Green on Blue: causes and responses (merged thread)

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon

That all depends on who thinks I am wrong now doesn't it.

Mine was a generic statement. Obviously you missed the "1918" as well as the "we" in that statement, applying to the US as an entity. I doubt you were responsible for all the errors since 1961 and I have no clue -- nor do I care -- whether you are wrong or right on this issue.

Fear of what someone else will do with what I write is not going to change my mind about writing it ... it will only change where I decide to send it.

I doubt fear can be instilled on an internet discussion board. I'd certainly never try to do that and you apparently missed the "flawed or perfect" element in comment stating my opinion on the crass stupidity of the Political class -- at whom that comment was directed.

If I intend a comment to be personal, it will be quite clear that was my intent.

Like this:

I suggest you read what's written and avoid interpolating between the lines.

Now back to the thread.

Fuchs:

Don't mix the political caution and the military propensity for a lack thereof. My comment was about the US Army, not the United States. US politicians ALWAYS address foreign policy (to include unleashing military forces) through the lens of domestic politics and that grinds rather slowly.

[TheCurmudgeon]

...just having a little fun. Nothing more

Guess it is difficult to tell sometimes.

[davidbfpo]

Found via another discussion board:

If IEDs were eliminated as causal factors since July 2010, the percentage of all ISAF casualties in Afghanistan through hostile action reaches a staggering 33% caused by the intentional actions of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) or Afghan Security Guard (ASG) personnel. Put simply, one out of every three ISAF killed since June 2010 has been murdered by the Afghans he is training or otherwise serving with.[i] This may be the highest incidence of intentional fratricide in recorded military history

Let’s put our critical thinking caps on. Once we put this emerging phenomenon into some rational perspective we’ll find that it’s 1) hardly “emerging;” and 2) not a phenomenon at all but rather the norm in a region and within a culture where conflict is not some abstract or strategic concept but instead is an intensely personal and familial endeavor. It’s the nature of the particular beast that we’re fighting and, if we’re going to fight this beast on its home turf, then we’d better understand it and develop approaches and polices that acknowledge the reality of this conflict.

Link:http://www.defenceiq.com/army-and-la...mber_155080732

[carl]

Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon

Not sure any of it is worth spit, but keep thinking that I ought to do something, even if its wrong.

If there is a problem and you desire to fix it, that is good. If you are afraid to do anything in case it may be wrong, that is bad because you will be paralyzed. So if after due consideration, if you think there is a good chance you can improve things by doing something, do it. That is better than doing nothing and hoping for the best, mostly. In any event it is admirable because it is an act of moral courage.

[carl]

Originally Posted by Ken White

Mmmm. To an extent but we have significant philosophical differences and when that's added to the experience variations, it's more than different words and angles... I

No, you're wrong. We're about the same, except I cock my hat forward and you cock yours to the rear.

Originally Posted by Ken White

I doubt the frequent murders will cause a withdrawal. I also suspect that the friction involved in those other situations was seen as less benign than it is looked at historically.

We'll see if the murders will 'cause a premature and precipitate bug out. I think they will but time will tell.

I am quite sure that in those other situations things weren't so benign. But the point isn't that they were all tea cakes and teary eyed farewells, the point is they didn't result in this level of murder.

Originally Posted by Ken White

There are other problems. Take KATUSAs for example, their baser options were constrained by very, very rigid, almost sadistic ROK Army discipline -- the Afghans don't operate that way. The Moros in the Constabulary were constrained by their Chiefs and Imams. The Afghans have Elders and Imams but Afghan culture is far more individualistic and less communitarian; those community leaders are heeded pretty much only when it suits.

Why are those things problems? Problems with what?

