All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread)

[Fuchs]

... and now imagine the length or pass time of a reinforced infantry company driving in vehicles with an average of only 2-3 men per vehicle, with proper military safety spacing (100 m, at the very least 50 m) and economical cruise speed of 80 kph.

Next, imagine what happens with all those vehicles once infantry dismounts to sweep a village. Would an entire platoon stay back to secure the many, many vehicles so school-aged boys cannot set them aflame?



This vehicle size (capacity) is of interest for dispersed actions, for skirmishing on an operational scale. It's no good logistically as general infantry vehicle.

[B.Smitty]

You can fit an entire squad on a suitably equipped HMMWV troop carrier.

http://www.amgeneral.com/files/specs...stic-04-10.pdf

That means at minimum four troop carriers per platoon.

An argument could be made to stretch that to six and use a mix or troop carriers and armament carriers.

[Fuchs]

Add reasonable amount of fuel, tools and other equipment, individual backpacks, netting, foodstuff, ammo, one or two crew-served weapons, some AT munitions, spare parts (tires!) ... no more than 6 per vehicle is reasonable.

[B.Smitty]

Six in back plus two up front is fine. With six HMMWVs, even with six additional drivers, there's still enough space for the entire platoon.

Add external stowage racks for rucks, spare tires and other gear.

BAE produced a field-installable armor kit for the M1152 that provides armor protection for troops in back as well as five weapon stations.

http://www.baesystems.com/ProductsSe...152_troop.html

[Fuchs]

There's a difference between theory and practice. In practice, even a 2+ ton truck such as Unimog can be small for a squad of ten simply because of all the gear.

Look at vehicle qty and personnel figures of large formations. The heads/vehicle ratio is surprisingly small even with the use of many large and outright huge vehicles.

I doubt that 10 men with their rucksack, individual weapon, webbing including canteen and other pouches and helmets fit into any of those "stretched Land Rover" or "stretched HMWWV" on a regular basis.

It's furthermore no good idea to use closed canopy vehicleswithout a substantial qty of spare seats in a unit; some vehilces break down and need to beleft behind at times. Which vehicle is going to carry their personnel if there's no spare capacity?

[B.Smitty]

The US manages to fit 37-8 dismounts in 4 Strykers plus mounted element.

Six troop carrier HMMWVs per platoon carrying 2+6 allows for 6 drivers and 42 dismount seats. There's 4-5 extra seats, assuming a similar sized platoon.

That's more room than in the 4 Strykers.

IIRC, the Stryker platoon mounted element is normally 7 soldiers (4 drivers and 3 vehicle commander/gunners). So the ratio of dismounts to vehicle crews is similar between the two organizations. I didn't allot any gunners to the HMMWV platoon, but there is enough "space" for a few, if desired.

[B.Smitty]

Six M1152s at GVW weigh around 33 tonnes. That's the same as two Strykers, or half the weight of a Stryker platoon's vehicles.

Assuming a generous $200k per M1152, you could outfit an entire company with them for the price of one Stryker ICV ($3.8M).

[Firn]

Originally Posted by PsJK Korte

I have to ask what is difference between MRAP and wheeled APC? Because despite googling I am still a little puzzled.

It is all very easy.

Tanks are an essential element of armed maneuver warfare. Yet, even this high-value, powerful weapon remains vulnerable to infantry anti-tank tactics especially in urban or confined environments. Hence, infantry accompany tanks to assist in suppressing possible anti-tank action.

During the Second World War, the Soviet tacticians incorporated joint infantry and tank attacks against German forces, both serving in roles to protect the other. Performance was less than desirable as infantry lacked the armored protection and rapid mobility of the tank, and thus unarmoured troops were vulnerable to enemy fire. This led to employment of armoured infantry carriage vehicles known as APCs which overcame these shortcomings.(Perrett 1987:65)

After the war, Soviet military analysed the high infantry casualty rate of combined infantry-tank attacks and concluded the lack of APCs were a major cause. This vulnerability in maneuver warfare was given high priority to remedy. The Soviet military industrial complex had its own designs, Lend-Lease vehicles such as the M3 Half-track and newly acquired German SdKfz 251 to serve as reference. (Perrett 1987:65)

The BTR-152 was one of the first Soviet armoured infantry vehicle after the Second World War. It was developed from November 1946 at ZiS plant by a team (it included K. M. Androsow, A. P. Pietrenko, W. F. Rodionow and P. P. Czerniajew)[1] led by B. M. Fitterman. The first two prototypes were completed in May 1947 and were followed by three experimental series. The vehicle was adopted by the Soviet Army on 24 March 1950. The vehicle was based on the existing ZiS-151 truck chassis. Despite an improved engine, the addition of 5 tons of armour resulted in the vehicle having insufficient mobility.

So first you take a truck chassis and uparmor it to make an APC looking like an MRAP. Sadly the heavy armor and truck heritage can result in a vehicle which lacks offroad mobility.

