Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict - Political Commentary

[kaur]

Svante E. Cornell, "Pipeline Power: The War in Georgia and the Future of the Caucasian Energy Corridor", Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol. 10 no. 1, Winter 2009

http://www.isdp.eu/files/publication.../GJIA-2009.pdf

[kaur]

18.06.2008

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A good start would be the peace plan proposed by President Saakashvili that Prime Minister Putin has publicly supported. Georgia, meanwhile, must consider to resist the temptation of any military reaction or unwise political demand, even in the face of provocations.

Page 10.

http://www.internationalrelations.ho.../110/43066.pdf

[Jedburgh]

JF, 3 Mar 09: The Impact of the Russia-Georgia War on the South Caucasus Transportation Corridor

....the paper argues that the initial damage that the war inflicted upon the political reliability of the transit corridor is gradually diminishing and that new opportunities are emerging. The complete reversal of this damage can be possible but will depend on U.S. and EU policy, the role of Turkey, internal stability in the Caucasus region, and Russian policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus. It is important to remember that when the initial decision to revitalize the energy corridor through Georgia and Azerbaijan was made in the mid 1990s, the security environment was extremely difficult and there was no infrastructure to support shipment of oil through the corridor, yet leadership of the United States and Turkey supported that decision and helped to implement it. Today’s environment is much more favorable considering the functioning infrastructure and greater demand for Caspian energy. New natural gas discoveries in Turkmenistan and the next stage in oil and gas developments in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan will require additional export capacity and a tough battle is ahead between the different export options, each supported by state sponsors with competing interests. It is significant in this context that Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan signed an agreement on November 14, 2008, to develop a Trans-Caspian oil transportation that will include onshore oil pipeline in Kazakhstan and a tanker fleet in the Caspian Sea to ship Kazakh oil to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and on to the world markets. As it was indicated at the Budapest summit devoted to the Nabucco pipeline project on January 27, significant progress has been made on the development of a natural gas link between the Caspian and Europe, and Georgia has an important role to play.....

[kaur]

Former Russian minister published in his blog list of South Ossetia officials. Most of them have KGB/FSB/military backround.
This is in Russian. Would you use Google Translate.

http://aillarionov.livejournal.com/75970.html

Russians have made movie about the war.

http://rutube.ru/tracks/1673082.html...8dbbdcaa7dafbf

[wm]

Hurriyet has this online today

Georgia says Russian-planned coup underway at military base

TBILISI - Georgia said on Tuesday a Russian-planned coup plot had been uncovered within the military of the former Soviet republic and a rebellion was under way at a military base near the capital.

The Interior Ministry said those involved in the plot had received money from Russia which has criticized NATO military exercises in Georgia due to begin on Wednesday.

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 22 Jun 09: Georgia-Russia: Still Insecure and Dangerous

....The Georgia-Russia war ended with ceasefire agreements that ordered an end to military action, a pullback to pre-war positions and access for humanitarian and monitoring missions to conflict areas, but the security situation on the ground remains tense. Russia has not complied with the main points of the truce, and the sides have not engaged in meaningful negotiations to stabilise the situation. These factors create a potentially explosive situation in which even small incidents could spark a new conflict. Russia’s veto on 15 June in the Security Council of the extension of the sixteen-year-old UN military observer mission in Georgia, combined with its apparent determination also to force out the OSCE mission at the end of the month is an unfortunate, potentially grave development that could further destabilise the situation and lead to a new outbreak of full-blown hostilities....

CSIS, 19 Jun 09: Georgia: Why We Should Be Watching

Buried on page A8 of the June 16 Washington Post was a short article entitled “Russia Vetoes Georgia Monitors.” The article briefly outlined Russia’s veto of an extension of the 15-year-old mission of United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), which had been monitoring the situation in the breakaway region of Abkhazia. Coming close on the heels of Russia’s rejection of an extension of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) observer mission in Georgia’s other breakaway region of South Ossetia, Russia’s veto of UNOMIG’s presence in Georgia must be seen for what it is: an attempt to legitimize its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but more ominously, an attempt to eject all foreign presence—and therefore foreign eyes—from Georgia’s conflict regions. True, there is still a European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, but it has been denied access to the conflict regions and must be content with monitoring the Georgian side of the conflict line. It would be a relatively simple matter for Russia to manufacture enough instability along the conflict line to chase the EUMM back to Tbilisi. This would leave the borders of the contested zones completely unobserved by members of the international community, making it all too simple for Russia to manufacture a “provocation by the Georgian side” to which it is “compelled” to respond, the same way it was “compelled” to “force Georgia to peace” last August. A resumption of Russia’s war in Georgia, which would be a disaster for the United States and Europe, is not out of the question.....

