Africa's Commandos - new book on the RLI

[JMA]

This is an extract from Group Captain Peter Petter-Bowyer's outstanding book on his career in the Rhodesian Air Force:

Winds of Destruction

Op Dingo briefing

Operation DINGO was the codename given to tir attacks on Chimoio and Tembue. Phase One was to be air attack against Chimoio on 23 November 1977. On completion, all helicopters were to move to Mtoko with their contingent of troops and the paratrooper element was to position at New Sarum preparatory to launching the long-range Phase Two attack against Tembue on 25 November.

I knew everything concerning Norman’s airstrike plans because he had involved me in formulating them; but that was all I knew. He had not mentioned the use of ground forces until, at short notice, I learned that I was to be the Admin Base commander for both operations and was to attend a two-phase briefing at New Sarum on Tuesday 22 November. The reason Norman Walsh selected me for the Admin Base task was to give me opportunity to inspect the areas of jet-strikes so that I could analyse the effectiveness of our locally made weapons in live target situations.

One of 3 Squadron’s hangars had been cleared and grandstands from the station sports field had been erected around a large-scale model of Chimoio Base. Present for the briefing were all the service commanders, senior staff officers from COMOPS and all active participants from the Air Force and Army. I remember the noise and excitement levels being incredible. Absolute silence fell when Captain Scotty McCormack of the SAS took centre stage to commence his target intelligence briefing on Chimoio. Having done this so many times for COMOPS, Scotty needed no notes for his excellent, smooth-flowing presentation. Much of what he had to say was new to me, even though I had known about Chimoio for months.

To assist in the briefing and to facilitate easy target identification during the operation itself, a single photograph of the entire Chimoio complex of camps was handed to every participant. ‘This photograph incorporated grid lines bearing alphabetic letters for the vertical lines and numerical numbering for the lateral ones. The same grid was overlaid on the target model.

Norman Walsh followed Scotty and commenced the air briefing by saying H-hour for Chimoio was 23:07:45 Bravo. He then outlined the operational sequence with specific timings before giving a detailed briefing to each participating squadron.

He revealed that he had arranged for a DC8 jet-liner to over-fly Chimoio at H-hour minus ten minutes in the hopes that this would have every CT diving for cover. He expected that, by the time the lead Hunter struck, ZANLA CTs would have realised that they had over-reacted to a passing civilian airliner and would be mustering for the regular 08:00 parade.

Using a long pointer and giving grid references directly from the target model, Norman indicated old farm buildings on the western side of the main concentration of camps. These were the headquarters and living quarters of ZANLA’s top commanders, Josiah Tongogara and Rex Nhongo. The first pair of Hunters, delivering Golfbombs against these HQbuildings, would initiate the air action spot on H-hour. Their Golf bomb detonations would act as confirming markers for a formation of four Canberras closing in from the west at low level to strike twenty seconds later. Smoke and dust from the Golf bombs would assist the lead bomber to ensure that the formation was correctly aligned with its targets commencing from the western edge of the HQ complex and stretching eastward.

Front-gun, Frantan and rocket attacks by Hunters and Vampires would follow the Canberras, striking against targets Norman indicated in sequence of attacks. At this time, the Dakotas would already be making their final run, three down the western flank of the main concentration of camps and three along the southern flank to drop the assaulting SAS and RLI paratrooper force in a single pass at H-hour plus two minutes.

Because of the noise factor, particularly over the fiat terrain around Chimoio, the helicopters would be coming in well behind the quiet Dakotas. This meant that the paratroopers would already be on the ground before the command helicopter and K-Cars reached them at H-hour plus seven minutes. However, Hunter and Vampire strikes would still be in progress for much of this intervening time. Flying on the north side of the K-Cars would be ten trooper helicopters to place RLI in a stop-line along the north side of Chimoio Base.

With troops north, west and south of the primary targets, four K-Cars were assigned to ‘close the gap’ by operating along a line across open fields commencing at camps in the southeast all the way up to the left flank of the RLI stop-line. The other six K-Cars would take on satellite camps lying west of the main target and to the rear of the assault troops.

A single helicopter assigned to the Admin Base, carrying spare radios and me, was to break away from the trooper belicopters and land in the assigned Admin Base area. My first job was to direct the DC7 for its deliveries of the Admin Base protection troops, fuel and ammunition. Thereafter I had to oversee all activity including refuelling, repairs and casevacs for helicopters moving to and from the target that was a little under ten kilometres away.

The command Dakota carrying General Walls and his staff had all the equipment needed to communicate with the command helicopter on VHF and COMOPS via HF and teleprinters. This aircraft was to rove at height, up and down the Rhodesian border. Peter McLurg would provide the link through which Norman could bring in reserve helicopters waiting at Lake Alexander or jets from New Sarum and Thornhill.

To keep security as tight as possible, helicopters positioning at Lake Alexander, which lay twenty-five kilometres north of Umtali, were to fly from New Sarum -and Grand Reef during the early hours, refuel and be ready for lift-off by no later than H-hour minus 90 minutes. Lift-off from Lake Alexander would be at H-hour minus one hour five minutes. Norman then gave details of how the DC7, Dakotas and jet aircraft were to launch from New Sarum and jets from Thornhill. Included were details of the ten reserve helicopters that would move from Grand Reef to Lake Alexander once the main force was clear.

Recovery of everyone back to Grand Reef, except for an SAS stay-behind force of ninety-seven men, had to be completed before nightfall. For this, all helicopters from the reserve pool at Lake Alexander would be called forward to assist the GCars and K-Cars already in the op area.

To be recovered were forty-eight RLI assault troops with parachutes, forty RLI troops of the northern stop-line, the admin area protection troops with parachutes, me and as many cargo parachutes as possible. No fuel drums, whether full or empty, would be recovered or destroyed.

The SAS stay-behind troops remaining in the target overnight were to be uplifted early next morning. Details for this recovery would be given at a separate briefing at Grand Reef. Norman concluded his briefing with details on VHF channels along with general and emergency procedures.

As commander of ground forces, Major Brian Robinson made his briefing in his usual crisp, clear manner aided by the target model, many charts and signals network diagrams. His in-depth briefing on all troop movements, all cross-referenced to Norman’s briefing, completed the entire operational presentation. An operational order issued with maps and target photos assisted operators to follow the briefings and fully comprehend their tasks.

When these presentations ended and all questions had been answered, there was a noisy tea break in the Parachute Training School hangar before everyone reassembled for the briefing on Tembue. The venue and set-up for this briefing remained the same as for Chimoio, except that the centrepiece was now the Tembue target model, suitably marked with the same grid markings that appeared on photographs of the target.

The briefing followed the same format as for Chimoio but only took half as long to complete because radio networks and basic procedures remained unaltered. On completion, General Walls gave a short address before everyone rushed off to prepare for an early-morning start.

