Africa's Commandos - new book on the RLI

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Firn

How good was the training given in medic school? How was the first aid/combat care organized later in the war? In this example it seems that one of the stick, the author, was able to give quickly competent help. The whole stick performed according to this account well, doing seemingly a pretty good job.

With both lungs collapsed the chances of survival should have been very small indeed, especially there and then.

Thanks

I will follow this reply with extracts from an article by a medic.

The medical training (we long since had stopped calling it "first-aid" training because of the advanced nature of how the training had developed) started during recruit training, followed by continuity training at any chance we had, then a structure 5-day course run by qualified medics for stick/Troop medics. The MA3 (medical assistant class 3) course was a three month course.

As stated by the RMO in post #6 of this thread by that later stages of the war we were able to clear casualties back to the MRU (mobile resuscitation unit) with 10 mins or to a local district hospital subject to flying time from the contact area.

To give you an example of what we (in the RLI) aimed for was a universal competence in dealing with the ABCDDE (Airways, Bleeding, Chest-wound, Drips, Drugs, Evacuation) process of stabilisation prior to casevac I attach a citation of an award made to one of my National Service (conscript) troopies after he had moved onto the Reserve. He had received no special medical training only what he got in recruit training and in the troop.

30 years after the fact I asked him whether the training - we (my sergeant and I) had to sometimes drag them out of their billets to do - was worthwhile when viewed in retrospect he replied, "I guess so."



There were a few problems, one was that when we took casualties other troopies rushed to help their fallen mates (often very close friends) placing themselves in the same line of fire that got their mate and reducing the rate of fire being returned.

The other was when their mate had a fatal wound they continued to attempt resuscitation after all hope was gone. Can't blame them. They at least had the basic skills to "do something" rather than just watch their mate die while not being able to do anything.

[JMA]

A RLI medic recalls:

During basic training recruits were instructed by the battalion medics on the ABCs of first- aid. This included clearing the airway, stopping the bleeding, patching chest wounds, administering drips or drugs and evacuating the patient.

...

My attitude towards the army started to change from a reluctant conscript to an individual that was becoming an integral part of a team. I spent time while in camp learning from the commando medic and was eventually selected to attend a five-day troop medic course. By the end of the course I could set up a drip, splint broken limbs, seal a chest wound and give intravenous or intra-muscular injections.

The role of the stick medic while on Fire Force is limited to stabilizing the injured until evacuation by helicopter which normally happened within 15 to 20 minutes.

...

I signed on as a regular soldier after my initial conscription on condition that I was given an opportunity to attend a Medical Assistant class 3 (MA3) medics course. MA3 courses lasted for three months and were held at Llewellin Barracks. Week one was dedicated to Anatomy and Physiology with a comprehensive test on the Friday. Delegates failing that first test were immediately returned to their unit of origin. Those that remained were generally better educated and highly motivated to learning as much as possible in the allotted three months.

...

On Friday and Saturday evenings we were transported to Mpilo Hospital to practise what we had learnt that week by assisting in the casualty department. Patients had no idea that we were army medics with limited experience as we wore the same white jackets as the doctors.
Patients were evaluated by a doctor and referred to the suture room where we would be eagerly waiting. Deep head and body wounds caused by panga attacks were common injuries and some of the most interesting to deal with followed by massive trauma due to vehicle accidents.

[JMA]

... proud when you earned the right to wear this:

[JMA]

... from one young Troop Commander who, now retired, went onto have a very successful career in financial consulting:

World-class organizations regard ‘human capital’ as their most precious asset. Hiring, developing and retaining the best people sets great organizations apart from their competitors. As a result, most organizations today spend a great deal of time, effort and money on developing their leadership capability. The problem they face is that leadership is best developed under high pressurized situations. You cannot easily simulate these conditions. As an individual you do not know how you are going to react under such conditions, and whether you are capable of leading your people well under these conditions.

The Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) provided an unbelievably effective environment for developing first-class leaders. It was able to do this because of three key factors. These factors are essential for creating and maintaining a world-class organization, which in turn is a pre-requisite for developing effective leaders :

1. The right ‘conditions’ under which leadership can be developed

2. The ‘knowledge culture’ that an organization needs to enable incoming generations to stand on the experienced shoulders of their predecessors

3. An unwavering ‘self-belief’ instilled in all of an organization’s members

The RLI provided its young soldiers with plenty of action, under life and death conditions, day in and day out. Experience was gathered at a fast pace. The battalion’s kill:loss ratio was extraordinary, and had a lot to do with the way in which the more experienced officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and troopies passed on their knowledge to the less experienced men.

