Africa's Commandos - new book on the RLI

[JMA]

Tembue continues:

A member of Stop I recalls enemy running beneath his para descent, and after landing in short grass, his stop managed to deal with 30-40 enemy who had blundered into them, probably exiting Camp C.

A little while later Stop 2 was ordered to advance on Camp B. Shortly after moving from the DZ Jackson recalls, “A couple of us noticed what looked like a lone man hiding behind a tree 500m to our front. Sweeping forward we suddenly found ourselves confronted by a large calibre black barrel in a fortified trench system. It was a 75mm recoilless rifle, pointed straight at us!” Stop 2 destroyed the weapon and continued with their advance, killing about 40-50 enemy before arriving at the outskirts of Camp B.

Meanwhile Stop 1 had been ordered to advance on Camp C, coming across limited opposition on the way. Many enemy had climbed into trees to escape the K-Cars and Golf bombs and the ground troops and aircraft were being constantly sniped at. After numerous skirmishes, eventually Stop 1 arrived at the outskirts of Camp C. Henson found, “I had next to me (as I subsequently had an all externals) Cpl Russell Phillips, SCR, with an MAG, my reasoning being that he had more than enough courage for both of us and I wasn't feeling particularly brave anyway!”

At this stage, the tally for Sp Cdo was about 90 ZANLA kills. “Under instruction from the command helicopter we continued our advance,” recounts Jackson. “We also ended up firing at Stop 1 who had slowed in their advance”. Stop 1 were kept active, not only by occasional fire from Stop 2, but with periodic firefights until the riverbank had been reached. Sergeant (Sgt) Graham Enslin picks up Stop 2’s story, “A captured enemy cadre led us to an AA position where there were 2 or 3 12.7mm weapons plus ammunition abandoned in a fortified trench. On instruction, we readied them for uplift out of the area”.

Stop 1, having reached the river, proceeded to search the huts, destroy weapons and gather documentation. Whilst waiting for Special Branch officers to arrive for an assessment, Henson recalls sitting under a large tamarind-type tree, when Cpl Phillips suddenly yelled out, “Watch out Sir!” and began revving the foliage with his MAG. Out fell a number of ZANLA cadres who landed at his OC’s feet. Henson, in surprise and confusion, recalled, “I immediately awarded Russell Phillips with every medal I could think of, whilst at the same time reprimanding him for waking a sleeping officer!”

Stops 1 and 2 then joined together, wheeled right and began sweeping upstream on the right-hand bank of the river. A considerable number of enemy were eliminated as they progressed, all hiding in a large latrine complex and in the various huts which were torched, as well as in the thickly-vegetated tree-line. This sweep, which covered a few kilometres was eventually halted by Airborne Command at a weapons pit which contained an 80mm mortar, and on instruction this weapon plus others were destroyed.

Stop 3 (SAS) then swept southward to meet Stops 1 and 2 who had been instructed to prepare for uplift. “The SAS continued to engage and eliminate small pockets of resistance,” recalls Neill Jackson, “but our evacuation had begun in earnest.”

The extraction involved the troops being lifted back to their parachutes at about 1420hrs, packing and then backloading them by G-Car. Stop 2, on completion of this exercise, were the first to be uplifted.

[JMA]

Tembue... and finally:

Conclusion
Zulu 2 was by any measure a highly successful operation. The conduct of all airmen, troops and command and planning staff was exemplary. There were no losses of either aircraft or troops, considerable damage had been done to ZANLA’s infrastructure and in excess of 500 enemy were known to have been eliminated.

Reflections on Operation Dingo
The RLI lost its innocence during Operation Dingo. The audacious plan, which a week before had drawn gasps of amazement, had been met with shaking of heads or total disbelief, had tested the regiment in a way it had never been tested before. The RL1 as a unit had emerged with much deserved credit, new-formed confidence and secure in the knowledge that it had a right to be described as ‘The Incredible RLI’.

For the first time, the regiment began to see the conflict’s wider picture: there was more to this war than the occasional Fire Force action; the numbers given by Special Branch in their ‘Threat’ briefings were not figments of imagination. The danger was now tangible. The RLI was in a toe-to-toe knockdown struggle that was a long way from being concluded.

Air power in Operation Dingo
The conduct of the Rhodesian Air Force in Operation Dingo was remarkable. This ambitious, audacious - some say outlandish - plan could never have been achieved without their planning, their professionalism, their devotion to duty, their passion to use every fibre of their being to employing their machines for their destined purpose and beyond.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF) on Commonwealth deployments in Aden and Cyprus achieved aircraft availability that had Britain’s Royal Air Force shaking their heads in disbelief. The availability of aircraft on the flight line for Operation Dingo matched and exceeded these figures; the flawless execution of two back-to-back airborne assaults within three days of each other employing eight different aircraft types whilst leaving nothing in reserve was a remarkable demonstration of the Rhodesian Air Force’s fighting resolve.

Lt Mark Adams, 3Cdo, who took part in Zulu 1 – Chimoio, has commented on the technical expertise of the chopper techs as follows:

No country - no army - no regiment was ever served and supported by a more devoted Air Force who gladly risked life and machine in support of their troops on the ground. To a man, the RLI would have died for the men in Blue, whom they loved, honoured and revered.

[JMA]

RLI paras kit up for Fire Force:

[JMA]

Extract from Chris Donald's article. Chris commanded 3 Cdo and later served with the Selous Scouts as a Group Commander (running pseudo teams):

...

So what made 3Cdo so special for me? Success yes, being at the right place at the right time, yes yes yes. We had great troop commanders and just who they were at the time made a significant and substantial impact. However, the role played by our CSM, our sergeants and corporals, from top to bottom, just had to be the difference. They were the continuity, the professional soldiers, and the people who kept the culture, professionalism and family together over the long haul. It is they we were indebted to for what made 3Cdo.

