Extract from the book and from the article by Chris Donald one of the more skilled Fire Force commanders of the war.

Obviously, intelligence was the driver of the war and it is here where the SB (Police Special Branch), Selous Scouts, SAS, Aerial Photography, Aerial Reconnaissance and more played a critical role. From this intelligence operations and troop deployments took place. During my time with 3 Cdo I would spend quality time with the intelligence people where we were operating.

Having standard intelligence briefs was a Standard Operation Procedure (SOP), but getting close to them, building a relationship and asking question after question was for me the only way of obtaining what intelligence we required for Fire Force (FF).

As mentioned, the asking of questions was the only way to get the info one needed. For example, all SOP-type intelligence briefs I ever attended never gave the detail that we required on matters such as terrain, bush cover, hill features and caves in the area. This may sound to the reader as unnecessary but for FF operations we felt it was an operational necessity. This same tactic of getting more than the normal standard information and asking questions I used right up to and before arrival at a target area.

There was a standard list of what would be transmitted to FF call-outs by an OP, but we realised that to be more effective and successful we needed more than the norm, plus I wanted as many people as possible who were going to be involved in the operation, to hear every detail. In simple terms, from the first report on a potential call-out up to our arrival at the target, I wanted everyone to have a detailed painted picture in their minds of the target area and everything else related to the incident.

Over and above the obvious we would get answers to questions such as: how many huts in a kraal/s, description and layout of the huts, any striking features/colours on huts, where was the cattlepen, relevant paths in the area, colour of clothing of the locals they had seen, enemy clothing description, hats/caps, cattle being herded and where, which of the locals by dress colour had been seen moving in and out of the base camp area, which direction or down which river line did the OP think the enemy would go, vegetation description on the river lines and other details. One also had to realise that in the case of an OP one had to picture the area through the eyes of the OP.

I also found that, depending on the surprise factor we could achieve with the noise of the helicopters, there was real benefit for the K-Car on approach to fly directly over the OP towards the target area and by a simple go-left, roll-out, go-right, roll-out, I was able to see exactly what the OP was seeing. The OP advising me when they could hear the sound of the aircraft was a must on every call-out (for obvious reasons) and then, once we had decided where to deploy the stops, the OP became important eyes, ears and information for us.