With the increasing number of national servicemen passing through the RLI during the mid to late 1970s this knowledge culture was essential to its ability to drive up kill rates and avoid casualties in the bush war. We all know that young people think they are invincible. What a self-belief to have in an organization! The RLI had this in bucket loads among its troopies and leaders.

In addition another you also went on to have a stellar career as an accountant (also now very comfortably retired) noted the following:

Serving in the RLI taught you to be self-sufficient and how to get on with men from all walks of life. It also taught you what was important and what was not. Many years later when I was about to leave a large corporation I got into a discussion with one of the executives about corporate urgency. I explained to him that executive management often tried to make things seem more serious and important than they really were as a way of motivating people to get things done. I told him that after having served in the RLI I knew what life and death situations really were and anything else was just corporate bull$hit.

[JMA]

Introducing the contributing authors in alphabetical order:

[Firn]

@JMA: thanks for that info about the medical training and system. It seems to fit into the general tendency of a strong effort to achieve a high level of training and integration at the necessary low level.

Personally I do believe that the historical context of this war is well known and can discussed in another thread. The same goes for WWII. It is hardly helpful to throw all of it into a single thread.

[davidbfpo]

I have moved four posts from this thread to the main Rhodesian COIN thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=2090&page=17

This thread on a forthcoming book by a SWC member clearly has a high visits rate (over 6k) and the exchange between JMA & Fuchs is best elsewhere.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by davidbfpo

I have moved four posts from this thread to the main Rhodesian COIN thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=2090&page=17

This thread on a forthcoming book by a SWC member clearly has a high visits rate (over 6k) and the exchange between JMA & Fuchs is best elsewhere.

Thank you David, I am sorry I took the bait.

This book contains the personal experiences of some 108 persons who served in or with the RLI back in the day and I should not allow my personal opinions and beliefs to take precedence.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Firn

@JMA: thanks for that info about the medical training and system. It seems to fit into the general tendency of a strong effort to achieve a high level of training and integration at the necessary low level.

Thinking back there are a couple of factors which I believe come into play.

The first one is that as a newly commissioned officer into the RLI you would serve three years as a troop commander on an operations rotation of six weeks on ops and two weeks traveling and on R&R. In other words we were there long enough - being beyond a six month tour or even a year tour - to make longer term plans for training and setting, achieving and maintaining standards.

Secondly, while the rate of KIA was low we did suffer an attrition rate of WIA.

The second factor prompted and motivated a relentless pursuit of higher levels of all skills - of infantry nature and medical etc.

One also reads of the horror stories from other wars where new recruits/replacements (aka FNGs) were treated poorly and often sacrificed or rejected by those they were posted in to join. We needed to draw them in and look after them as we really needed them as we were always numerically challenged.

What assisted in this was how quickly the new soldiers were blooded in combat (in most cases within days of joining the unit) and as such were "initiated" into the close personal network of relationships at troop/stick level.

I measured success by how the peer pressure worked. In the early days (1973 in my terms) a troopie was deemed to be smart if he knew how to beat the system. By 1977 the better the soldiering skills of the individual the more the respect they attracted from their peers. We would sit and discuss how we could do things better - which would translate into more enemy kills and fewer own forces KIA/WIA which was a vast improvement in approach over earlier times.

[JMA]

Came across this in a book I am currently reading and thought would also be valid in the case of this book.

Finally if any young soldiers of today should chance to read this book, they may understand that while the face of war may alter, some things have not changed since Joshua stood before Jericho and Xenophon marched to the sea. May they come safe to bedtime, and all well. – George MacDonald Fraser in the introduction to his book “Quartered Safe Out Here”.

[JMA]

... a means of delivery into battle.

[davidbfpo]

Mark aka JMA,

You are 100% right to commend:

George MacDonald Fraser in the introduction to his book “Quartered Safe Out Here”.

