Green on Blue: causes and responses (merged thread)

[ganulv]

Originally Posted by Gurkha

Another mistake from the US side was not to get the Indian Army involved : the 2nd largest army, infantry predominant, CI experienced force who were, are & always will be the bulwark against Islamic terror, and who have traditionally fought the Afghans & Pakis from the earliest of times. True it would have been a difficult [t]ask with […] Paki generals opposing it […]

Opposed it? The Pakistani securitocracy would have s*#t bricks if the Indian Army had been brought in on OEF!

[davidbfpo]

This article in The Guardian appears to have caused a few ripples on Twitter, he's wrong, he's right and he's confused.

I don't think his message is "on message"; the title & sub-title:

Nato withdrawal from Afghanistan could be speeded up, says Rasmussen
Exclusive: Redeployment of some troops might be accelerated, says Nato chief, who admits 'green on blue' attacks have hit morale

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012...eat?CMP=twt_gu

What he said:

From now until the end of 2014 you may see adaptation of our presence. Our troops can redeploy, take on other tasks, or even withdraw, or we can reduce the number of foreign troops...From now until the end of 2014 we will see announcements of redeployments, withdrawals or drawdown … If the security situation allows, I would not exclude the possibility that in certain areas you could accelerate the process.

(On green on blue) Political leaders in the capitals of troop-contributing countries know very well that this is part of a tactic or strategy to also undermine public and political support at home … The real target is politicians, media, opinion-formers at home in partner nations and allied nations.

(On the post-2014 deployment) The core will be a training mission. Of course, we will have to ensure that our trainers can operate in a secure environment so we need capabilities to make sure that our trainers can operate

Personally I think he is signalling that ISAF contributors will leave soon. I am not sure the 'green on blue' attacks if at the Taliban's direction are aimed at the "distant enemy". Rather that it is aimed at undermining trust between ANSF & ISAF, so weakening both and then the "distant enemy".

[Dayuhan]

Originally Posted by JMA

If that quote I posted is accurate then my position - that a general who leaves before his 30 years are up stands to take a financial knock in the process - is correct.

It isn't correct, because you shifted the goalposts when you wrote this:

Originally Posted by JMA

If the above is correct then if you are looking at a 30 year career and resign at 21 years you stand to lose about 22.5% of your base pay as pension.

We were talking about generals, and an officer who resigns at 21 years isn't a general. By the time a general is a general - and by the time a "moral courage resignation" would mean anything at all - he's already quite close to the top of the pension food chain. Given that, and given that officers who resign generally earn more in the private sector than they did in the military, it's difficult to support the premise that failure to resign in support of your opinions is financially motivated. Is it not possible that the officers in question simply don't share your opinions?

Originally Posted by JMA

Maybe... but how long until its back to the dominance of the warlords/druglords/tribal chiefs? Is there a positive outcome scenario?

That would depend on how you define a positive outcome. Personally, the probable return to dominance of the warlords/druglords/tribal chiefs would be an acceptable outcome, if not entirely positive, as long as the warlords/druglords/tribal chiefs believe that attacking us or harboring those who do will bring unacceptable consequences to them. I don't think transformation of Afghanistan was ever going to be a practical or achievable goal, but I also don't believe that it was necessary to transform Afghanistan to remove the threat.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

It isn't correct, because you shifted the goalposts when you wrote this:

We were talking about generals, and an officer who resigns at 21 years isn't a general. By the time a general is a general - and by the time a "moral courage resignation" would mean anything at all - he's already quite close to the top of the pension food chain. Given that, and given that officers who resign generally earn more in the private sector than they did in the military, it's difficult to support the premise that failure to resign in support of your opinions is financially motivated.


Is it not possible that the officers in question simply don't share your opinions?

To term the issues I raise as simply my opinions is disingenuous to say the least. In this case the issue of tour lengths - or as I prefer to term it operational continuity - it is a hardy annual with roots (as far as the US is concerned) back to Vietnam. You remember this quote?