The BTR-152 and BTR-40, the first two Soviet mass produced APCs, developed after the Second World War given the Soviet Army useful experience with wheeled armoured personnel carriers. However even as they were designed they weren't suited for the needs of the Soviet Army as they lacked a roof (which was added in later versions designated BTR-152K and BTR-40B respectively). [U]The low combat value of BTR-152 and BTR-40 was exposed during the Suez Crisis when the Egyptian Army used them. This was one of the reasons for which the new APC was developed.[/I][U]

Between 1956 and 1957 a decision was made to convert all rifle and mechanized divisions into new motor rifle divisions and a requirement for a new vehicle was drawn up.

Thus the BRT-60 which "was a revolutionary design for its time" was developed, a 8x8 wheeled APC, fully amphibious and highly mobile, with independent suspension and an armor capable to withstand 7,62mm rounds fired from over 100mm away from each direction. It was introduced in 1960.

(All the links are from Wikipedia)

----

As has been written the design of a modern MRAP is to a good degree the result of trying to get a very high protection against blast mines. Thus the vehicles have a lot of ground clearance and are quite heavy for the numbers of people they transport. The rapid introduction addressing a specific need in a specific environment meant that other aspects as offroad mobility were not as seen as important.

[Fuchs]

German experience was that APCs (SdKfz 251 mostly) halved infantry losses. APCs were only employed in motorised/armoured formations which tended to use aggressive (offensive) tactics, of course.

[Firn]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

German experience was that APCs (SdKfz 251 mostly) halved infantry losses. APCs were only employed in motorised/armoured formations which tended to use aggressive (offensive) tactics, of course.

I always wondered what an impact a (very) considerable numbers of a family of trucks like the Tatra 111 or Unimog would have made on the German war effort, especially in the East. Of course more of anything, be it AFV like tanks or APCs, artillery and ammunition would have had a potentially massive impact, but a great lot of a unexpensive, robust, and highly mobile/mobile family of easily mass-producable might have completely changed the mobility of the German forces. [Lack of key ressources like metal, rubber and especially fuel, but also the lack of capability/skill/ability to handle mass production (of a reduced range of products) like the US had of course their influence on that].

Said that the prices of the new APC/IFV like the Boxer and Freccia are quite stunning. Even for the ever smaller European forces it is pretty much impossible to switch the relevant brigades over to such vehicles. In this case economies of the state and of scale are hitting really hard.

[davidbfpo]

This appears to be the main thread on MRAP and was originally titled 'MRAP JLTV concept of infantry mobility'. It is now: All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread).

There were other threads: What is the MRAPs future in the US Army?, (on SWJ Blog) The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT’s, (ditto) MRAP Future Discussion Paper and Military Claims Victory with V-shaped Truck.

[davidbfpo]

A short article in Foreign Affairs, which ends:

Indeed, even if the United States drove all its MRAPs lemming-like into the Euphrates upon departing Iraq, the vehicles still would have been a bargain, not a boondoggle.

Link:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articl...oney?page=show

[Tukhachevskii]

...thread but someone closed it I'll post it here anyway (it won't quite sound/feel right but what the what).

Now, regardless of what you may all think about the “great” Mike Sparks/Sparky, I always found his concept of “battle-boxes” quite intriguing (nay, sensible?). Looks like someone else has too! Specifically KMW’s Heavily-protected personnel transport. I actually prefer the idea of these than the MRAP fetish now gripping the world’s militaries. I can’t see why an entire battalion couldn’t mount up in these on heavy trucks the logistics chaps would have anyway and be transported into their AO or a friendly rear (). Once there the Battalion would mount up in an APC Squadron/Regiment for movement over the line of departure. Given any army worth its salt would already have heavy 8x8 trucks in its transportation/distribution companies the only real costs would be the actual containers themselves. Furthermore, although I can’t fathom it from the limited literature available currently, Bn’s could be administratively moved by train without needing to debuss from the containers given they seem to be of standard ISO size and could simply be mounted on rail cars. At the rear area RV the containers (plus troops) would simply be lifted onto waiting trucks and “shipped” to their respective formation rear areas where (separate) APC battalions would be waiting for actual combat (did I repeat myself?! I can’t wait to tell my ex ).

[davidbfpo]

Thread re-opened, it must be Spring.

[Tukhachevskii]

Originally Posted by B.Smitty

Six M1152s at GVW weigh around 33 tonnes. That's the same as two Strykers, or half the weight of a Stryker platoon's vehicles.

Assuming a generous $200k per M1152, you could outfit an entire company with them for the price of one Stryker ICV ($3.8M).

... for hard up recession hit armies. If you buy our bog-standard light troop carrier in preference to one from our competitors for your "Toyota Horde" (hat tip to old Wilf) then we'll outfit your vehicle in a number of snazzy colours (unfortunately, due to customer demand, periwinkle blue is no longer avaliable!) /