Originally Posted by Ken White

Perhaps you missed it in your reading but things always go poorly for us in every war -- and the lower the intensity of those wars, the longer it takes us to learn and get down to business. So, your statement is correct -- we will not change and if we get into difficulties with the Chinese, things will go poorly for us. Only when we bring masses of people into the forces and they and the enemy of the moment FORCE new thinking do we start improving (Note that not since we were in WW II have we faced an enemy significant enough and / or with capability to force that; not once since 1945). As I said, you and I can wish as much as we want to but that is not going to change...

I miss almost everything in my reading. But once in a while things stick, especially after I go back and read it again and again.

One of the things I didn't miss was that in the past, we started off bad but seemed to learn more quickly than we do now. The Philippines is an example. We started out not so good but basically pacified the islands (Bob's World: I know what you are going to say) in just a few years. Those were the days when a Lt. could pass a paper up and have it read and actually acted upon.

We can't seem to do that now. We seem to make the same mistakes for generation after generation. I just finished No Sure Victory and its thesis-that the Army was pre-occupied with meaningless measurements, metrics, for their own sake-seems to me to be as valid today as then.

One of the other things I picked up from my reading (it took six books read twelve times to do it) is that we had a lot of time to make up for some of our unpreparedness and that time was given to us by things that aren't there anymore. The Royal Navy isn't there anymore. The potential adversary in the Pacific doesn't have an economy much smaller and more backward anymore. The Red Army won't be fighting against the enemy too anymore. The upshot of all this is we won't have to time to get it right in the midst of the fight anymore. I think it is complacency to believe that we will.

Originally Posted by Ken White

I cannot dictate what the world or most Americans (including you, apparently -- or do you??? ) believe they see. Nor am I much concerned about them or that -- it does not change the reality, if they miss that, it's a lick on them...

They act upon what they see. So what they see is that the US has been there for 11 years. They aren't going to say that "Oh well, you're right. I see it now. We've been there once, 11 times. Why in that case I'll judge the thing entirely differently." They aren't going to say that. We, the US, have been there for 11 years.

Originally Posted by Ken White

Well, maybe you do see but you're still living in a dream world. Yes, it can be changed but while to you there is cause for such change to be forced, I can assure you that most of the political and military establishment and most definitely the Congress do NOT see it that way. It can be changed but it will not be.

You would like my dream world. The Coca-Cola is always cold, but not too and it is served by smiling women with wonderous hip to waist ratios with large..., anyway like there ain't no gravity there. And there is always a tailwind and I never miss a prarie dog, ever. You should come.

Like I said, we mostly always agree. Just check your last sentence.

Originally Posted by Ken White

Given the significant problems with the Health Care and Legal industries, you'll pardon me if I find that allegory totally laughable. That doesn't mean the upper echelons of the Military are good or even marginally competent, they are not (and anyone who believes that is not a systemic problem isn't really looking at why it's that way...) -- but simply that the Medical and Legal profession are little if any better and IMO anyone who thinks they are needs to undertake deeper study of all three.

That is what I do, bring laughter to the world. But the health care industry isn't run by docs, it is run by MBAs. But in any event lawyers and docs have ethical standards that most of them are quite serious about. And the prospect of losing license or being disbarred for not meeting those standards is taken very seriously by them. Some of them, many of them maybe, aren't so good, but enough are that docs are highly respected and parents still are quite happy when their children go into the law.

Originally Posted by Ken White

Most of them know what's wrong, however, they are systemically constrained and cannot do what you wish. Since I strongly disagree on the levels of professionalism of the docs and lawyers -- and at my age and with my background, I bet I've had far more dealings with both those than you have -- I'll simply point out that all three professions have systemic constraints that limit their ability to truly force change and increase effectiveness. It is what it is and the best approach is to live with it and try to circumvent those systemic thin gs to the extent possible.

You're wrong about the level of professionalism of lawyers and docs vs. the stars and multi-stars. There are legions of lawyers who will fight other lawyers on matters of law and basic justice. Docs upend the conventional practice of medicine on a regular basis. That is how the field progresses. Our multi-stars in my view, remember that I am dreamy and miss a lot, fight tooth and claw to maintain the status-quo. I don't ever see any star or multi-star saying, "Boy did we screw up." of "Boy was that guy an idiot." The lower down officers will say that, but not the high boys. If that has happened regularly, I missed it again.

