BAE GCV Photos

[gute]

Here is a link to the BAE GCV entry - the vehicle looks like a M2 and M113 made a baby. What imagination they have at BAE This is enough to make a guy cynical.

http://defensetech.org/2012/03/02/fr...id/#more-16487

[gute]

I mean really, is this a f***ing joke!

[gute]

Well I guess I'm the only responding to this so I will continue to have this conversation with myself

Now that I took a big boy pill I get the size of GCV - I believe both Ken White and Wilf (as well as others) have posted that vehicles that are designed to operate/complement the MBT needs to be built like a tank and the GCV design by BAE seems to meet that requirement at 140,000 pounds. I do wonder about the gun size, but I have a feeling that the future Armored Brigade Combat Team (formally the HBCT) will be designed like the current SBCTs with three battalions of GVCs with a platoon of M1 tanks attached to each GCV company.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by gute

I mean really, is this a f***ing joke!

It's NOT built like a tank; as you first noted, it's a cross between a 113 and an M2 / 3. -- which probably means it'll have the worst attributes of all. It's problem is that it'l get used like a tank as were the Bradleys. Bad vehicles all. We ought to buy Namers but won't, not invented here.

Hopefully we'll drop the 'team' bit and just call it an Armored Brigade.

I have a feeling that the future Armored Brigade Combat Team (formally the HBCT) will be designed like the current SBCTs with three battalions of GVCs with a platoon of M1 tanks attached to each GCV company.

Too infantry heavy IMO. Two Tank and two Mech Cos are far more flexible.

That GCV is a bad idea, sounds simplistic but I learned one thing over a lot of years -- if it looks right, it'll work right. If it doesn't, it won't. That thing doesn't even look right, way too much overhang in all directions for one thing. Way too tall for another. It'll be a bear to drive due to all that and that means lengthy and difficult driver training. Overarmed, too. I really doubt it'll keep up with an M1 in tight quarters or cross country...

[carl]

I don't know much about the subject but those overhangs made it look funny. Then when Ken mentioned them it hit me why. It looks like the WWI French St. Chamond tank with a big beanie on top.

140,000# seems very heavy. Do the Army and USMC have the engineering and bridging capacity to handle so many heavy vehicles? I don't know which is why I ask.

"a M-2 and M-113 made a baby"- I laughed like hell at that line.

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by Ken White

Hopefully we'll drop the 'team' bit and just call it an Armored Brigade.Too infantry heavy IMO. Two Tank and two Mech Cos are far more flexible.

Designations are supposed to mean something. A 2-2 ratio is typically understood to be a mechanised (infantry) brigade; infantry in protected tracked vehicles and main battle tanks, suitable for a wide variety of terrain.

An Armored Brigade would receive a different NATO icon on maps and lead coalition staffs to inadvertently think that the formation is rather meant for terrain that's not so nice to infantry AND to think that the entire formation is suitable for demands of fast operational advances.


Besides; I'm a bit flabbergasted why one of the bigger active armies in NATO would turn away from formation specialization and embrace a standard format. Small forces need to standardise, bigger ones can enjoy the benefits of specialisation.
There should be formations with a focus on mounted combat (with infantry strength for the exception from this rule) and mechanised formations with a focus on slower, yet more thorough dismounted combat (where tanks become assault guns and security vehicles, with infantry being the main hand). I suppose the airborne and 'mountain' forces do not satisfy the need for the latter.


(West) Germany had a 1950's discussion about optimal brigades (divisions were ruled out as too cumbersome and only raised because politicians had promised 12 of them to the West). A universal balanced brigade was favoured, but geographic realities forced us to specialise (South and North Germany are very dissimilar).
In the end, we developed an entirely different culture and tactics between armour and mech inf brigades. The armour brigades turned towards a much, much faster and more daring movement style while the armoured mech thought more infantry-like and emphasised security more. I suspect a balanced standard brigade would not develop such a rich repertoire for an army.

[J Wolfsberger]

Originally Posted by gute

Here is a link to the BAE GCV entry - the vehicle looks like a M2 and M113 made a baby.

And from the look of this beast, they weren't married at the time.

Originally Posted by gute

What imagination they have at BAE This is enough to make a guy cynical.

I see a lot of FCS in it. On the other hand, I'm sure it satisfies every single spec in the RFP/contract and provides every feature the Army asked for.

If you ask companies to design to a large set of specifications instead of asking them to develop a design that provides capabilities, this is what you get.

(Of course, getting people to understand the difference between a capability and a design solution that provides it is a whole different challenge.)

[gute]

Originally Posted by Ken White

It's NOT built like a tank; as you first noted, it's a cross between a 113 and an M2 / 3. -- which probably means it'll have the worst attributes of all. It's problem is that it'l get used like a tank as were the Bradleys. Bad vehicles all. We ought to buy Namers but won't, not invented here.

If you look at the ass end it has a little Namer in it. Must have been a 3-way.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Designations are supposed to mean something. A 2-2 ratio is typically understood to be a mechanised (infantry) brigade; infantry in protected tracked vehicles and main battle tanks, suitable for a wide variety of terrain.

The US norm was, for years, two Inf, one Tank = Mech Bde; two Tank, one Inf = Armored Bde. The hybrid 2 and 2 is my idea of a better approach. Not telling yet how the Armored Bde will actually be structured.

