Green on Blue: causes and responses (merged thread)

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by carl

There is a matter of degree of course but in our history we have worked successfully with people from radically different cultures ..

I think you may wish to read a little more deeply into that thought. There was friction in many of the cases you cite, just didn't arise with folks who were into multi-generation blood feuds.

We have even successfully worked with Muslim men from a culture just as prickly if not more so than the Afghans, those being the Moro members of the Philippine Constabulary.

Also, the Moro Constabulary guys in the 5th Region were told by their Imams and Datus to go and to do good -- and they did. They were also locally receruited and employed. With the Afghans, we deliberately avoided local recruiting or getting elders and Imams involved. That doesn't mean we didn't know better, it means we deliberately decided to support other values. A mistake? Sure, one of many -- but stemming not so much from ignorance as from egos and arrogance "we know what's best..."

Having worked with Filipinos to include Muslims and with Afghans, I disagree with that assessment of temperament....

The important thing is that these killings may result in us getting bounced out of there much sooner and in a much more confused way than we are planning on. Maybe not of course, but I think that is more than possible edging into probable territory.

Given the extremely confused way we are now leaving, I doubt more confusion would be possible but if it were, it might even help. More speed in leaving, a more likely outcome would not be at all bad.

That reaction to set off factors may be different in Afghanistan than elsewhere is a very good point. But we have been there for 11 years.

No, we have not. We have been there for 11 one year or less tours, a very different thing.

We should know how things differ and make or have made changes in order to allow for those differences.

We do know but we cannot change the way we do business. Many thing we do are not really very smart but they are deeply imbedded and both societal and Congressional pressures as well as long standing policies preclude any significant change. You and I can talk about what's wrong until we're both blue in the face, we can agree on much of what should be changed but in the end, I'll tell you it will not be changed and you'll say that it isn't right. I'll then say "you're correct -- but it still won't change." We've already done that on this and similar topics. No sense in doing it again.

However, judging by the number of murders and their increasing frequency, we haven't.

Oh, many have -- problem is that most of 'em figure out what to do just before they rotate and and new guy comes in, won't listen to the old guy because he's smart (ego and arrogance again...) and proceeds to make the same mistakes...

I don't think things had to come to this point. But they have and I don't think much, if anything can be done about it.

In reverse order, I agree little to nothing can or will be done about it but disagree that it didn't have to come to this point. It did. The minute George W. Bush decided to change the game plan and stay in Afghanistan, it was pre-ordained. I was telling folks that right after I came on this board five years ago. Nothing's changed. Nothing. Except we told the world we were going to leave which just encouraged everyone involved -- including the homicidally inclined -- to cock a snook at anything American.

[carl]

we agree on most things, we just use different words and angles to get to the same place.

We did work with all those groups successfully and there was some friction, but not to the point of forcing premature withdrawal because of frequent murders. There are reasons for that, reasons within our control, reasons that you alluded to. The practices that resulted in this mess aren't the result of of ineluctable forces of nature, they are the result of human decision making. Humans can change what they decide, even though the military-political culture seems set in stone. For the moment in this conflict, nothing will change, granted. But that doesn't mean this failure can't be used as a wake up call. It must be used as a wake up call because if we get into a tussle with the Red Chinese and haven't changed our ways, things will go poorly.

You mention that we haven't been in Afghanistan for 11 years. No, we have. United States forces have been in Afghanistan for 11 years. That is what the world, and the American people see. We have been there for 11 years. They don't see that we have had 11 different iterations of United States forces, each so different that we in effect went in and pulled out 11 times. Neither do they see that was something that was fully within our control and that we made a conscious decision to be foolish. Now you are right that the set-in-stone culture made that inevitable. But that can be changed.