"We don't have twelve years experience in Vietnam. We have one year's experience twelve times over." - John Paul Vann

The Brits too have issues relating to 'short-termism' and ‘six-month wars’:

Short-termism and the ‘six-month wars’

As the occupation proceeded, and as one UK brigade gave way to another every six baleful, casualty-filled months, the situation gradually, inexorably deteriorated. Battalions cycled through, finding themselves less and less capable of maintaining any real form of authority on the streets of Basra. The British MP and former soldier Adam Holloway observed a correlation between the optimism inherent in the six-monthly end-of-tour summaries: ‘Every six months there was a little spike of hope upwards. This reflected the departures of senior officers out of Basra at the end of their six-month tours, as it had been left on a high note – as they presented the place in better condition at the end of their tour than at the beginning.’ In Afghanistan and Iraq, army units served six months in heatre.40 Every British soldier knows the routine well: one spends two months learning the job, two months doing it and two months counting the days until you go home for ‘tea and medals’, as the saying goes. This is another legacy of Northern Ireland. Units on long tours in the ‘Province’ served two years – as did the headquarters units – and were posted there with their families. Short-toured units served six months. The six-month rotation was retained for Bosnia in the early 1990s and flows on today.

Ledwidge, Frank (2011-07-15). Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (pp. 34-35). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.

Now while it appears those who get bent out of shape when reminded of this issue - about which they have long capitulated to the politicians on - the problem continues to have a significant negative impact upon operational performance in Afghanistan.

I take criticism from whence it comes... so being called a troll by certain people for raising this particular issue is more of an accolade than a criticism as it takes more moral courage and determination to pursue a issue - where I am not alone as at happens - than rolling over in that canine act of submission and effectively wimping out.

Moving on to the issue of pensions. For the record my first comment in this thread was #228:

... Then as per normal the politicians will get off scott free and the "generals" may... just may, suffer reputational damage but will not lose their pensions. ...

I have used "US military in general and the General Staff in particular", 'senior officers' and 'generals'. It seems clear that if a 'general' or 'senior officer' leaves before his 30 years are up he will take a financial knock.

You offer that these 'generals' could earn more outside the military is probably correct but betrays an opinion that salary and earnings are everything. Maybe for you but any soldier who is motivated but that would have been dumb to have joined up in the first place. I would suggest that most/a lot would rather stay in the military until 64 and go out with a pension of 75% of current earnings (or whatever). For those who can't stay - iow have reached their ceiling and are faced with not being promoted after 5 years in current rank and therefore out - perhaps they can take solace in their disappointment by the comfort of earning more out of the army.

Now please drop the red herrings and comment if you can on the moral courage issue.

For starters look up John Paul Vann and see what his moral courage cost him.

That would depend on how you define a positive outcome. Personally, the probable return to dominance of the warlords/druglords/tribal chiefs would be an acceptable outcome, if not entirely positive, as long as the warlords/druglords/tribal chiefs believe that attacking us or harboring those who do will bring unacceptable consequences to them. I don't think transformation of Afghanistan was ever going to be a practical or achievable goal, but I also don't believe that it was necessary to transform Afghanistan to remove the threat.

I addressed that to Ghurka as I would far more value his opinion and response.

[Dayuhan]

Originally Posted by JMA

To term the issues I raise as simply my opinions is disingenuous to say the least. In this case the issue of tour lengths - or as I prefer to term it operational continuity - it is a hardy annual with roots (as far as the US is concerned) back to Vietnam.

The issue itself is well established. Your particular positions on the issue and your specific comments on the appropriate response for US personnel affected by the issue are entirely your opinions. Of course you're entitled to those opinions, but accusing those with other opinions of incompetence or lack of moral courage, and insinuating that they don't do what you think they should because they fear for their pensions, seems a bit uncalled for.

Originally Posted by JMA

the problem continues to have a significant negative impact upon operational performance in Afghanistan.