[Jedburgh]

IFRI, 23 Jul 09: Russia and the "Eastern Partnership" After the War in Georgia

Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 sent a shock wave across the post-Soviet space, particularly the republics to the west and south of Russia. In December 2008, the European Union formalized the Eastern Partnership initiative, directed at Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In order to understand the impact of this war both on Russia’s bilateral relations with these countries and on the Eastern Partnership area as a whole, this article analyzes the reactions of these former Soviet republics to the Russian offensive. Three types of response are observed: keeping distance from Russia; maintaining a balance between Moscow and the West; and, finally, changing course (from rapprochement to keeping a distance and vice-versa) vis-à-vis the former center of the Soviet Empire.

[kaur]

IF JUSTICE were the ultimate goal, Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s president, and Mikheil Saakashvili, his Georgian counterpart, should appear together in court in The Hague. As their countries’ commanders-in-chief, both violated international law during the war in Georgia. So suggests this week’s European Union report on the war. Behind them should sit Vladimir Putin, the mastermind of Georgia’s dismemberment, and the leaders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia who also acted illegally.

http://www.economist.com/world/europ...ry_id=14560958

EU report.

http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 1 Nov 10: Georgian Lessons: Conflicting Russian and Western Interests in the Wider Europe

Russia’s invasion, occupation, and partition of Georgia in August 2008 initially sent shock waves throughout Europe and NATO and appeared to signal a new confrontational phase in Moscow’s relations with the West. This volume places the conflict in the context of Russia’s broader objectives, its internal weaknesses, the limitations of EU and NATO policies, and America’s security priorities.

First, the Georgian conflict underscored Moscow’s determination to reclaim an extensive zone of dominance corresponding with the former Soviet territories. Second, it displayed a shrewd calculation by the Kremlin about the fractured and ineffective Western response, and Moscow continues to test the Obama administration’s rapprochement in pursuing its expansionist ambitions. Third, the 2008 conflict had a lasting impact on the Central-East European and post-Soviet states most exposed to pressures from Moscow. While the former demanded more tangible security guarantees from NATO, the latter either sought accommodation with Russia or intensified their protective strategies. Additionally, beneath the veneer of success, the conduct of the war, the economic recession, escalating separatist sentiments, and faltering attempts by Moscow to make the country more globally competitive revealed Russia’s long-term weaknesses in the midst of its attempted neo-imperial restoration. The study concludes with succinct recommendations on how the transatlantic alliance can more effectively handle Russian ambitions and prepare itself to deter or manage future crises......

[kaur]

BBC: «Putin, Russia & the West: The War»

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tLc_b5xgb6Y

[davidbfpo]

Found by accident a fascinating article and link to a Russian documentary of unclear origin (which is on YouTube) and just in time for the fourth anniversary too:http://www.jamestown.org/programs/ed...b5dc88c4bee68c

The fourth anniversary of the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war has been marked by a seemingly open spat between the supporters of President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. In a 47-minute documentary film of unclear origin, “Lost Day,” posted on YouTube, retired and active service top Russian generals, including Army General, former First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky, accuse Medvedev of indecisiveness and cowardice during the conflict with Georgia and praise Putin. According to Baluyevsky, a decision to invade Georgia was made by Putin before Medvedev was inaugurated President and Commander-in-Chief in May 2008. A detailed plan of military action was arranged and unit commanders were given specific orders in advance. In August 2008, according to Baluyevsky, Medvedev needed to issue a simple order: “Go” – and commanders would open sealed envelopes with combat orders that were given to them beforehand to commence the invasion.

Curiously a retired CIA analyst at a UK conference referred to there only being 48 hours notice of the crisis.