In my view the professional military has a special responsibility in trying to change that culture. I just started Losing Small Wars and Ledwidge made a comment about the military profession and the legal and medical ones. The comment highlighted to me that the military profession, as practiced in the US now at least at the high levels, isn't up to the professional standards of the docs and lawyers. They must give their best professional advice whether the client/patient wants to hear it or not. IF they don't they can be and sometimes are held accountable. Our high end military doesn't meet or have to meet the same standards of professional behavior. They go along with things they know, or should know, can't work by hiding behind the "can do" attitude or complicated power point presentations about how things aren't really bad. (They're really good, see look at slide 37!) Or they'll shrug their shoulders and say we'll look into it. These murders are a fine example of the incompetence of the high level US military. They have been ramping up for several years and the top US commander when asked why, makes a guess about Ramadan because he doesn't know.

The US military must take a hard look at itself, especially/mainly the stars and multi-stars, figure what is wrong and articulate a way to fix it. That would move them up to the level of professionalism at least of the docs and lawyers. They have to at least be able to tell the patient/client the truth and continue to tell the truth even if the patient doesn't want to hear it. I of course, can't make that happen. I don't know who can or how they can. I just know that if they don't we will have more trouble and maybe really big trouble.

That second quote in your last post: only the first sentence was mine. Where did the rest of it come from?

Absolutely. Your assessment of the relative pricklyness of the people you worked with must be countenanced. But you didn't work with the Moros of 1900. You worked with the Moros of much later. Judging from my reading (from within the safe confines of my US armchair), they weren't the same Moros. And I'm not sure what propensity for multi-generational blood feuds have to do with an argument at a checkpoint that results in two US and one ANSF dead, as happened yesterday.

[jcustis]

Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon

I would like to offer three ideas for consideration.

First, reduce or limit the number of general purpose forces working directly with ANSF.

Second, create a Cultural Liaison Officer who is imbedded in units working directly with ANSF. Their job is to observe and identify potential cultural issues that could fester and explode into violence. There would be one on the ISAF side and one on the ANSF side. The would consult together and make recommendations for interventions.

Third, institute a Sulha style conflict resolution system. The Sulha’s task is to facilitate transformation of the disputants’ as well as their clans from a desire for revenge (with its potential implication of endless blood revenge cycles) to a willingness to forgive, binding all disputants, for all generations, past, present, and future. The Sulha is based on a mix of mediation and arbitration applications performed interchangeably by a Sulha committee ( Jaha) composed of community dignitaries—men with standing and clout. On the “mediation side,” Sulha strives to reconcile differences between the disputants’; on the “arbitration side,” the decision of the Jaha is final and binding. (Pely, D. (2010). Honor: The Sulha's main dispute resolution tool. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 28(1), 67-81. doi:10.1002/crq.20013) The intent would be to arbitrate disputes in a system that would be acceptable to the Afghans.

The overall intent would be to identify problems at the unit level and resolve disputes there. Where this is not possible the alternative would be to personnel actions to separate the ISAF or ANSF personnel who are most antagonizing the situation.

This sounds like good stock for a Joint Forces Quarterly or PRISM article that you should write.

There's been a lot of studying and admiring of the problem in this thread, and you've had the most concrete recommendations.

At the tactical level, even if we cannot put a finger on 100% of the causation, we need better means to deter, prevent, and defeat future attacks. I think we are headed in the right direction, but in the wake of some of the personal protection measures that are being implemented aboard secure sites (magazine inserted and Condition 1 or 3 at all times), we probably stand to fan flames over some parts of the problem. I hope we can avoid a cycle of damned if you do and damned if you don't.

To shift trails a bit, it is my opinion (alone) that we really need to consider Afghan sensibilities over women as well. I'm not convinced that the employment of women in FETs, in support of ETTs, and through other means that have them brushing up against ANSF, makes the situation of Green-on-Blue any easier to resolve. I think it in fact heightens the risks of an Afghan male losing his bearing.

The same could be said though for building COPs and FOBs where one can get ten flavors of ice cream in one of the most dismal parts of Afghanistan, and then inviting ANSF over who still sleep in hand-wrought mud buildings. Don't read the above paragraph and assume I am a male chauvinist (sp?), but it comes to mind among many other things we could probably stand to do differently over there.

Sidenote-Has anyone done any scrounging to see if the Soviets had similar problems during their time in AFG and trying to prop up a government?