There are many problems that have significant negative impacts on the situation in Afghanistan, and many of those problems trace back to political decisions. That's an inherent facet of any military culture that accepts civilian supremacy, especially, as Ken has so often and accurately pointed out, in conflicts that are not perceived as existential threats.

Moving on to the issue of pensions. For the record my first comment in this thread was #228:

"... Then as per normal the politicians will get off scott free and the "generals" may... just may, suffer reputational damage but will not lose their pensions. ..."

Yes, that's what you said. It was pointed out subsequently that they would not in any event "lose their pensions", which are protected by law. They might have to take a slightly smaller pension, a quite different thing and, given the financial opportunities available in the private sector, not a very compelling factor. The only point to this is that there's really no reason to suppose that anyone has a craven financial motive for not doing as you think they ought.

Originally Posted by JMA

You offer that these 'generals' could earn more outside the military is probably correct but betrays an opinion that salary and earnings are everything.

You're the one who offered the opinion that "salary and earnings", in the form of a pension, are a factor in individuals not doing what you think they ought to do. I merely pointed out that if that sort of mercenarism really is in play, the logical decision would be to make a large and visible issue out of whatever is bothering you and parlay the media coverage into an attractive private sector billet. Resigning in public protest is not going to change the system, but it will buy 15 minutes of fame and can be an astute career move.

Originally Posted by JMA

Now please drop the red herrings and comment if you can on the moral courage issue.

Has it been established that there is a "moral courage issue"?

Originally Posted by JMA

For starters look up John Paul Vann and see what his moral courage cost him.

His "moral courage" gained him a good job in the private sector, and when he wanted to go back to Vietnam it gained him a civilian role a good deal higher in the food chain than he would have risen in a similar time frame if he'd stayed quiet. He got famous and earned a notoriety he never would have enjoyed otherwise. Whether or not he intended his actions to be an astute career move, they worked out to be one. Whether his actions indicated moral courage or self aggrandizing showboating would be a matter of opinion. I'd suspect a bit of both, as they are not in any way incompatible.

Originally Posted by JMA

I addressed that to Ghurka as I would far more value his opinion and response.

The private message function is always available if you wish to avoid public comment.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Sorry, but have not been keeping up.

Does anyone have statistics for green-on-blue attacks from Iraq? ... from any other conflicts outside Afghanistan?

How about green-on-green from Iraq?

Thanks

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

Has it been established that there is a "moral courage issue"?

Well yes. Maybe you missed it?

As a matter of interest what did they teach you in the Peace Corps about the meaning of "duty of care"?

His "moral courage" gained him a good job in the private sector, and when he wanted to go back to Vietnam it gained him a civilian role a good deal higher in the food chain than he would have risen in a similar time frame if he'd stayed quiet. He got famous and earned a notoriety he never would have enjoyed otherwise. Whether or not he intended his actions to be an astute career move, they worked out to be one. Whether his actions indicated moral courage or self aggrandizing showboating would be a matter of opinion. I'd suspect a bit of both, as they are not in any way incompatible.

Wow... ten minutes on Google and you are an expert on the life of John Paul Vann. Amazing.

As a Peace Corp agriculturalist I guess it would be lost on you that a good many people who enter the service do so because they see it as a low paying calling or profession and understand and accept they will never make top dollar in terms of pay. For these professionals it has little to do with going where the money is and more about the honour of service through soldiering.

I believe you should withdraw your criticism of the man's character.

The private message function is always available if you wish to avoid public comment.

Drop the smart comments... I suggest that Ghurka's response would be more valuable to all who may have an interest in the issue than what you as a non-military guy can offer.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

The issue itself is well established. Your particular positions on the issue and your specific comments on the appropriate response for US personnel affected by the issue are entirely your opinions. Of course you're entitled to those opinions, but accusing those with other opinions of incompetence or lack of moral courage, and insinuating that they don't do what you think they should because they fear for their pensions, seems a bit uncalled for.

Lets start with the common debating tactic where when a sensitive issue is raised there is a tendency to try to turn it into and anti-American "attack" of sorts. Numerous times over the past few years I have suggested that this level of high-school level maturity in debate is out of place here where people should be encouraged to question and explore.

