North Korea: 2012-2016

[Dayuhan]

Fuchs has done a better job explaining how he believes "influence" should be approached and could work than you have - continuing your stock position in near every instance - of suggesting doing nothing.

What Fuchs suggests is simply not realistic. First, it relies on the assumption that the "Great Western Powers" (who he means by that I've no idea, you'd have to ask him) can act secretly and cooperatively toward a common goal without that being patently obvious to anyone who's half paying attention. Second, it assumes that these "Great Western Powers" have sufficient influence to make the Chinese want to do something that they most emphatically don't want to do, have no real reason to want to do and have very real reasons to avoid.

These assumptions seem pulled out of thin air and no basis for them is presented.

I've no objection to trying it: unlike some plans we've seen that are based on fixed assumptions about what can be done and how others will react to proposed actions, the consequences of its failure would not be terribly inconvenient. It won't work, of course, but at least it probably wouldn't blow up in anyone's face. Even when the whole "secret" plot inevitably ends up all over the Internet it would only seem mildly silly.

North Korea will change when they have no alternative but to submit to influence/pressure/whatever.

Do you assume that change in North Korea can only be the consequence of external "influence/pressure/whatever"? If so, why?

In this case the key lies with China, as with Syria the key lies with Russia/Iran.

I don't think that assessment is accurate. The key in Syria is not Russia or Iran, but the Syrian Armed Forces. If enough of his military defects, Assad will fall, no matter what Russia or Iran say or do. If enough of his military stays loyal and fights it out, he will sustain the civil war and possibly win.

Of course even if we assume that Russia or Iran is "the key", that gets us nowhere, because Russia and Iran will act according to their own perception of their own interests, and no combination of Western powers is going to change that perception.

Similarly, "the key" in North Korea is likely to be the DPRK armed forces: I doubt that there will be really meaningful change unless the generals either decide to take over themselves or refuse to suppress a popular uprising. Neither of these seems likely any time soon, though a coup would naturally be unexpected until it occurs.

Similarly, even if China was "the key", that would get us nowhere, because the Chinese have no interest whatsoever in trying to "fix" the DPRK, and that's not something any outside influence is going to change.

The U.S. and other nations openly oppose DPRK's WMD program, but are relatively quiet about the human rights abuses in North Korea. Expanding the focus of pressure to include human rights does put China and other supporters of North Korea is tougher position diplomatically to continue to support an oppressive government.

I have no problem with expanding the focus of pressure to include human rights, but I also have no illusions about that accomplishing anything. It's certainly not going to put China in a tougher position: the Chinese consistently and vigorously oppose any effort to enforce an externally dictated human rights standard on anyone, anywhere. Making human rights an issue might well induce the Chinese to give more support, just to show how little they care and how seriously they oppose the idea of anyone pressuring anyone else to conform to such standards.

Failure to gain support through their normal cycles of provocation because the world is tiring of their treatment of their people puts them in a position where they'll be more likely to adapt changes over time. This would potentially increase the stability of North Korea and the region. A lot of countries are tired of the U.S. determining who can and can't have nuclear weapons, so that is hardly a high moral ground issue that resonates.

I can see the point about overreliance on the WMD issue, and mostly agree. I doubt, though, that changing the focus of complaint to anything else is going to produce much meaningful change. China will support the DPRK just enough to keep the regime afloat, because they do not want the regime to fall. That's not something any external influence is going to change. As long as the DPRK is assured of that support, they've little incentive to change, and of course they are institutionally very deeply against change.

There are cases in which "we" - the US, the West, whatever - are simply not in control, and where attempting to take control is likely to create a bigger mess than what we've already got. Sure, we can try to exert influence, but don't expect much tangible result, because the influence "we" can bring to bear is quite limited.

I seem to recall some rather lofty and unrealistic policy objectives for both Iraq and Afghanistan.

And that got us... where?

Again you're the one saying liberate the North, I'm looking for strategies for changing the behavior of the regime in the North, not replacing it. Change is already happening in North Korea, so I'm leary of the experts who continue to believe the legacy system will continue forever without a military intervention. It is evolving now and the world should explore ways to shape that evolution.

I'm not convinced that "the world" has common objectives in this, or most, cases, and I think the capacity to shape and change the regime is very limited. No objection to trying various carrots and sticks, but they haven't worked well in the past and aren't likely to work well in the future.

Realistically, I think we're stuck with the status quo or some minor variant thereof, and are likely to be in that position for some time. We can talk less about WMD and more about human rights, but is anything likely to change? I doubt it. The catalyst for change is probably going to be internal, it will probably take us by surprise, and it will not be dictated or controlled by any outside power.

Bill: If a serious resistance movement did arise and neither South Korea, Red China nor Russia supported it, it would have no chance. It would have no sanctuary and no external support. Northern Korea would be essentially an island and what resistance there was would wither and die.

I hesitate to say this since I haven't read any of max161's papers yet, but I agree with you in questioning how much of a resistance could develop especially if the South Koreans showed up and contrived to provide everybody with 3000 calories a day. Juche might be have some appeal but enough or more than enough food to eat is a pretty powerful motivator.

Insurgency in the Philippines has been going on for 40+ years with no sanctuary and no meaningful external support. Different situations of course, but sanctuary and external support are not absolutely necessary for insurgency to endure.

Invasion and foreign occupation can be a powerful motivator... though it seems a very moot point, since I don't think anyone is likely to invade the DPRK any time soon.