A matter not often realised or considered at the time was “what impact and effect does such a job have on a person?” We had many a man who came out of recruit course and within a matter of days was being shot at, seeing death in its gory military form and having to shoot to kill people. With the services of men doing their national call-up, this also meant that some had just completed their schooling prior to their basic training. For such boys who became men and had to operate with hardened and experienced soldiers and the FF, it was about doing this task every day. For the troop commanders it was about making these new soldiers a part of four-man effective fighting units. When there were only four men in a unit there were many considerations of where to put new and unknown soldiers. Going to sleep at night knowing what you had to do and face the next day in the FF was not something that many people could do, day in and day out. In hindsight I would like to think that it was for these very reasons that we lived and behaved the way we did and created our 3Cdo family which I have outlined above.

During my time with 3Cdo the decision was taken to have the RLI as a parachute battalion. When it was our turn to have everyone in the commando parachute trained, the decision of who or which troops were going on the first course and who was going last, was a decision that neither I nor anyone wanted to make. I can’t recall how we solved this but I do remember the first group of men who returned with their wings. They were the centre of attraction and envy of us all with many questions being asked by those who had not yet been trained. As far as the new trained para commandos were concerned, they were now in a league of their own. To say you were now parachute trained and to wear the wings made such a difference to each individual. I am sure many slept with their wings! To be able to make use of this new troop and additional quick troop deployment was not only a learning curve for me but was also a great new enhancement to the way we operated.

Much has been written about airborne assault, airborne command, FF and in the main these articles and books concentrate on the intelligence gatherers, the fighting troops and the enemy, with normally a sideline mention, at best, of the role the Air Force played. It is so obvious but nevertheless an unfortunate fact that one always seems to forget that the role played by the Air Force is equal to and an integral part of such operations. To put it bluntly Rhodesians did not give them the recognition they so rightly deserved or thank them adequately during or after the war. Specifically from a 3Cdo point of view, a great deal of our success was due to them.

...

[JMA]

Extract from Chris Cocks' article in the book:

...

We found the first guerrilla face down among the tufts of grass beyond the mango trees, his spine smashed. A bullet-shattered AK-47 lay next to him.

“Clear his weapon, Bob, and search the body,” McCall ordered.

Ten metres farther on was another body. It was a boy of about fifteen or sixteen and his head had been blown apart like a melon. He must have been a mujiba running with the guerrillas. His clothes were saturated with fresh, sweet blood. Already the flies were settling on his corpse.

I scanned the ground for the others but they were nowhere to be seen. “I hit them, I know I did,” I insisted indignantly. “I saw all four fall.”

McCall remained sceptical.

Then I noticed an SKS rifle half concealed in the grass a few paces away, next to a large antbear hole. I looked inside and saw a crumpled heap of bloodied humanity. There were two bodies in there, one draped over the other. I bent to pick up an AK lying on top of the bodies when suddenly there was movement and a pair of eyes stared at me in abject terror.

I jumped back, startled. “There’s one still alive in there, Hugh.”

McCall and Smith came over to the hole.

“Simuka! ... Stand up! ... Get out of there!” I brandished my gun and the guerrilla slowly extricated himself from the clawing embrace of his dead comrade. As he crawled from the hole I saw why he was taking so long. I had shot him through both legs and he couldn’t stand.

“Visa shamwari ... Get your friend out!” I yelled, indicating the body slumped in the hole. I must have looked particularly fiercesome, because in spite of his dreadful wounds he struggled desperately to obey me. It was pitiful. Smith assisted him and soon the corpse was stretched out on the ground near the hole. I searched it and discovered a diary and other papers of military importance, as well as a wrist-watch which I pocketed.

McCall checked out the wounded man who was losing a lot of blood and whimpering in pain.

“D’you reckon he’s worth keeping?” McCall asked.

I shook my head.

...

[JMA]

From Bob Lines - ex-Grenadier Guards and Anglian Regt:

Operational Trip To The Valley With 1 Commando (1Cdo)
Never having been to the Rhodesian bush before, I was deployed with 1Cdo to the Zambezi Valley. Here was I having only seen wildlife in photographs and at circuses and zoos. This was something out of a Disney film.

First day Mana Pools area on the Zambezi river, quickly learning from the boys. I informed them that I wanted to try compass marching, only to receive blank stares. However, we slogged along la Musembura-style but after changing direction several times, I realized that these ouens had been patrolling this area for months and knew it like the back of their hands. So I changed strategy quickly. However, it was a good experience. Within a day or so, having got used to the valley heat, mopani flies, wild animals and the like, I was leading a five-man patrol. We were up and away in the early morning and, having tabbed three to four hours, we came to a large riverbed. Now I learned what a vlei was. Steve Rousseau, the leading scout, suggested we move up the riverbank, inside cover, with the intention to crossing further up. This we did. We found a suitable crossing point. We got down tactically peering across the vlei. All appeared fine, wide riverbed with an island in the centre. We sent Steve across. We were ready to give covering-fire support if required. Three-quarters of the way across Steve knelt down. We started to bristle and Steve backtracked towards us. On reaching us he said Better if we cross further up the riverbed beyond the island. So we came out of the position, backed off the bank into cover, and continued walking upstream. We stopped further up, well past the island and we started crossing procedures again. This time Steve reached the other bank safely from where he signalled for us to cross. We did so. Half way across, Dave Parkin shouted enemy left. For seconds we were stunned. There was an outburst of weapons fire. But then we realized the enemy happened to be one big bloody rhino charging at us from the island. We dropped this rhino a few feet away from where we were standing. Then we saw Steve grinning from ear to ear on the opposite bank. He had set us up: having first seen the rhino on the island, he got us upwind so it could get a good smell of us crossing the vlei. Now we had to abort the patrol and head back to base and report it to the game rangers. Killing a rhino was a serious offence. The remainder of the next weeks deployment was spent with much more caution, forever learning many aspects of Rhodesian soldiering. The fantastic countryside and wild animals were, for me, an experience never to be forgotten.

