Pakistani Army commentary

[carl]

Originally Posted by Bob's World

Historically, taking one's eye off of external threats to deal with internal discontent is the trip before the fall...

Far better for the Pak government to address the concerns of the Pashtu and Baluch populace, and for the military to stay focused on the military matters of national defense.

Bob's World:

The paper was interesting. The primary thesis being that after a bad start the Pakistan Army has very quickly learned to be more effective in a small war conducted within its' national borders. It has mostly learned on the fly and is incorporating what is has learned into unit training and various schools. Kind of interesting too when you think of it as indicating the organizations ability to learn like Nagl covered in his book.

I got the sense from the paper this concern with small war is especially evident at the lower levels of the army because all the casualties they've suffered in the past few years have been suffered in FATA and Swat. Fear not though, the senior generals are keeping their steely gaze fixed on the Hindu hordes to the east.

Since we are on the subject of the Pak Army and in the correct thread, I wish to ask about your following comment.

Originally Posted by Bob's World

I believe that Pakistan's position is reasonable, as is their position in regards to the Durrand line. Most military professionals doing a basic assessment of the terrain and the threat would probably come to the same conclusion. If Pakistan is reduced down to just the Indus river valley a quick push by India could foreseeably take their entire country. They would cease to exist as a nation. A fearful, nuclear armed state with its back up against the Hindu Kush and a rival nuclear state to their front is NOT a healthy situation for anyone. I think there are workable solutions, but before the US can get to sitting down and discussing workable solutions we to first be willing to recognize their reasonable perspective in regards to what their national interests are and how highly they prioritize them.

Second, to rephrase your question a bit: Is sustaining a set of conditions that supported a workable situation of deterrence between India and Pakistan one that I think is more important than disrupting that balance to grant India a clear advantage? I have to go with sustaining the status quo. Like our own Cold War with the Soviets, it was sometimes a bit dicey, but it worked. I can't imagine if some external power would have come along and ceded Canada into the Warsaw Pact, allowing the Russians to positions military forces all along our northern border, that we would have said "oh, ok."

First off, you say above most military professionals would say that Pakistan needs territory east of the Indus valley to fall back on to preclude defeat by a quick Indian push, the implication being that territory includes Afghanistan. So my question is this, what is the defeated army going to fall back on? There is nothing much in those mountains and there is nothing much in Afghanistan. What are they going to use to resupply and build up troop strength? It seems to this forever civilian that even if they used this sovereign country as their fallback, it wouldn't do them any good. There is nothing there for them to use. If they got pushed to the west of the Indus valley, it would be over regardless. I may be reading this wrong and if I am, please tell me but it seems to me that unless you have some kind of resource base to fall back on, you may as well be falling back into the ocean.

As to your second paragraph quoted above, I think I prefer you answer my question as I originally stated it. Your rephrasing changes the sense of my original question. Or you maybe could answer your rephrased question if you swapped the words "India" for "Pakistan" and vice versa. But I would prefer you answer my original question as originally stated-is the Pak Army/ISI's desire to exert control over Afghanistan one we should honor any more than India's desire that they don't?

Also you state above you believe the Pak Army/ISIs position is reasonable, yet in the past you stated that you didn't believe they had a right (or something like that, I will get lost if I go retrieve the quote, but I can if you want) to exert control over Afghanistan. Those two statements seem contradictory.

[omarali50]

FYI: http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksd...ar-ali.html#tp

http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/mar20...2011/dia.htm#5

[davidbfpo]

Since a certain event there have been a number of threads and posts that have touched upon the role of the Pakistani Army.

There are now increasing signs that the army is having problems externally with civil society and this WSJ article covers it all:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...orld_LeadStory

Opens with:

Pakistan's army leadership, under mounting domestic pressure since a U.S. strike team infiltrated its soil to kill Osama bin Laden, issued a rare defensive response to domestic critics Thursday, offering to reduce its reliance on U.S. military aid and training and setting strict limits on American intelligence operations within the country....

The roughly 1,000-word statement—at various points apologetic, belligerent and strident—was the clearest indication to date that in striking a balance between the competing demands, Pakistan's military leaders are looking to first assuage their own people, even if that means scaling back ties to the U.S.

