Africa's Commandos - new book on the RLI

[davidbfpo]

I noted ex-Rh. AF veteran Peter Petter-Boyer in this passage (in Post 198), offers a rare example of reflection on the horrors of war in this thread:

The SAS men escorting me were used to seeing bodies mutilated by grenades, land mines and even heavy air strikes. For me it was different. An airman’s war tends to be detached. Even seeing CTs running and going down under fire seemed remote. Never again did I accept airstrike casualty numbers as a means by which to judge our air successes without remembering the horrors of what I saw at Chimoio.

It is also interesting as the Rh. AF was credited at the end of the war as having the better strategic viewpoint, alongside being technical proficient.

Not read much, aside from SWC and links therein, on Rhodesia for many years, although I have a shelf of books - so I am enjoying this thread. As the viewing figures show so are many others.

[JMA]

Simon Haarhoff continues:

The sweep line then moved through the vlei area with considerably reduced resistance and claimed a number of kills before emerging on the other side. By this time the 2Cdo sticks were getting into the camp areas and evidence of habitation was all around. As the commando moved through, many buildings and weapons were destroyed, but this was in passing as we needed to continue the sweep. Around early afternoon the commando was sweeping in extended line using a well-defined track as the axis of advance when the left flank came under fire from close range. Good infantry training kicked in as the IA drill “Enemy left, charge” was ordered by the officer in charge of the left. The sticks on the left immediately charged towards the fire, firing as they moved. Fortunately it became apparent very quickly that the ‘enemy left’ was in fact elements of 3Cdo, who had seen movement through the bush, thought it was terrs and opened fire. One 3Cdo troopie was slightly wounded and had to be casevaced.

How that developed... Canadian, Mike McDonald again:

About 500 yards away to the north in some thick green scrub a lone gook kept taking potshots at every aircraft that passed nearby. The gook kept this up for some time.

Lt Mark Adams picks it up:

While regrouping at the headquarters a lone gook fired the odd shot in our direction from a clump of trees downhill from the where we were. I instructed my men to go to the other side of the main building and out of the line of fire. Major Jerry Strong tasked me off to deal with the gook with the death wish. I did it myself rather than delegate and took only my stick. Our approach was across a bare maize field. I placed Donnelly with his gun at a convenient anthill. The three of us swung round further to the left to get as close to 90 degrees to the supporting fire as possible, which was all good School of Infantry stuff. I gave Donnelly the signal to open fire and we approached at a brisk pace. Then we broke into a run. Donnelly stopped firing when we got close to his line of fire. I shouted, “BULLETS” and we stopped and fired into the trees. Then, “CHARGE”, then “BULLETS” again, and so on until we were into the trees at a gallop. Donnelly then ran up to join us.

The trees hid a small clay-pit used for making bricks. Inside were a number of bodies, most probably the result of gunship attention earlier in the day. Our gook got his wish and was at the death-rattle stage when we came across him. We worked through the clay-pit making sure that no one in the pit would be a potential source of future irritation to us. Ahead of me the edge of the pit was low enough to step out of while the others were faced with a chest-high depth. I climbed out and fired into some scrub ahead of me to clear it. That’s when the $hit hit the fan.

[JMA]

BOOK REVIEW

The Rhodesian Light Infantry: Africa’s Commandos. By Mark Adams and Chris Cocks (Boksburg Industrial: RLI Regimental Association, 2012. Pp. 320.)

During the short lived British Commonwealth Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland several military units were formed in the 1960s that would feature in the subsequent Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Southern Rhodesia and the ensuing Bush War between 1966 and 1979. One was the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), an all-white regular regiment formed to balance the black manned Rhodesian African Rifles. Other units established at the same time were a Special Air Service (SAS) Squadron and an armored car squadron. These regular units backed up the part time reserve and militia Rhodesia Regiment. Bear in mind that the Federation had a colonial police force, the British South African Police, which was larger than its armed forces. Federation army and air force units augmented the British Empire and Commonwealth commands in the various post World War II conflicts of “national liberation.” They also saw combat service as part of the independence struggles of southern Africa from Portugal, Great Britain, and South Africa.

The regiment had a single battalion with supporting establishment and soon adopted a “commando” or light infantry role as the best means to accomplish its mission as a force in readiness. This included intensive training in the use of helicopters and parachutes for “vertical” envelopment as a quick reaction element. Emphasis was placed on the integration of small units, with superior communications, supported by close air support to close with and destroy terrorist and guerillas. Manned by volunteers, conscription from national service requirements provided most enlistees. These “troopies” also reflected the values and vices of their society as the war went on and younger and younger men were called up. A foreign element was present from the beginning to make up for a lack of qualified local manpower bringing experience from other Cold War conflicts including personnel from South Africa, Great Britain, and America. These provided an outspoken, if not always the most skilled participants, which the native Rhodesians tolerated. One result was that the post war narrative was dominated by the more controversial views or opinions from those with the least to lose from the conflict. This book makes up for this with the authentic voices of its regimental members. As someone who had followed the conflict and the RLI for some forty years, this book is something new. Previous “unit histories” were published in 1977 and 2007. This is a departure from those with a collection of interviews, or oral histories, by veterans.