Originally Posted by Ken White

Then you have missed the most important point in this sub-thread. Violence in problem solving leads to feuds. A history of such conflicts while present to an extent in some of the other culture herein mentioned (to include us in the West and in the US in particular) is, in Afghanistan which has not undergone the leavening / 'civilizing' processes of most modern nations including the Philippines, literally defines the Afghans. The propensity to get hacked off at a slight, real or perceived and take violent reprisal action is deeply embedded due to that lack of leavening. You or I get insulted, we may get angry, may even get even -- but neither of us is likely to have first thoughts of the offending person being dead at our feet. Some gang bangers here operate that way but not too many of even those; in Afghanistan, it is the norm. It can and likely will be changed but it'll take more than has occurred in the last 50 years there to cause that change.

Well, I do miss a lot. But no, I haven't missed the point. While all you say may be true, it is beside the point. It is a given. That is the way those guys are. We went over there and we decided to do what we have done. If we haven't taken what they are like into account, that is our fault. And it is a failure of the professional military. What training should have been done wasn't. What units should have been doing the training weren't. The counter intelligence that should have seen some of this coming didn't. What limits on troop behavior that should have been emplaced (sic) and enforced weren't. Shoot, some of this may have been caused because Afghans are offended by cursing. It may be smirking fashionable to say that is impossible to control but it isn't. That it wasn't seen to be important and controlled is a failure of the professional military that may have cost lives.

Sometimes it seems to me that this problem is being presented as an inevitability. I don't think it was inevitable. I think we did an awful lot to bring it on ourselves. The trouble with presenting it as inevitable is that that is a cop-out. It is an excuse for and a rationalization of human failure, avoidable human failure. Improvement can't come unless it is acknowledged that things indeed can be improved. Viewing these things as inevitable is just throwing up hands and saying "Don't blame me. Nothing could have been done anyway." That's a cop-out.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by carl

No, you're wrong. We're about the same, except I cock my hat forward and you cock yours to the rear.

Can't speak for yours, you're wrong on mine. Another standing broad jump at a wrong conclusion.

I am quite sure that in those other situations things weren't so benign. But the point isn't that they were all tea cakes and teary eyed farewells, the point is they didn't result in this level of murder.

That's true and no one has said otherwise. It is also irrelevant, as are all those other experiences. What we did then and can do now are very different things.

Why are those things problems? Problems with what?

Comparing Kumquats to Mushmelons. Usually leads to erroneous conclusions...

...Those were the days when a Lt. could pass a paper up and have it read and actually acted upon.

Very true -- and those days are gone, never to return. That's just one problem in your allegory.

We can't seem to do that now. We seem to make the same mistakes for generation after generation. I just finished No Sure Victory and its thesis-that the Army was pre-occupied with meaningless measurements, metrics, for their own sake-seems to me to be as valid today as then.

Very astute of you -- I've been pointing that out to you for several years and you finally got it -- when someone else also said it.

The upshot of all this is we won't have to time to get it right in the midst of the fight anymore. I think it is complacency to believe that we will.

I don't disagree with that in broad principle, we will have less time and less aid. However, I do not agree that we are being complacent about it or that the sky is falling / will fall. Few things are that simple.

They act upon what they see. So what they see is that the US has been there for 11 years. They aren't going to say that "Oh well, you're right. I see it now. We've been there once, 11 times. Why in that case I'll judge the thing entirely differently." They aren't going to say that. We, the US, have been there for 11 years.

So what? Who cares what they think. It affects nothing. Least of all the fact that while the US has been there for 11 years, the US Army has been there for 11 one year or less tours. Perception is not reality

Like I said, we mostly always agree. Just check your last sentence.