Shooting the messenger is another immature debating tactic which is seen way too often around here.

But I digress...

Once again you attempt disingenuously to present what I have posted on this issue as purely my opinion. The quote from your General Harold K. Johnson indicates that he believes there was a moral courage dilemma in his career and he made the wrong choice. There are others who have attempted to argue that any such display of moral courage would not have changed anything. Tolerating cowardice is quite frankly shocking and there should be not such debate among the officer corps.

It may indeed not affect the military but it sure affected the good general because as he said:

" I am now going to my grave with that lapse in moral courage on my back."

Come on... you know your way around Google tell me what pathology a "lack of conscience" may indicate?

There are many problems that have significant negative impacts on the situation in Afghanistan, and many of those problems trace back to political decisions. That's an inherent facet of any military culture that accepts civilian supremacy, especially, as Ken has so often and accurately pointed out, in conflicts that are not perceived as existential threats.

I am talking about this one in particular.

Yes, that's what you said. It was pointed out subsequently that they would not in any event "lose their pensions", which are protected by law. They might have to take a slightly smaller pension, a quite different thing and, given the financial opportunities available in the private sector, not a very compelling factor. The only point to this is that there's really no reason to suppose that anyone has a craven financial motive for not doing as you think they ought.

LOL... now you attempt to spin your way out of the hole you dug for yourself.

Now that you are an expert on military pensions do tell me what happens to a major with 15 years service if he resigns for whatever reason?

You're the one who offered the opinion that "salary and earnings", in the form of a pension, are a factor in individuals not doing what you think they ought to do. I merely pointed out that if that sort of mercenarism really is in play, the logical decision would be to make a large and visible issue out of whatever is bothering you and parlay the media coverage into an attractive private sector billet. Resigning in public protest is not going to change the system, but it will buy 15 minutes of fame and can be an astute career move.

More spin.

What price moral courage?

It is indeed unlikely that a resignation on the grounds of conscience would change much... but that not why those with character, principle and the courage of their convictions resign. They do it so as to be able to live with themselves. This is obviously an area that you have no understanding of.

.

[Dayuhan]

Originally Posted by JMA

Lets start with the common debating tactic where when a sensitive issue is raised there is a tendency to try to turn it into and anti-American "attack" of sorts.

How about the rather juvenile scene where the guy in the faraway comfy chair accuses those in the hot seat of cowardice and incompetence because they don't do what he thinks they should... what does one call that, if not pathetic?

Originally Posted by JMA

The quote from your General Harold K. Johnson indicates that he believes there was a moral courage dilemma in his career and he made the wrong choice.

General Johnson believed that he faced a moral courage dilemma and believed, in retrospect, that he made the wrong choice. That cannot be extrapolated to an assumption that anyone else faces a moral courage dilemma or to any assumption about what the most courageous choice for any other individual might be. A moral courage dilemma is an intensely personal thing, and any attempt to define anyone else's dilemma or to dictate what the best or bravest choice another person could make to resolve their personal dilemma is pointless and... well, pathetic again. General Johnson is of course in a position to speak on the dilemma he faced, and to admit that in his retrospective opinion his decision was wrong. Accusing others of making wrong or cowardly choices when you're not in their shoes and have no clear or complete grasp of the dilemmas they face is a very different story.

Originally Posted by JMA

Tolerating cowardice is quite frankly shocking and there should be not such debate among the officer corps.

Are you accusing someone of cowardice? If so, who?

Originally Posted by JMA

LOL... now you attempt to spin your way out of the hole you dug for yourself.

So says the spinner in the hole.