Oral histories, particularly those well after the events in question, need to be considered critically in conjunction with contemporary documents and narratives. For most individuals it takes years or decades to find the words to describe their experience with more eloquence than they commanded at the time the actions occurred. As a result, memoirs are long on subjective experience and can be short on facts. It also means you are dealing with those compelled to tell their story, regardless of significance. The “quiet professionals” are often left out. But these circumstances provide grist for the trained historian rather than the soldier. Even so, this is a valuable book with contributions that would otherwise have been ignored as the former government of Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) has no one to tell the story. For professional soldiers, historians, and the public this is a good read. The ouens have the last word!

For example, there are the seven evocative accounts from the November 1977 Operations Dingo. This raid occurred at two locations respectively 90 (Objective Zulu 1) and 200 kilometers (Objective Zulu 2) inside of Mozambique. A force of 184 RLI and SAS troops on the ground, supported by air force fighters, gunships, and transports took on an enemy force of 7,000. This air and ground attack on the guerilla bases at Chimoio and Tembue netted the largest “bag” of enemy kills of the war through daring and aggression. At the time, there were an estimated 1,200 enemy dead with total casualty counts up to 5,000 based on camp occupancy at the time. The eyewitness narration of these events brings life to the historical narrative.

The text is arranged in three chronological parts. Each entry is preceded by a “postage stamp” photo and brief biography of the narrator. It includes a glossary and appendixes. Maps and images illustrate, but do not dominate the text. While a regimental publication, professional editing and design came from 30 Degrees South’s Chris and Kerrin Cocks. Graphic and editorial support was provided by Dr. J.R.T. and Carole Wood. Both authors Mark Adams and Cocks served with “The Saints” and are active in the RLI regimental association in South Africa. Profits from sales will go to the association. The book is available through direct sales.

Charles D. Melson, chief historian USMC.

[JMA]

Bruce Kidd continues:

“I must say that was one of the most aggressive firefights I have experienced. The reason for that was soon to be understood. We had met another RLI sub unit. Mr Adams recognized the ‘crack and thump’ was from an FN and not the terrorist-used AK. Donnelly was shot in the shoulder. Mr Adams realized we were returning friendly fire. He immediately executed a tactical withdrawal. One at a time as I recollect, Mr Adams being the last to withdraw back to cover and out of the killing area.”

Note: in the British tradition a subaltern - lieutenant or 2nd lieutenant - would be referred to as 'mister' and addressed as Mr So-and-so, sir.

LtMike Rich continues:

Well into the afternoon, a ‘friendly fire’ contact took place in which 8 Troop, on our right flank, mistook 3Cdo’s left flank for gooks. During this fortunately brief engagement, Peter Donnelly of 3Cdo was unfortunately wounded. Sergeant Fraser Brown of 8 Troop, who was a good friend of Donnelly’s, was later to be seen proudly sporting a T-shirt which read I Shot Pete Donnelly!

After the action, and back in the forward admin area, Lt Mark Adams of 3Cdo gave Lt Graeme Murdoch a good bollocking when Graeme went over to apologize for the incident, which he then tempered with the compliment that he had never before been under such accurate fire, and had conducted his radio calls for assistance with his cheek pressed tightly to the ground so as to keep his head profile as low as possible!

Lt Adams continues:

A gunship came overhead and both 2 Cdo and I threw smoke. We were told we were 30 metres apart. Great. Donnelly was walking wounded so we pulled back to the headquarters area. Donnelly was casevaced. Thankfully Kidd and McLennan were OK. I made a cup of tea and chain-smoked a few cigarettes. It was one of those moments when one just shakes one’s head. That was just too close for comfort.

Lt Greame Murdoch has recalled:

“…Mark Adams was on Op Dingo and 2Cdo tried very hard that day to do our Christian duty and despatch him to his maker – much to his annoyance!” And more seriously, “When we met up with Mark Adams in the Forward Admin Area that evening Lt Vernon Prinsloo and I had very sheepishly approached an all-too-senior Mark Adams to apologize for the incident earlier in the day and after he had finished tearing the proverbial second arsehole in both of our junior rear ends, he did compliment us on the quality of our shooting.”

And finally from Mark Adams:

As soldiers are and have been since time immemorial it did not take long before a small group of 2 Cdo troopies, led I am told by Sgt Fraser Brown, produced and started wearing ‘I shot Peter Donnelly’ T-shirts. What can I say?

...oh yes and finally from Major Simon Haarhoff:

... So how many had 2Cdo accounted for? An accurate number was impossible as, unlike operations inside Rhodesia where the troops would follow up and hunt down all terrs engaged, this was an operation where the enemy was engaged and routed and the troops did not stop to take body counts. All the 2Cdo troops were polled as to how many had been killed and the best guess was about 150 confirmed and with true troopie humour – “don’t forget the one 3Cdo oke wounded”.