[JMA]

... used on Op Dingo:

Alpha bombs

Rhodesian made Alpha bombs

Description:

A circular shaped anti-personnel bomb that, when dropped by the Canberra from level flight, gave a natural dispersion pattern. The bomb would strike the surface activating the fusing mechanism and then bounce into the air to detonate about six metres above ground.

This bomb was an improved version of that used by the Rhodesian Air Force. About 300 could be loaded into the bomb bay.

Due to the sphere shape, when released they spread apart both laterally and vertically because air pressure builds up between them and pushes them away from each other. The Alpha is a hallow sphere(155mm external diameter.) pressed out of 3mm plate with two halves welded together. Inside the outer casing is a smaller sphere of 8mm steel. Between the two spheres is packed 240 hard black rubber "bouncing" balls of 15mm diameter. (Similar to those glow in the dark type bouncing balls kids have.) When dropped from low and fast aircraft, they hit the ground at less than 17 degrees from the horizontal. On impact most of the rubber balls compressed against the outer wall, thus creating forward bounce for about 60ft in the direction of the aircraft and rising no higher than 12ft. The inner sphere is similar to a grenade and on impact with the ground the fuze fired a cap with a 7 sec delay. The bomb exploded between 6 - 12 ft above the ground dispersing on average one lethal fragment per square yard with a radius of 15 yards from explosion. The Canberra carried 300 Alpha bombs in groups of 50 inside six hoppers fitted to the bomb bay and was operated electrically. They could be dropped in salvo or in ripples.



1 Safety Pin (removed before flight) - 2 Cap and Primer - 3 Delay Train - 4 Detonator - 5 Booster Charge - 6 Filler Plus - 7 Casing Outer and Fuse Pocket - 8 Striker Assembly - 9 Moving Parts - 10 Separator Spring - 11 RDX/TNT Main Charge - 12 Rubber Grommets - 13 'Super' Balls
(This anti personnel bomb was 155 mm external diameter and was coloured red. A Canberra B2 could carry 300 of the bombs in groups of 50 inside 6 specially designed hoppers. They were dropped from low level and bounced back above the ground, exploding at about 3 meters.)

The golf bomb

GOLF BOMBS.

Extensive testing was carried out to produce a suitable bomb capable of producing a lethal effect over a large area. Conventional 5001b & 10001b MC bombs, which we held from early days, were not designed for, nor capable of, achieving this requirement. The finally accepted & proven answer to this requirement was named the " Golf Bomb" ( after the Project letter ).

It was a 450kg bomb, consisting of double steel cylinders conventionally shaped, between which thousands of pieces of chopped 10mm steel rod had been encased.. There were two pentolite booster charges, one at the front & one at the rear, both simultaneously initiated when the meter long proboscis impacted with the ground, causing an airburst.

The filling was ANFO, manufactured locally by mixing prilled ammonium nitrate with a small quantity of diesel fuel, giving the benefit of equally damaging explosion & implosion. The tail unit incorporated locally designed & manufactured drogue chutes which caused the bomb to become vertical before impact.

They also provided adequate separation when the bombs were dropped in pairs & produced a bush flattening area 90 meters wide by 135 meters in line of attack. These bombs became operational in March 1977 & were very effectively used by the Hunter & Canberra aircraft on airstrike operations thereafter.

The Frantan was a local Rhodesian made naplam delivered in a 50 gal variant from the Hawker Hunters in pairs.

[davidbfpo]

JMA's posts often touch upon OPSEC before major cross-border operations and this aspect cropped on the main Rhodesian COIN thread, in Posts 211-217:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2090

As the raids built-up there was a suspicion that the targets were being warned, so this post (Post 211) is cited in part, first JMA:

Of concern to us was the fact that at one point operational intel was being passed on. For example on one camp attack into Zambia when we were going through the paperwork in their ops room we found a fresh signal they had received that morning saying "You will be attacked at 12h00 today" (JMA ends).

(I start)I learnt when in Zimbabwe in 1985 that operational security lapses had caused immense concern and aside from the "usual suspects" some thought was given to the regular arrival of external supporters before each major external operation. Supporters who provided the funding and more - they were not identified, but the finger of suspicion pointed northwards to Arabia. Their arrival in executive jets invariably was to Salisbury and could have been monitored.

After 1980 the Rhodesians discovered that some of the lapses could be attributed to the weather station at Salisbury airport, which was all-African and from their position could monitor the build-up of aircraft. Maybe even requests for weather reports? IIRC the Rhodesian Air Force main operating base, New Sarum shared the civil Salisbury airfield.

[BayonetBrant]

Originally Posted by JMA

And Mike recalls his father at the end of the Briefing to 2 Cdo by Maj Simon Haarhoff:

LOVE this story

[JMA]

Hawker Hunter FGA.9

[JMA]

English Electric Canberra B2

[JMA]

de Havilland Vampire:

[JMA]

More from:

Dingo Firestorm: The Greatest Battle of the Rhodesian Bush War – Ian Pringle

[Group Captain Norman] Walsh explained the air-strike sequence. First, a DC-8 cargo jet would fly over the target as a decoy, making as much noise as possible. When the assembled terrs (terrorists) heard the DC-8, they were likely to scatter and dive into the trenches or man the anti-aircraft guns. When they realised it was a false alarm, they would start reassembling on the parade square, by which time Red Section would be about to launch the initial strike. The DC-8 would also mask the sound of the approaching Dakotas and helicopters.

It was unprecedented to use a civilian jetliner at the leading edge of a major air attack. The aircraft in question belonged to Air Trans Africa, a Rhodesian sanction-busting airline operated by a former World War II Spitfire pilot, Jack Malloch. Jack was sitting in the audience. He would not be flying the DC-8 himself; instead, he would fly a propeller-driven DC-7, the aircraft every helicopter pilot would rely on for fuel.

Walsh continued:
“At precisely H-hour, Red 1 (Hawker Hunter) will strike the HQ building complex here, with Golf [percussion] bombs, while Red 2 (Hawker Hunter) will plant Golf bombs here, on target Mike [Chitepo College], and Red 3 (Hawker Hunter) will drop frantan here, on Lima [Pasidina 2]. The weather forecast is good, but if there is cloud, frantan will replace Golf bombs. Red Section’s strikes will be the markers for Green Section (Canberras), which will strike with Alpha bombs at H plus 30 seconds.”

[JMA]

More on this from John Cronin:

Two weeks after we returned to Salisbury, I saw some black and white aerials of one of the parade decks on which several hundred ZANLA were mustering for morning formation when the Canberras dropped the first Golf bombs on them as a prelude to our attack. The Air Force had sent a civilian-marked aircraft in a few minutes ahead of the bombers to scare the guerrillas, and then allowed them enough time to regroup into their formations before sending in the first bomber wave, reasoning that the men on parade would be less likely to scatter a second time because they would believe it to be another false alarm. The ruse was lethally successful and the bombs had cut them down almost too easily, leaving over 400 dead, in row after neat row like corn stalks, still in ranks lying next to one another. They would have heard the engines, looked up, seen the aircraft fly a few hundred feet over their heads, seen the bombs bounce in front of them and died exactly where they stood, with not the time it would have taken to look around again.