As the WW2 generation pass on I fear the British Imperial 14th Army will fade away, so we end up with a Euro-centric focus, plus North Africa.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by davidbfpo

Mark aka JMA,

You are 100% right to commend:

As the WW2 generation pass on I fear the British Imperial 14th Army will fade away, so we end up with a Euro-centric focus, plus North Africa.

This book is full of deja vu moments even though I was never there. As the man says ... the face of war may have changed but there are many experiences which are universal. Like this one:

Corporal Little had paused to scan with his binoculars, and I was crossing the crest of the little bund when there was a sharp pfft! in the air above me, followed a little later by a distant crack. If the others had reacted quickly, I'd have done the same, but Little simply squatted down, and the other two looked around before following suit; there was no sudden hitting of the deck or cries of alarm. Little just said: "Gidoon, Jock," and continued his scan. (page 38)

This passage reminds me of post #99 above titled “Hey, Yank! You had better get down. That bastard is shooting at you!” and a number from personal memory.

Well written personal accounts such as this book leave me saying yes when he recounts experiences and feelings with which - through my own experiences - I can identify. This is authentic military writing at its best.

Buy the book: Quartered Safe Out Here - George MacDonald Fraser for two bucks or so.

What is so wonderful about good military books (and probably others too) is that when they are read every say 10 years you draw as much from the the book as the first time but from a different perspective - its like reading a new and different book.

.

[JMA]

From the Rhodesian COIN manual:

SECTION 6: ENCOUNTER ACTIONS

General

Encounters with terrorists are sudden, short, and often so unexpected that the opportunity to inflict casualties is lost. What is required is immediate, positive and offensive action.

For this reason it is essential for simple encounter actions to be taught and thoroughly practiced. It is impractical to attempt to cover every contingency by committing to paper numerous "drills," because not only would they tend to cramp initiative but they would not be read or digested or remembered in the stress of action. It is, however, important to teach an action to cope with any situation commonly met. The principles underlying the action must be simplicity, aggression, s peed and flexibility.

Before a patrol leaves its base, the commander in his briefing should include directions for encounter action. This is necessary each time because patrols vary in strength and Organization according to the nature of their tasks. In addition, the mention of the encounter actions applicable to the operation will act as a reminder to the troops taking part and so help them to avoid being surprised.

A high standard of weapons training, marksmanship and a thorough under- standing and instinctive awareness of weapon capabilities and limitations will ensure that encounter actions are successfully executed.
The Encounter Actions

It is important to note that although encounter actions are usually taught on a section basis, they can be adopted for use by a platoon. These actions are applicable to the varied forms of terrain and in all cases normal infantry minor tactics or section and platoon battle drills usually apply after the initial contact. These encounter actions are a sound framework on which leaders at all levels should build as their experience dictates. it should be remembered, however, that no action, drill or order will achieve success unless the leader and men have practiced them to a stage of instinctive action, reflex and immediate reaction to firm and confident initiative on the part of the leader.

If a patrol is accompanied by persons who have little or no knowledge of encounter actions, e.g., guides, informers, surrendered terrorists, etc., the patrol leader should keep them strictly under control and in his view. These persons should be briefed as thoroughly as possible before the patrol starts. It may prove as well to rehearse encounter actions for these persons or even for inexperienced troops before a patrol moves out on operations.

Encounters with enemy could fall under one of the following headings:

Situation A. The initiative is with the military forces (terrorists seen first). Reaction: Immediate ambush.

Situation B. The initiative is split between the military forces and the enemy (simultaneous sighting). Reaction: Immediate offensive action.

Situation C. The initiative is with the terrorist (military forces are fired on with small arms or are ambushed). Reaction: Immediate offensive action to an enemy ambush.

Action for Situation A.
This will be used for situations when terrorists are seen first by the military forces.

Explanation of action.

* Leading elements give silent signals.

* Depending on the cover and distance, military forces make any reasonably silent attempt to go to ground in the best possible fire position. Minimum movement and silence may prove vital. Fire will be opened only on the orders of the patrol commander or in the event of the position being detected by the enemy.

* The commander now makes a quick assessment and issues silent signals/orders accordingly. His aim must be to eliminate as many terrorists as possible using the closest range and the best selected killing ground.