The hole you dug is the claim that an officer could "lose their pension" if they took a stand on their beliefs, and the suggestion that this craven financial fear was intimidating officers into moral cowardice. As Ken points out, this is a complete load of bollocks. You cannot "lose your pension". It's yours, no matter what you say about anyone. You can forgo future pension if you choose to resign, but that doesn't mean you "lose your pension" because what you haven't yet earned isn't yours and you can't possibly lose it... and given the employment opportunities available in the civilian worlds, financial incentives support resignation, not staying in. The charge that officers are wimping out and avoiding morally courageous actions (as defined by you, of course) for financial reasons, is unsupportable and IMO inappropriate.

Originally Posted by JMA

Now that you are an expert on military pensions do tell me what happens to a major with 15 years service if he resigns for whatever reason?

Presumably he gets his pension - the pension he's earned - and a job that will probably pay more than he earned in the military.

Originally Posted by JMA

It is indeed unlikely that a resignation on the grounds of conscience would change much... but that not why those with character, principle and the courage of their convictions resign. They do it so as to be able to live with themselves. This is obviously an area that you have no understanding of.

Neither you nor I understand the dilemmas faced by others, or whether - for example - a braver decision in any given case is to quit or to stay the course and work with what can be done. The difference is that you're ready to accuse others of cowardice and incompetence on the basis of decisions you don't understand, and I'm not.

[Dayuhan]

do tell me what happens to a major with 15 years service if he resigns for whatever reason?

Presumably he gets his pension - the pension he's earned - and a job that will probably pay more than he earned in the military.

I understand that this is not correct, and that there would not be a pension. A mistake, but one that makes no difference whatsoever. If the hypothetical major in question really faced a moral dilemma so pressing that continued service would be incompatible with "character, principle and the courage of... convictions" he would simply resign, move to the private sector, and come away with a financial gain. The idea that officers are being whipped into submission and moral cowardice by financial threat still holds no water at all. If you're talking about Generals, as you were when you raised the point, it holds... well, less than no water, if that's possible.

Just noticed this...

As a Peace Corp agriculturalist I guess it would be lost on you that a good many people who enter the service do so because they see it as a low paying calling or profession and understand and accept they will never make top dollar in terms of pay.

You persist in the bizarre and incorrect notion that I've ever had anything to do with agriculture, and that two years spent over 30 years ago somehow defines my perceptions... but aside from that, has it crossed your mind that those who serve as volunteers might also be familiar with the notion of working at less than top dollar? People who serve in the aid profession face a very similar situation, and many of them, as do many of their counterparts in the military, do eventually leave, both because they find the limitations imposed on them frustrating and because they'd prefer (as one sometimes does when approaching middle age) to earn more money. Whether or not these resignations, in either case, have anything do do with "moral courage" would depend entirely upon the individual circumstances.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

How about the rather juvenile scene where the guy in the faraway comfy chair accuses those in the hot seat of cowardice and incompetence because they don't do what he thinks they should... what does one call that, if not pathetic?

Is that the best you can do?

I appreciate that your not having served as a soldier in combat precludes a practical understanding of the subject at hand.

Let’s start with (British) Major-General Sir James Wolfe:

… Room for a military criticism as well as a place for a little ridicule upon some famous transactions of that memorable day… But why this censure when the affair was happily decided? To exercise ones ill-nature? No, to exercise the facility of judging… The more a soldier thinks of the false steps of those that have gone before, the more likely his is to avoid them. - Major-General Sir James Wolfe

It should be standard practice among the officer corps to vigorously debate battles and actions of the past. As an officer cadet I was allowed to exercise my mind in this fashion – often outrageously – most probably to the intense boredom of the course staff. I was later able to return the favour to officer cadets and young officers who came under my wing.

You see I have been there and done that. I raised issues and was sometimes slapped down and sometimes thanked for the input. This is a dynamic and vital ongoing process which has an intimate outcome on the lives of young men. The importance of arming young officers with the ability see and understand the importance and end result of their decision making in terms of lives and broken bodies is – I understand – beyond the ken of those whose biggest decisions hinge around the selection of which hybrid seed to recommend for the coming season.

Physical courage is a simple matter. You either have it or you don’t. In terms of officers you need to have it in sufficient quantity to make decisions and lead your men in the stress of combat.