Cronin, John R. (2012-07-06). The Bleed (Kindle Locations 6440-6447). . Kindle Edition.

[JMA]

... what became the origin behind this T-shirt in all its variants:



.

[JMA]

Op Dingo Op Order: Part 1

Operation Dingo

Op Order :

SIT

1. En Forces
a. Consist of FPLM (Mozambican), TPDF (Tanzanian) and approx 100 Russian/Cuban advisors. Tanks and armoured cars have been reported in Chimoio Town, but this cannot be substantiated.
b. No known air threat is present.
c. AA wpns consist of 14.5, 12.7 and Strela missiles

2. Breakdown
Troop dispositions, strengths and reaction times are as follows :
Ser... Location...........Function...... Strength..........Weaponry.................Reactio n Time
1...... Vanduzi Town....Ptl Base.......1 Pl........... .....AA, Mors...................30 mins
2...... Chimoio............Bde HQ........ FPLM 430........AA, Strela,.................1 hour
................................................TP DF 100........Mors, A/Tk
..............................................Russ ians 100......Armd Cars/Tanks, Vehs
3...... Manica.............Bn HQ......... FPLM 725........AA, Strela..................1hr 30 mins
...............................................TPD F 100.........A/Tk, Vehs
4...... Machipanda......Coy HQ........ FPLM 200........AA, Strela, Vehs............ 2 hours

Chimoio Terrorist Base
3. Functions
a. ZANLA Ops HQ
b. ZANLA Admin HQ
c. ZANLA Log HQ
d. ZANLA Trg Centre
e. Manica Prov HQ

4. Total Strength
a. Trained terrs 2000
b. Ters under trg 1000
c. Hosp orderlies 1200
d. FPLM elements 80
e. Miscellaneous 200

5. Dispositions : The base is made up of 18 complexes all containing terrs with a small element of FPLM for control purposes. All complexes have at least six guards on by day and night.

(PASINDIA 2) a. Complex L WQ 522033 (This target will be struck at H-Hour)
1. Description - 66 pole and dagga structures laid out in rows to form a rough box shaped area.
ii. Function - to house trained convalscent ters.
iii. Numbers - up to 400 including 4 FPLM.

(TAKAWIRA 1) b. Complex J WQ540045 (This tgt is a K-Car tgt)
i. Description - This complex is made up of two camps known as Matopos and Takawira 1. It has 70 structures, all of which are pole and dagga.
ii. Function - Matopos complex houses the Registry, Takawira complex houses semi-trained terrs, recruits awaiting transport to selected external training camps.
iii. Numbers - up to 500 or more depending on recruit numbers and 4-6 FPLM.

(PASINDINA 1) c. Complex K WQ 541050 (This target is a K-Car target)
i. Description - This is a small camp containing 19 structures all poles and dagga.
ii. Function - houses the limbless terrs ex Rhodesia.
iii. Numbers - up to 70 and 4-6 FPLM

(HQ) d. Complex H WQ545042 (This target is first priority at H-Hour)
i. Description - This the HQ area and is the most important target in the whole base. The area includes 10 metal roof buildings, 41 large thatched buildings and 49 small structures.
ii. Function - houses the hierarchy and is the main office and clerical area.
iii. Numbers - up to 200 and 4-6 FPLM.
e. Engineers Complex WQ 545040 (This target is a K-Car target).
i. Description - This is a small camp containing 12 buildings, all pole and dagga.
ii. Function - to house the engineers resposible for the maintenance of the HQ Complex.
iii. Numbers - up to 70 and 4-6 FPLM.
f. Complexes M, C, D, B : From WQ 551036 to WQ 559040 (This target is second priority at H-Hour)
i. Description - This area is taken up by five complexes, all made of pole and dagga huts. There complexess are all inter-joining, therefore it has been considered as one target area.

ii. Function -
(a) Complex M - Chitepo College where political commissars are housed and taught.
(b) Complex D - Parirenyatwa Camp, Chaminuka Camp and the DB. These complexes house the trained and learning nursing staff, the security section and Rhodesian prisoners. Mugabe lives in this area on his visits.
(c) Complex B - Nehanda Camp holds the young terrs who are not yet of training age, and the women.
iii. Numbers -
(a) Chitepo College - 250 and 4-6 FPLM
(b) Parirenyatwa Camp - 1200 (700 male, 500 female, 4-6 FPLM.
(c) Chaminuka Camp - 500 (ex-Peking) and 4-6 FPLM.
(d) Detention Barracks - 20 Guards (unknown number inside).
(e) Nehanda Camp - Unknown numbers.

(NEW GARAGE) g. Complex A. WQ 568042 (This is a K-Car target).
i. Description - This is a small camp consisting of three pole and dagga buildings.
ii. Function - A new garage area where long distance drivers and mechanics are housed.
iii. Numbers - 50 and 4-6 FPLM.

(OLD GARAGE) h. Complex P. WQ557051 (This is a K-Car target).
i. Description - This area consists of 1 large one sided metal roofed building and 29 small pole and dagga structures.
ii. Functions -
(a) Fuel Dump (underground).
(b) Ammo store for Recruit Camp.
(c) Vehicle graveyard.
(d) Tool store.
iii. Numbers - up to 70 and 4-6 FPLM.

(NGANGAS - spirit mediums) j. Complex Q WQ 561054 (This is a K-Car target)
i. Description - The area consists of 88 informally set out pole and dagga huts.
ii. Function - To house ngangas and old people.
iii. Numbers - unknown.

(NATIONAL STORES) k. Complex R. WQ 569051 (This is a K-Car target)
i. Description - This complex is made up of an old tobacco barn and 53 pole and dagga huts plus 5 bell tents. It has a bulldozed fire break encircling it.
ii. Function - This is the main ZANLA Logistics Centre and contains food, clothing and ammunition.
iii. Numbers - Up to 150 and 4-6 FPLM with a guard on a boom on both entrance and exit.

(THIN CAMP) l. Complex S WQ 574048 (This is a K-Car target)
i. Description - This area consists of 12 small pole and dagga huts.
ii. Function - to house 'thin' recruits.
iii. Numbers - Unknown, but could be as many as 150, and 4-6 FPLM.

(RECRUITS CAMP) m. Complex T WQ 571089 (This target will be struck at H-Hour).
i. Description - This area consists of 33 barrack huts, 43 small huts, 3 bell tents and a kitchen area.
ii. Function - This area is the main Recruit Training Camp.
iii. Numbers - Up to 1 000 recruits, 25 instructors, and 4-6 FPLM.
Target Priority : H-Hour - Complexes H, MODB, T, thereafter K-Cars orbit over selected complexes.