We agree on the result or end state frequently, we more frequently disagree strongly over the why and how.

You're wrong about the level of professionalism of lawyers and docs vs. the stars and multi-stars.

We disagree on that as well and I almost certainly have far more experience interfacing with all three. No sense wasting pixels on it.

Our multi-stars in my view, remember that I am dreamy and miss a lot...

Oh, I do.

... fight tooth and claw to maintain the status-quo. I don't ever see any star or multi-star saying, "Boy did we screw up." of "Boy was that guy an idiot." The lower down officers will say that, but not the high boys. If that has happened regularly, I missed it again.

That's because they do not -- and cannot -- do it publicly (Legally among other reasons, most good, some not). You miss it because it's hidden. Those guys are just like every other group of humans, there are good, bad and indifferent folks, there are fighters and there are go along, get along people. However, you can't see that because a lot of media and writer types hang on to the images of Catch -22. Reality isn't quite like that.

Well, I do miss a lot. But no, I haven't missed the point. While all you say may be true, it is beside the point. It is a given. That is the way those guys are. We went over there and we decided to do what we have done. If we haven't taken what they are like into account, that is our fault...

It was known and taken into account and the Pols said 'Go.' Once there, the average westerner makes the mistake of trying to treat everyone as if they were fellow westerners and reasonably trustworthy. The locals are not other Westerners and they are trustworthy IF you know what that means to them. There' not enough training time in any Army to cope with that cultural divide -- what you're asking is that those western kids park a lifetime of upbringing and familiarization with a type society and adapt to the mores of a very different society. Not going to happen, not without years of training and effort. The SF guys can handle it, they've had those years of training for the cultural divide. The large Army, the GPF cannot afford the training time nor should they be able to handle it. Not their job. They are being misapplied at political direction (and they know that...) and are coping as best they can.

And it is a failure of the professional military... That it wasn't seen to be important and controlled is a failure of the professional military that may have cost lives.

What is your solution for how to control the issues cited in the second quote in David's 11:47 AM post? What training would you insist upon to provide an ability to cope with that?

You're long on criticism of things you don't fully comprehend and short on positive suggestions...

Sometimes it seems to me that this problem is being presented as an inevitability. I don't think it was inevitable.

Almost nothing is inevitable. Sets of circumstances can conspire to make a given situation very difficult but little is inevitable.

I think we did an awful lot to bring it on ourselves.

I agree but I bet our reasons are quite different.

The trouble with presenting it as inevitable is that that is a cop-out. It is an excuse for and a rationalization of human failure, avoidable human failure. Improvement can't come unless it is acknowledged that things indeed can be improved. Viewing these things as inevitable is just throwing up hands and saying "Don't blame me. Nothing could have been done anyway." That's a cop-out.

That's an indictment with some merit. Problem is that no one is claiming inevitability -- predictable, yes but not inevitable. Again we agree on a result -- but you're evading a significant point to make that statement.

That point is that once the decision to remain in Afghanistan against the advice of all those Stars you denigrate while knowing little to nothing about them is that what has happened with respect to Afghans shooting westerners was not inevitable -- but it was so extremely likely to occur that few should've been surprised.

You can slam the Flag Os -- some of them deserve it but not all do -- but do not give the Politicians who overruled them and told them to stay there and who then dictate the rules through Lawyers and with the advice of Doctors (PhDs but still...).

I await your solutions to controlling the situation and for the training that should have been or could be conducted.

[Dayuhan]

Originally Posted by carl

The Philippines is an example. We started out not so good but basically pacified the islands (Bob's World: I know what you are going to say) in just a few years. Those were the days when a Lt. could pass a paper up and have it read and actually acted upon.

We can't seem to do that now. We seem to make the same mistakes for generation after generation.

I've seen this comparison made before, and I remain unconvinced. I don't think it's historically accurate and I don't think the Philippine-American War provides much in the way of relevant comparisons with Afghanistan.