Several months later at Karoi Magistrates Court and having been presented with the game rangers evidence, I was accused of slaying a rhino, a protected species. He had a whole map showing what had happened, including our footprints and where we had gone. Knowing we were guilty with nowhere to run, I pleaded with the magistrate that I had only previously seen a rhino in the London Zoo. He accepted my plea, bollocked me and acquitted me. I swear to this day I can classify that as very good luck.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by davidbfpo

I noted ex-Rh. AF veteran Peter Petter-Boyer in this passage (in Post 198), offers a rare example of reflection on the horrors of war in this thread:

It is also interesting as the Rh. AF was credited at the end of the war as having the better strategic viewpoint, alongside being technical proficient.
.

Dick Paxton - a Rh AF chopper pilot - echos the "air" view in his article:

Killing people from helicopters is not difficult: there’s a feeling of detachment - the distance does that.

There are a number of contributions which cover the "horror" that PB speaks of and you refer to. Steve Geach talks of collecting and moving dead bodies with horrific wounds and Mark Condon wrote a poem about then in a conatct - where the insurgents were dressed in womens clothes - in clearing a hut (hooch) he fired at movement under a blanket... and found he had killed three children under six years old. 30 years on he still not recovered from that personal trauma. I see him quite often and the really sad thing was that whenever he saw his children playing he thought of those children. He finishes with:

My son shouts for me to go in goal
as I rise upon my feet,
his eager, smiling face looking at me
his father, who will never be complete.

Nobody remains unscared by combat.

[JMA]

Where it all began. No 1 Training Unit became the 1st Battalion The Rhodesian Light Infantry on 1 February 1961:



.

[JMA]

By Tim Bax, author of Three Sips of Gin who served with both the RLI and the Selous Scouts:

...

Twenty minutes after my call, the helicopters appeared as four tiny dots on my horizon flying fast at treetop level. The pilots had no fancy navigation equipment to assist them to their target. They relied solely on a compass and their skill at reading a 1:50,000 map. At a distance of 1,000 yards from the ravine, the gunship began to climb steeply, its rotor blades clattering noisily in the thin air as it gained altitude and started circling the target below in a tight orbit. Almost immediately the gunner started laying a withering stream of steep-angled 20mm cannon fire into the thick foliage inside the ravine. The three troop-carrying Alouettes orbited once, then descended heavily into a nearby cornfield amidst clouds of flying dust and debris, quickly disgorging their cargo of RLI troopers.

There were no thoughts by the young soldiers of taking cover and waiting for the gunship to inflict maximum damage before their assault. Without waiting for any orders they fanned out into an extended line and advanced quickly toward the ravine. They started taking heavy fire from the terrorists’ position even as they started skirmishing quickly and inextricably towards their prey, deadly streams of lead spitting from their assault rifles.

The soldiers were all in their late teens or early twenties, some barely out of school uniform. They wore no helmets, no body armour, no heavy boots. They were not weighed down by layers of heavy equipment or by heavy weapons. Their uniforms were black running shoes, military green shorts, T-shirt and camouflaged sweatband around their heads. Their exposed skin was tanned a deep brown by the African sun. Around their waists they wore webbing with enough water, food and ammunition to sustain them through the day. Each carried a Fabrique Nationale NATO issue 7.62 automatic assault rifle (FN). Every fourth soldier carried a general-purpose medium machine-gun. They were light, mobile, fearless, and they were unstoppable. They had only one thought: to close with and kill a murderous enemy who sought to take their country through force of arms.

Modern military doctrine is never to engage an enemy unless with overwhelming force of numbers. The Rhodesian soldier enjoyed no such luxury. From my vantage point on the hill I heard a vicious firefight taking place inside the ravine below me. A long staccato burst of fire from a terrorist RPD machine-gun was instantly answered by the heavier, rhythmic chatter of a NATO issue general-purpose machine-gun carried by a trooper. It was twelve RLI soldiers against twelve terrorists who enjoyed the advantage of fighting from a prepared defensive position. Fighting would be at close quarters and victory would belong to the bravest and the best trained. RLI soldiers were the bravest of the brave and they were superbly trained. The outcome was never in doubt. It was over almost as quickly as it had begun. Thirty minutes after they had disappeared into the ravine, the young troopers emerged from the other side. Nine terrorists had been killed and three captured. One RLI soldier had suffered a minor flesh wound to the shoulder. It would quickly be patched up and he would be fighting alongside his comrades later the same day in yet another firefight, at yet another location.

...

[JMA]

The late Lt-Gen John Hickman recalled:

On 8 December 1968 the first of a number of attachments to the Portuguese Forces in the Tete Province of Mozambique took place. The objective was to assist the Portuguese in their counter-insurgency war against the Frente de Libertaao de Moambique (FRELIMO), who were then penetrating this area from Malawi and Zambia but for the most part were confined to areas north of the Zambezi River. We in Rhodesia were justifiably concerned about FRELIMO and by association their new allies, Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) occupying Mozambique, thus opening up the whole of our vulnerable eastern border. The real reason, however, was to stiffen up our allies military resolve to engage the enemy aggressively and demonstrate some of the successful methods of our joint service Counter-Insurgency (COIN) warfare.

...

