MG Flynn, Fixing Intel so Relevant in Afghanistan & beyond

[Steve the Planner]

Wilf:

I think the exam question is misplaced. In irregular warfare, we find the enemy and neutralize them. I suspect that, for the most part, the enemy is known, as are the means to neutralize it.

In this bizarre COIN world, however, what happens when you: (1) find the enemy, but they are the folks you are supposed to support; (2) see that enemy so closely intertwined with undefined externalities that neutralizing them is a separate problem in itself; and, (3) find that the enemy (who we are supporting) is opposed to any path within our resources/capabilities/interests?

I remain concerned that, while the military intelligence community continues to do its thing in a very predictable way, it is missing the point in Afghanistan.

The answers are outside of its analytical sphere, and are not filtering their way in to substantially inform solutions that can work to bring positive transformation.

We can fill this site with answers on the tactics of success in a battle, but not on the strategies of success in a unique multi-dimensional war (or mission, or whatever we want to actually call this thing.

Plenty of folks on this board understand the scope of their sphere---why what is in front of them is not working---and how to alternatively effect what is in front of them. But, at every turn, it is the externalities that limit their success.

Something else is going to need to be developed or to occur. The traditional definitions are all wrong. The traditional questions asked are not the relevant ones. The traditional answers are not useful.

The Graveyard of Empires looms only if the empire cannot adapt to this non-empirical environment. Success is somewhere else.

How do we get at that?

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Steve the Planner

Wilf:

I think the exam question is misplaced. In irregular warfare, we find the enemy and neutralize them. I suspect that, for the most part, the enemy is known, as are the means to neutralize it.

Well once the enemy is defeated/neutralised, you've won! What's the problem?

In this bizarre COIN world, however, what happens when you: (1) find the enemy, but they are the folks you are supposed to support; (2) see that enemy so closely intertwined with undefined externalities that neutralizing them is a separate problem in itself; and, (3) find that the enemy (who we are supporting) is opposed to any path within our resources/capabilities/interests?

COIN is not a bizarre world. Irregular warfare is very simple. We just choose to ignore the facts.
1. Then they are not the enemy! The enemy oppose you using violence. - so they CANNOT be supposed to support you! You cannot be half pregnant.
2. Then you haven't got point 1.
3. Then what are you trying to do?

In A'Stan the only thing military forces can do is ensure that the Taliban do not take power via force of arms! That is all! What's so hard about understanding that?

[Ron Humphrey]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Well once the enemy is defeated/neutralised, you've won! What's the problem?

COIN is not a bizarre world. Irregular warfare is very simple. We just choose to ignore the facts.
1. Then they are not the enemy! The enemy oppose you using violence. - so they CANNOT be supposed to support you! You cannot be half pregnant.
2. Then you haven't got point 1.
3. Then what are you trying to do?

In A'Stan the only thing military forces can do is ensure that the Taliban do not take power via force of arms! That is all! What's so hard about understanding that?

As long as the military are also having to fill in the blanks on non-mil stuff required as well then they will also tend to try doing what any good team does. Get actions and what not at all levels to work towards common cause.

Supporting action's/narrative's/endstates/etc
You want to pull a British East India Company, or US Organizations that used to exist at levels capable of supporting this sort of thing out of your back pocket ready to go great.

Till then those there have to do the best they can with what they have.

So although I understand your concern with the "lack" of military doing military only we're all there now, and those Orgs aren't at least in any where near large enough scale to be able to fulfill their roles at levels needed.

So What is the answer you propose besides- We shouldn't be doin that stuff?

[Steve the Planner]

Wilf:

Nail on the head.

In Iraq in 2007/8 there was a simple mission with a simple objective (end our involvement/turnover to the Iraqis) pursued by two primary elements/people (Crocker/Petreaus) with a common purpose and objective.

If someone believes that the US and West have a continuing governmental interest beyond just a "graceful withdrawal" from Iraq, I would invite them to demonstrate the evidence of that. Sure, we will have some substantial interests, maybe including going in again, but not now.

If we define the mission in Afghanistan as simply to keeping the Taliban from gaining power by force of arms, perhaps we are on track---persistent, continuous deployments, drones, and "village" battles (Marjah, etc.---every six months, a new village to mow the grass in). (Note that that is a far step beyond defeating/destabilizing AQ)

Question is: Whether we can find a "sustainable" and cost-effective approach that is not grounded in huge deployments, great peril and loss of life, billions of effort, and, creates an enduring foundation for self-generated sustainment of an Afghan civilian system that does not invite support (from some population areas) for continuing Taliban-related conflict and destabilization, protects its (sometimes ill-defined) borders, and substantially "controls" its ungovernable spaces?

The confusing mission "leap" (not creep) into defining the above solution as somehow or another springing from, and dependent on, the Karzai regime, and our ability to make them a modern, effective governing regime with a full and complete "writ of government" extended down to the relevant districts, seems to be the Achilles Heel in the latest chapters in western engagement in Afghanistan.

Are there other definitions, solution boxes? Yes.

Are they in the analytical works?

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey

So What is the answer you propose besides- We shouldn't be doin that stuff?

I would propose seeking to fix the problem, by understanding the limits of the solution - not my place to create policy. That's for the elected official. - but using an Army to do something other than what it was created and designed for is not symptomatic of sound thinking.
I absolutely understand that we are where we are, but that does not forgive the stupidity of how we got there.

[Steve the Planner]

Ron:

Right. The agencies/organizations needed to effectively engage the non-military issues simply don't exist.

For all the talk of reform/change at USAID, there is no actual proof of that being in the works, let alone accomplished.

There is a CFR interview with Ambassador Herbst (DoS), who heads the SRCS. It is rather sad actually. No adequate resources over a five year period to actually create or deploy much, and most of the early days appear to have ben spent on turf wars (still unresolved). Instead, they have minimal planning and coordinative staffing and resources---enough to field, on average, short-term deployments for 20 or so people to Afghanistan for planning/coordinative activities, mostly in and around the "whole of government" activities.

As Ambassador Herbst pointed out, they just don't have the staff or resources to effectively engage in Iraq or Afghanistan.

I keep looking at the reality versus concept of civ-mil, whole of government, etc... and keep coming back to the same realization as many folks here have. This entire spectrum of activities (civ, mil, stabilization, nation-building, reconstruction), for better or worse, is in the military's hands. Doing it as an accidental or of-necessity quick fix is chaotic and ineffective.

I was reading the recent intel lament on Kandahar (we just don't know enough about the place, who's in charge, what's going on). At some point, the military is going to have to grasp the basic and critical civilian information needed to discharge its default full-spectrum obligations, or it will just continue to mow the grass in a new place every few months.

Frankly, I find the current civilian governance outcomes over the last few years to be the almost inevitable result of the efforts applied. There is just no mystery to this stuff. If you want to create what is there, do what we have done/are doing, add several billion dollars, and wait a few years. (Bad government in a box)

My concern, especially as more soldiers move to a real complex urban challenge environment where intel and effort (at the higher levels) is ineffective, is for them.

God bless the soldiers in the field.

[davidbfpo]

The progress of MG Flynn is noted in an April 2012 SWJ article: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...ligence-reform

The report on Afghanistan, the subject of this thread, was his first public appearance - well certainly for over here.

A man to watch IMO.