To cite only the most obvious differences, the Philippine American War was purely a war of colonial conquest. There was no effort to create a viable indigenous government, we were there to conquer, hold, and rule. It was also a different age, with vastly different ideas about what was wand was not acceptable, starting with the whole idea of a war of outright colonial conquest.

The times they have a'changed. In many was they've a'changed for the better, but the changes do provide some new kinks for those who would occupy other countries.

[jcustis]

From a sample of just two guys who I've polled, and who are either currently in or recently out of theater, the boys seem to be thinking about all of the implications of trying to work the paradigm of mentorship from Afghan to ISAF, building rapport, and identifying causes of friction so as to defuse problems before the become something more dramatic. The discussion distinguished ANSF losing their mind and bearing and initiating an attack on ISAF, and ANSF infiltrated by Taliban and committing an attack.

They also identified that the adage of "criticize in private, praise in public" holds true in much of what they do during interactions. For those moments when they feel like taking an Afghan and kicking him in the ass and throwing his weapon off of a cliff because he simply won't listen when the s*it is flying, they make a point to get back to the individual as soon as things calm down, and explain why they got so pissed or animated, and so the Afghan can truly understand why their actions weren't cool. They recognize it is a tough balance, and it isn't something that they were trained to do. It seems to come from basic, simple, good soldiering and junior leadership skills.

Still, a common theme that we've talked about here already came through in one guy's comment:

If you suck at being a people person, take a knee, face out, drink water, and pull security.

They also make a point to provide for internal security against the possibility of an green-on-blue attack (detect and defeat), and are clear to never become lax and forget to watch their back.

[davidbfpo]

Diggers suffer again:

An Afghan army soldier shot dead three Australians and wounded two more at a patrol base in southern Afghanistan. Hours later, two Australian (SF) soldiers were killed in a helicopter crash in Helmand province.

The Australian PM stated:

In a war of so many losses, this is our single worst day in Afghanistan....Indeed, I believe this is the most losses in combat since the days of the Vietnam War and the Battle of Long Tan. This is news so truly shocking that it's going to feel for many Australians like a physical blow.

This is what hurts at home:

Australia has now lost 38 troops in the eleven-year-long campaign in Afghanistan, including seven who were killed by Afghan soldiers.

I've not seen this official assessment before:

Nato commanders believe around one in four of such attacks can be linked to infiltration or coercion by the Taliban and the rest are rooted in violent arguments based on cultural or personal clashes.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19418267

[carl]

David:

25% of these murders being the result of Taliban & Co. action is up from the 10% they used to quote. Combine that with this "The Taliban has been actively recruiting members of the Afghan security forces, publicly announcing that insider attacks were a central part of their strategy against Nato forces" from one of the articles you linked to and things are looking a bit dark.

Back in post #21 I wondered if Taliban could take advantage of this trend and exacerbate it for gain. I would bet now that is exactly what they are doing. I was skeptical they would do that because I figured it was a waste to use a genuine infiltrator for onesys, twosys and threesys killings rather than using them for bigger things associated with attacks, like opening the gates and things (though I read that happened on an attack on the ANP). But Taliban & Co. and the Pak Army/ISI are nothing if not adaptable and it would be smart to take advantage of something that was already going on and pushing it. The results so far have been pretty good for them. Hardly a day goes by now without some killings. Over the course of weeks the casualty effect is the same as a successful big attack and the morale effect upon us is vastly greater. The enemy is doing well.

[jcustis]

The need to constantly look over your shoulder has got to be a drain on the effectiveness of the primary mission. You can only sleep with one eye open for so long.

A gauge of whether the Taliban infiltration factor is truly on the rise will be the moment when a platoon-sized ANSF element turns on a Squad-sized ISAF mentor element, murders them all, and then melts away with their ammunition and weapons. It would not be hard to do.

We would be royally screwed then. Royally screwed...