Note: The above actions are in effect a minor ambush. At troop level it is not normally possible to deploy into a particular area. At section level it may be possible to move everyone into specific positions if movement is acceptable and the terrorists are approaching along a definite route, i.e., a track, river bed or game trail.

Action for Situation B.
Immediate offensive action may be taken when military forces:

* Encounter sentries outside a terrorist base perimeter;

* Encounter part of the terrorist base perimeter;

* Encounter a moving terrorist group;

* Encounter a visible static terrorist group (in a base, at a resting place, drawing water).

Explanation of the action.

* Elements in contact or in close proximity put down a heavy volume of controlled fire with the aim of winning the firefight and eliminating terrorists. It may be possible for these elements to execute immediate skirmishing. The maximum use of grenades and light mortars should be made.

* Patrol commander makes a quick appreciation and plan and issues orders for the required action.

* If an assault is to take place, the route taken for deployment and assault depends on the ground. Consideration must be given to the deployment of cut-off groups, possibly using the patrol reserve. The assault plan must include covering fire.

* Throughout the preliminary stages of this action, the patrol commander must ensure that the firefight is won and the cut-off groups are moved into positions if at all possible.

* Normal reorganization should take p the assault i.e., face after all-around defense, clearance/security patrols, thorough search of the area, reporting the contact. But, if at all possible, contact with the enemy should be maintained with immediate follow-up action.



Action for Situation C.
This action may be used when military forces are ambushed and in situations where part of the military force patrol is pinned down.

Note: In the case of most situations detailed below, the military forces will not be able to confirm, until much later in the resulting action, the strength of the enemy.

Explanation of the action.

* Elements under fire or in close proximity go to ground and put down a heavy volume of controlled fire with the aim of winning the fire-fight and eliminating terrorists. It may be possible for these elements to execute immediate skirmishing. The maximum use of grenades and light mortars should be made.

* Patrol commander makes a quick appreciation and plan and issues orders for the required action.

* If an assault is to take place, the route taken for deployment and assault depends on the ground. Consideration must be given to the deployment of cut-off groups, possibly using the patrol reserve. The assault plan must include covering fire.



* Throughout the preliminary stages of this action, the patrol commander must ensure that the firefight is won and the cut-off groups are moved into positions if at all possible.

* Normal reorganization should take place after the assault, i.e., all-around defense, clearance/security patrols, thorough search of the area, reporting the contact. However, contact with the enemy should be maintained with immediate follow-up action.

However, where the whole patrol is pinned down, the group will have to extricate itself by maximum fire and maneuvering. Only then can subsequent action be taken as a result of an appreciation and plan, which may be either offensive action, or a withdrawal, depending on the casualties sustained and the strength of the enemy.

When a battle is at close range, the side that opens fire and applies the heavier and more accurate weight of fire will win. Skirmishing movement will consolidate the firefight. The encounter actions, therefore, are normally "Go to ground, win the firefight.

Subsequent action is based on the commander's initiative.

To some extent, the application of the actions explained above is affected by a patrol formation. If the formation has a leading element of approximately one-third of the local strength and the patrol commander moves into a position from which he can command and control any battle, the normal principles of fire and maneuver can be successfully applied. In all cases, the basic principles of a platoon in battle must be applied by the commander to the circumstances of the situation.

It is most important to emphasize that there are three main actions that take place:

* Go to ground.

* Win the firefight.

* Concurrent with a. and b. above, the commander must quickly assess the situation and give appropriate orders. Whenever possible, the patrol Commander is to keep his superior headquarters fully informed about the contact, i.e., what has happened, where it is, what the terrorists are doing and what the military forces are intending to do.

[JMA]

Photo page from the book:

[zealot66]

This is a great thread. Much appreciation for the contributors. The article I wrote for sofrep.com was just an introduction in short hand and expose the RLI to a wider range of people. Its simply a piece of military history that doesn't get much attention...

[JMA]

...in September 1960 the half trained RLI was deployed to Northern Rhodesia and positioned along the then Belgian Congo border when the decolonization process (predictably) turned into chaos.

The then Major Digger Essex-Clark remembers:

Our training was based on the standard British Army and identical Rhodesian Army systems. The difficulty was weapon-training space, with the firing ranges being a long drive to the Woollendale Range complexes out of Bulawayo. The old RAF Kumalo airfield provided adequate space for drill training and the hullabaloo of sounds from the words of command and instruction from that quarter were constant except at night. The few quickly attached British Army volunteer instructors from the UK fitted in very successfully and comfortably. Their joining us seemed to be one successful act by Army Headquarters and our Army staff in London. They were much needed.