[Jedburgh]

Belfer Center, 27 July 2011: An Introduction to Pakistan's Military

The Pakistani military remains an opaque entity, both inside and outside of the country. Few publicly available reports exist for those seeking a basic understanding of its leaders, functions, or allegiances. An Introduction to Pakistan's Military is the first of two Belfer Center reports examining the Pakistani military. To assemble this report, the authors interviewed over two-dozen retired Pakistani military officers, principally in Islamabad and Karachi. The authors also conducted nearly forty additional interviews with Pakistani politicians, civil society actors, journalists, and military experts, as well as with US and European military, diplomatic, and intelligence officers and analysts.

The first report examines Pakistan’s:

• Overall strategic security and threat environment;

• Military history since 1947;

• Conventional military capabilities;

• Nuclear strategy and security posture;and

• Current counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts (briefly).

[omarali50]

This report looks rather lame. How does it provide any new insight into the "opaque" side of the army? All it tells you is boilerplate strategic theory and numbers of weapons and so on. Hamid Hussain's occasional articles are far superior if you really want to know something about the Pakistani army.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to FP Blog and an article by Christine Fair, which is sub-titled:

New data suggest it may be even more liberal than Pakistani society as a whole.

I find no systematic evidence that conservative areas are producing more officers than other areas as late as 2002....In the absence of ideal data on officers, I did the next best thing: provide insights into the kind of areas that produce officers.

(Ends with and my emphasis) Admittedly, these conclusions are tentative, and these measures of social liberalism are no doubt imperfect. This study, moreover, cannot be conclusive as it can only speak to the districts that produce officers, not the worldview of officers themselves. Given the high stakes involved, this subject requires more thorough data collection and analysis. Understanding these dynamics is vital for the United States, but it's perhaps even more important for Pakistan and Pakistanis who rely on their military to protect their country.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...think?page=0,0

[blueblood]

Originally Posted by davidbfpo

Hat tip to FP Blog and an article by Christine Fair, which is sub-titled:



Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...think?page=0,0

I guess so. Just like most non western countries (or not) , Pakistan Army recruits it's enlisted troops from the rural regions. Bar the officer corps, they are not exactly well versed in world affairs. Since the education system has long been Islamized, it hardly matters if you study in a madarassa or a private or government school, books are mostly same and they don't really provide a very good picture of non Muslim world. Officers may or not be radicalized but most of the troops are very much influenced by the hardliners.

A Pakistani I know, mentioned that Musharraf tried to reverse the Zia effect but as soon as soldiers reached their villages or towns and attended a sermon by the local Mullah they get back to square one.

[omarali50]

The focus on "madressas" and "conservative areas" is useful as an academic exercise but should not "reassure" or "scare" anyone either way. Christine Fair is much more sensible than the previous retarded attempt at connecting lifestyle with political views (he drinks whisky and soda so he must be pro-western), that has a long history in US-Pakistan affairs by now...but this is still misleading.
The problem with GHQ is its tunnel-vision version of "paknationalism"..everything else proceeds from that. Reliance on Islamists is a result of that obsession, not a cause of it. Afghan policy is derived from that obsession, not from Islamic solidarity. And so on...
But, at this point, I think the best thing for NATO would be to throw up its hands and give up. They clearly dont understand what is going on and will continue to throw good money after bad. Let the Indians and the Chinese sort it out, or not sort it out.

The officer corps has become more formally Islamic with time (as have other sections of the middle class) and this newfound "Islam" is not without its problems, but there is a very long journey from being a more orthodox Muslim to supporting the Haqqani network..and many generals can make that journey without passing through Islam on the way.

[omarali50]

I was unhappy with the first attempt at a reply this morning and edited it again and am still unhappy. The point may be moot anyway. Events may be moving in a direction where liberal and "conservative" Pakistani officers will all look equally problematic to American analysts because the pendulum is now swinging from "our army in South Asia" to "our enemy in South Asia", with God knows what results to follow.
And we have an election year coming up.
If I was an academic specializing in research papers about the recruitment patterns of the Pakistani army and the school networks in Chakwal, I would start thinking of grant ideas in a different direction. When the money spigot is finally turned off, it wont be done very rationally. Nobody wants to study a disaster until at least 20 years have passed.