Among other basic weapons drills, I'd be running some El Presidente work if I was in charge of getting a mentor team trained up.

[carl]

I found this item in a May 1, 2012 BBC story about ANA troops working with British soldiers:

Also, Taliban ring tones have been banned, even when the Afghan security forces use them as a joke

I remember reading also, on Afghan Analysts Network I think, that if somebody goes through a Taliban & Co. checkpoint, they had better have a Taliban ring tone-or else. When those ANA guys go on leave everybody in the family must have to keep close track of phones and tones. That country seems like it is very hard to live in.

[davidbfpo]

In Post 103 Jon Custis asked:

Has anyone done any scrounging to see if the Soviets had similar problems during their time in AFG and trying to prop up a government?

Hat tip to a SWC member who knows Russian we now have some scrounging.

On the attachment a Russian article which has been edited down to the keypoints; if you want the original:http://www.proza.ru/2010/05/11/907

Of 190 dead advisers, 145 were officers:http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclope...893@cmsArticle

[carl]

Originally Posted by Ken White

That's true and no one has said otherwise. It is also irrelevant, as are all those other experiences. What we did then and can do now are very different things.

But why? Why can't we accomplish things like that now? That is at the heart of much of my concern. There is, I see from my armchair, a military culture that in many ways prevents things that should be done from getting done.

Originally Posted by Ken White

Very true -- and those days are gone, never to return. That's just one problem in your allegory.

Again, why? What I hear when you say that is the Army used to be able to do some effective things 100 years ago but that can't now and never will be able to again. Why not? Why can't what is keeping that from happening be changed? For example, Congress doesn't care if over emphasis on seniority is inculcated into cadets at West Point (one of Jorg Muth's theses). They just care about the football team and that there is a girl or two with stripes. That over emphasis is within the purview of the professional military establishment. The things they have control over, they won't change.

Originally Posted by Ken White

Very astute of you -- I've been pointing that out to you for several years and you finally got it -- when someone else also said it.

Shoot Ken, I can't catch a break even when I agree with you. (grumble, grumble, grumble)

Originally Posted by Ken White

So what? Who cares what they think. It affects nothing. Least of all the fact that while the US has been there for 11 years, the US Army has been there for 11 one year or less tours. Perception is not reality

Perception may not be reality, but it is mostly what people act upon. So perception is quite important. In my view, it is in the interests of the general officer protection society that that not be known. If it was carefully explained to the Americans, they would arch eyebrows and say "How the heck can you guys be so stupid?" As it is they can blame it on somebody else, or the weather, or the mountains, or history.

Originally Posted by Ken White

We disagree on that as well and I almost certainly have far more experience interfacing with all three. No sense wasting pixels on it.

Multi-stars you indeed do have more experience. I think I saw one once. Docs and counselors, maybe not...

Originally Posted by Ken White

That's because they do not -- and cannot -- do it publicly (Legally among other reasons, most good, some not). You miss it because it's hidden. Those guys are just like every other group of humans, there are good, bad and indifferent folks, there are fighters and there are go along, get along people. However, you can't see that because a lot of media and writer types hang on to the images of Catch -22. Reality isn't quite like that.

That is close to an apologia for the multi-stars, in my skewed view anyway. They will get no sympathy from me. I haven't heard of anybody resigning in protest. I haven't heard of anybody really spilling the beans after they retire. I see a lot of guys who cover for each other, sometimes at the expense of their troops and who make a lot of money after they retire.

Originally Posted by Ken White

It was known and taken into account and the Pols said 'Go.' Once there, the average westerner makes the mistake of trying to treat everyone as if they were fellow westerners and reasonably trustworthy. The locals are not other Westerners and they are trustworthy IF you know what that means to them. There' not enough training time in any Army to cope with that cultural divide -- what you're asking is that those western kids park a lifetime of upbringing and familiarization with a type society and adapt to the mores of a very different society. Not going to happen, not without years of training and effort. The SF guys can handle it, they've had those years of training for the cultural divide. The large Army, the GPF cannot afford the training time nor should they be able to handle it. Not their job. They are being misapplied at political direction (and they know that...) and are coping as best they can.