[JMA]

Corporal Jimmy Swan continues:

We entered Camp 2 and, again, more devastation. We looked to the high ground to our west and there seemed a line of ants moving out. How they got through, who knows, but we had no time or energy to go after them. Our task was within. As we scanned and searched for ammo dumps and bunkers, we heard the distinctive pop of mortars and then all hell broke loose on the outer perimeter of the camp. A large group of well-trained and heavily armed gooks had engaged the sticks on the one flank. Two RPG-7 missiles came right over us and exploded in the dense bush. It is a distinctive sound. There is the initial explosion as it leaves the launcher and it is terrifying as it passes over you, then hits and explodes. It has armour-piercing ability and is very mean.

We swung round to support the flanks and moved forward to join the fight. I picked out two distinct, irregular shapes near an anthill and gave them each two shots, hitting two gooks in ambush position. Both died with muffled grunts. We confirmed further kills, about 14 this time. We all converged on the centre of the second camp, which was basically a continuation of the first, but had its own command hut. We then got the troops into all-round defence while the stick commanders had a meeting. In the interim, selected men went through the camp searching for bunkers and destroying them. We were all smiles, in spite of the cuts and bruises and grime. We had a water break, had a quick tin of bully beef and took stock.

... We then continued toward our final target—the CQ stores on the western side of the main parade ground. The killing continued, but with little resistance and basically it was now down to a clean-up operation—flatten the camps, blow up bunkers and weapons, burn and blow up ammo dumps, anti-aircraft positions and mortar positions. Water and food supplies were destroyed as well as, unfortunately, livestock, with some cattle having been killed in the battle.

We could make out our other forces moving in the distance. Then we got the message we had all been waiting for—get to clearings for chopper uplift. We are going home. We passed the message on to the troops and there was much joy. We made or way to our respective LZs and awaited uplift. This was a major task for the Alouettes. We sat in the crouch, I talked the chopper in, we climbed in, patted the pilot and tech and then we were up and airborne heading home to Rhodesia.

[JMA]

A frame from a poor quality super8 film:



From the book:

Dingo Firestorm: The Greatest Battle of the Rhodesian Bush War

[JMA]

Canadian machine gunner Mike McDonald continues:

The main headquarters area was then cleared. There were two rows of round huts running north-south on the eastern side of camp. East of us was a large field, then some woods running north-south on the far side. Most of the base inhabitants had fled to these woods where the SAS were currently sweeping through with plenty of skirmishes going on.

Our stick cleared the row of huts on the eastern side. My MAG was too unwieldy so I rested it on its bipod nearby and used my pistol for hut-clearing. Most huts contained a bed, a table and a wardrobe. With Soviet uniforms lying all around, these were probably the Soviet advisors’ quarters. A G-Car landed with Special Branch and a prisoner to give us a guided tour. We made a large pile of captured material nearby.

I placed a brand new folding-butt AK-47 in the pile which was quickly snatched up by a chopper pilot for his personal defence. I’m glad he got it. I placed a briefcase full of documents on the pile and several more trips with goodies, including a few empty holsters, stacked up the pile. I cleared more huts and scored a fancy Oris watch for myself off a side-table, but I was still mindful of the anti-looting order. I had to shoot the padlocks off some huts to enter. No gooks were found lurking in any huts.

Our huts cleared, we took up defensive position northeast of the HQ area. To our north were a bayonet-practice range and some large fields. About 500 yards away to the north in some thick green scrub a lone gook kept taking potshots at every aircraft that passed nearby. I wished I had a captured AK with several magazines so I could blast away at him. The gook did this for a couple of hours actually. I was conserving my own ammo as we were still far from home and might get an angry response from the nearby Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique (FRELIMO) garrisons.

Several times we came under fire from the woods, plus took a few stray shots from the SAS skirmishes. We hugged the ground, looking around anxiously, then a few minutes later were back to sitting around. Same routine every 15 to 20 minutes. I was starting to wonder who had shot at us more today: gooks or SAS?

A terrorist armed with a Soviet SKS rifle with bayonet extended appeared out of the dead ground to our east, running flat-out straight towards us, away from the SAS. I grabbed my MAG and fired a single burst as two other soldiers fired double taps at him. Simultaneously he dropped dead 15 yards from us. Two of us ran over to him and I gave his SKS to a trooper to clear while I checked his body. I kept his fancy necklace, a wooden medallion two inches in diameter carved on both sides, which I still have today.

Now obviously not all our rounds hit the target and a couple went into the woods beyond. The SAS guys whined for months afterwards how the RLI fired on them at Chimoio. SAS ouens (men): you’re great soldiers and we love you like brothers but get over it. (PS I fired some of those rounds.)

[JMA]

Lt Mike Rich continues:

We were amongst the final load out of the admin base late in the day and were witness to some impressive formation flying by the 7 Squadron pilots as we flew triumphantly into Grand Reef airfield that evening.