[davidbfpo]

Jon asked:

Has anyone done any scrounging to see if the Soviets had similar problems during their time in AFG and trying to prop up a government?

I have looked thought the 'Soviet Experience in Afghanistan' thread, plus some of the linked articles and found nothing. There is one article (Post No.12) that refers to KGB advisers undergoing a two year training before deployment and concerns over "Muj" infiltration of Afghan forces.

IIRC the Soviet intervention suffered from Afghan Army units defecting or refusing to fight, not individual acts of murder. There is long-standing story that a massacre of Soviet advisers and families in Herat before the 1980 intervention, but in my recent reading this appears to be a legend.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by carl

we agree on most things, we just use different words and angles to get to the same place.

Mmmm. To an extent but we have significant philosophical differences and when that's added to the experience variations, it's more than different words and angles...

We did work with all those groups successfully and there was some friction, but not to the point of forcing premature withdrawal because of frequent murders.

I doubt the frequent murders will cause a withdrawal. I also suspect that the friction involved in those other situations was seen as less benign than it is looked at historically.

There are other problems. Take KATUSAs for example, their baser options were constrained by very, very rigid, almost sadistic ROK Army discipline -- the Afghans don't operate that way. The Moros in the Constabulary were constrained by their Chiefs and Imams. The Afghans have Elders and Imams but Afghan culture is far more individualistic and less communitarian; those community leaders are heeded pretty much only when it suits.

For the moment in this conflict, nothing will change, granted. But that doesn't mean this failure can't be used as a wake up call. It must be used as a wake up call because if we get into a tussle with the Red Chinese and haven't changed our ways, things will go poorly.

Perhaps you missed it in your reading but things always go poorly for us in every war -- and the lower the intensity of those wars, the longer it takes us to learn and get down to business. So, your statement is correct -- we will not change and if we get into difficulties with the Chinese, things will go poorly for us. Only when we bring masses of people into the forces and they and the enemy of the moment FORCE new thinking do we start improving (Note that not since we were in WW II have we faced an enemy significant enough and / or with capability to force that; not once since 1945). As I said, you and I can wish as much as we want to but that is not going to change...

...United States forces have been in Afghanistan for 11 years. That is what the world, and the American people see.

I cannot dictate what the world or most Americans (including you, apparently -- or do you??? ) believe they see. Nor am I much concerned about them or that -- it does not change the reality, if they miss that, it's a lick on them...

They don't see that we have had 11 different iterations of United States forces, each so different that we in effect went in and pulled out 11 times. Neither do they see that was something that was fully within our control and that we made a conscious decision to be foolish. Now you are right that the set-in-stone culture made that inevitable. But that can be changed.

Well, maybe you do see but you're still living in a dream world. Yes, it can be changed but while to you there is cause for such change to be forced, I can assure you that most of the political and military establishment and most definitely the Congress do NOT see it that way. It can be changed but it will not be.

The comment highlighted to me that the military profession, as practiced in the US now at least at the high levels, isn't up to the professional standards of the docs and lawyers.

Given the significant problems with the Health Care and Legal industries, you'll pardon me if I find that allegory totally laughable. That doesn't mean the upper echelons of the Military are good or even marginally competent, they are not (and anyone who believes that is not a systemic problem isn't really looking at why it's that way...) -- but simply that the Medical and Legal profession are little if any better and IMO anyone who thinks they are needs to undertake deeper study of all three.

The US military must take a hard look at itself, especially/mainly the stars and multi-stars, figure what is wrong and articulate a way to fix it. That would move them up to the level of professionalism at least of the docs and lawyers.

Most of them know what's wrong, however, they are systemically constrained and cannot do what you wish. Since I strongly disagree on the levels of professionalism of the docs and lawyers -- and at my age and with my background, I bet I've had far more dealings with both those than you have -- I'll simply point out that all three professions have systemic constraints that limit their ability to truly force change and increase effectiveness. It is what it is and the best approach is to live with it and try to circumvent those systemic thin gs to the extent possible.

...I just know that if they don't we will have more trouble and maybe really big trouble.