[davidbfpo]

This is a review of Carey Schofield's new book:http://www.spectator.co.uk/books/720...y-within.thtml

Like other writers who know the country well, she regards it as the only institution which is able to transcend the religious and tribal divisions that rend the country apart. ‘A Christian or a Parsi or a Sikh can serve in the Pakistan army,’ writes Schofield. ‘Atheists do. But all are bound together by a willing submission to discipline and a battle for self-improvement that is in itself doctrinal in character.’

This is the reason Schofield is optimistic that the army has not been heavily infiltrated by the Taleban...

She paints a convincing picture of the army as an honorable, indeed moral institution, dedicated to the security of the Pakistan nation. But what is this nation to which the army is loyal?

A slim bio:http://ccw.modhist.ox.ac.uk/people/bios/schofield.asp

[omarali50]

I see that the army is still the great white hope in Pakistan. There is an Urdu verse that fits here:
Meer kya saada hain, beemar huey jin key sabab
Ussi attar key londey sey dawa letey hain..

How naive is Mir, going to get his medication,
from the same physician who made him sick in the first place..

Who knows. Next time around, it may work.

[omarali50]

Good review, of all places, in huffpo: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aparna..._b_995933.html

[davidbfpo]

Omarali50,

We must have read a different review! As you said:

Good review..

The reviewer was blunt, for example:

Here again, Ms. Schofield unquestioningly accepts the Pakistan army narrative on Afghanistan, on the Afghan war, and on U.S. policy towards Pakistan. Like the Pakistan army, she repeatedly states that the Pakistan army does not lack intentions, only capabilities, in fighting the militants. There is no attempt to address U.S. concerns about Pakistan's links with the Taliban and the Haqqani network, or Pakistani Jihadi groups. The prescription is simple: Americans need to help build Pakistan's capabilities and resources if they want Pakistan to do more.

Finally:

Otherwise you end up with simply portraying what the propaganda machine asks you to do, taking away any shred of credibility. ... Her latest book is not an academic work on the Pakistani army, but a long press release written by a foreigner.

[omarali50]

If its blunt, it cannot be good?

I will be the first to admit it, I think the Pakistani army high command (for all sorts of reasons) has adopted a strategic worldview that is fundamentally flawed and leads to repeated disasters and missed opportunities. And I also think that a lot of Western commentators take it for granted that all modern looking armies must have the same fashionable modern notions of strategic necessities and problems, so they tend to take the Pak army view as a reasonable starting point and take it from there. I think that is a mistake.
I also think the Pakistani army is not impossible to reform. They are pragmatic at heart and if more of their "allies"and advisers had told them so and been a bit more upfront, they might have been induced to rethink...."enabling" their pathologies is not helping them.
having said that, I also suspect it may be too late now. Mistrust and accumulated mistakes make it hard to imagine the US or NATO playing too constructive a role any more. Maybe Uncle Chin will have to do what Uncle Sam could not..

[omarali50]

for a look at how the strategic geniuses are thinking, go to http://rupeenews.com/

[omarali50]

we have a bit of a discussion going about the 1971 war and I wondered if anyone here (especially Ray) can shed some light on Indian operations in East Pakistan. The discussion is at: http://www.brownpundits.com/2011/12/...west-1971-war/

btw, I have seen that military men can be rather suspicious of people who seem disloyal to their own military...but I hope you dont judge too harshly
we mean well.

[davidbfpo]

We have had at least two reviews of Carey Schofield's book 'Inside the Pakistan Army: A Woman’s Experience on the Frontline of the War on Terror', pub.London: Biteback Publishing, 2011; 232 pages.

Here is one by a contributor to SWC, Hamid Hussain, who is a USA-based analyst and this is a slightly edited summary

The most valuable part of the book is summary of some of the military operations in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)....This book gives an impression of a favorable narrative about Pakistan army and it is not surprising. Pakistan army was author’s host and it is very difficult to criticize one’s host...Despite its shortcomings, book still has its value for those interested in Pakistan army.

At length

Carey Schofield’s book on Pakistan army is another addition to the work done on Pakistan army. Carey was given unprecedented access by then Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and President General Pervez Mussharraf. She made several trips to Pakistan over five years time period and was given access to several senior generals and visited many formations; a privilege not granted to any Pakistani or foreign writer.