Remarkably, despite the odds, the Rhodesians had only suffered one dead and a handful of wounded. By contrast, literally thousands of terrorists were killed and wounded that day. The commando drove back to New Sarum and were placed ‘in quarantine’ until the Tembue raid two days later, where 2Cdo had a supporting role, with Simon Haarhoff and I manning the admin base on the Mozambican mountain feature known as ‘The Train’, and Vernon Prinsloo and Graeme Murdoch parachuting from a DC7 into the forward admin base north of Cabora Bassa.

All these years later, I occasionally contemplate that remarkable day, and the motivation behind my father taking the incredible risk that he did by joining his men on the ground for what he was well aware was potentially the most dangerous mission of the war. Was it to give his men courage in the face of bewildering odds in the tradition of great leadership, or simply to be with me at this critical time – perhaps the ultimate display of a father’s love for a son? Sadly, he died tragically in 1982 before I was mature enough to fully understand the great significance of what he did that day. No matter. He was a remarkable soldier and a man who will always be remembered with great respect, admiration and fondness by the men who were fortunate enough to have served with him. I am privileged to be one of them.

[JMA]

Corporal Jimmy Swan continues:

Still flying low to avoid gooks opening upon us on the way out, we relaxed. We looked back at Chimoio and it was simply gone. We were crossing Chicamba Dam and suddenly our pilot stated we had taken ground fire, he had minimal control and that he would land on a small grass island in the middle of this lake, right below us. We came down, extremely vulnerable. Our ammo was in short supply and if we came under attack we would be in trouble. Watching our buddies flying away was just not good. We landed okay and took up positions around the chopper while I met with the pilot and tech. We had taken two rounds at some stage and the aircraft was now inoperable. To be honest, our ears were still ringing so we hadn’t heard a damned thing. We now faced a dilemma—do we destroy the aircraft or wait for spares? It was getting late and we were worried. Finally, in came Father Christmas in the form of a chopper with some parts and 30 minutes later we were airborne and, with some overhead protection, we headed for home. We flew all the way back to Salisbury and landed at New Sarum.

We were dirty, tired and basically worn out. Our equipment was in a tatty state. We washed up and were then immediately informed of our next raid. We were locked up in the hangars and the briefings began …

[JMA]

Major Simon Haarhoff continues:

Shortly after reaching the assembly area and regurgitating the war stories to anyone who would listen the 2Cdo troops were uplifted by helicopter and returned to Lake Alexander for redeployment on Zulu 2. Somewhat unwelcome at Lake Alexander was the posse of Special Branch people who were checking for any trophies that might have been picked up and brought home – needless to say the troops were very pissed off by this and compliments were not the order of the day.

2Cdo were reunited with their vehicles and reserve personnel, replenished ammo and equipment and immediately set out to position for the second phase of Op Dingo – the attack on Tembue.

Canadian machine gunner Mike McDonald:

We were very glad to get back on Rhodesian soil.

... No rest for the wicked. We were briefed immediately about another raid on a ZANLA base at Tembué codenamed Zulu 2 and were resupplied. For Zulu 2, 48 RLI Support Commando paratroopers were on the assault with the SAS. Forty-eight 3Cdo paratroopers went to Mt Darwin as the emergency backup force. At Mt Darwin we donned parachutes at 0800hrs and waited to be called. Two Dakotas came straight there from dropping their first load of paratroopers, refuelled and waited with us. At 1000hrs we took off our parachutes but waited nearby in case we were summoned but we were never required.

Many years later back home in Canada I checked the archives of the public library for the newspapers during the time of the Chimoio raids. These historic raids had made the front pages of newspapers around the world. Sadly though, the ZANLA bull$hit terrorist propaganda version of ‘an agricultural training centre for refugees’ made bigger headlines and received bigger coverage than the official Rhodesian communiqué printed beside it.

It was one of the highlights of my military career to have been part of this operation.

[JMA]

Thank to the Freedom of Information Act - UK the following telexs from the British Ambassador to Mozambique are now available:



Note: the gallant Mozambique forces did not arrive until two days later to "resist".

Then this gem:



Note: One wonders who these "independent eyewitness accounts" came from? Maybe also arrived a few days later after the site had been suitably "prepared"?

Also it calls into question the competence of the British Embassy and intelligence services in terms of knowing what was actually happening on the ground in Mozambique.

.

[JMA]

Op Dingo - Chimoio



.

[JMA]

"Refugees" at work at Chimoio:



From the book: Dingo Firestorm: The Greatest Battle of the Rhodesian Bush War

[JMA]

Operation Dingo
Zulu 2 – the attack on Tembue base, Mozambique, 26 November 1977

“Zulu 2 would test inter-service dependence way beyond the experience of any of its participants”, Major Nigel Henson.