Friendly Forces
1RLI
i. Provide the following :
a. 48 troops para role after air strike.
b. 48 troops para role reserve.
c. 40 troops heli role.
d. 20 troops heli assembly area protection.
e. 16 troops Adm Base protection. This to include one 81mm mortar and team.
f. 1 doctor and 3 medical orderlies.

SAS
2. Provide the following :
a. 96 troops para role after air strike.
b. Para role reserve (approx 30 men).

Air Force
3. The mission is predominately air strike supported by ground forces. Following support will be available subject to serviceability .
a. 7 Hunters.
b. 4 Vampires.
c. 7 Dakotas.
d. 1 DC8
e. 1 DC7
f. 4 Lynxes
g. 4 Canberras
h. 31 helicopters (including Polo).

4. Three Officers to provide control at the following locs :
a. Grand Reef (normal FAF comd)
b. Heli assembly area.
c. Adm base.

5. Technical recovery teams and an armourer to be available at Grand Reef.
Special Branch

6. 4 man SB team for immed int gathering in camp area. This team to provide prisoner and body identification.

7. Further two teams may position heli assembly area as back up. This must include IO SAS and DMI rep in first back-up team.

LOG
8. Capt Jackson to be operation's log officer.
9. In consultation with QM 1RLI and OC 3 Air Supply Platoon you are to staff the following Supply Points :
a. Grand Reef
b. Heli Assembly Area.
c. Adm Base.
10. You are to establish a transit base and security area at New Sarum. This is to be done in liaison with Q Rep Sarum.

Mission
11. To provide ground forces in support of air strike on enemy terrorist base camp coded named Z1 with the following desired effect :
a. Killing and capturing maximum terrs.
b. Int gathering.
c. Destruction of enemy war materials.
d. Capture of selected enemy war materials such as STRELA.

[JMA]

Op Dingo Op Order: Part 2

Exec

12. General Outline
a. Air strikes to take place against selected eneny targets followed by vertical envelopment by para and heli troops.

13. Detailed Tasks.
a. 1RLI
i. Grouping. Nil.
ii. Task
(a) Provide para stops 1 and 2 and heli stops A to J.
(b) Para sticks area of responsibility GR QQ 523040 to GR WQ 538027. Heli sticks responsibility GR WQ 528046-WQ 535050.
(c) Stick commanders to be officers where possible and are to position in centre of sticks. One officer in command heli troops.

b. SAS
i. Grouping . Nil.
ii. Task
(a) Provide Stops 3, 4, 5 and 6.
(b) Area of responsibility.
Stop 3 WQ 538025 to WQ 546019
Stop 4 WQ 546019 to WQ 558026
Stop 5 WQ 558026 to WQ 568032
Stop 6 WQ 568032 to WQ 578042
(c) Stops to be commanded by an officer who is position in centre of the stick.
(d) Major Graham to be ground forces commander.

c. Action on Landing.
i. Paras to get out of harness asp and group together with any other para immediately available. Take up a position in best cover, wait and shoot.
ii. Do not spend time trying to regroup in sticks. All paras to attempt to visually locate own forces in close proximity.
iii. Persons on strick extremes namely 1 and 24 para and A, J heli to have white phosphorous readily available to indicate sticks locs.
iv. Note the position you leave your parachute, reserve and helmet etc.
v. 40 heli troops who have emplaned in heli assembly area are to be positioned west of the ridge with responsibility from GR WQ 528046 to GR WQ 535050.
vi. Heli troops to be dropped off in dead ground to west of ridge. Once they have been dropped they are to move towards the target and position on top of the ridge.
vii. Before drop off stick commanders to take particular note of stick drop off points on either side.
viii. Officer to be nominated to command heli sticks. He is also to be centrally positioned.

d. The Sweep
i. Once the air strikes and K-Car actions are over, all sweep lines with sweep towards and eventually through the target area.
ii. The sweep sequence to be given by command heli.
iii. During sweep if contact is made and close air support required a white phosphorous grenade is to be thrown followed by a target indication.
iv. Once the outer camp area has been cleared a thorough search of the target area is to take place. SB teams will be made available at this time and will be delivered to the HQ area. Sticks in immediate area responsible for SB protection.

e. Reorg
i. After the sweep and search of the area has been completed, stick to return to their parachutes and recover kit and equipment left in the area.
ii. G-Cars to be sent to assist in parachute location. Once equipment collected G-Cars to uplift parachutes to Admin area.
iii. Extraction sequence to follow once parachutes cleared. Persons uplifted from camp area to Adm base initially and then to heli assembly area. Polo aircraft to carry out concurrent lift from admin area to heli assembly area.
iv. Orders for extraction from command helicopter on completion of parachute uplift.

f. Adm Area Troops
1. 16 RLI including mortar and mortar team emplane heli assmy area and land at Adm area. Mortar team and mortar to position as OP at GR WQ 519290 Adm base loc GR WQ 517290.
ii. Adm base to establish comms with DC7 and take fuel resupply.
iii. Q element to establish supply point.
iv. Air force rep to establish refuel point.

14. Special Tasks
a. Stop 1
i. Grouping. Nil.
ii. Task
(a) Provide one c/s early warning/mining party and position on road GR WQ 525037.
(b) You are to lay a centre blast mine to prevent any possible enemy vehicle interference.
iii. Reorg. Remain that loc throughout the extraction phase.
b. Stop 5
i. Grouping. Nil.
ii. Task
(a) As per Stop 1. Prevent vehicle interference from eastern road GR WQ 550032.
iii. Reorg. Remain that loc throughout the extraction phase.

15. Coord Instr
a. D Day is Wednesday 23 November 1977 and H-Hour is 230745B.
b. 1RLI Land Tail. To consist of the following :
i. 48 Para resrve.
ii. 40 Heli troops.
iii. 16 Heli troops incl mortar team for Adm area.
iv. 20 protection troops for heli assembly area. Must included 4 x 81mm mortar tubes and teams.
v. Q rep to liaise with OC 3 Air Supply Platoon.
vi. SB and medical teams.
vii. Resuscitation team.
c. Routing
i. 1RLI move from Salisbury on D-1 [Tuesday, 22 November]
ii. 1RLI paras remain Grand Reef to provide para reserve.
iii. D-Day [Wednesday, 23 November] Following persons depart Grand Reef for heli assembly area :
(a) 76 RLI.
(b) SB teams.
(c) Resuscitation team.
(d) Medical team for Adm area.
iv. Sufficient vehicles on this convoy to be capable of uplifting 150 men after the op.
d. Heli Assembly Area.
i. Location - Lake Alexander.
ii. Comd Air HQ Rep.
iii. Function :
(a) to establish LZ to cater for 31 heli at one time.
(1) Establish Supply Point. Log Officer to appoint representative.
(2) Establish Resuscitation medical team. Army HQ to org.
(3) Provide protection for fuel and transport required for op.
(4) Hold 4 mortar tubes in reserve.

