ARMCHAIR ANALYSIS

1. Causes
(a) Taliban infiltrator campaign.
(b) Radicalised ANA soldier.
(c) Faulty strategy : large numbers of isolated detachments.
(d) Ineffective background check programme.
(e) Self portrayal as the losing side : announcement of withdrawal.
(f) Cultural & personal aggravation at functional level.

2. Constraints , who do you expect will speak up :-
(a) The NCO from Special Forces / Marine ? Infantry whose ethos & training calls for
him to always achieve the impossible for 'regimental izzat' (look it up) no matter
how lunatic the orders sound ?
(b) The career major who would have been selected to undertake this difficult task
and who knows the unemployment stats in civvy street ?
(c) The colonel whose brethren conceptualised the plan in the first place... and
who isnt on site anyway ?
(d) The general who has been hand-picked to settle Afghanistan because of his
"can- do" attitude (otherwise he would have been commanding a recruit training
centre in Kalamazoo )
(e) Or the civilian bureaucrat who has learnt to survive ?
3. Why bother ?
(a) The idea wasnt bad in itself and did work for a while till the announcement
regarding the withdrawal.
(b) Why bother...how else would the programme to train the ANA get accelerated.
By the time NATO leaves it needs a force which would not collapse at the first
sight of the Taliban...I think they would have achieved that.

4. The balance : There is no black & white in AfPAk but lots of grey , tan & mauve !!
The warlords of today are the Talibans enemies so ..... The Long term strategy

(a) The withdrawal in 2014 is not or rather must not be considered as the
endgame. Politically, socially & for the boots on ground you may just waiting to
get out and put the whole mess behind but thats not how grand strategy is
executed.
(b) It must be seen as the second phase of the campaign in which indigenous
forces will hold off the Taliban or strike them when they make the first headlong
surge : spring & summer of 2015.
(c) They need to be hit by a combination of Special forces,missiles and from the
air. all the while in close coordination with friendly factional forces.
(d) It may be more easy for the Taliban to play the role of insurgents than a
governing force : remember the LTTE.
5. Take a step back and look at the issue from a larger timescale & wider perspective....easier said than done though, especially if you've seen regimental blood spilt..