Mass Insanity: Latest Trend in Army Doctrine

[Bill Moore]

Gute, the link didn't work, and furthermore I can't get the image of a pink twinkie spinning round and round in the bowl, but refuses to go down even after multiple flushes. Thanks for the nightmare image.

[Bob's World]

The Army is VERY focused on capturing and applying "the lessons learned from the past 10 years." Not at the strategic level, so as to better understand the types of threats we have been facing, or better design the operations we have applied so as to be more effective and less expensive. Those are assumed to be proper (to do otherwise would be to call into question senior leader decision making over that same period)

No, it is a very focused effort on how they could have made the BCTs more effective at the missions they were sent out to accomplish in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Things like BSOs having greater control over the IA, NGO and SOF forces operating with their space. It is almost as if we want to absolutely ensure we fight the next war just like the last.

My suggestion is that most of these tactical lessons learned will be of little value in virtually any other type of conflict that we are more likely to become involved in. Also, that once we actually do take a hard look at how we understand these threats and how we could better design operations for an appropriate military role in addressing them, we will find that it in not very war-like, and that the previously derived tactical lessons learned no longer have much merit.

[gute]

Try this link to the contents page of the March/April 2012 edition of Military Review, then click on Unifed Land Operations

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...4300001-MD.xml

[Jrizzuto77]

The change in Army doctrine is a manifestation of 11+ years of conflict and the need to capture lesson learned and reinvest in core competencies. We could debate if the past decade was worth its price in treasure but we cannot debate revolution in thought and lessons learned. Now we are challenged; we must fuse the lessons of the conflicts, the nature of the evolving threats and nuanced changes in domains by rewriting our doctrine. The Army is the quintessential learning organization and unlike reactive adjustments, these tweaks in doctrine are a natural manifestation to our great learning organization.
**The views expressed in this are those of MAJ Rizzuto, Command and General Staff College, and do not reflect the official policy of the Department of the Army, DoD or the US Government. **