We soon found that, despite lengthy and time-consuming conventional war type Operation Orders, including such unnecessary data as Start Lines and Phases of Attack, etcetera, that these were seldom applied in a practical sense. In fact, on one occasion an imminent surprise attack on a FRELIMO base was aborted because another phase was due according to the original order. Not to overstate the case, we found that we were making the hard-yard with little or no support from our allies, so much so that the ground troops were reinforced to provide the combat trackers with our own immediate, but limited, support. Some of our operations were described as a turkey shoot for we found that FRELIMO were not accustomed to long, bold and aggressive patrolling and immediate assaults on their bases, no matter the size. The Portuguese troops, on the other hand, when and if they did patrol on foot, were of short duration and insignificant distance. They were often too noisy and appeared to be over-dependant on fresh rations, particularly fresh bread, which dictated the length of their patrols. They also had a definite defensive complex and preferred to barricade themselves in isolated bush forts for the duration of their operational tours and venture forth as little as possible. There they became the victims of intensive mining and ambushing campaigns on the bush tracks linking the forts and subject to frequent
mortar and rocket attacks from a free-moving enemy.

...

[JMA]

31 in a contact:

[JMA]

Hill 31 – contact report

On Monday, 15 November 1976, at 0545, contact broken at 2000. VQ744430. Fire Force A. 3 Commando, 1RLI, commanded by Captain C.W. Donald. 30 plus terrorists. Trooper Da Costa, F.D. killed, Rifleman Grobler, P.J., Privates Chikoto, Saxon and Philip Chagwiza, wounded. Killed 31, one captured, escaped unknown. Escaped wounded. Unknown.

The main contact area was on the western side of steep broken feature with numerous gullies and covered in dense undergrowth. Weather: initially extremely low cloud base which cleared after midday. Callsign 81A (K Company 10 RR) sighted approximately 20-30 people moving in single file from east to west south of Honde Mission.

Sticks were dropped to the west of the contact area and a 4 RR Sparrow team on the tracks. The tracker team and 81A had a contact with two terrorists at Point A, killing both of them. The terrorist tracks then followed the main path and as the follow-up team came round the feature, the main terrorist group were contacted. More sticks were brought into the area including Support Company 1RAR mortar team who were used only in a minor role.

For the remainder of the day series of sweeps took place resulting in a large number of contacts. All contacts were at extremely close range, in rugged terrain and dense bush. The following aircraft were used during the contact. One Lynx Call sign Alpha 4 which dropped four frantan and made four SNEB rocket attacks. One K-Car. Three G-Cars. A total of 25 flying hours was flown by the Fire Force helicopters carrying out trooping, casevac, air support, resupply and airborne command. In the rocky terrain the 20mm cannon proved extremely effective. All in all an excellent job was done by the Air Force.

Trooper Da Costa was killed instantly by a terrorist running away from the sweep line. Da Costa was casevaced immediately by helicopter to Ruda and then by fixed wing to Umtali. Rifleman Grobler was casevaced with minor injuries by helicopter just before last light. Two RAR privates were injured by small arms fire in a helicopter while flying towards the combat area. They were casevaced direct to Ruda. The terrorists settled themselves down on the western side of the feature and as usual all the contacts between ground forces took place at very close range in dense bush or rocky outcrops.

A significant point to note was that a great deal of terrorist small arms fire was directed at the aircraft throughout the day. One RPG7 rocket was fired at a troop carrying helicopter which exploded about 20 metres behind the aircraft. Another helicopter was forced to land due to damage received from small arms fire from the vicinity of VQ748452.

Generally terrorists tend to avoid high ground when contacted but due to the position of stops, available cover and the approach direction of the Fire Force, no other course was open to them. The capture had no idea of the number of terrorists in the area. He gave out that he had come into the country as a member of a group of eleven. The exact number contacted in not known. Direction: unknown. 32 terrorists were accounted for and 33 weapons recovered. All the terrorists were dressed in a mixture of civilian and camouflage clothing.

The night of 15-16 November, stops were left in ambush on likely escape routes and as a result one terrorist was killed at 2000. All the bodies and equipment recovered were displayed to the locals, leaflets have been distributed and a great deal of publicity was given to the contact. Interrogation of the capture would be done and the necessary action taken. Weapons: eleven SKS, one RPD, 21 AKs, one RPG, 25 RPG projectiles, one landmine, 19 boxes of ammunition, 59 82mm mortar bombs and 28 stick grenades.

============================

The Sub-Unit Commander noted the large variety of sub-units were involved. Under the circumstances, the co-operation between them all, including the Air Force and every man doing his bit, was extremely good. This resulted in a smooth running contact with excellent and a well earned final result.

To give individual praise would be most difficult but Trooper Garnet, commanding Stop 3 was outstanding and must be complimented on his work. Thee necessary action will be done in due course. Brigadier A.O.N. MacIntyre found the outstanding feature was the first class co-operation of the RLI, RAR and 10RR with first class Air Force back up. Captain Donald did an excellent job, remaining cool and positive through a long day’s battle. The 4RR trackers worked well. In all a most satisfactory effort. Major-General J.S.V. Hickman agreed, writing ‘An excellent effort’.

[JMA]

Hill 31 thirty years later:

[JMA]

From the book "The Saints"

Part 1

Battle of ‘Hill 31’

At dawn on 15 November c/s 81A of K Company 10RR, operating in the Mutasa North TTL (south of Honde Mission), sighted approximately 30 to 40 persons moving in single file on the western side of a steep broken feature with numerous gullies and covered in dense jesse bush. There was a kraal to the north. Fireforce was called up, Captain Chris ‘Kipper’ Donald in the K-car. Sticks were dropped to the west of the target area and four 4th Batt Sparrows (trackers) led by Sergeant Laurie Ryan were dropped alongside c/s 81A and began to follow tracks on a footpath heading south. As they advanced they contacted two insurgents and killed both. Moving on and still on the track, they came around the feature and hit the main insurgent group.

