Clausewitz and World War IV

[SWJED]

Armed Forces Journal commentary - Clausewitz and World War IV by MG Robert Scales, US Army (ret.).

The essence of every profession is expressed in the writings of its unifying theorists: Freud for psychology, Adam Smith on economics, Justice Marshall on law, and — depending on one's preferences — Marx or Jefferson on governance. War is no exception. The 19th-century Prussian writer Carl von Clausewitz is regarded as a prophet whose views on the character and nature of war have held up best over the past two centuries.

Periodically, changes in the culture, technology, economics or demographics induce movements to revise the classic masters. After the Great Depression, Keynes amended Smith, behavioralists supplanted Freud, Marshall gave way to Oliver Holmes, who eventually surrendered to the revisionist doctrines of Hugo Black and Earl Warren. The profession of arms, perhaps more than any other profession, has been — is "blessed" the right word? — by intellectual revisionists more frequently perhaps because armed conflict is the most complex, changeable and unpredictable of all human endeavors. And history has shown, tragically, that failure to amend theories of conflict in time has had catastrophic consequences for the human race.

Changes in theories of war come most often during periods of historical discontinuity. Events after 9/11 clearly show that we are in such a period now. Unfortunately, contemporary revisionists to the classical master have not been well treated in today's practical laboratory of real war. In the moment before Sept. 11, 2001, the great hope was that technology would permit the creation of new theories of war. This view, influenced by the historical successes of the U.S. in exploiting technology, has been carried to extremes by some proponents of "effects-based and net-centric operations." These true believers visualized that sensors, computers and telecommunications networks would "lift the fog of war." They postulated that victory would be assured when admirals and generals could sit on some lofty perch and use networks to see, sense and kill anything that moved about the battlefield. Actions of the enemy in Iraq have made these techno-warriors about as credible today as stockbrokers after the Great Depression.

Theory abhors a vacuum as much as nature, so newer revisionists have popped up in profusion to fill the void left by the collapse of technocentric theories of war. One philosophy proposes to build a new theory of war around organizational and bureaucratic efficiency. Build two armies, so the proponents argue, one to fight and the other to administer, and the new age of more flexible and adaptive military action will begin. Another group of theorists seeks to twist the facts of history into a pattern that brings us to a fourth generation of warfare, one that makes all Clausewitzian theories of state-on-state warfare obsolete. Thus Western states are threatened by an amorphous, globally based insurgent movement. The inconvenience of Middle Eastern states collapsing and reforming in the midst of a state-dependent terrorist environment makes this fourth generationalist assault on the master difficult to sustain, if not actually embarrassing.

To be generous, each of these revisions contains some elements of truth. But none satisfies sufficiently to give confidence that Clausewitz can be amended, much less discarded. To be sure, networks and sensors are useful, even against terrorists, particularly in ground warfare at the tactical level. Armies should be reorganized to fight irregular wars more efficiently. And the influence of the state in irregular war must be revised to accommodate the realities of nonstate threats or, perhaps more accurately, not-yet-state threats; Osama bin Laden's first desire is for his own caliphate, or even emirate. But at the end of the day — and in light of the bitter experiences of recent years — it's clear that none of these rudimentary attempts at revision possesses the intellectual heft or durability to challenge the tenets of the classic master of conflict theory...

Follow the link for much more. Hat Tip to John at the OPFOR Blog.

[zenpundit]

In the moment before Sept. 11, 2001, the great hope was that technology would permit the creation of new theories of war. This view, influenced by the historical successes of the U.S. in exploiting technology, has been carried to extremes by some proponents of "effects-based and net-centric operations." These true believers visualized that sensors, computers and telecommunications networks would "lift the fog of war." They postulated that victory would be assured when admirals and generals could sit on some lofty perch and use networks to see, sense and kill anything that moved about the battlefield.

I'm pretty sure that Art Cebrowski never put it that way and that he was primarily ( and sensibly) concerned with systemically maximizing a comparative advantage in high tech possessed by the United States. Nothing wrong with that and a major reason why no state desires to go toe to toe with the United States in a conventional war. At no point that I'm aware of did Cebrowski ever say that network-centric warfare would be a blank check for American omnipotence or shag shadowy terror cells out of a civilian populace.

Every theorist has disciples who are so enamored of the strengths of their cherished ideas that they develop blind spots.

[Tom Odom]

n the moment before Sept. 11, 2001, the great hope was that technology would permit the creation of new theories of war.

And in 1992 MG Scales leaned that way himself as we wrote Certain Victory--against the recommendations of some of us--and later in writing Yellow Smoke. I remember reading passages that praised "just in time logistics" as the way ofthe future and declarations that "reach back capablities would mean that intelligence and other administrative functions" could best be done from the rear.

As for Clausewitz et al, classical studies are great and everyone here knows that I believe in studying history as measure of reality. But Clausewitz was not Moses and as far as I know he didn't speak to a burning bush. General Scales sees anything related to EBO as heresy; he has his points in that debate but so do EBO proponents.