16. Sequence of Events and Timings
a. D-1 RLL land tail to position Grand Reef by 221800B.
b. D Day. Heli assembly area to be functional by no later than 230600B.
c. All heli troops ready for uplift by no later than 230600B.
d. Air Force rep to ensure stick O's correct. Adm troops separated from heli troops.
e. 0430-0500 hrs. Helis carry out phased departure from Salisbury to Heli Assembly area.
f. 0630-0700 hrs. All 31 helis refuel at Heli Assembly area and pick up troops for target (10 G-Cars)
g. 0600 hrs. Paradaks airborne from Salisbury.
h. 0630. DC7 airborne from Salisbury with fuel.
j. 0710 hrs. 10 K-Cars, 10 G-Cars with 40 RLI leave Heli Assembly area for target.
k. 0710 hrs. 10 Polo aircraft leave Heli Assembly area for Adm Area. Air rep to ensure SB on board and all Q and aircraft munitions also on board.
l. H-Hour 230745B.
i. 2 Hunters, 1000 lb bombs on Target H, and M.
ii. 1 Hunter Frantan (227 litres of Napalm) on Target L.
iii. 4 Vampires with 20 mm cannon and 60 lb rocket projectiles on Target T.
m. H+30 seconds
i. 4 Canberras with MkII frags on following :
(a) 1 Canberra on Target H.
(b) 2 Canberras on Targets M, D and C.
(c) One Canberra on Target L.
n. During period H+30 seconds to H+5 [minutes]
i. 4 Hunters with 68mm rockets and 30mm cannon on AA positions Targets J and B.
o. H+2 Paradaks drop 144 troops on target.
p. H+5. 10 G-Cars deploy 40 RLI on ridge and 10 K-Cars attack following targets.
i. 2 K-Cars on Target H.
ii. 1 K-Car on Target R.
iii. 2 K-Cars on Target T.
iv. 2 K-Cars on Target L.
v. 1 K-Car on Target P.
vi. 2 K-Cars on Targets B, D, M and C.
q. 1 Command G-Car, Command Dak and 2 Lynx for wide recce and relay overhead. Thereafter cabranking of Hunters and Vampires. Once aircraft clear the area and rearm and refuel.
r. Aircraft standby state to cater for both air-to-air and tank threat.
s. H+15 Polo aircraft arrive Adm area carrying :
i. Reserve holding all type ammo.
ii. 4 SB.
iii. 2 Medics.
t. H+15. One Polo helic to mark DC7 and take fuel drop. Heli LZ 1 km from fuel DZ until drop completed.
u. H to H+5 and a half hours. Mopping up and closing in of Stop Lines. Search of area continues.
v. 1645. All troops clear of target area and clear of Mozambique by D+1 0800hrs.
w. Last wave directly to Grand Reef. Thereafter all troops recover to Salisbury by 6 Daks, helis and road transport. This move coordinated at Grand Reef.

17. General Instructions
a. No burning is to take place unless the order is given from the Command Heli.
b. During the reorg SB team are to examine the 'Pit' and vet captures. These captures are to be taken to the Admin area.
c. Every single document or attractive item of equipment must be handed to SB. Any souvenir hunters will be severely disciplined.
18. Heli positioning and extraction detail see Appendix A.
19. Air Aspects detail Appendix B.

[JMA]

Op Dingo Op Order: Part 3

Adm and Log

20. Personal equipment per stick see Appendix C.
21. Logistic Instruction see Appendix D.
22. Ammo holding summary see Appendix E.
23. Transport required detailed Appendix F.
24. The above Adm instructions caters for both tasks Z1 and Z2.

Comd and Signals.

25. Air Commander S Force Group Captain Walsh, deputy Commander Squadron Leader Griffiths.
26. Ground forces Commander Major Robinson, deputy Commander Major Graham.
27. Substitute Command Heli Squadron Leader Griffiths and Major Graham.
28. 3 IC operation 1RLI Commander.
29. Radio discipline is vital to the control of the operation. Only use the battle frequency if the transmission is essential. Make use of the domestic frequencies for sub-unit control and co-operation.
30. Should a sub-unit require air support or if vital information is to be passed to the Command Heli that callsign is to change to the battle frequency.
31. Each stick commander is to have an additional radio operator close on hand in order to control the domestic net which will be on a different frequency.
32. Each stick and Squadron will be allocated domestic frequencies.
33. For net diagram see Appendix G.
34. See signals Op O Appendix H.

Op Dingo : Air Aspects

Phase 1

Allocation of Air Effort
1. The following air effort is allocated to the Phase 1 operation :
4 x Canberra
7 x Hunter
6 x Vampire (4 x FB9, 2 x T11)
4 x Lynx
10 x K-Car
10 x G-Car
10 x G-Car (Polo - South African)
1 x G-Car (Command)
6 x Dakota (Para role)
1 x Dakota (Command)

Rehearsals
2. Co-ordinated rehearsalss and training to be conducted by various Squadrons prior to the Air briefing on Sunday, 20 November 1977.

Briefing
3. Air briefing to be conducted by DOPS at Rhodesian Air Force New Sarum at 1500 hours on Sunday, 20 November, 1977. To be attended by OCFWs New Sarum and Thornhill, Squadron Commanders, Section Leaders and K-Car pilots.
Full Air/Ground briefing to be conducted at SAS Model Room at 0900 hours on Monday, 21st November, 1977. To be attended by OCFWs, Squadron Commanders and Air HQ reps.

Prepositioning of Aircraft
4. A phased withdrawal of helicopters, Dakota and Lynx aircraft will be conducted and is to be completed by 1800 hrs on Monday, 21st November, 1977.
5. Vampire aircraft plus supporting services are to position at Rhodesian Air Force New Sarum by 1800 hours, on Tuesday, 22nd November, 1977. Movement order and co-ordination to be conducted by OC No 2 Squadron. Rhodesian Air Force New Sarum to be informed of accommodation requirements.
6. All aircraft with the exception of Hunter and Lynx aircraft will depart from New Sarum on D-Day.
7. Lynx aircraft to position Grand Reef on D-1 for deployment on D-Day.
D-Day Sequence of Events
8. 0430-0500 Helicopter phased departures from New Sarum to Heli Assy area.
9. 0630-0700 All 31 helicopters refuel at Heli Assembly area. Following to be uplifted by G-Cars (Polo) to Adm Base :
23 pax (16 Army, 1 Air Force (DZ Controller), 4 SB, 2 Medics)
1 x mortar
4400 x 20mm ammunition
7500 x .303 ammunition
Demolition explosives
Army ammunition