A series of contacts, all at extremely close range, began to take place as sweeping sticks moved in. The mortar team from Support Company 1RAR was also called in. Trooper F. D. da Costa (recently arrived from Portugal), who was part of a sweep line, was killed by an insurgent who had been flushed out and had fired on the run. Da Costa’s body was casevaced to Ruda. The K-car’s 20mm cannon proved extremely effective. All call signs were performing well, Trooper Pete Garnett as commander Stop 3 being particularly aggressive (Donald recommended him for an award and he was awarded a Military Forces Commendation (Operational) for his conduct).

Two RAR privates, Philip Chagwiza and Chikoto Saxon, while on their way to the contact area in a G-car, were wounded by small-arms fire. Both were casevaced to Ruda. Rifleman Grobler received minor injuries and was also casevaced. The enemy had now settled themselves in the rocky outcrops on the western side of the kopje from where they continued to direct most of their small-arms fire at the helicopters. One RPG rocket fired at a troop-carrying G-car and exploded 20 metres behind it. Another helicopter was forced to land because of damage caused by small-arms fire. The sweeping stops closed with the insurgents and the fire fights took place at close range. The battle had gone on through the day, by the end of which 31 insurgents had been killed and one captured (by Lieutenant Rod Smith’s stick). An unknown number had escaped. Twenty-one AKs, 11SKSs, one RPD, one RPG (with 21 rockets) 19 boxes of ammo and a landmine were recovered and handed in to SB Ruda.

Beryl Salt on the Air Force’s participation: …The first signs of an enemy build-up came early on the morning of 15 November, when ground forces reported unusual activity in the valley. Flight Lieutenant Tudor Thomas, the senior pilot at Ruda, the police base in the Honde Valley about 55 kilometres north of Umtali, was called on for support. The four helicopters were crewed by Flight Lieutenant Chris Wentworth and Sergeant Tony Merber; Flight Lieutenant Tudor Thomas and Sergeant Brian Warren; Flight Lieutenant Trevor Baynham and Flight Sergeant Ted Holland; and Air Sub-Lieutenant Nick Meikle and Sergeant Hans Steyn.

The helicopters with RLI, RR and RAR sticks were quickly deployed and the first contact came about at 0645 hours on the western face of a kopje. The crews came under fire as soon as they flew into the contact area and were under sporadic fire throughout most of the day. Despite the difficult and dangerous flying conditions with early morning cloud, they worked steadily, trooping men and re-supplying ammunition. During the day, vital supplies of ammunition and fuel had to be ferried into Ruda.

During the 12-hour battle, the four helicopters spent a total of 14 hours in the air. It was good to be in on it, said Flight Lieutenant Tudor Thomas. A fixed-wing aircraft, piloted by Squadron Leader Dag Jones, also took part in the fight and put in several effective strikes on the enemy. “Afterwards, when we found out that the total killed was 31, the morale of the pilots and technicians was high. I had underestimated the number of terrorists and when we found out how many we had killed, it was fantastic,” said Dag …

Chris Cocks adds: … We christened it ‘Hill 31’, bit like the Yanks in Vietnam. Some called it the Battle of the Honde Valley. At the time, it was the biggest internal kill of the war and it was quite something to have been involved in. I remember how awed I was by Kip Donald’s control of the battle. He was controlling a good couple of hundred troops—RLI, RAR and TF (including Laurie Ryan’s formidable 4th Batt trackers), all spread out over several square kilometers, on all sides of the mountain. (And a mountain it was, not a kopje! We climbed up and down the bloody thing several times and it was pretty damned sheer.) I got my first confirmed kill here, fairly innocuous, but for me it was a life-changing event. I was in Lieutenant Roddy Smith’s stick. Humphrey van der Merwe was the MAG gunner and Peter McDonald, a new rookie from Canada, was the other rifleman.

We were in first wave (Stop 1) and got dropped at the foot of the gomo around 0700 hours. We hooked up with Laurie Ryan’s sticks, who’d just had the initial contact and were waiting for us. They all had beards and looked fearsome, but were good guys and were happy to see us. (We regarded the 4th Batt trackers as some of the best in the Army. Sadly Laurie Ryan was killed in a hunting accident shortly after the war.) Kip Donald then sent them up the path leading to the top of the mountain and directed our stick to sweep around the southwest of the base of the mountain and then straight up to the top, covering all the likely re-entrants the gooks might try and escape through. Roddy was like a bitch on heat, itching to get into the action and at times was literally bounding up the slopes—thickly vegetated, rocky and treacherous as they were. We had a series of running contacts all the way to the top. Humphrey nailed a couple of gooks snivelling down a gully with his MAG. One was only wounded and moaning loudly so Roddy chucked in an HE grenade and finished him off. This was Pete McDonald’s first contact and he was wide-eyed and scared, but hung in there. He was quite a portly guy and was struggling to keep up with our intrepid leader.

Around midday we finally got to the top of the mountain. To my surprise, we came across a TF stick huddled in some rocks. Where in the hell had they come from? They were old guys, scared to death and clearly didn’t want to be there. Their relief on seeing us was immeasurable and within minutes they’d packed up and were gone, down the mountain. We took over their position near the summit and spread out into all-round defence and waited. I was next to Humphrey looking out from some thick bush into a clearing that was the summit. No wonder the TF guys were so terrified. There were gook bodies lying all over the place, probably taken out by the K-car—the TF guys would have been pretty close to where the 20mm rounds were striking.

...

[JMA]

From the book "The Saints"

Part 2

Battle of ‘Hill 31’ (cont)

I figured we’d climbed all the way to the top for nothing as it appeared business had been taken care of, when literally minutes later a gook strolled into view in the middle of the clearing, carrying an AK in each hand at the trail. About 40 metres away, he appeared to be in a daze and was walking slowly, without making any effort to take cover. He looked shell-shocked. I raised my rifle, in spite of Humphrey’s urgent plea not to shoot as he thought he was an RAR soldier. I was convinced he was a gook, so took careful aim, at his chest as we’d been taught, as the chest made the largest target. I squeezed the trigger, one shot, and the gook dropped like a stone. No mess, no fuss. Humphrey was in a terrible state, convinced I’d shot an RAR soldier. We got up and warily went forward to inspect my handiwork. My chest shot had entered the man’s forehead neatly between the eyes.