Therefore, before we deployed to the Congo-Northern Rhodesia border the level of training had reached no further than what we call in Australia ‘Basic All Arms Training’, which, in simple terms meant that all recruits knew well how to drill as a squad, platoon and company, and fire and maintain a rifle, and an LMG (Bren), and how to dress well, stand tall and how to salute. They had practised arming and throwing a 36 hand grenade and some had thrown a small number of live grenades. However, they were long short of being trained infantry and did not know how to fight and win tactically as a team at section, platoon, or company level. Their NCOs knew them only from barracks maintenance and tidiness, the drill square and rifle/weapons ranges at Woollendale rather than deployed tactically in the field. We had not been able to gauge their quality as infantrymen as part of a team. Nor had we the time to train them in map reading or navigation skills, radio voice procedures or radio discipline and the NATO phonetic alphabet.

They had not completed what most Commonwealth and British oriented armies title their ‘special to corps training’ which includes, for infantry, team training at section and platoon level in tactical deployment, such as fire and movement tactical techniques, or defensive preparing and siting, plus active patrolling, and they had had no battle inoculation experience. They were, therefore, not effectively trained or practised infantrymen by any standards. This level of training that they had not yet achieved is often titled ‘initial employment training’ (IET) and follows basic training; and none had completed this. Nor could any of our recruits or our junior NCOs control artillery or mortar fire, or close air support.

However, many had militarily useful civilian skills such as first aid and vehicle maintenance; and some could read a map reasonably well, and use a prismatic compass, but not easily give grid references or do resection to find their position on a map. Most were not ‘bush aware’ and many from city life, or from overseas, were initially and understandably very nervous of the bush environment. Fortunately, we had many ‘bush aware’ Rhodesians and South Africans who helped them get over this apprehension of the natural environment and its only rarely threatening wild animals.

These were the semi-trained novices that we took to the Congo border. We were a far cry from the bush aware, well trained, tactically competent and combat-hardened infantrymen of the RLI in the middle and latter stages of the bush war. Our men in September 1960 were no more than warrior puppies needing much more collective training and sound leadership by corporals, sergeants and young officers. This they got.

Digger Essex-Clark left the service at the break-up of the Federation and returned to Australia where he served in the military, retiring finally with the rank of Brigadier.

[JMA]

More of the contributing authors introduced:

[JMA]

... John Ashburner recalls (extracts):

In early 1970 Capt Reid-Daly and other officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and those of us with tracking experience were deployed into Mozambique to assist the Portuguese Army Praquedistas (Grupos Especiais Praquedistas). This operational tracking experience proved very valuable and successful because the Portuguese troops never followed up the tracks of FRELIMO. So when we followed up their tracks we caught them totally off guard and killed many of them.

...

Another lesson learned in the early days of tracking was when someone had the notion that due to the contacts being initiated at close range, the tracker should carry a Browning automatic shotgun. I tried this for one contact that occurred in the Mount Darwin area. The weapon was useless as all it did was to make the insurgent run faster due to a backside full of buckshot. This weapon was quickly dropped and we went back to the proven and trusted faithful 7.62 FN rifle which was so effective in dropping the terrs in their tracks throughout the bush war.

...

The ability to track is something that comes from an inborn instinct and being able to use all five senses, and from living and experiencing all the things that happen in the bush. The more contact and experience you have with wildlife, the better the bushman/tracker you become. Some people will only progress so far while others will have the uncanny ability to become highly skilled.

Being a tracker demands great courage, mental fitness due to high levels of concentration, as well as being physically fit with good soldiering abilities. Following human tracks differs from following animal spoor. Humans are far more intelligent and dangerous. Tracking people can be extremely difficult if they know they are being followed.

[JMA]

... a few hours work:



Good rear view of gunners webbing. Centre rear pouch probably containing some rats, two water bottles then the pouches to carry the belts. Got to have a bedroll in case of a night out. Travel light.

Oh yes, the bandana was normally worn to cover blond or light covered hair. Better than having to rub camo creme into it.