Carey has tried to put a complex story of Pakistan and Pakistan army in two hundred and thirty two pages which is a very difficult task. In chapter three, she starts the story from the time of Prophet Muhammad in seventh century going through various dynasties of the subcontinent, linking it with British Empire and then via Afghanistan all the way down to Baitullah Mahsud of the tribal badlands fame. These events spread over centuries and wide geographic areas are not related to the story of Pakistan army.

Carey is intelligent enough to pick up some of the nuances of inner dynamics of senior officer corps as well as civilian elite. However, her sweeping comments about criticism of army as pastime of ‘chattering classes’ is not correct. In general, army still retains respect and even admiration from general public; however a wide spectrum of the society wants army to stay in its own lane. Large segments of Pakistani society as well as many non-Pakistani well wishers of Pakistan are fully cognizant of the enormous sacrifices made by the soldiers and officers of Pakistan army. Fresh graves continually added to the army graveyard in Rawalpindi are a constant reminder of the sacrifices of Pakistan army. The casualties suffered by senior brass of Pakistan army are unprecedented for any army in recent times. During my recent visit to army graveyard, it was sad to see four graves of senior officer’s right next to each other. Major General Amir Faisal Alvi and Brigadier Moinuddin Ahmad; both assassinated in Islamabad are buried next to each other and immediately below them are buried Lieutenant General Mushtaq Ahmad (assassinated by a suicide bomber in Rawalpindi) and Brigadier Anwarl ul Haq Ramday (killed during attack on army General Head Quarters). In addition to death, countless soldiers have been disabled by the current conflict. Criticism of senior brass is in the context of some seriously flawed decisions regarding national security policy as well as encroachment on areas not related to military affairs.

Carey links some of the preparations made by senior officers in 1999 prior to the coup with potential threat of breakdown of law and order. Evidence does not support this assertion and it is quite clear now that these preparations were made to counter any move by then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during his confrontation with General Mussharraf. The cast in the play, their relationship with Mussharraf and subsequent meteoric rise of almost all of these officers makes it quite clear that by the middle of 1999, army was securing all its bases against Sharif. Then Chief of General Staff (CGS) Lieutenant General Muhammad Aziz Khan summoned a meeting with presumed threat of possibility of attempt of overrunning Prime Minister and President House. Those in attendance included Director General Military Operations (DGMO) Major General Shahid Aziz, Director Military Operations Brigadier Haroon Aslam, Special Services Group (SSG) Commander Brigadier Amir Faisal Alvi, 111 Brigade commander Brigadier Salahuddin Satti, SSG Zarrar Company commander Major Haroon ul Islam and Commanding Officer (CO) of the battalion guarding Prime Minister House Lieutenant Colonel Shahid Ali. It turned out later that the group actually overran the Prime Minister and President House although they were pretending to prevent such an outcome by someone else.

Muhammad Aziz was later given the fourth star and served as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), Shahid Aziz and Satti were promoted to Lieutenant General rank and both served as CGS and Corps Commanders, Haroon Aslam was promoted Major General and appointed General Officer Commanding (GOC) SSG (he is now Lieutenant General and Corps Commander), Faisal promoted to Major General rank (although he later fell out with Mussharraf and unceremoniously removed) and Haroon ul Islam became Lieutenant Colonel and died during Lal Masjid operation. Lieutenant Colonel Shahid did not go further in the army but for different reasons. On the day of the coup, Shahid had restrained newly appointed COAS Lieutenant General Khwaja Ziauddin and his guard and Ziauddin’s escort had pulled guns at each other coming close to a shootout. He also later confronted Lieutenant General Salim Haider and prevented him from entering the Prime Minister House. Shahid followed the orders of his superiors but no army Chief can be comfortable promoting an officer after such encounters. In contrast, Shahid’s counterpart commanding the battalion at President House Lieutenant Colonel Javed Sultan was given choice postings and promoted to Major General rank (he died in a helicopter crash in 2008).

Carey has highlighted some of the differences among senior brass regarding ongoing operations. No army is monolithic and Pakistan army is no exception. In war, there are differences between various branches of the armed forces as well as senior officers. There was and probably still a clear divide between intelligence agencies and fighting formations as far as conduct of operations is concerned. It is also very difficult for an outsider to navigate the minefield of personal and professional rivalries and jealousies among the senior officers.