At the tactical level, effects can and do work if the interoperative system of assessment and intelligence work closely, especially in a COIN environment where non-lethal is often the means of choice.

Best
Tom

[Tc2642]

Originally Posted by Tc2642

Theory abhors a vacuum as much as nature, so newer revisionists have popped up in profusion to fill the void left by the collapse of technocentric theories of war. One philosophy proposes to build a new theory of war around organizational and bureaucratic efficiency. Build two armies, so the proponents argue, one to fight and the other to administer, and the new age of more flexible and adaptive military action will begin. Another group of theorists seeks to twist the facts of history into a pattern that brings us to a fourth generation of warfare, one that makes all Clausewitzian theories of state-on-state warfare obsolete.

I am rather perplexed by this, Clausewitz, never said that 'State on State Warfare' was the be and end all of war theory, neither is 4GW diametrically opposed to Clausewitzian theory, in fact I believe the two theories are rather complementary to each other. Anyone who reads, 'Unrestricted warfare', will see how a state can conduct 4GW against another state.

[Bill Moore]

Tc I have read "Unrestricted Warfare" and concur with your line of thought as far as you expressed it. 4GW can be used to supplement conventional strategies, or used in place of them. I think both the U.S. and USSR employed elements of 4GW against one another, but they were always ready to ramp it up to mutual assured destruction, so in effect the MAD strategy as strange as it sounds had a moderating effect. I think this is where the non-state and state actor employing 4GW differ.

The State actor has centers of gravity that are vulnerable to conventional military attacks, especially by a superior hostile military force. This means State actors will “normally” employ 4GW with a measure of restraint, because they likely do not want to escalate the conflict to the point that they are on the receiving end of conventional military strikes against their security forces and economic infrastructure. Libya was a perfect example of a State employing 4GW that crossed the threshold and was severely punished.

Iran is using 4GW against Israel via a number of surrogate groups. Personally I think Israel is pursuing the wrong strategy to counter it, although there are very few, if any, good options. Maybe the best option is to punish the State sponsoring these attacks? Iran is playing an incredibly dangerous game of brinkmanship with their activities directed against Israel and the U.S., and thumbing their noses at the West with their alleged nuclear program. I won’t discount the complex problems associated with attacking Iran, but allowing a State to play 4GW at an increasingly dangerous level without any response may be more dangerous.

A State actor employing 4GW is worrisome, but they seem to have some constraints, even the extreme ones like Iran. Non State actors on the other hand will employ 4GW tactics/strategy to the extremes possible because they do not have centers of gravity that are vulnerable to conventional military attacks, thus their risk assessment does not persuade them to only push so far then stop. This was validated today with their latest plot uncovered for non-state actors to employ 4GW to murder up to thousands of civilians by blowing up a number of commercial airliners. If a State committed an attack (a crime) like this there would be a very, very severe price to pay, but a non State organization executes an attack like this secure that we can only escalate the conflict so much, and if we escalate carelessly we’ll play into their hands. If we don’t respond we’ll play into their hands. These people won’t hesitate to use WMD against our citizens, and since conventional war fighting theories do not apply against this type of enemy, I would hope MG Scales would be open to additional methods to frame and address the problems we’re facing, which EBO is only an attempt at. It is a far from perfect attempt at doing so, but it does have some merits that should be pursued. None of us can afford the luxury of being myopic in our use of strategies. Very loosely paraphrasing Bruce Lee’s philosophy, he stated that “the usefulness of a cup is its emptiness, so empty your mind of the traditional dogma, so you can learn”. Maybe the paraphrase isn’t even close, but you get my point .

[Tc2642]

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

None of us can afford the luxury of being myopic in our use of strategies. Very loosely paraphrasing Bruce Lee’s philosophy, he stated that “the usefulness of a cup is its emptiness, so empty your mind of the traditional dogma, so you can learn”. Maybe the paraphrase isn’t even close, but you get my point .

Definitley, I always think that there is a divide between "traditional" camps of thought, usually defined along Clausewitzian lines, and the "non traditional", with the likes of 4GW, netwar, etc. What seems to have happened is that Clausewitizians have seen works like "The Transformation of War" and seeing Creveld's misinterpretation of the "Remarkable Trinity" seem to associate all 4GW theorists as falling into the same trap, and on the other side of the coin, the 4GW theorists seem (in some instances) to have viewed Clausewitz in a far too dogmatic fashion and seemingly state centric (again some Clausewitzians may also be guilty of this fault)

[Strickland]

For the record, Clausewitz defined Absolute War in two ways, one of which was "peoples war," akin to that which he was familiar with in Spain from 1808. Based on this definition, this would mean that Iraq is an absolute war.

[Tc2642]

Originally Posted by Strickland

For the record, Clausewitz defined Absolute War in two ways, one of which was "peoples war," akin to that which he was familiar with in Spain from 1808. Based on this definition, this would mean that Iraq is an absolute war.

The other part of Clausewitz's idea of Absolute war is based in philosophy and pure theory, because Clausewitz used the "absolute" in a Kantian ideal sense of the word, being that in theory there is an ideal absolute but we live in reality and therfore cannot achive this ideal.