Roddy came bounding forward to see what had happened and at that moment, the $hit hit the fan with volleys of AK firing coming our way from slightly down the slope. My first kill moved into the realms of history as we hit the ground and skirmished for cover. In seconds the K-car was overhead, blasting away into the bushes not metres to our front. It was terrifying and comforting all at the same time.

Then all went quiet and we crept forward to clear the area. That’s when we got the capture. A gook was hiding under a bush and he’d been hit in the legs and couldn’t move. He looked up at me with terror on his face. He looked very young. He tried to raise his arms and was gasping, “Surrender … surrender.” His eyes looked directly into mine, imploringly, as I raised my rifle to finish him off. I mean, what were we going to do with him? But I was shaking and pulled the shot. He screamed as the bullet winged him, a flesh wound above his ear. I stopped, stunned, as Roddy approached. I think he realized this guy deserved to live, if there’s such a thing. (In war, who deserves to live and who deserves to die? Isn’t it all one big lotto?) Roddy and I stooped down and gingerly grabbed the guy under his arms and managed to drag him onto the path. He was crying and shivering uncontrollably. We bandaged his legs as best we could and then gave him a cigarette which seemed to calm him down. I asked him his name and he said it was Cuthbert.

The next problem was how to evacuate him. There was no LZ on the summit, so a chopper came and dropped a stretcher—that’s how we’d get him down—carrying him. The next few hours were a surreal nightmare as we slithered and slid down the slopes, half-dragging, half-carrying our captured charge. And every few dozen paces or so, Roddy Smith on point would make contact with a guerrilla or two hiding in the bush and engage in contact. The rest of us were too tired to care. As dusk enveloped us we came to the original LZ where we’d been dropped 12 hours before. The capture was casevaced and we were uplifted back to our base above the Mtarazi Falls. That night we celebrated our victory around the campfire and got very drunk.

I heard later that Cuthbert recovered, was tried and received a life sentence. (There you go—still the ‘police action’ mentality in place.) I was secretly pleased I hadn’t killed him. We went back the next day to sweep the area again and recover all the gook bodies, a hideous task as many of the corpses had been dead for over 24 hours and were lodged in inaccessible nooks and crannies all over the gomo. By evening, arranged neatly in a row at the foot of the mountain near a school, were 31 bodies, all in various stages of disrepair, dismemberment and decomposition. It was a gruesome sight. We’d lost one man—Trooper Francisco da Costa from my troop, 11 Troop. He was a gentle man and had joined up in the RLI because he couldn’t get a job in his native Portugal.

‘Hill 31’ was something of a watershed in terms of guerrilla infiltrations. From here on it would become a regular occurrence to encounter groups of 50 or more …

Beryl Salt concurs: … The size of the gangs crossing the border was now very much larger and in the middle of November, a group of about 100 crossed from Mozambique. On Wednesday 24 November at 1100 hours, a contact occurred with security forces. Acting on information from a call sign, a stick of four soldiers entered the area under cover of darkness. They were moving into position in thick bush when they heard movement. It was a group of 60 ZANLA men. The patrol went to ground and there was a similar reaction from the terrorists. The security patrol knowing they were in a curfew area, opened fire first. The group returned fire and beat a retreat dropping their equipment as they ran. The patrol gave chase. Tudor Thomas who was once again at the scene said, “We picked them up quite easily and dropped troops into the area.” He also reported that captured equipment had included anti-aircraft guns. “We haven’t lost any planes,” he said. “They don’t seem to be very effective at using their guns.” This fight, which included the Army, the Air Force and elements of the police force continued for a week, taking place in rugged hilly country about 20 kilometres from the border in the Inyanga North area close to Avila Mission …

[JMA]

Now we hear it from (Lt) Roddy Smith:

Cisco’s Mountain - Part 1
By Rod Smith

The Honde Valley, halfway between Umtali and Inyanga, was one of the few areas within Rhodesia on the eastern side of the mountains which border Mozambique, and one of the highest rainfall areas in the country. Waterfalls drop in wavering torrents from the surrounding mountains to the fertile valley floor, where extensive cultivated areas are interspersed with thick tropical vegetation. This valley was a major infiltration route for the terrorist groups which were flooding into Rhodesia at the end of 1976: the location east of the mountains made it easy for them to cross the border, the dense population (thoroughly subverted by the classic Communist combination of intimidation and indoctrination) together with the thick vegetation provided perfect cover, and it was close to the major terrorist staging camps in Mozambique.

Consequently it had become one of the hottest operational areas in the country; a mini-Joint Operations Centre (JOC) under the energetic Colonel (Col) Peter Browne of 4th Battalion Rhodesia Regiment (4RR) had been set up to control operations and the Op Thrasher Fire Force – K-Car plus 3 G-Cars and 11 and 13 Troops of 3 Commando Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) (12 Troop had been detached to Hot Springs in support of a Selous Scouts operation and 14 Troop was on R & R – the Commando was permanently deployed at the time) - had been moved from Grand Reef to a temporary base in the Eastern Highlands close to the Honde Valley in order to provide back-up to the companies deployed there.

At first light on 15 November callsign 81A from K Coy 10RR sighted a group of 20-30 armed terrorists on the move and called for Fire Force. When a sighting involved static terrorists in a base some time could be taken to plan, but in a situation such as this where the terrorists were on the move (and indeed had already moved out of the Obervation Post’s (OP’s) field of vision) speed of reaction was absolutely critical. Fortunately 3 Commando (3Cdo) were extremely experienced at this by now so the initial briefing – general situation and lay of the land – was very brief indeed and we were airborne within minutes.