Background
At briefings on 20 and 21 of November 1977, senior Planning and Command officers Major Robinson of the Special Air Service (SAS) and Group Captain Walsh of the Air Force, whilst giving detailed attention to Zulu 1 (the attack on New Farm - Chimoio), made reference to another target that would probably be engaged (depending on the outcome of Zulu l) on an enemy location and at a time provisionally given as 26 November.

Once Zulu 1 was concluded and all the troops and aircraft recovered from Mozambique, detailed attention was turned to Zulu 2, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) base north of Lake Cabora Bassa in Mozambique. Considerable planning had already been done, but the final detail and its specifics had not been divulged to the troops and airmen involved. All was revealed at briefings held at New Sarum Air Base and at the SAS model room on 25 November. All the troops involved had been ‘quarantined’ within the confines of New Sarum since their return and had set up temporary camps on the base sports fields.

The target
Tembue base was situated some 200km from Rhodesia’s northern border, across the Cabora Bassa Lake in the Tete province of Mozambique. This base was ZANLA’s Tete Province High Command and also the location of their training and specialist skills centres. The complex known as Tembue was in fact three fortified mud hut locations complete with trench and bunker systems spread along the banks of the Luia River: Camp A covering an area of some 3.5sq km populated by about 1,000 trainees in simple shelters; Camp B some 8km to the south was of the same dimensions and housed about 500 trained insurgents undergoing skills training, and Camp C 1km further south occupied by 150 trained personnel awaiting deployment into Rhodesia. Various AA (anti-aircraft) weapons (12.7 and 14.5mm heavy machine-guns) were located in Camps B and C as were some 81mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle positions.

The Forças Populares para o Libertaçao de Moçambique (FPLM) presence (about 10 troops in each camp) could be supported by 1,250 additional troops within a six-hour reaction time. These FPLM forces had the capability of deploying SAM 7 missiles, various Soviet APCs and heavy mortars.

[JMA]

Tembue : the raid - 26 November 1977

[JMA]

Tembue continued:

The plan
Using the same modus operandi as Zulu 1, Zulu 2 would be para-boxed on four sides (as per figure 1) shortly after the camps had been attacked by Hunters (two on each camp) and bombed by Canberra (Camp B). Concurrent with the paradrop after this bombing, eight K-Cars would attack opportunity targets from orbit (as indicated in figure 1).

Once the air assets had stabilized the target, the paratroops, under Airborne Control, would conduct sweeps and destroy operations in Camps B and C supported where necessary by K-Car and Lynx aircraft.

Gathering the parachutes would conclude the operation and thereafter all troops in the target area and admin bases would be backloaded by helicopter to Rhodesia.

In order to support the operation, two admin bases (Zulu 1 had only one) would be established, one close to the target and the other on a feature known as ‘The Train’ (because its profile view resembled a train with coaches), on the southern shore of Lake Cabora Bassa. In addition, a further admin base was necessary just inside Rhodesia at the remote Chiswiti airfield.

Observations
Whilst Zulu 1 and Zulu 2 operations might be considered as similar, there were some essential differences:

Zulu 1 has always been viewed as the ‘glamour’ operation and Zulu 2 as almost an afterthought because of the number of enemy involved (i.e.10,000 vs 1,500); Zulu 1 was first of a type, and was the blueprint (with very little modification) for any subsequent operations. Very little was changed when Zulu 2 was launched.

However, whilst Zulu 1 was a ‘harder’ target, Zulu 2 was a far more complex undertaking for many reasons: sheer distance when operating light payload helicopters of limited endurance made the operation more hazardous; 15 minutes of flying would be over water, a flight not to be undertaken lightly in a single-engine aircraft; access to anything but the most basic of medical attention (drip, morphine, field dressing) was over two hours’ flying time away.

The enormity of the logistical problem becomes apparent when one contemplates the helicopter fuel problem, particularly at the Forward Admin Base. Failure for any reason to deliver the paradrop fuel would result in 30 ‘dry’ helicopters, and many troops left without intimate air support, no casevac/medivac and no means of extraction; backloading of troops and equipment required about 66 hours of helicopter trooping time on Zulu 1. This figure was in excess of 140 hours for Zulu 2; adverse weather en route or over the target area would have played havoc with the execution of the plan.

Thus, every phase of the operation left no margin for error or for any gremlins. Indeed, commitment had been made far past the point of no return. The time and space problems of Zulu 2 would test inter-service dependence beyond any experience the participants could have ever contemplated.

[JMA]

Corporal Jimmy Swan:

I was again in the thick of the action at Tembue. 2 Commando (2Cdo) as a whole unit would jump from the DC-7 and act as stop groups and mortar teams for the main assault, made up of Support Commando, 1 Commando and the Special Air Service (SAS). Coming with us on the DC-7 would be the fuel supply for the choppers. According to the briefing, Tembue was a smaller camp. We expected to encounter many of the gooks who had escaped the Chimoio raid. They would be demoralized and exhausted.

