. In 2011 'Kilcullen on Libya: U.S. Should be ‘Air Referee’