Moral courage is a different animal.

Moral courage is higher and a rarer virtue than physical courage. - William Slim

General Johnson did face a moral dilemma and by his own admission failed not only himself – but also his soldiers, the US military and the country. Yes, to face a moral dilemma of such magnitude is to find oneself in an intensely lonely situation. The situation he faced had not appeared overnight but rather was a situation that developed over time. He reached the point where he believed he needed to act – in his words: “I remember the day I was ready to go over to the Oval Office and give my four stars to the President…” - but then wimped out. At the time he justified it as follows: “I made the typical mistake of believing I could do more for the country and the Army if I stayed in than if I got out”.

He ends with “I am now going to my grave with that lapse in moral courage on my back.”

By his own admission General Johnson failed himself, his soldiers, the military and the country.

General Johnson believed that he faced a moral courage dilemma and believed, in retrospect, that he made the wrong choice. That cannot be extrapolated to an assumption that anyone else faces a moral courage dilemma or to any assumption about what the most courageous choice for any other individual might be. A moral courage dilemma is an intensely personal thing, and any attempt to define anyone else's dilemma or to dictate what the best or bravest choice another person could make to resolve their personal dilemma is pointless and... well, pathetic again. General Johnson is of course in a position to speak on the dilemma he faced, and to admit that in his retrospective opinion his decision was wrong. Accusing others of making wrong or cowardly choices when you're not in their shoes and have no clear or complete grasp of the dilemmas they face is a very different story.

Do you really think General Johnson needs you to make excuses for him?

He admits to the lapse… but the only thing he did not do was to place a cost – in terms of lives – on that lapse.

Yes, the decision is indeed “intensely personal” but the cost of that failure goes way beyond that. For the ultimate cost there is no one other than General Johnson who must bear the responsibility.

Let’s look at that Johnson quotation again:

“I remember the day I was ready to go over to the Oval Office and give my four stars to the President and tell him, ‘You have refused to tell the country they cannot fight a war without mobilization; you have required me to send men into battle with little hope of their ultimate victory; and you have forced us in the military to violate almost every one of the principles of war in Vietnam. Therefore, I resign and will hold a press conference after I walk out of your door.’ I made the typical mistake of believing I could do more for the country and the Army if I stayed in than if I got out. I am now going to my grave with that lapse in moral courage on my back.”

General Harold K. Johnson, quoted in Lewis Sorely, ‘To Change a War’,
Parameters, Spring 1998.

Others seem also to make the “typical mistake” of balancing an act of moral courage against the effect of acting with conscience. Even here.

Johnson blew it on a grand scale (because of his position at the time)… and this should be a case study of the failure of moral courage – or moral cowardice (as you prefer) – to be discussed at every level of officer training.

I am not accusing Johnson of cowardice… he has admitted to it. I am saying that the Johnson admission should be used to stiffen the resolve of those still serving to act according to their conscience and not make the same mistake he did by making the “typical mistake” of trying to rationalise moral cowardice in terms of the effect or outcome only.

However, all is not lost.

Here is a masters thesis from a thinking youngster which I suggest you should not only read but study. This IMHO is the type of thinking which allows one to retain a glimmer of hope for the US military as a whole.

Moral Courage or Heresy:
The Benefits and Pitfalls of Military Leaders Speaking Out

Ending with a quote from this thesis:

Conclusion: Every military leader must put aside careerist goals and rank ambition in order to speak up for what is right. They must expose flawed policies, strategies, and decisions in order to possibly save the lives of our servicemen and protect the country.

[Gurkha]

Lets keep the focus on the major issue :Is the green on blue due to a faulty strategy of training the Afghans ? I put it that it is not. I think that he NATO forces have done well given the constraints.Those who expected miracles, whether in the military / NGOs / civilian bureaucracy, are being impractical and rather naive. I think the West's interest would be best served by propping up those who profit most from status quo & those who are the natural enemies of the Taliban & Pakistan. Note that the present Pathan leadership under Karzai may not completely welcome the Taliban as they would have to play 2nd fiddle to them. I think that the more pressing worry (which nobody wants to think about) is the steady deterioration of Pakistan which is a recalcitrant,paranoid & nuclear armed state.