Almost certainly -- that's the way it's been for over 200 years; unlikely to change barring a disaster; those forced most earlier changes. A few changes occur without that impetus or catalyst but they come very slowly.

That second quote in your last post: only the first sentence was mine. Where did the rest of it come from?

Bad edit on my part, now corrected. Sorry.

And I'm not sure what propensity for multi-generational blood feuds have to do with an argument at a checkpoint that results in two US and one ANSF dead, as happened yesterday.

Then you have missed the most important point in this sub-thread. Violence in problem solving leads to feuds. A history of such conflicts while present to an extent in some of the other culture herein mentioned (to include us in the West and in the US in particular) is, in Afghanistan which has not undergone the leavening / 'civilizing' processes of most modern nations including the Philippines, literally defines the Afghans. The propensity to get hacked off at a slight, real or perceived and take violent reprisal action is deeply embedded due to that lack of leavening. You or I get insulted, we may get angry, may even get even -- but neither of us is likely to have first thoughts of the offending person being dead at our feet. Some gang bangers here operate that way but not too many of even those; in Afghanistan, it is the norm. It can and likely will be changed but it'll take more than has occurred in the last 50 years there to cause that change.

Check the LINK. It was set in Iraq where some elements of the culture exist but the Arabs are sort of laid back about it, they tend to be patient and wait for an opportunity in order to avoid adverse consequences -- the Afghans do not do laid back, they do not wait, they're hotheads and they're into instant response and consequences be damned...

[Steve Blair]

I could bore people with tales of Indian scouts during the Frontier Army period of our own history, but won't. Suffice it to say, though, that the relationship there was not smooth or painless (for either side).

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by Ken White

So, your statement is correct -- we will not change and if we get into difficulties with the Chinese, things will go poorly for us. Only when we bring masses of people into the forces and they and the enemy of the moment FORCE new thinking do we start improving (Note that not since we were in WW II have we faced an enemy significant enough and / or with capability to force that; not once since 1945).

I'd like to intervene and assert that the U.S.Army did not improve in WW2 until after the Battle of the Kasserine Pass in early 1943.

I've so far not seen any evidence for quality improvements by the influx of fresh recruits by early '42.

The idea of how fresh troops bring change in themselves doesn't sound plausible to me anyway, for they could not have much impact prior to becoming majors - and that lasts a while, at the very least about two years in World War mode of operations (90 day wonders who miraculously survived their early engagements and keep getting field-promoted) afaik.

- - - - -

I also like to point out that the North Koreans and Chinese on their offensives should be counted as capable enough to force some improvements on the U.S.Army. The lasting effect of their offensive infantry actions in hilly/mountainous terrain (prior to the Korean War turning into a static war) was astonishingly marginal, but they did exert a lot of pressure and generated some thorough embarrassment on parts of army and marines.

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by davidbfpo

IIRC the Soviet intervention suffered from Afghan Army units defecting or refusing to fight, not individual acts of murder.

The Afghans of the 80's were mostly different Afghans, and the society was different. A generation worth of civil war has been added since, and this has disrupted the civil society, customs, mentality and much else that could be considered relevant.

[Dayuhan]

Originally Posted by Ken White

The Moros in the Constabulary were constrained by their Chiefs and Imams.

Moros who joined the Constabulary generally did so because their datu (chief) decided to back the Americans, generally as a way to gain leverage over other datus or to gain the inside track on positions and largesse the Americans were expected to dole out. The datus were fairly astute and in many cases the tactic was effective. The individual soldiers would be unlikely to turn on Americans because in their eyes they were still in the service of their own datu and any move of that sort would be a move against their own clan.

Afghanistan is of course completely different. I'm always hesitant to accept the idea that we used to know how to do certain things, and subsequently forgot. More often the circumstances have changed to the point that what worked before no longer works.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

I'd like to intervene and assert that the U.S.Army did not improve in WW2 until after the Battle of the Kasserine Pass in early 1943.

I've so far not seen any evidence for quality improvements by the influx of fresh recruits by early '42.