That sounds a lot like what the military said after Vietnam. "We didn't make any big mistakes. It was those politicians." I don't buy that people can't make the adjustment. They make adjustments all the time in normal life. You don't go places and say things in other places and various times. People can learn that. I agree it is not going to happen with the present big military, but to get back to my previous point, why can't that be changed, at least parts of it?

Originally Posted by Ken White

What is your solution for how to control the issues cited in the second quote in David's 11:47 AM post? What training would you insist upon to provide an ability to cope with that?

You're long on criticism of things you don't fully comprehend and short on positive suggestions...

Well, I figure it this way. I am riding in the boat and I only know a little about actually operating the boat but I know enough to know when the boat is sinking. So I says out loud "Hey you guys! The boat is sinking!" And then the captain an 1st mate say "You don't know what you are talking about." Then I says again this time sputtering 'cause the water is up to my mouth "No glub glub really! It's phfft splish sinking!" Then they reply "Well when you can come up with a suggestion about how to fix it, then you can complain." Then I is no more.

Though Curmudgeon has some good ideas. The guys JCustis talked to had some good ideas. Kilcullen had some good ideas. Frank North had some good ideas. Barry Petersen had some good ideas too. Lots of people have had good ideas. I only knows I is drowned.

Originally Posted by Ken White

That point is that once the decision to remain in Afghanistan against the advice of all those Stars you denigrate while knowing little to nothing about them is that what has happened with respect to Afghans shooting westerners was not inevitable -- but it was so extremely likely to occur that few should've been surprised.

You can slam the Flag Os -- some of them deserve it but not all do -- but do not give the Politicians who overruled them and told them to stay there and who then dictate the rules through Lawyers and with the advice of Doctors (PhDs but still...).

Two things about that. First is, as I said above, that sounds an awful lot like the multi-stars are setting up others to take the fall, a lot like they did after Vietnam. Second is if it was so likely how come the multi-stars are so surprised that one of them is making silly guesses about Ramadan? If it was so likely they should have seen it coming and done something to head it off. They didn't, on both counts.

Originally Posted by Ken White

I await your solutions to controlling the situation and for the training that should have been or could be conducted.

I'll be happy to send as much as you care to hear via personal message or email. I won't do it here for a couple of reasons.

1. I'm a big chicken.

2. I don't like to jump through hoops at another's command. It looks bad
and my Mom, God rest her soul, would frown at that.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by carl

But why? Why can't we accomplish things like that now? That is at the heart of much of my concern. There is, I see from my armchair, a military culture that in many ways prevents things that should be done from getting done.

It's not just military -- though that certainly is a part of it; rather small part, really -- it's a societal and political problem. US society has changed and demands different things than it de even 50 years ago. The US political milieu has added more and more restrictive laws to everything.

Again, why? What I hear when you say that is the Army used to be able to do some effective things 100 years ago but that can't now and never will be able to again.

I've never said that nor am I saying it now. What I am saying is that the days when LTs got listened to much above Co level are gone -- they will return but only when we are confronted with an existential fight. That's what it will take to cur through the societal, Congressional and military bureaucracy and inertia.

Again Why not? Why can't what is keeping that from happening be changed? For example, Congress doesn't care if over emphasis on seniority is inculcated into cadets at West Point (one of Jorg Muth's theses). They just care about the football team and that there is a girl or two with stripes. That over emphasis is within the purview of the professional military establishment. The things they have control over, they won't change.

I think you just answered your "Why not?" question...

Congress funds on whims. Upset them, ignore their priorities and you lose bucks. The Army doesn't want to lose bucks. Congress likes the one year tour, congress likes a one-size-fits-all personnel system that is 'fair' and objective' (Read NOT meritocratic...).

