I think most here are well aware of that.
Probably true, though it's way too early to tell how Egypt, Tunisia, or Libya will turn out. The question is whether these events could at any point have been redirected by an outside power without excessive cost and risk. The choice seems to have been to let things play out with a little verbal and moral support for the rebellion (sanctions, statements, etc) and try to contain the ill effects, rather than to intervene and try to redirect the revolution. Given the costs, risks, and slim probability of success offered by intervention, that seems to me a reasonable choice. Of course that choice has risks, all choices have risks in these situations.
Certainly that risk was there from he start, and would be there is just about any "fall of Assad" scenario. The question is what could be or could have been done to alleviate that risk. I haven't seen many viable suggestions beyond an effort at containment. Intervention by any party at any point could just as easily have exacerbated the risk of spillover.
All of those are possible, though by no means certain. There is some reasonable chance that any of these can be averted by placing pressure on the outside parties involved, who of course would face considerable risk from war as well. Of course that might fail. The question is whether any attempt to reduce risk by forcing an end to the Syrian conflict has any better prospect of success.
That's the crux of it, is it not?
'll give a simple answer: none. Forget it, it's not going to happen. If somebody has a realistic and viable plan that offers a chance to "enforce a separation of the combatants and force a political solution", please present it and I'll gladly reconsider that opinion, but I don't think anyone does, nor do I think there was ever a point at which it would have been a viable solution. Again, if anyone has a practical, viable suggestion for how this could have been done I'm all ears, but I don't expect to hear much.
There are a few reasons for that.
First, this thing has "quagmire" written all over it in glowing bold-face letters, and nobody wants to walk into one of those. It would be very expensive and very risky, the probability of success is extremely low and the probability of sinking into an extended mess extremely high.
Second, any attempt to "enforce a separation of the combatants and force a political solution" is and always has been likely to kick off the very regional escalation it's supposed to prevent. Any effort to do that will be perceived (with good reason) by everyone else in the neighborhood as an effort to advance the interests of the intervening party. That's free license for everyone else to jump in to advance their own interests, especially for those whose interests are different from those of the intervening party. That could be averted if the intervening party had no direct economic or strategic interests at stake, but no nation on earth would take on a mess like that with no interests at stake.
An outside attempt to "enforce a separation of the combatants and force a political solution" would not prevent an escalation, it would be an escalation, and would probably kick off more escalation.
Letting things play out and trying to contain the results is not a perfect option, and there are certainly risks. The question is whether there is or at any point was a better option. If anyone thinks there was, I hope they'll tell us about it, in enough detail to allow some determination of whether it would or would not have actually been a better option.
Neither do I. I don't think anyone does.
Why would the Chinese want to get involved? What compelling economic or strategic interest is at stake for them? Given the geographic and logistic realities, it would be an enormously complicated and expensive venture for them. What would be the payoff? The Chinese are not in the habit of bleeding themselves dry in pointless military adventures in distant places, what reason would they have to start now, and in a place with so little to offer? Oil isn't a factor; Syrian exports are insignificant.
The Russians have access and motive, so there's at least a possibility that they might step in (realistically the probability of Chinese intervention approaches zero). Hardly a desirable turn of events, though. The Russians have zero credibility as a neutral mediator. If they intervene it will not be to "enforce a separation of the combatants and force a political solution", it will be to keep Assad in power. That of course would be a green light for those supporting the rebels to escalate their own involvement. A Russian intervention would be a bonus for AQ, they'd be all too eager to recreate the glory days of the Afghan mujahedin, and while it would be nice to have their attention elsewhere for a while, we all recall that using Islamists against a rival didn't work out so well last time around.
I think Russian military intervention would be more likely to accelerate and escalate regional spillover than to prevent it. That's even assuming the Russians would go in. I have some doubts on that: they want the port at Tartus, but do they want it badly enough to risk another Afghanistan? Certainly they'll ship arms to Assad, which may or may not make much difference: I don't get the impression that lack of weapons is a constraint for the Assad side. They'll vote in his favor in the UN, slip him money, do what they can from a distance.... but putting boots on the ground? Could happen, but I suspect they'll be very reluctant.
One possibility I've heard floated is that the Allawites could withdraw to the eastern areas where they are a majority, with their armed forces and WMD, and establish a breakaway state, of course with Russian support (Tartus is in that Allawite-dominated zone). That of course would likely kick off a round of ethnic cleansing, among other things. Like all hypothetical scenarios, it's a bit remote; we shall see.
I don't think Russian military intervention is likely, and I certainly don't think it desirable: more likely to make matters worse than to make them better, IMO. Of course there might arguably be some geostrategic advantage to the US in having the Russians up to their necks in scheisse, but I suspect that this would be more a vicarious pleasure in seeing someone other than us in that position for a change than an actual advantage.
In any event the preferred strategy from the US and Europe seems to be to let things play out and try to contain the violence as much as possible. Not an ideal strategy perhaps, and certainly with risks... but has anyone got a better idea?
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