As for military leaders & idealism : its the same story in every army..or navy or airforce... the guys who get to the top are ...SURVIVORS!! You shed some of your idealism, most of your conscience & all your beliefs on the climb..believe me!!

[Ken White]

Well said, all of it...

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Gurkha

Is the green on blue due to a faulty strategy of training the Afghans ? I put it that it is not. I think that he NATO forces have done well given the constraints.

Two points.

What is green-on-blue caused by in your opinion?

If the 'constraints' lead to poor outcome how come no one is questioning the constraints?

Those who expected miracles, whether in the military / NGOs / civilian bureaucracy, are being impractical and rather naive.

Who expected miracles? If the job was not possible to be done with any real chance of success then why bother?

I think the West's interest would be best served by propping up those who profit most from status quo

Not sure I agree with this...

... & those who are the natural enemies of the Taliban & Pakistan.

Who are these? The druglords and the warlords?

.

[Gurkha]

ARMCHAIR ANALYSIS

1. Causes
(a) Taliban infiltrator campaign.
(b) Radicalised ANA soldier.
(c) Faulty strategy : large numbers of isolated detachments.
(d) Ineffective background check programme.
(e) Self portrayal as the losing side : announcement of withdrawal.
(f) Cultural & personal aggravation at functional level.

2. Constraints , who do you expect will speak up :-
(a) The NCO from Special Forces / Marine ? Infantry whose ethos & training calls for
him to always achieve the impossible for 'regimental izzat' (look it up) no matter
how lunatic the orders sound ?
(b) The career major who would have been selected to undertake this difficult task
and who knows the unemployment stats in civvy street ?
(c) The colonel whose brethren conceptualised the plan in the first place... and
who isnt on site anyway ?
(d) The general who has been hand-picked to settle Afghanistan because of his
"can- do" attitude (otherwise he would have been commanding a recruit training
centre in Kalamazoo )
(e) Or the civilian bureaucrat who has learnt to survive ?
3. Why bother ?
(a) The idea wasnt bad in itself and did work for a while till the announcement
regarding the withdrawal.
(b) Why bother...how else would the programme to train the ANA get accelerated.
By the time NATO leaves it needs a force which would not collapse at the first
sight of the Taliban...I think they would have achieved that.

4. The balance : There is no black & white in AfPAk but lots of grey , tan & mauve !!
The warlords of today are the Talibans enemies so ..... The Long term strategy

(a) The withdrawal in 2014 is not or rather must not be considered as the
endgame. Politically, socially & for the boots on ground you may just waiting to
get out and put the whole mess behind but thats not how grand strategy is
executed.
(b) It must be seen as the second phase of the campaign in which indigenous
forces will hold off the Taliban or strike them when they make the first headlong
surge : spring & summer of 2015.
(c) They need to be hit by a combination of Special forces,missiles and from the
air. all the while in close coordination with friendly factional forces.
(d) It may be more easy for the Taliban to play the role of insurgents than a
governing force : remember the LTTE.
5. Take a step back and look at the issue from a larger timescale & wider perspective....easier said than done though, especially if you've seen regimental blood spilt..

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Gurkha

ARMCHAIR ANALYSIS

1. Causes
(a) Taliban infiltrator campaign.
(b) Radicalised ANA soldier.
(c) Faulty strategy : large numbers of isolated detachments.
(d) Ineffective background check programme.
(e) Self portrayal as the losing side : announcement of withdrawal.
(f) Cultural & personal aggravation at functional level.

