Ken, I can understand your frustration at not being able to operate anywhere near the optimum but it is unseemly... no maybe just not the most intelligent choice to just block out the factor and pretend it does not exist.
It took the Brits on the ground in Helmand years and years of repeatedly drawing attention to the shortage of helicopters to support their operations there. Finally the penny dropped... and now - while the problem is not solved - there is general acceptance among the politicians and general staff that this is indeed a problem.
In this regard - the lack of operational continuity through short tours - one aspect of the Brit problem is covered in the General Sir Richard Dannatt and diplomat Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles spat.
Two other arguments relate to concern about the effect on the marriages of soldiers on long tours together with the anticipated increase in PTSD within a smaller cohort with greater combat exposure.
Not sure anyone has done the calculations on how the PTSD plays out among long tours in a smaller cohort as compared with short tours among a larger cohort.
This is the sort of problem that should be given to staff courses and SNCOs to figure out as to what would be the ideal. It would be an exercise in applied intelligence and the results should be thrown in to the faces of the politicians - like the Brits did over their helicopter shortage - until the penny drops.
There is a principle here... and that should be fought for. It is quite unacceptable that officers accept circumstances that lead to largely preventable deaths of the men over whom they have aq duty of care.
I know only of Maj Sebastian Morley (of the SAS) who resigned in disgust over the use of Snatch LandRovers saying such continued use in the era of the IED was 'cavalier at best, criminal at worst'. Appears moral courage is not the strong suit out there. Perhaps this is why some get so irritated when they are reminded that their silence is a failure in the duty of care to their men.
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