Carey has given a detailed account of the controversy surrounding the unceremonious removal and death of the former GOC of SSG Major General Amir Faisal Alvi. Carey knew him well and he shared many details with her therefore the account is quite credible. Carey was criticized by many army officers when she published Alvi’s letter after his death. Many charged that the letter was fabrication to discredit Pakistan army. However, there is no reason to believe that the letter was a fabrication. It was Alvi’s own view in the context of his deep anger towards some senior officers. Carey provides her take on the issue and gives the readers all sides of the story and they can reach their own conclusions.

Alvi was forcibly retired and he suspected that then Director General Military Intelligence (DGMI) Major General Mian Nadeem Ijaz and then CGS Lieutenant General Tariq Majeed conspired to remove him. It is quite clear now that Alvi was removed for passing some remarks against General Mussharraf that were recorded by MI and played to Mussharraf. Alvi’s affair with a woman got entangled with his removal as remarks were passed during telephone conversation with this lady. Alvi was furious as many other officers also had affairs and he didn’t hesitate to announce this to many. However, later Alvi tried to put disagreement regarding policy matters (peace deals with militants) as cause of his dismissal and accused some officers including Tariq Majeed in this regard. This gives the impression that somehow these officers were not committed to the fight against militants or worse they were running their own show; both assumptions not correct. Negotiations and payouts to militants were part of the general policy that proved to be disastrous as later events showed. However, officers (formation commanders and intelligence operatives) involved in these efforts were following a policy decision and not acting independently. Tariq’s own son-in-law has been abducted by the militants and in their custody for the last eighteen months. They have demanded release of some high value detainees and huge ransom and it is to Tariq’s credit that he has held his ground.

The most valuable part of the book is summary of some of the military operations in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) although author could have provided more details in view of her access to several senior officers involved in the operations. There are few minor typo errors in the book. On page 100, Hizb-ul-Tahrir; a London based Islamist group championing Caliphate is named incorrectly Hezb-e-Islaam and on page 137, tribal police khassadars is written Hasildars.

This book gives impression of a favorable narrative about Pakistan army and it is not surprising. Pakistan army was author’s host and it is very difficult to criticize one’s host. Such relationship invariably affects the perspectives and if one is using titles such as ‘unimpeachable’, ‘glamorous’, ‘outgoing’, ‘scrupulous’, ‘clever and kind’, ‘darkly brilliant’, ‘neat’, ‘honorable’, ‘guileless’, ‘principled’, ‘gutsy’and ‘gentle and thoughtful’ for senior officers, it is very hard to criticize the same individuals. Despite its shortcomings, book still has its value for those interested in Pakistan army.

The review has appeared in a regional defence journal, but no link could be found without warnings by my IT defences.

[omarali50]

we, in the chattering classes, have a name for this condition. Its called Lieven Syndrome, in honor of respected author Anatol Lieven. Extreme cases may also be labelled "Cloughley syndrome", for obvious reasons.

[davidbfpo]

The occasional SWC contributor, Hamid Hussain, a USA-based analyst has written an article for a regional defence journal and provided a copy (slightly edited by me).

This coup brought General Musharraf to power and the paper details what happened. What I found interesting was the inter-action within the army leadership and the future careers of those involved - with several suicides.

[Ray]

Omar,

I am responding since you asked me to.

On the contrary Pakistan army’s war plan centered on launching a counter-offensive with one armored and two infantry divisions on the Western front in case of Indian attack on East Pakistan. At what point in time would the attack be launched, however, remained undecided. On December 3, 1971 Pakistan’s 12 Div attacked Poonch but lack of surprise, poor quality of generalship by GOC Akbar Khan (a candidate for COAS in 1976), insufficient logistics and a determined Indian resistance led to the failure of the offensive and Pakistani troops had to withdraw.

Usual reasons given for not succeeding.

In his piece Defeat in the West, Waseem Altaf appears to indicate that practically all the Pakistani military were staffed by incompetent brass and that is why Pakistan made no headway.

If that is true, which I am sure it is not, then there is some real systemic problem in the Pakistani military.

I am sure this article denuded the Arabian Sea of sea salt since much of it was consumed while reading this piece.