The huge plane would be used to deploy the commandos, all with 50-kilogram CSPEPs, packed with mortars, mines, spare ammo and the like. The plane was totally stripped down to form a huge hollow cylinder and would deploy 70 men, 50 drums of chopper fuel, and more. It would be a dispatcher’s nightmare. We were still reeling from Chimoio and all we wanted to do was get to the pub and drink ourselves stupid. While we packed our containers and re-established our tasks, we wiped the mud and blood off our webbing and nurtured the blisters and cuts from the Chimoio raid. We simply looked at one another, cracked jokes and pumped ourselves full with extra-sweet tea and the favourite beans and franks … cold. We kitted up and slept with our parachutes.

We were woken at 0300hrs and gulped down hot coffee and sandwiches. We had the final briefing and kitted up. The CSPEP containers were large and clumsy. Each man was carrying heavy and hence most uncomfortable. We moved in single file onto the plane, which was dimly lit. We had already fitted our ’chutes and strapped our weapons. We dragged the containers and finally we sat in discomfort in our positions. The fuel and other supplies had been loaded beforehand; hence we would land first and secure the dropping zone (DZ) for the later supplies.

We took off before first light from the long New Sarum airstrip and headed for our target, just past The Train, being the mountain range in Porkos (Mozambique) with which we were all too well acquainted. We flew low to avoid ground fire. The dim lights in the plane allowed us to just see our buddies and equipment. We crossed the border and could see the choppers and other aircraft falling in below.

Then we felt the increase in altitude in a sudden upward movement and we knew we were over the DZ area. By now the jets had commenced their attack. We were told to “Stand up, hook up and check equipment”. The dispatchers moved through the sticks, doing their final checks. Then we moved forward in the famous two-step, shuffling clumsily with the weight of equipment. We were up and ready, packed close together. I could see the trees clearly below. Then the command to stand in the door. “ONE TWO” is the chorus from the entire plane as our first man stands in the door, part of his body protruding into the slipstream. The dispatchers look up at the light and we all take a deep breath. Now the pilots are turning sharply and heading for the DZ. Taking ground fire now could be deadly as we are packed like sardines, and surrounded with drums of fuel. It would just take one tracer …

[JMA]

Tembue the attack:

The weather was clear when the attacks went in. At 0800 hours, Red Section reported: “On target. Red 2 on target.”

Blue section reported: “On target.”

At the same time the Vampires reported: “Time over target in one minute.”
But for some unknown reason the usual morning muster parade had not occurred, which meant that the majority of the occupants escaped the aerial holocaust when it struck. The ground troops—Stops 1 to 6—were dropped. Robinson checked them out. There was one minor jump casualty. The camp was virtually surrounded with Stop 6 closing the gap between itself and Stop 1. K-car 2 reported fire coming from the area of the garage. Robinson ordered Stops 4 and 5 to move forward to the river. Stops 1 and 2 were ordered to move to the road. A mere 48 minutes after the initial attack and obviously expecting great things given the Chimoio results, ComOps inquired of Robinson: “Can you estimate Charlie Tango casualties yet?”

K-car 1A reported many trenches and bunkers in Camp C. Robinson now ordered Stop 1 to sweep northward.

A minute later K-car 2 came on: “Southwest of Bravo—have killed many CTs—require additional assistance.”

K-car 4 came into the action, directed by K-car 2: “Open fire now. CTs at base of every tree.”

Stop 6 called for a strike on target F. Robinson told them to mark the target with smoke. Then: “Are you clear? Yes? Stand by. FLOT marked.”

Two minutes later Air Force c/s Label 2 reported: “On target.”

K-car 4 requested: “Put more strikes in.”

K-car 2 came forward: “Will mark. Label 2—hold off.”

Robinson ordered Stop 1 to move in after the strike. Both RLI Stops 1 and 2, under covering fire from 3 and 6 were directed to sweep through the complexes. Having done so, Robinson ordered them to sweep through the camp area at C and toward the river where Stops 4 and 5 were in an ambushing stop line. Here Major Mick Graham, the alternate airborne commander, instructed Stops 4 and 5 to “watch and shoot”.

There was a flurry of enemy movement as the ZANLA cadres ran wildly, anywhere, seeking escape. Stop 4 was in contact. K-car 2A was ordered to support Stops 1 and 2 as many insurgents were seen moving toward them. Graham asked K-car 3 to support Stop 6 as they swept through. Stop 1 now shook out into extended line and began to sweep systematically northward. Ten minutes later, they came up against several insurgents whom they dispatched in a series of fire fights. They fought through, continuing the sweep northward towards Stop 2’s position in the middle of B. They were again engaged by insurgents.

Robinson relayed to Stop 4: “Stop 1 still having contacts. Hold where you are.”

K-car 3 coming up to support Stop 1: “Stop! Romeo 3—Charlie Tango lying down just in front of you.”

At 1044 hours, Stop 1 began to enter area B. Here they joined Stop 2 and compared notes. Stop 1 advised Robinson: “Stop 1 killed 25. Stop 2 killed 45 on move up to Bravo. Not many dead in Bravo.”