10. 0600 Para Dakotas depart New Sarum for the target.
11. 0630 DC7 departs New Sarum for Adm Base (80 drums of fuel).
12. 0710 10 K-Cars, 10 G-Cars (40 RLI) and Command Heli departs for target.
13. 0741 DC8 deception aircraft overhead target.
14. 0745 H-Hour
2 x Hunters: 1000lb bomb High Dive profile or Frantan profile on Targets H and M. (Frantan profile if weather or noise problems arise).
1 x Hunter : Frantan on Target L with 30mm restrike capability.
4 x Vampires FB9s : RP and 20mm cannon strikes on Target T.
H+30 seconds : 4 x Canberras : Mk II Frag Bombs on targets as follows
1 x Canberra on Target H
2 x Canberra on Targets M, D, and C complex.
1 x Canberra on Target L.
H+30 secs to 5 minutes : 4 x Hunters: 68mm RP and 30mm cannon on AA positions and additional strikes on Targets J and B. One pair after RP strikes to climb up and provide top cover.
H+2 minutes 6 x Dakotas paradrop 144 troops on target.
H+5 minutes 10 K-Cars engage following targets :
2 x K-Cars on Target area H
1 x K-Car on Target area R
2 x K-Cars on Target area T
2 x K-Cars on Target area L
1 x K-Car on Target area P
2 x K-Car on Target areas B, D, M, C.
(K-Cars return Adm Base to refuel on phased/controlled basis).
10 x G-Cars deploy 40 RLI on ridge to north of target. Then proceed to Adm Base to refuel and to standby for further tasks (casevacs etc.).
Command G-Car in area.
Command Dakota in area.
1 x Lynx on close recce and radio relay.
1 x Lynx on wide recce
H+15 2 x Vampire T11s take over top cover from Hunters.

15. Post-Strike Requirement :
a. Top cover of either Hunter or Vampire aircraft throughout the sweep and recovery phase. (Recovery will extend into D+1 commencing 240545B).
b. Bomber profile Hunters to refuel only and remain in air-to-air configuration.
c. One pair to rearm with 68mm AP RP for possible anti-tank role. (Only to be used for top cover but 68mm only to be used if absolutely necessary).
d. Remaining Hunters rearm with normal 68mm or Frantan/30mm configurations.
e. Vampires recover to New Sarum for rearm with 20mm for top cover duties.
f. 3 x Canberras rearm with Mk 11 and Frag bombs and remain on crew room readiness.
g. 1 x Canberra rearm with 1000lb bombs for possible retaliation in the event of Umtali being attacked.
h. 6 x Dakota recover to Grand Reef and remain on standby for possible reserve troop uplift, resupply of fuel, ammo, water plus possible casevac uplift Grand Reef to Salisbury.
j. 2 x Lynx positioned at Grand Reef to take-over recce role from those already airborne.
16. Adm Area (WQ 5228)
a. H-20 minutes 10 x G-Car (Polo) aircraft depart Heli Assembly area for Admin Base. Loads as follows :
i. 16 x RLI including Mortar Team.
ii. 1 x 81mm Mortar and Bombs
iii. K-Car ammo
iv. Army ammo/grenades
v. Explosives
vi. 3 x SB reps
vii. 1 x Air Force DZ Controller
viii. 1 x Air Force armourer
ix. Doctor/Medic.
b. H+15. 10 x G Car (Polo arrive Admin Base and mark DZ for DC7 paradrop of fuel.
c. H+15. DC7 Fuel drop into DZ one km from heli LZ. (80 drums of fuel).

17. Control
a. Overall command will be conducted from the Command Dakota with intimate operational control being maintained by the Command Heli. A Deputy Controller (Alpha &) has been nominated and will assume command of the intimate operational area when necessary.
b. Admin Base control will be maintained by the Air Force DZ controller. VHF communications are required.
c. Heli Assembly area control will be maintained by an Air Force LZ controller. VHF communications are required.

18. Communications
a. The communications net is shown in Army Orders section.
b. Callsigns and frequencies will be allocated at Air briefing.

19. Recovery
a. The recovery of troops and equipment will be conducted in two phases but is planned to run concurrently.
b. Recovery of troops and parachutes from the target area to the Adm Base is to commence no later than 1330. A detailed flow chart is shown at Appendix A.
c. Troops, equipment and parachute recovery from this Admin Base to the Heli Assy area will commence immediately the first wave of troops arrive at the Admin Base from the target area. A detailed flow chart is shown at Appendix A.
d. It is anticipated that approx 62 troops will remain in the Admin Base overnight and will be recovered by 0830 on the 24 November, 1977. This move is included in the attached flow chart.
e. A helicopter recovery team will be positioned at the Heli Assembly area and will assist in the recovery of helicopter aircraft that cannot be flown out but are worth recovery action.

20. Emergencies
a. Helicopter emergencies will be dealt with by the Command team in the immediate operational area.
b. Search and rescue will be initiated immediately with the Lynx and helicopter effort in the area. Hot extraction/rescue will also be initiated immediately with helicopter effort from the Admin Base. Wherever possible destruction of irrecoverable downed aircraft will be attempted. Other emergencies will be covered at the Air briefing and individual Squadron briefings.

21. Logistics.
The following equipment is required to be positioned at Grand Reef and to go forward to the Heli Assembly area or Adm base as indicated :
a. Ammunition 4400 x 20mm (K-Car) 7500 x .303 (To go forward to Heli Assembly are a.m. Wednesday)
b. Sapres. Helicopter spares with recovery team and armourer plus vehicle (to move forward to Heli Assembly area a.m. Wednesday)
c. Fuel.
i. 160 drums to go forward to Heli Assembly area a.m. Wednesday.
ii. DC7 load of 80 drums to be loaded p.m. Tuesday for delivery by para on Admin Base a.m. Wednesday. (NOTE : These drums will be written off.)

22. Messing and Accommodation.
a. Messing and accommodation is required at New Sarum for No 2 Squadron personnel.
b. Helicopter crews (62 personnel) plus Dakota and Lynx crews will be required to be accommodated at Grand Reef (FAF 8) on the night of Wednesday, 23 November 1977.

[JMA]

Op Dingo Op Order: Part 4

Appendix A to SAS Verbal Os




Appendix G to SAS Verbal Os

Command and Signals

1. Overall Command
Comd Comops, airborne as Comops Tac HQ (DC3)

2. Tactical Command
a. Command Heli
i. Army Comd - Major Robinson
ii. Air Force Comd - Gp Capt Walsh
b. Alternate Command Heli
i. Army Comd - Major Graham
ii. Air Force Comd - Sqn Ldr Griffiths

3. Ground Command
a. Stop 1 - 1RLI Comd – Lt Adams
b. Stop 2 - 1RLI Comd – Maj Strong
c. Stop 3 - Capt Willis
d. Stop 4 - Capt Mackenzie
e. Stop 5 - Lt Roberts
f. Stop 6 - Capt Wilson
g. Stops A-J - 1RLI Comd – Maj Haarhoff