There is a good piece by Bruce Fleming which I have recently scanned through called "Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes?" which gives a good insight, I have read most of On War but the text can be very confusing and is contradictory in parts, even so I do believe that Clausewitz's theory of war is still unsurpassed and still relevent today.

[Strickland]

I recently attended a lecture by Dr. Sumida (University of Maryland Prof.) concerning Clausewitz's On War. His book, one that he has been working on for 15 years, is due out later this year, and asserts that Peter Paret and Mike Howard were off-base with their assertions in the 1976 translation and accompanying essays. Mike Howard is actually helping him with this work, whicch should be the most definitive study and translation in English yet. The work will teach you how to read Clausewitz, and what it means.

[zenpundit]

should be the most definitive study and translation in English yet. The work will teach you how to read Clausewitz, and what it means

.

There must have been something in the water in Germany to produce such a large body of philosophers whose thinking powers were inverse to their writing skills. Clausewitz is far from the worst in that regard. There's also a few exceptions but those philosophers were also poets.

[Merv Benson]

In fairness to Clausewitz, his manuscript was apparently not finished at his death. That suggest that he was not around for the editing process. Nevertheless, he still managed to communicate some insightful things about war.

[Steve Blair]

Originally Posted by Merv Benson

In fairness to Clausewitz, his manuscript was apparently not finished at his death. That suggest that he was not around for the editing process. Nevertheless, he still managed to communicate some insightful things about war.

Exactly. "On War" was still a work in progress when he died. From what I recall, only the first four books (parts, whatever you want to call them) were really "done" when he died. Still...it's a work that has never really been equalled or surpassed.

And for those who complain that Clausewitz was in places contradictory, he was writing about one of the most complex and contradictory events in human experience. Maybe he just captured its essence well....

[Martin]

What do you think about Jomini then?

[Steve Blair]

Originally Posted by Martin

What do you think about Jomini then?

I think Jomini focused more on the "meat" of conflict as opposed to the theoretical grounding behind it. His decisive battle concept has to a degree (in my view, anyhow) hindered intellectual development on the part of some writers and military leaders. The first sections of "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" has some interesting observations regarding the differences between the two theorists, and I tend to agree with the author in many areas. Jomini seemed to focus more on Napoleonic events while Clausewitz was trying to look beyond that and explain a much larger event.

[Tc2642]

Originally Posted by Strickland

I recently attended a lecture by Dr. Sumida (University of Maryland Prof.) concerning Clausewitz's On War. His book, one that he has been working on for 15 years, is due out later this year, and asserts that Peter Paret and Mike Howard were off-base with their assertions in the 1976 translation and accompanying essays. Mike Howard is actually helping him with this work, which should be the most definitive study and translation in English yet. The work will teach you how to read Clausewitz, and what it means.

Does this mean I will have to spend another two years annotating, underlining and making notes on "On War" again.

Do you know when the new book is out?

[Jrizzuto77]

Jomini's view on the role of intelligence is prescriptive. In Jomini's, The Art of War, Article XLII, he discusses the role of intelligence. According to Jomini, "one of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war is to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the proceedings." Jomini, is specifically talking about the critical importance of analyzing your adversary's relative strengths and weaknesses in order to gain an advantage.
**The views expressed in this are those of MAJ Rizzuto, Command and General Staff College, and do not reflect the official policy of the Department of the Army, DoD or the US Government. **

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by Jrizzuto77

Jomini's view on the role of intelligence is prescriptive. In Jomini's, The Art of War, Article XLII, he discusses the role of intelligence. According to Jomini, "one of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war is to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the proceedings." Jomini, is specifically talking about the critical importance of analyzing your adversary's relative strengths and weaknesses in order to gain an advantage.

Sounds nice, but Marshal Suvorov didn't care about this and never lost a battle.

Besides, research has revealed that we humans are idiots. We stick to our first impression, and info that arrives later only reinforces said impression - even if it's factually in conflict. This kind of undermines whatever sense a huge analytical effort makes in theory.

[jmm99]

Sumida wrote his book, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to "On War" (2008); book review by Janeen Klinger, Professor of Political Science, US Army War College.

Sumida's 2002 (pre-book) syllabus for his Clausewitz course, requires besides "On War" (P & H version), these refs:

Guy Claxton, Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind: How Intelligence Increases When You Think Less (New York: Harper Collins, 1997). A biography of my brain written by Claxton with my full tortoise-like co-operation.

Jon Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997; paperback 1999).

Jon Sumida, “The Relationship between History and Theory in On War: the Clausewitzian Ideal and Its Implications,” Journal of Military History, 65 (April 2001): 333-54. Re this article, you might want to look at Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War," International Security, 17:3 (Winter, 1992), pp. 59-90.

For anyone who is interested enough to actually work through this syllabus, Strassler's redo in The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, will probably be useful for review of basic power concepts.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

Hare Clausewitz Answers Your Questions:



From The Children's Illustrated Clausewitz.

Regards

Mike