2. Constraints , who do you expect will speak up :-
(a) The NCO from Special Forces / Marine ? Infantry whose ethos & training calls for
him to always achieve the impossible for 'regimental izzat' (look it up) no matter
how lunatic the orders sound ?
(b) The career major who would have been selected to undertake this difficult task
and who knows the unemployment stats in civvy street ?
(c) The colonel whose brethren conceptualised the plan in the first place... and
who isnt on site anyway ?
(d) The general who has been hand-picked to settle Afghanistan because of his
"can- do" attitude (otherwise he would have been commanding a recruit training
centre in Kalamazoo )
(e) Or the civilian bureaucrat who has learnt to survive ?
3. Why bother ?
(a) The idea wasnt bad in itself and did work for a while till the announcement
regarding the withdrawal.
(b) Why bother...how else would the programme to train the ANA get accelerated.
By the time NATO leaves it needs a force which would not collapse at the first
sight of the Taliban...I think they would have achieved that.

4. The balance : There is no black & white in AfPAk but lots of grey , tan & mauve !!
The warlords of today are the Talibans enemies so ..... The Long term strategy

(a) The withdrawal in 2014 is not or rather must not be considered as the
endgame. Politically, socially & for the boots on ground you may just waiting to
get out and put the whole mess behind but thats not how grand strategy is
executed.
(b) It must be seen as the second phase of the campaign in which indigenous
forces will hold off the Taliban or strike them when they make the first headlong
surge : spring & summer of 2015.
(c) They need to be hit by a combination of Special forces,missiles and from the
air. all the while in close coordination with friendly factional forces.
(d) It may be more easy for the Taliban to play the role of insurgents than a
governing force : remember the LTTE.
5. Take a step back and look at the issue from a larger timescale & wider perspective....easier said than done though, especially if you've seen regimental blood spilt..

Very good response... thanks.

Seems you believe the big 'factor' was the announcement of the date of withdrawal?

[Gurkha]

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...little_america

[Gurkha]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/nation...y.html?hpid=z3

[davidbfpo]

Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon

Sorry, but have not been keeping up. Does anyone have statistics for green-on-blue attacks from Iraq? ... from any other conflicts outside Afghanistan? How about green-on-green from Iraq?Thanks

The questions posed set my mind thinking, alas not about Iraq as The Curmudgeon asked. Nor do I recall the issues being raised on SWC re Iraq, except for one post about two senior US Army officers being killed at an un-occupied Iraqi Army roadblock - which is not a 'green on blue' attack. In a moment I will check the now closed OIF forum for likely suspects.

There is a "lurker" who maybe able to help, so a RFI will be despatched.

In the post-1945 British experience of 'small wars', mainly in colonies, I can only recall one incident in Aden in 1967, when a local armed police mutinied and ambushed a patrol. The first full account I found:http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Aden/mutiny. and a blogsite with more details:http://gmic.co.uk/index.php/topic/29...7/page__st__80

There were a series of mutinies in East Africa in 1964, in newly independent Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda which were suppressed by British troops swiftly, so not really 'green on blue'. One explanation:http://britains-smallwars.com/RRGP/Tanganyika.htm

I have a vague recollection that in the early period of the Mau Mau Emergency in Kenya, that a tiny number of incidents occurred as loyalties were stretched. In Cyprus in the EOKA (Greek) Emergency the police remained loyal, it was a locally recruited Greek Cypriot & Turkish Cypriot force with some British officers, although again Greek loyalties were stretched. If 'green on blue' had occurred then I doubt it would have been publicly reported.

Before 1945 there were 'green on blue' incidents, notably in Iraq, but that was an attempt to end British involvement by the Iraqi state:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iraqi_War

[TheCurmudgeon]

Thanks Davidbpro ...

So that begs the question: "what is unique about this time?" Is it the nature of the mission - a complete cultural overhaul? Is it our attitude? Is it the fact that we want to be their friends rather than their conquerors?

I do remember something about the uprisings with the Bangladesh in 1857 that had a cultural overtone. ( http://bangladesh2000.com/bdall/uprising1857.html) Not sure anything else really compares.

Iraq and Afghanistan make a nice "compare and contrast" as far as green-on-blue goes. Not really sure what the answers (multiple) are. Heck, not sure I am even asking the right questions.