Perception may not be reality, but it is mostly what people act upon. So perception is quite important.

We can disagree on that.

In my view, it is in the interests of the general officer protection society that that not be known....

Again we disagree -- the responsibility for one year (or less) tours is directly attributable to the US polity. The Army would change if they could and IF they didn't have to attract the Millenials into the service. Start sending folks over for more than a year and the divorce rate would climb significantly while the enlistment and officer accession rate would decline precipitously.

Multi-stars you indeed do have more experience. I think I saw one once. Docs and counselors, maybe not...

So in other words you're condemning a whole slew of people based on your perceptions?

That ain't reality...

That is close to an apologia for the multi-stars, in my skewed view anyway.

It isn't and your view is indeed skewed. I have no delusions of changing that view .

They will get no sympathy from me. I haven't heard of anybody resigning in protest.

I'm sure that will really perturb a bunch of people...

Resigning in protest isn't the American way, never has been. The Parliamentary democracies are big on it but we're a Republic and do things differently.

I haven't heard of anybody really spilling the beans after they retire. I see a lot of guys who cover for each other, sometimes at the expense of their troops and who make a lot of money after they retire.

That, too is the American way -- that societal thingy...

That sounds a lot like what the military said after Vietnam. "We didn't make any big mistakes. It was those politicians."

Some in the military. most of us knew better

... why can't that be changed, at least parts of it?

I've answered that question from you half dozen times over the last couple of years and just above. You don't like my answer and that's okay but no sense wasting pixels on it.

...Second is if it was so likely how come the multi-stars are so surprised that one of them is making silly guesses about Ramadan? If it was so likely they should have seen it coming and done something to head it off. They didn't, on both counts.

You state what one said publicly. What do you know about what others said publicly or not?

I'll be happy to send as much as you care to hear via personal message or email. I won't do it here for a couple of reasons.

1. I'm a big chicken.

2. I don't like to jump through hoops at another's command. It looks bad
and my Mom, God rest her soul, would frown at that.

Commands and requests are very different things. I'm in no position to give you a command -- perception? or chip?

A PM would be interesting and it'll remain private. And remember, even Chickens cross roads...

[SWJ Blog]

Afghanistan: Green on Blue Attacks Are Only a Small Part of the Problem

Anthony Cordesman being the author.



--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[jmm99]

Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data (by Bill Roggio and Lisa Lundquist; August 23, 2012, data last updated on Aug. 31, 2012).

Covers 2008 to date, with links to sources of the reported incidents, as well as summaries by province, etc. It also documents the different positions as to causes suggested by ISAF, NATO, US and Afghani authorities.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

A snippet via a FP Blog comment and from a reporter whose documentaries are amazing IMO:

A better alternative, in my opinion, is Ben Anderson's No Worse Enemy. Anderson is a British television reporter who lived first with British troops in Helmand province, then with their US Marine successors.

The most striking thing about the book are the verbatim exchanges between Afghans and Western troops. Anderson doesn't speak Pashtun, but he filmed practically everything, and later had the statements from the Afghans translated. These vividly show the breadth of the disconnect, which was often widened by the failure of the official Afghan translators with the troops to provide complete and accurate translations.

Link:http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/...ut_afghanistan

[TheCurmudgeon]

General Bradshaw announced that the allies had agreed on joint counterintelligence teams, as well as joint post-attack assessments and “direct input from Afghan Army religious and cultural affairs advisers” to improve cultural sensitivity.

Culture Clash With Afghans on Display at Briefing

We are working to educate Afghans on our culture, not sure we working to respect theirs in their own country.

Afghans create 'Western culture' manual to help counter insider attacks

[TheCurmudgeon]

Anyone familiar with the concept of "non-mediated peacekeeping"? It was used to refer to joint Palestinian/Israeli patrols under the Oslo accords form about 1993 to about 2000.