4. Radio Communications
a. VHF Nets
i. Battle Cmd Net
(a) All aircraft, the mortars at the Admin Base and Stops 1-6 and A-J will be on the Battle Command Net frequency of 132.20 Mhz, A76 code L20.
ii. Domestic Net
(a) Stop 1 C/S will operate of frequency 130.50 Mhz, A76 code J50.
(b) Stop 2 C/S will operate of frequency 130.30 Mhz, A76 code J30.
(c) Stop 3 C/S will operate of frequency 130.10 Mhz, A76 code J10.
(d) Stop 4 C/S will operate of frequency 130.40 Mhz, A76 code J40.
(e) Stop 5 C/S will operate of frequency 130.00 Mhz, A76 code J00.
(f) Stop 6 C/S will operate of frequency 130.20 Mhz, A76 code J20.
(g) Stop A C/S will operate of frequency 130.60 Mhz, A76 code J60.
(h) Mortars plus the 16 RLI Prtn elm at the Adm Base will operate of frequency 130.70 Mhz, A76 code J70.
(j) Heli Assy Area, 20 1RLI Prtn troops will operate of frequency 130.80 Mhz, A76 code J80.
(k) Should a c/s request close air support, the c/s is to switch to the batatle comd net frequency 132.20 Mhz, A76 code L20.
(l) All aircraft have a dual fit and can speak to one another on their natter frequency.
iii. Adm Net
(a) The Command Heli, Adm Base, Heli Assy Area and SAS Grand Reef will be able to switch to the Adm net frequency of 130.90 Mhz, A76 code J90. All aircraft have the ability to swith to the frequence if necessary.
(b) The Adm Base, Heli Assy Area ;and SAS Grand Reef are also on the Army Comd Net (HF).
iv. Call Signs
(a) Comops TAC HQ (DC3) C/S 0
(b) Command Heli C/S 09 Maj Robinson C/S D0 Cp Capt Walsh
(c) Alt Command Heli C/S 9A Maj Graham (if airborne) C/S A7 Sqn Ldr Griffiths
(d) Stop Groups will use their Stop Gp numbers as their call signs (Stops 1-6 and A)
(e) Stop C/S 1, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15.
(f) Stop C/S 2, 21 22, 23, 24 and 25
(g) Stop C/S 3, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35
(h) Stop C/S 4, 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45
(j) Stop C/S 5, 51, 52, 53, 54 and 55
(k) Stop C/S 6, 61, 62, 63, 64 and 65
(l) Stop C/S A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and J
(m) [unreadable] C/S 91, 91A, 91B, 91C
(n) Mors (at Admin Base) C/S [unreadable]
(o) Heli Assy Area C/S 92. This includes the Prtn party with 92A, 92B, 92C, 92D, 92E
(p) SAS Grand Reef C/S 93
(q) Normal procedures to be adopted for ground C/S to contact aircraft.
v. Batteries. All A76 setst o hold four spare batteries.
vi. Recovery of Equipment. This is the first time the A76 is being used externally. Every effort is to be made to recover this equipment should it be lost.
b. HF Net
i. The Army Command Net will be utilised and will consist of the following :
(a) Army HQ (control station) 13 NIS AY
(b) Comops HQ 52
(c) Comops TAC HQ (Airborne) 78
(d) JOC Repulse 63
(e) JOC Tangent 01
(f) HQ 1 Brigade Battle Group 81
(g) JOC Hurricane 32
(h) JOC Thrasher 60
(j) 1RLI (Rear) 12
(k) SAS (Rear) 41
(l) SAS (Grand Reef) 90
(m) Adm Base 62
(n) Heli Assembly Area 83
(o) JOC Splinter 71
(p) JOC Grapple 18
ii. Frequencies
(a) F1 2160USB
(b) F2 3226USB
(c) F3 4625USB
(d) F4 6245LSB
(e) Approximate times for changes frequency - on instructions from control station.
(i) At 0620 F1 - F3.
(ii) At 0830 F3 - F4.
(iii) At 1800 F4 - F1.
iii. Teleprinter. A secure teleprinter system will be utilised between Comops TAC HQ and Comops HQ. This will be an Air Force responsibility.

5. Establishing Communications
All stations to minimise before H-Hour and join respective nets as and when necessary.

6. Documents. All C/S, Air Crews, Comd elements etc. will be in possession of Special Button/Shackle/Riddle code. Comops TAC HQ, the Command Helicopter, Alternative Command Helicopter, Helicopter Assembly Area and Adm Base will be in possession of Placard and Trigram code in addition to the above.

[JMA]

Op Dingo Op Order: Part 5:

8. Reserves. Spare radios and radio batteries will be held in each K-Car.

Appendix E to SAS Verbal Os





General.

12 hours rats - 12 hours Emergency Rats per man.
1 x FFD and 1 x Sosegon capsule per man.
Blood groups written on shirts.
4 water bottles per man minimum.
Tracer 1 : 5 rounds
Spare Radio Batteries per callsign.
Heliograph per callsign commander.
Compass, Maps and Protractor per callsign commander.
Shackle code per call sign commander.
Full Rhodesian camouflage.
All men to wear Rhodesian Combat Caps with Dayglo for recognition. NO ter or jungle hats.
Commanders to ensure NOTICAS Detail current, and SAS and 1RLI (Rear) responsible for NOTICAS after initial notification via Comops HQ.
Length of paracord per man.
NO blacking up.
The Dak and Helicopter Wave Commanders to have gridded Air Photographs of Z1.
Casevac to Umtali Hospital, Resuscitation Team at Heli Assembly Area or Doctor in Admin Base dependent on seriousness.
PWs held by Stop Groups and later Adm Base by G-Car.
SB to Stop Groups as required. PWs returned to Rhodesia on completion of initial SB screening.
Resupply by parachute for any emergency items.

[davidbfpo]

Yesterday I thought JMA requested this thread be locked now, in fact it was to properly close a quote in Post 174 - it was a long day Monday.

He has given an update:

the book is at the printers so its a week or two until the release.

[JMA]

Extract from the book:

OPERATION DINGO: Rhodesian Raid on Chimoio and Tembue' 1977

0741–0815hrs (H-4 to H+45 minutes)

At 0741hrs, however, cloud cover over the target was broken enough for the opening ruse to work. Suddenly climbing to create maximum noise from its four jet engines, the Afretair Douglas DC-8 cargo liner roared overhead, alarming and scattering the muster parades in the camps. The ZANLA muster parades reformed as the DC-8 rumbled away northeastward.

At 0745hrs (H-Hour), flying in line abreast, three Hunters of Red Section attacked New Farm. Red 1, Squadron Leader Richard Brand (the officer commanding No. 1 (Hunter) Squadron) opened Operation Dingo with a long burst of fire from his four 30mm Aden cannons. Diving, he strafed the sprawling ZANLA headquarters—the former farmhouse, nine corrugated-iron-roofed outhouses and the surrounding 41 thatched buildings and 49 pole and mud huts.

