Just my 2 cents as a NG guy with a background in force structure...
1. HQDA does Total Army Analysis (TAA) every 2 years, which, based on the inputs for what the Army requires, spits out the appropriately sized tactical force and the necessary general force required to execute National Strategy. Of course, this is limited by resource & end strength constraints. We haven't had much say in what DA loads in the front end of the Army Sausage Machine, so the resultant structure is based on what DA wants. When it's done, DA tells the USAR & NG how many of which types of units we get. Sure, we lobby back for future changes, but I haven't seen anything more than onesy-twosy shifts in the past 6 years.
2. NG resources come from Congress, just like the AC's. Sometimes a Congressional delegation might work a Congressional Add to fund a specific piece of equipment for units in their State, but this is not too frequent & it only gets the equipment, not necessarity the training & maintenance funds to support continued operation. Prior the GWOT, some NG Divisions were resourced as low as 20% of what would be required to conduct full-spectrum operations. I repeat, our funds come from Congress, not the State.
3. 800 MP Co was NOT a NG unit - they're USAR. Federal, not State. And poor training is not limited to USAR & NG: 507 Maintenance was an AC unit with poor land nav and PMCS training.
4. The big delay in NG Soldiers responding to Katrina stemmed from the Governor of LA not requesting the support. That's how it works: we don't act until we're asked. Governors get testy if a neighboring State deems them in mortal peril and sends in the troops without an invitation. What sticks in my mind more than GEN honore yelling about weapons was the interview with the guy who complained the NG wasn't there. He said something about "all we see as the Red Cross helicopters." You know, the UH-60s with the red cross on them. AKA NG air ambulances. You'll no doubt recall MS also suffered in Katrina, but they prepositioned the NG & requested support from other States. Katrina was a failure of local & State government, not the NG.
5. As for C2 capability of NG Battalions and Companies, now that we're being used as an operational reserve, I've noticed a big improvement is the quality of the Commanders & staffs. C2 is a perishable skill. We've deployed units with every OIF rotation since it started & the feedback our units (& Commanders) have received has been significantly on the positive side.
6. I think the discussion would go much better if we focused on developing a doctrine & building a force structure to match, rather than trying to divvy up the force structure & crafting a Doctrine to match our tools.

Regards,

Mike Greene