The Taliban collection (2006 onwards)

[carl]

I was reading some of the articles in this thread and figure we actually have a lot to work with on the negotiation front.

First, it appears that some of the high ups in Taliban & Co realize they can't take over the country even when we bug out.

Second, they don't like AQ and wish they would go away.

Third, one thing Taliban & Co and the Afghans have in common is they both hate the Pakistanis.

Fourth, some of the higher ups in Taliban & Co are talking up the possibility of negotiations. It doesn't matter much if they will turn out to be really serious about it or if it just a ploy, it is something that can be exploited.

In the RUSI article, the id's of the people interviewed can be easily accerned (sic) but those guys are still alive. So maybe there is some genuine support for negotiations of some kind. Even at MO's level, maybe.

Sixth, though the Haqqanis profess fealty to MO, there seems to be some uncertainty if that will be the case in actuality.

Seventh, MO is a critical person.

So it seems there are a lot of potential avenues to pursue to cause dissension in the ranks over there. I don't know exactly how to do it but these guys don't seem all that certain and united.

The most critical thing would be to somehow, someway (and I don't know how) to get them physically away from the Pak Army/ISI. But maybe that wouldn't work because MO is too deep in the ISI pocket to ever come out.

So that leads to bumping off MO. Can he be replaced or is his personage so important that if he were killed, the Taliban & Co and Pak Army/ISI nexus would unravel and the thing would turn into a confused mess?

There are things that can be exploited. The bigger question is can we, the US led by our betters inside the beltway, exploit these things. I am not hopeful, recalling how we were had by a shopkeeper from Quetta and continue to be had by the sahibs in 'Pindi.