On his left across the road, Red 2, Air Lieutenant David Bourhill, dropped a pair of 50-gallon frantan bombs on Chitepo College which housed 250 ZANLA trainees and staff. He followed Brand up into an orbit.

The right-hand Hunter, Red 3, flown by Squadron Leader John Annan, hit the westernmost camp, Pasindina 2, with his frantan bombs, setting alight many of its 66 thatched huts. Pasindina 2 was home to 400 veteran ZANLA convalescents, recovering from wounds and illnesses contracted while on operations in Rhodesia. Annan then raked huts along the tree line to the north of the camp with his cannons before climbing to rejoin the other two.

As Red Section turned in to restrike, the fires they had initiated belched fireballs, blown upward by fierce convection currents, marking the camps for the fast-approaching Canberra bombers beneath them.

Flying at 350 knots at 300 feet above the ground, their optimum bombing profile, the Canberras headed for their selected targets. The leading Canberra overshot Pasindina 2 slightly and ran a full load of 300 bouncing, exploding 155mm spherical Alpha bombs through the second half of the burning camp and beyond. The second Canberra deluged the headquarters complex with its Alphas, killing 600 ZANLA personnel. The two following Canberras smothered Chitepo College and its immediate neighbours, Chaminuka Camp (housing the ZANLA security section and 500 Peking-trained insurgents, and where Mugabe stayed on his visits) and Parirenyatwa Camp (inhabited by 1,200 male and female trained and trainee nursing staff).

[JMA]

Captain Ian Buttenshaw recalls:

… Setting up the admin area was a bit of a nightmare. We had one large hill on which I positioned the Mortar Fire Controller. It was about two kilometres from the main admin area, but had good views over the whole area. However, any small, determined band of ters could have approached the admin area moving cautiously through the trees. On arrival, we established the 81mm mortar position—two tubes, about 50 rounds each, and also some very local sentries. However, no sooner had we arrived than Jack Malloch’s DC-7 arrived to drop Avtur fuel for the helis. This landed all over the admin area LZ area and in the trees. There were only about 25 of us there, so leaving one mortar manned and a Control Post Operator having established a Predicted DF (SOS) and a couple of DFs, it was all hands to recovering the fuel drums and positioning them so that the helis could land and refuel. We were still doing this when the first helis arrived, having dropped the troops. Basically, for the first two hours, local defence was non-existent, as refuelling and turning the helis around was the priority …

[JMA]

Corporal Jimmy Swan recalls:

The night before the raid, we all turned in early, very much immersed in our own thoughts. We talked a bit and for the umpteenth time double-checked our kit was in perfect fighting order. Everything tied down, ensured grenade pins cannot get pulled out, ensured all magazines were in working order. But more than that, we continually reassured each other that it would all be okay.

On D-Day, we awoke at 0300; we kitted up, climbed on the 4.5s and for the first time in a week, rolled out of Grand Reef Fireforce base. We travelled in silence, fear and excitement etched on our faces. Arriving at Lake Alexander we were briefed and then the unmistakable sound of rotors, then lights ... We had a final brief and jumped in our choppers. Most of the pilots and techs we knew from previous sorties. We did final checks when in the choppers, gave the thumbs-up and we eased upward and forward, headed for the border and then on to our target, Chimoio. I clearly remember looking at my stick and thinking how we looked like fresh poes (NFGs) in the new issue kit.

The sun was an hour from rising, but there was light on the horizon and as we got up over the tree line, it was a proud moment. We were part of the most extensive raid ever and all around us we saw the lines of aircraft against the horizon. Tree-top flying was immediate as we entered Mozambique. This was just fantastic and a tactic we relied on to minimize noise on approach. Then the Daks and the Lynx joined us. The deep roar of the massed aircraft must have been frightening for anyone on the ground below.

We flew over the lake off the Rio Pungwe and knew our target was close. We were leaning half out the open doorways of the choppers, craning to catch a glimpse of what lay ahead. The sight to our front was awesome. Just streaks and hisses from the ghosts of the sky and then flashes on the ground. The jets had started the assault on their targets. Big thumbs-up from the pilot. We sat on the edge of our seats, adrenaline rushing, fear and excitement in a cocktail. We were ready.

[JMA]

Machine gunner Mike MacDonald - from Canada - recalls:

Next morning we kitted up and put on our parachutes. I had 16 x 50-round belts for my MAG, and some were carried by the rest of my stick. It was an unforgettably awesome sight with six long lines of paratroopers marching to the six waiting Dakota transport planes for this historic raid, codenamed Zulu 1.

It was a two-hour flight to Chimoio. We flew low under the Soviet radar, bizarre to see trees and rock faces out the window only yards from the wingtips as we passed the gomos (hills). On Fire Force, I always seemed to be in the Dakota flown by Bob d’Hotman (nicknamed ‘Stuka Pilot’). Finally we got the ten-minute warning. I leaned back and there was a loud pop/crack noise. Ten guys near me jumped a foot off their seats thinking we’d been hit by ground fire but I’d cracked the little window behind me with my MAG butt.

Finally, “Stand up, hook up, check equipment!” The one dispatcher was partly out of the doorway, continuously photographing the camp getting bombed up, to the last second when we jumped. This same dispatcher told me later our Dakota took four hits from ground fire.

As I jumped out I noticed a huge fireball over the main camp and the sound of constant gunfire. I quickly checked my canopy, then the paratroopers on each side of me, and then studied the ground for running terrorists. Of the 12 combat jumps I had done, this damned parachute was the first to drape all over me on my hottest landing zone ever. I fought this entanglement and even used my knife to slash para cords, with bullets cracking all around. My fellow stick mates helped pull the ’chute off and I took cover ten yards away behind the right side of a large tree with another soldier on the left. Part of my ’chute was hooked on the branches of a young tree which drew lots of fire from several terrorists in a bushy river line about 70 yards away.

Luckily we landed in this scrub because the ground toward the terrorists was flat and open; had we landed 50 feet farther north we would have been easily killed in the open. A moment’s respite to wiggle out of harness and we watched, hoping the terrorists would come across the open towards us. On any combat jump we wanted to get out of the parachute harness immediately so we could fight evenhanded. We couldn’t see muzzle flashes or determine the exact position of the terrorists, as the river line was one long thick mass of bush across our front.

Our stick commander got a K-Car to fire at the river line; the K-Car fired three rounds and asked: “How’s that?” I was thinking maybe 20 or 30 rounds would have been a good start. The K-Car fired another short burst and that was all. The enemy went quiet and we slunk off to the right some way to join up with the rest of the para stops. As soon as we linked up word came down the line that Keith White had killed a gook carrying an FN rifle, which raised some eyebrows!

The overall assault was delayed because the main command chopper, flown by Group Captain Norman Walsh with Major Brian Robinson of the SAS in command, was damaged by anti-aircraft fire and withdrew. Eventually they returned in a new chopper. All Rhodesian aircraft involved were hit by ground fire on this operation.