As the choppers came over the rim of high cliff-girt mountains and made the stomach-lurching drop into the valley, the target area was easily identifiable: the dominant feature was a big isolated granite hill thrusting up from the valley floor. The low ground around it where the terrorists had last been sighted was almost all cultivated land, but the hill itself was steep and rugged with great broken boulders, rocky outcrops and gullies, and dense tree cover. There was no doubt that the terrs were in there somewhere, but it looked like a pretty big haystack from which to pluck some nasty sharp needles, and with only three G-Cars to drop troops it was going to take time to get troops in any numbers on the ground.

The Fire Force commander that day was Kip Donald, the 3 Cdo 2i/c at the time and a superb K-Car commander. He had a great eye for ground: a big part of what made a good Fire Force commander was the ability to put the stop groups in the right place and he had to make decisions on the spur of the moment as to which way the terrs were most likely to break and how far they could already have gone: too far out and you doubled the area you had to cover and reduced the chances of contacting them; too close in and they were already gone. Given the limited number of troops available these decisions could make the difference between a successful contact and a big lemon. Kip was methodical and totally unflappable under pressure, and had a gift for relating what he was seeing from 800’ up to what the troops were seeing at ground level (more difficult than it sounds) and for giving the ground troops clear and easily understood instructions.

Normally we would have tried to approach the target area flying low-level using hill features and the wind to keep the terrorists from hearing the aircraft for as long as possible; in this case this was not practical as we knew that as soon as the choppers cleared the surrounding mountains they would be audible over the whole valley and the terrorists would probably bombshell before we could see them. For this reason a Sparrow team (tracker combat team) from 4RR under Sgt Laurie Ryan was included in the first wave. The terrs had last been seen at the base of the west side of the mountain: Stops One and Two were immediately dropped at the north and south extremities of the west side of the hill and directed to move a little way up the slope and take up stop positions where Kip judged they had the best chance of contacting the enemy, and the Sparrow team was dropped at the spot where the terrs had last been sighted to get an idea of direction of movement. The choppers then headed back to pick up more RLI sticks.

It turned out that some of the terrorists had not gone far – within about ten minutes the tracker team had made contact and killed two of them. Firing now started breaking out sporadically all over the mountain – scattered groups of terrs firing at the orbiting aircraft (“Just like Paris by night” as Major Jerry Strong was wont to say, referring to the red and green tracer streaming up into the sky) and the K-Car engaging terrs as they were spotted, with the Lynx flown by Squadron Leader (Sqn Ldr) Dag Jones putting in frantan and rocket strikes when particularly heavy resistance was located. Fire Force actions were always very much a team effort between Blues and Browns, the two complementing each other and the whole being very much more than the sum of the parts.

It had immediately become apparent that two under-strength RLI troops were never going to be able to cover the whole expanse of the mountain, and while the helicopters were ferrying in the remaining 3 Commando stops Kip was making arrangements to bring in sticks from Sp Coy 1st Battalion Rhodesia African Rifles (1RAR) and 4RR.

In the meantime Stop One (consisting of myself, Chris Cocks, Humphrey van der Merwe with the machine-gun (MAG) and a rather portly Canadian named Macdonald) was waiting on what Kip had assessed as a likely enemy escape route a little way up the mountainside. We were spread out in extended line, motionless in the available cover, when we saw terrs approaching. We opened fire and terrs vanished into a gully. They seemed to have been hit; we advanced cautiously and hearing scrabbling sounds, tossed a fragmentation grenade in and then closed in to check that they were finished and took their weapons. It was awkward having to carry captured weapons with us in a combat situation, but at that stage no part of the mountain could be considered clear of terrorists, so we couldn’t leave the weapons there and have other terrs possibly pick them up.

...

[JMA]

More from Roddy Smith:

Cisco’s Mountain - Part 2
By Rod Smith

...

Kipper’s game plan at this point was for the stops that were already on the ground to sit tight and cut off what escape routes we could cover until we got enough troops on the ground to form a viable sweep line, which would then sweep around the mountain and push the terrs into another stop line. He was reluctant to have callsigns advancing straight up the steep slope into an enemy which would have all the advantage of higher ground and good cover, but then we got a call that a Special Forces (SF) callsign was in contact at the very top of the mountain and required assistance and Stop One was in the best position to respond. We pushed straight up the hill as fast as we could given that it was steep, rough country, with sporadic contacts going on all around us - it was a beast of a climb and it was not the last time we would have to do it that day. Eventually we reached the top, drenched with sweat, and found a Territorial Army (TA) stick huddled behind a big fallen tree.

They were older guys, obviously from one of the TA Reserve companies, and I still have no idea how they got there – they must already have been on the OP up there when it all started and may even have been the guys who made the initial sighting. At any rate they were mightily pleased to indicate where they had last seen the terrs they had contacted and let us get on with it. We put in a quick flanking attack on the location but the birds had flown so, after a brief halt to catch our breath and have a few sips of water, we started down again towards the sound of firing.

We were on the edge of a small clearing when we saw another terr approaching; we went to ground, he walked briskly into the clearing without seeing us and Chris Cocks shot him dead – classic Immediate Action (IA) drill. Humphrey van der Merwe, who somehow managed to be one of the best MAG gunners I ever knew despite being very short-sighted, was convinced we had shot an RAR soldier by mistake but in fact he was very much a terr and carrying two AKs. We found the owner of the second one under a bush, wounded. He had a broken leg from K-Car fire and our first inclination was to shoot him as getting him out of there would be a major task; the bush was too thick and the terrain too steep to uplift him by chopper. In the end, however, a stretcher was dropped to us and we started the back-breaking task of carrying him all the way back down the mountain. We found a rudimentary goat path twisting down the steep rocky hillside but it would have been hard going for one man unencumbered, let alone four carrying a loaded stretcher. To make matters worse we were in the middle of a major contact and had to maintain some semblance of tactical alertness as we slipped and skidded down, sweating and swearing. We could hear firing going on sporadically all around the mountain and a lot of 20mm cannon fire from the K-Car, which claimed a lot of kills.