I agree and have before -- it was actually 1944 before the influx of new people gained enough seniority to challenge the system. That applies to all services.

The idea of how fresh troops bring change in themselves doesn't sound plausible to me anyway, for they could not have much impact prior to becoming majors - and that lasts a while, at the very least about two years in World War mode of operations (90 day wonders who miraculously survived their early engagements and keep getting field-promoted) afaik.

Also agree with that -- and have long said so here. That's mostly why I say it was '44 before they had an impact.

I also like to point out that the North Koreans and Chinese on their offensives should be counted as capable enough to force some improvements on the U.S.Army. The lasting effect of their offensive infantry actions in hilly/mountainous terrain (prior to the Korean War turning into a static war) was astonishingly marginal, but they did exert a lot of pressure and generated some thorough embarrassment on parts of army and marines.

Mostly correct and they did force some minor improvements, unfortunately in that respect but fortunately in most respects Korea ended too soon for many of those improvements to survive the onset of Peace...

Mostly, out of Viet Nam, we got bad habits...

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

Afghanistan is of course completely different. I'm always hesitant to accept the idea that we used to know how to do certain things, and subsequently forgot. More often the circumstances have changed to the point that what worked before no longer works.

Yes. There's also the fact that people interpret 'history' differently and thus 'learn' varied lessons -- witness Carl and I -- or Gian and I...

Certainly the cultural differences of those groups Carl cites offer significantly different circumstances. The societal norms of even as late as the 1960s were far more permissive of the application of force or behavioral rules (both US and others...). Many differences.

All compounded if one cannot assure that one puts the most qualified person in charge, insure said person correctly interprets the lessons of the past and is then permitted (by law, societal pressure, superiors or other possible impediments) at least the potential to employ them, then awesome success is not probable. In fact, marginal success may not be...

[TheCurmudgeon]

Originally Posted by jcustis

This sounds like good stock for a Joint Forces Quarterly or PRISM article that you should write.

Not there yet, still doing research. Contacting the key players in the things I have read to get further information. If the stars align I will try to set up a symposium type event at the campus I work at to discuss the issue. If I can't do that I will put what I can together and see who might want to read it.

Originally Posted by jcustis

At the tactical level, even if we cannot put a finger on 100% of the causation, we need better means to deter, prevent, and defeat future attacks. I think we are headed in the right direction, but in the wake of some of the personal protection measures that are being implemented aboard secure sites (magazine inserted and Condition 1 or 3 at all times), we probably stand to fan flames over some parts of the problem. I hope we can avoid a cycle of damned if you do and damned if you don't.

My concern is that we do not even recognize the warning signs until that warning sign is a barrel in our face. We don't understand the culture of the people we are working with and have no interest in trying. We are teaching them so they must fall in line with our methods, end of story ... at least until something bad happens.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon

We don't understand the culture of the people we are working with and have no interest in trying. We are teaching them so they must fall in line with our methods, end of story ... at least until something bad happens.

Moral of that is do not use a crew of HVAC technicians to do EMT jobs. You cannot and will not fix that basic incompatibility problem with all the edumacational finesse in the world. The GPF milieu, Army or Marine, will never do the 'COIN' thing properly -- nor should it be able to do so. Use SF for that; if there aren't enough of them, you best have a Plan B...

As an aside, the application of 'metrics' in warfare usually is quite mistaken -- though we are indeed foolishly wedded to the concept.

[Steve Blair]

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

Afghanistan is of course completely different. I'm always hesitant to accept the idea that we used to know how to do certain things, and subsequently forgot. More often the circumstances have changed to the point that what worked before no longer works.