Stop 4 came on: “Killed 80 at Camp Alpha—still killing.” Later followed by: “Have located camp office. Can we have Sierra Bravo?”

SAS Stop 6, still at camp F, reported killing 23 and capturing one. They appeared to be in a receiving and controlling centre. They requested Special Branch to come in and have a look.

Stop 1 began to sweep the western side of B where they arrived at some huts and found interesting documents. An SB party moved up to investigate. Further documents indicated a magazine in area C or B. Stop 1 moved forward and was involved in further contacts. It was obviously thirsty work because 20 minutes later they asked for more ammunition and water. They blew up a munitions dump after which they were joined by Stop 2 and cleared Camp B. Robinson told Stop 3 to link up with them and then ordered all three to move to the LZ. Stop 5 had found a large arms cache, including 75mm and 82mm mortars, grenades and much ammunition and got busy setting up demolition explosives. At 1445 hours they reported the demolition complete.

At the camp office Stop 4 requested: “Require G-car to uplift documents plus two prisoners. Killed 150 in Camp Alpha.”

Three 12.7 anti-aircraft guns were found, one damaged by the air strike. Both serviceable guns were dismantled and uplifted.

At 1450 hours the energetic Stop 4 came back on air: “Captured ter maintains 1,000 Charlie Tangos left last night for another camp to the north and another 500 to Bene in the south. Require replacement K-car as still sweeping the area and still finding Charlie Tangos. Estimate further 45 minutes to one hour to complete task.”

The reason the camp had been ‘under-populated’ by ZANLA that morning was now explained. Wasting no time Walsh got on to ComOps: “Have located new camp at Victor Uniform 815688. Permission to take out?”

He had a reply in less than 3 minutes: “Okay, given to take out new camp.”

...

[JMA]

Major Simon Haarhoff on the Tembue raid:

2Cdo’s role in Zulu 2 was hard work and not very exciting. The commando moved by vehicle to Mukumbura in the north of the country and close to the Mozambique border. At the Mukumbura airfield five sticks (20 troops) under the command of Major Simon Haarhoff were uplifted by helicopter and dropped on The Train late afternoon. Lt Col Peter Rich had declined to join 2Cdo again as he saw no fun in cutting LZs and manhandling 44-gallon drums of AVTUR around the top of a mountain. That’s why he was the CO, a wise man!

2Cdo’s task was to prepare an LZ on the eastern end of The Train to accommodate five Alouette III helicopters at a time. In addition 44-gallon drums of AVTUR were to be dropped by parachute on to The Train and these had to be positioned on the LZ so the helicopters could refuel.

Most of the first night on The Train was spent cutting the LZ and preparing that for the first wave of helicopters in the morning. The foliage on top of The Train consisted of a few stunted trees and multitudes of bushes that had two- to three-inch thick branches that were very whippy and strong. As soon as the troops started to clear the LZ it became apparent that our equipment was woefully inadequate for the task. Army issue pangas with blunt edges just were not able to cut the branches of the bushes, let alone the trees.

However, the troops went at it with a will and open spaces soon began appearing. The other challenge was that, despite The Train looking flat as a table from afar, it was far from flat at close range. So there was not enough contiguous level ground to allow for a five-helicopter LZ, resulting in three separate areas being chosen as the LZs. When the progress with pangas became too slow and tedious, the well-known LZ creator - the 7.62mm FN chainsaw - was brought into action and a number of the larger trees and bushes were cleared using this cunning device. It took most of the night to complete clearing the LZs and to mark them up for the arrival of helicopters shortly after first light the next day. In addition to clearing the LZs the troops had to manhandle the AVTUR drums into position, no mean task over the rough terrain on The Train.

All was ready for the first helicopters and for the next two days the 2Cdo troops received and dispatched helicopters to and from The Train. In inimitable Blue Job fashion hot tea was expected with all arrivals and departures. As helicopters and then troops started filtering back to Rhodesia via The Train it became apparent that the attack on Tembue had not achieved what it set out to do. There were considerably less terrs in the camp than expected and the reason for this was not clear. Had they got wind of the pending attack after the Chimoio raid, or was it just the luck of the draw that there were far fewer than expected? The old adage of first in, last out applied to 2Cdo and when all the troops had been extracted from Mozambique the 2Cdo force was helicoptered back to Mukumbura after all equipment on The Train had either been recovered or destroyed.

At Mukumbura the 2Cdo sticks were reunited with the remainder of the commando and moved back to Salisbury for the night. Next day, after replenishing ammo and equipment, they departed again for Grand Reef to resume duties as Fire Force, Grand Reef. A very hectic few days followed with moments of frantic action interspersed with periods of boredom, in true Army fashion. No casualties were a bonus and not what was anticipated when the briefing was given of approximately 8,000 armed terrs in Chimoio. A good op.