About a third of the way down as we stopped for a breather we had a contact with one terr. He fell down-slope and landed in a space between a cliff and a great boulder which had broken away from it. As I approached cautiously an AK muzzle thrust round the rock and fired a burst; we returned fire but the owner was screened by the rock and we heard him crashing away down the slope. A few minutes later we heard firing further down the mountain; he had run into Corporal (Cpl) Bob Smith’s stick who I think killed him, but unfortunately not before he had shot and killed Trooper (Tpr) Francisco Da Costa. Cisco was a nice guy from Angola, fairly new to the Commando but very well liked and a sad loss.

Meanwhile more troops had been choppered in from Sp Coy 1RAR and 4RR. Two RAR soldiers, Privates (Ptes) Phillip Chagwiza and Saxon Chikoto, were wounded by small-arms fire as they were being flown into the area, which gives an idea of the amount of fire being directed at the aircraft. For the territorial soldiers of 4RR it was the first experience of Fire Force operations: Kipper had done a remarkable job of briefing them over the radio as to do’s and don’ts and required equipment before uplifting them, but it was still very much a case of them being thrown in at the deep end, and they did very well under the circumstances. As far as possible they were interspersed with RLI sticks. Pete Garnett, although still only a trooper, was commanding Stop 3; he ended up running a whole sweep line of six or seven sticks and doing an excellent job for which he later received a well-deserved MFC. He was a quiet, compactly built young guy, very professional and confident and a natural soldier. He would undoubtedly have gone far in the Army, but tragically he was killed in action the following year.

The operation continued throughout the day with intermittent contacts all over the mountain; late in the day Rifleman Grobler of 4RR was wounded and casevaced. At last light the 3 Commando troops were uplifted back to the Fire Force base as they had to be ready in case the Fire Force was called out again first thing in the morning, while some of the remaining callsigns based up for the night in ambush positions surrounding the mountain. One of these killed another terr trying to get out of the area at about 2000hrs.

The following day came the unpleasant task of sweeping the mountain all over again and recovering the bodies of the dead terrs. The end result was 31 terrorists killed, one captured and an unknown number escaped wounded, and 21 AKs, 1 RPD, 1 RPG7 launcher and 25 projectiles, 11 SKSs, one landmine, 59 82mm mortar bombs, 28 stick grenades and 19 cases of ammunition captured for the loss of one of our men killed and three wounded.

The Rhodesia Herald christened this the Battle of Hill 31, but for 11 Troop it was always Cisco’s Mountain.

[JMA]

RLI Troopie trying to look rugged

[JMA]

Book review ans local launch details:

[JMA]

Rhodesian Drake Shoot
(Also to be found here)

RHODESIAN TRANSITIONAL SHOOT
(aka Drake Shoot)

INTRODUCTION

1. During most contacts a low rate of kills is being achieved to the number of rounds fired. For example after one engagement it was reported that a platoon fired approximately eleven hundred rounds and achieved no kills or hits despite the fact that the contact took place at a range of less than thirty yards. Examination of the contact area later revealed that the majority of shots fired by the security forces were high, this was borne out by the amount of damage to trees in the vicinity. Most rounds had struck foliage three to four feet above ground level.

2. From those observations it would appear that whilst it is possible to train a soldier to a high standard of shooting on the range it does not necessarily follow that he is automatically able to apply the lessons learnt when he comes under fire in battle.

This lack of application can be put down to two basic reasons:

a. A failure to relate his weapon training lessons to fieldcraft.

b. A natural nervousness due to stresses created by battle conditions.

AIM

3. The aim of this range practice is to teach soldiers to relate field craft and ground appreciation to good shooting under realistic conditions.

METHOD

4. The basic faults to overcome are:

a. A tendency to fire high. This is a result of firing range practice at comparatively large figure targets mounted approximately six feet above ground level. The terrorist will usually be at ground level and will present a target no higher than twelve inches.

b. Failure to fire at potential enemy cover. Soldiers nust appreciate the ground, and fire at likely enemy positions, WHETHER THEY CAN SEE MEN THERE OR NOT. Logs, bushes, tree trunks and folds in the ground all provide likely cover, the high velocity 7,62mm round will penetrate most natural cover at close range!

c. Tendency to concentrate fire on the most likely position. If a terrorist is visible or isolated cover suggests more likely position, there is a tendency for all to fire in one direction. This results in the arc to the front not being fully covered and although one terrorist may be well and truly dealt with, several others in less obvious fire positions will remain unscathed and potentially dangerous.

5. To summarise, a soldier must be taught and practised to:

a. Fire low, no higher than 9 - 12 inches above the estimated ground level.

b. Select and fire at likely enemy fire positions remembering to relate his field craft to his shooting.

c. Fire at the enemy within his own particular arc to his front and not to be drawn to fire at obvious targets already covered by others within his fire unit.

RESULT

6. This dootrine has been tried and proven. A platoon trained on the lines described above engaged terrorists in three separate contacts in one day, resulting in:

a. Four terrorists killed.

b. Two seriously wounded (one suffered 10 hits).

c. Five captured.

d. A total ammunition expenditure during the whole day of 250 rounds and one grenade.

PRACTICES

7. The following practices are best fired on field firing ranges or in jungle lane areas but can be adapted to classification or transitional ranges by the provision of artificial cover.

8. This shoot should be fired by all soldiers at the completion of recruit training and Practice 3, with variations, by trained soldiers at every available opportunity.