There are several major factors that cloud/shape our thinking on North Korea. We really need to not discuss North Korea in terms of problem/solution until we have isolated and taken on each of those factors.

Some of those factors, IMO, are:

1. The obsolete basis for our state to state perspectives and relationships in North East Asia. Born of WWII, designed for the ideological phase of the Cold War in the dark days of Nationalist China falling to Mao, the war in Korea, etc in the tail end of the Truman administration, these things are out of date. We need to get out a clean slate in some back room and reframe the problems, interests, etc for the world we live in today. When one only makes iterative changes to old perspectives and plans one tends to carry over outdated concepts that corrupt the products that come from that approach.

2. Having a 4-star US Command in South Korea. Four Star Generals don't succeed by doing less or by reducing the assessment of the threats they face. We are probably 1-2 ranks over-grade in every single position in the military, so this is not just a Korea problem, but the senior US commander there should probably be a Major General. Yes, the rest of the commands in PACOM would need to adjust in similar fashion. (20 years ago TSOC commanders were Colonels, and we've had to grow those billets up to 2-stars just to have some degree of parity at the table. We'd be better served if we reduced all of the others by two grades instead.)

3. Our poor understanding of the nature of and the distinction between revolution and resistance. Our doctrine is a hot mess that is still far too weighted in the colonial experience of Western nations, with good doses of logic-corruption stirred in from our own containment and war on terrorism experiences. We don't have a good idea of how close the DPRK populace is to revolution because we don't have a good understanding of what factors contribute most to creating the coiled spring with in a populace for some event to unleash, nor do we have a good appreciation for how the populaces of DPRK actually feel about their situation or who they blame. (I suspect they blame other governments more than they blame their own). This brings us to Resistance. One can almost guarantee that any military effort to "liberate" or "stabilize" or "nation build" North Korea will be met with a determined resistance insurgency. One that will probably find sanctuary and support in the PRC. Any ideas about conducting those types of operations really need a reality check. But there is no such reality in our current doctrine.

4. Our fixation on WMD. This is a tough issue, but while I have no silver bullet answer, I do believe that our current fixation on and weighting of this issue is unhealthy to our overall national security. We need to rethink this. The only nation that the DPRK could destroy or defeat through the employment of nuclear weapons is their own. They know that. Same is true for Iran. Tough issue, but we need a smarter, more balanced perspective.

There are other issues as well, of course, but the beauty of each of these for the US is that these are all problems of our own creation, and therefore fully within our duty and authority to fix. We need to fix ourselves first, then go out and see what we can do to shape the actions of others. We tend to cling to outrageous positions, and then make equally outrageous demands of others to comply to us. That approach is wearing thin.