Typically what happens is a handful of individuals may have worked out what works (or what comes close to working). Those ideas, which are very situational and contextual, are either ignored or imperfectly documented by the institution in question, which then assumes that they are prescriptive ideas that work in any situation. The institution is not good at teaching people how to learn or comprehend their environment...that takes time and skills that may not be easily learned or taught (especially when the system places a premium on more technical or quantifiable skills). We don't do well what we don't value, and can usually be counted on to incorrectly document those things that we don't value. Thus we may build one heck of a bridge, but we'll insist on putting one where it isn't needed, or saddle a group with maintenance costs that they can't possibly afford.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Originally Posted by Ken White

Moral of that is do not use a crew of HVAC technicians to do EMT jobs. You cannot and will not fix that basic incompatibility problem with all the edumacational finesse in the world. The GPF milieu, Army or Marine, will never do the 'COIN' thing properly -- nor should it be able to do so. Use SF for that; if there aren't enough of them, you best have a Plan B...

Agreed. But as you have pointed out on numerous occasions that is what will only happen in a perfect world.

If what I am thinking about works it may be applicable in other places (think JIIM). Not sure any of it is worth spit, but keep thinking that I ought to do something, even if its wrong.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon

Agreed. But as you have pointed out on numerous occasions that is what will only happen in a perfect world.

Not really, I have pointed out that has happened since 1961 (and looks as though it may well occur in the future). However, it does not necessarily have to happen in even an imperfect world. That's not quite the same thing as hoping for a perfect world that will never appear.

... keep thinking that I ought to do something, even if its wrong.

That is truly the American way...

The old US Army dictum was "Never apologize, never complain; always be five minutes early; and do something even if it's wrong." Worked well enough until 1918. Regrettably, we have not changed with the times; the time available for course corrections that then existed no longer is available. I think that approach is very much responsible for all the errors in the small wars arena and in many Army problems since 1961.

Added to that, the political class will seize upon any scholarly study, flawed or perfect, that supports what they want to do regardless of the merit or cost benefit ratio of that idea. It's the old "be careful what you wish for, you may get it..."

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Steve Blair

The institution is not good at teaching people how to learn or comprehend their environment...that takes time and skills that may not be easily learned or taught (especially when the system places a premium on more technical or quantifiable skills). * We don't do well what we don't value, and can usually be counted on to incorrectly document those things that we don't value...(emphasis added / kw)

Terribly, scarily, disgustingly true...

* Not only regardless of value but tilted toward simplicity and ease of acquisition. Witness the Army's 'return' to the Three Event Physical Fitness Test instead of implementing the hard earned combat focused fitness requirements which the three event test will not reflect in any way. However, it'll be easier to administer and score and will offer 'an even playing field to all.' Sad.

[davidbfpo]

Abu M is critical of the proposed new ISAF general:

The cultures, politics, tribes and peoples of Afghanistan are at least as complex as those of ancient Gaul, yet we Americans are so arrogant to think that we can send officers there with no experience and, owing to our superior knowledge of combat operations, watch them succeed. We will then send units which have never deployed to Afghanistan to partner with Afghan forces and wonder why they do not get along.

This is madness. The casual arrogance with which the U.S. military has approached the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has a direct relation to the difficulty with which we have fought each war. That we think we can send a commander to Afghanistan with no prior knowledge of Afghanistan and watch him be successful in the eleventh year of the conflict shows that after eleven years of conflict, we really don't know too much about Afghanistan. And we might not know too much about conflict either.

Note his post's title provides some context and the link is:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...ini-rants.html

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by Ken White

The old US Army dictum was "Never apologize, never complain; always be five minutes early; and do something even if it's wrong."

Maybe it's five minutes early, but that's usually overshadowed by being a couple years late...

[TheCurmudgeon]

Originally Posted by Ken White

The old US Army dictum was "Never apologize, never complain; always be five minutes early; and do something even if it's wrong." Worked well enough until 1918. Regrettably, we have not changed with the times; the time available for course corrections that then existed no longer is available. I think that approach is very much responsible for all the errors in the small wars arena and in many Army problems since 1961.

That all depends on who thinks I am wrong now doesn't it ...

Originally Posted by Ken White

Added to that, the political class will seize upon any scholarly study, flawed or perfect, that supports what they want to do regardless of the merit or cost benefit ratio of that idea. It's the old "be careful what you wish for, you may get it..."

Fear of what someone else will do with what I write is not going to change my mind about writing it ... it will only change where I decide to send it.