[JMA]

Tembue continued:

Zulu 2 and the RLI

Deployment

The RLI played a significant part in Zulu 2. The 136 troops involved were committed as follows:

Assault: 48 troops ex Support Commando (Sp Cdo) in two para stops commanded overall by Major Henson with Lieutenants (Lts) Webb and Jackson as stop commanders.

Forward Admin Area: 16 protection troops supplied by 2 Commando (2Cdo) and parachuted into position together with 60 drums of fuel from a DC7.

On The Train: 16 troops commanded by Major Haaroff with 2 x 60mm mortars.
(The "Train" was a large isolated flat-topped feature which resembled a train when viewed in profile.)

Chiswiti: 20 Sp Cdo troops with 81mm mortars commanded by Captain (Capt) Buttenshaw. The RLI CCP was also positioned there.

Mt Darwin: 36 para reserve troops from 3Cdo at battle readiness.

D-Day: 26 November 1977
The day dawned clear across the northern part of Rhodesia, the route to the target, and the target itself. The short-term forecast was for later thunderstorms across the affected area in late afternoon and early evening. One concern had been removed from all commanders’ minds - weather would play no part in preventing the plan from proceeding.

Across the various staging posts/departure points, activity was frenetic. We now follow developments as they occurred:

0300-0500hrs
Corporal (Cpl) Jimmy Swan, 2Cdo (Forward Admin Area): “We were woken at New Sarum at about 0300hrs. We gulped down some coffee and kitted up. We carried CSPEP containers and boarded the DC7, the fuel and other supplies having been loaded earlier”.

At 0510hrs, ten Alouettes lifted off from Mt Darwin for The Train via Chiswiti, carrying 16 RLI and nine drums of fuel. At 0555hrs, eight K-Cars and the command helicopter left Mt Darwin for The Train to refuel before tackling the long trip to the target.

Meanwhile, back at New Sarum the 144 paras were kitting up. “There were 48 men from Sp Cdo”, recalls Second-Lieutenant (2Lt) Neill Jackson, “Stop One commanded by Mike Webb with Major Nigel Henson also in his stick, and Stop Two commanded by myself.”

Major Henson remembers a long (un-officer-like) walk to the DC3 and remarked upon boarding, “I saw the pilot Bruce Smith already wearing a parachute and remarked to him that there was no way he would beat me to the door!!”

The six para DC3s took off at 0625hrs and in the words of Neil Jackson, “We flew north at low level. The trip seemed to take hours (in reality 1hr 37mins) in bumpy conditions. Some men threw up, but for most of us it was just uncomfortable, being unable to relieve the pressure on aching limbs.”

Ten minutes later, the command heli and eight K-Cars arrived at The Train to be refuelled from the nine drums brought earlier. At 0700hrs, the DC7 with Corporal (Cpl) Jimmy Swan and 15 2Cdo, 2,500 K-Car shells and 80 drums of fuel (20 for The Train, 60 for the Forward Admin Area) departed New Sarum.

0715hrs - 12 G-Cars left The Train for the target area. 0720hrs six Hunters, four Canberras and four Vampires depart New Sarum for the target area. 0720-0758hrs - all the troops and aircraft now routing to the target.

0800-0900hrs - airstrike and drop.

0758hrs - 12 G-Cars arrive at the Forward Admin Area and the fuel and protection party drop from the DC7 called in. The drop into the Forward Admin Area became a nightmare for Jimmy Swan’s stick of protection troops. They were used to the sedate manners of the DC3, with a cruise speed of 160mph, a stall speed of 75mph and a normal paradrop speed of about 90mph. The DC7 was a different animal: it cruised at 359mph and whilst it stalled clean at 97mph, it could not be safely flown loaded with fuel and troops at less than 120-130mph. Even at this speed, the DC7 bucked, porpoised and groaned and its huge radial engines generated a slipstream that was almost lethal. 130mph became the new drop speed - 30 to 40mph faster than ever experienced before, but still within the safety limit of the T10 parachute which was 180mph.

As Jimmy Swan reflects, “We knew we were over the DZ area when we received the order – stand up, hook up and check equipment! We are packed in like sardines. ‘Go’ is given and seconds later there are paras everywhere - Jesus - we are in the trees, no time to jettison the containers. We have been dropped far too low, coming into a non-existent DZ at 16 feet per second. We plough in, weapons broken, bodies broken, some serious casualties.”

0800hrs - six Hunters attack Camp A, B and C (two on each) followed by four Canberras dropping 1,200 Alpha bombs on target B. Further strike by five Vampires put in on Camp A.

0803hrs - eight K-Cars and command heli into the orbit and receiving AA fire.

0804hrs – “We were dropped from 500’ AGL,” recalls Stop 2’s Neill Jackson. “Once my chute was open, I remember the awesome sights and sounds of the Hunters attacking, firing their cannon into the already burning camp area. As I floated gently to earth, I was relieved to see no fleeing enemy beneath and immediately upon landing, grouped into all-round defence and reported to the airborne commander that we were safely on the ground”.