Besides; I'm a bit flabbergasted why one of the bigger active armies in NATO would turn away from formation specialization and embrace a standard format. Small forces need to standardise, bigger ones can enjoy the benefits of specialisation.

True but that's what happens when one lets the Accountants have too much sway...

...The armour brigades turned towards a much, much faster and more daring movement style while the armoured mech thought more infantry-like and emphasised security more. I suspect a balanced standard brigade would not develop such a rich repertoire for an army.

Same here and I believe your assessment's correct.

[Tukhachevskii]

... Crusader (maybe BAe should look into it. Seems like "outlandish" is their motto)

[J Wolfsberger]

From the Lexington Institute: Is The Army About To Make Another FCS-Size Mistake?

[gute]

Interesting article by Ralph Peters from 1997. If you noticed from the photos and descriptions of the GCV is the sensors or similar capabilities. Anyways, take a look at his article on the future of armored warfare:

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/p...umn/peters.htm

[Fuchs]

Whenever there's talk about 'future tanks' keep in mind that it's likely only about Western future tank projects or even only about requirements.

Meanwhile East and South Asia is mass-producing the classic MBT and (thinly armoured) IFV categories and judging by the numbers they define the future of tanks.

[gute]

I really wondered how long it would take GM to put tracks on the Stryker and try to market it as a viable option for the GCV. I don't know this for a fact - total speculation.

http://snafu-solomon.blogspot.com/

[gute]

yep, it's true. Here is a short news article on it.

http://blog.thenewstribune.com/milit...-seen-at-jblm/

[Firn]

So it is now very roughly about 42 tons similar to the heavierst German Puma variant which of course has a "turret".

At least the US has some scale to work with, which can't be said of the Italian efforts in this direction.

[Fuchs]

I wrote a comment here yesterday (deleted prior to submission).

The short version is that I think BAe and the U.S.Army should be kept away from AFV development in general for the next decade. Give other institutions a chance.


Oh, and I'd like to express my great relief that EADS does not merge with BAe.

[gute]

I'm with Ken and many others here that the IFV or whatever you want to call it should be armored like a tank if it's fighting with tanks. keep the remote weapon station of at least a 50 caliber and and a useful troop load of 9+ and we just might have "weiner" here gents. I don't know if the entire vehicle was up armored or the added weight comes from the double-V hull and tracks. The other thing I like about this as a possible replacement for the M2 - cost (if it keeps our guys safe that is). The cost of the GCV pictured on this thread, but earlier posts was going to be between 9-11 million each - WTF! I would imagine this baby is gonna run 5-6 million. The more knowledeable here will know and can set me straight about its viability as a replacement for the M2.

[Firn]

A question for the more knowledgeable guys out there.

It seems that quite a few here think that infantry organized to fight alongside MBTs need a carrier with MBT-like qualities, especially armor and mobility, minus the firepower. The Merkava - Namer combination has been named as a good example. Considering the low numbers of vehicles purchased, especially in Europe, and the advantages of a mostly shared vehicle does it make sense to go with a standard front engine configuration for new MBT projects?

Thanks.

[Compost]

Originally Posted by Firn

It seems that quite a few here think that infantry organized to fight alongside MBTs need a carrier with MBT-like qualities, especially armor and mobility, minus the firepower. The Merkava - Namer combination has been named as a good example. Considering the low numbers of vehicles purchased, especially in Europe, and the advantages of a mostly shared vehicle does it make sense to go with a standard front engine configuration for new MBT projects?

A major factor in favour of a front-engine and transmission is use of their mass and bulk to increase forward protection up to the top of the glacis. That location and use can be considered as likely to increase the probability of a mobility kill. However, a penetration of the forward hull that causes such damage is anyway likely to injure crew members and otherwise disable the vehicle, or similarly an equivalent rear-engine vehicle. The other major gain with a front-engine is that the rear hull can then include a door and ramp that enables ready and better protected entry and egress for the crew and any passengers, possibly including one or more litter-borne casualties.

Conversely a major factor in favour of a rear-engine and transmission is that they act as a counterweight to armour concentrated at the front end which a crew typically aims at what they perceive to be their main threat. Another factor is that pulling track to a rear sprocket is more efficient in terms of energy lost to friction than pulling to a front sprocket, or to an elevated sprocket on a mid-engined tracked vehicle as used mainly by industry.

Each of those factors is obvious but assessment of their importance has been affected by considerations that are specific to and supposedly mandatory for a well-configured MBT with an enclosed main armament. One is that its gun should be mounted as low as practicable on the vehicle in order to minimise overall height and particularly the weight of armour on the turret front and to some extent its sides. Nothwithstanding that the turret roof must be high enough so the gun can depress below the horizontal for utility and hull-down fire over a berm or other form of cover. Somewhat similarly elevation is restricted to avoid recoil into the turret floor.

However, the Israeli Merkava Mark 1 through Mark 4 tanks each have the engine and transmission below a mildly sloped glacis and have a turret which provides depression and elevation of -8.5 and +20 within a turret roof height of 2.8 m. Corresponding figures for other western MBTS are: Abrams: -9, +20, 2.9m; Challenger: -10, +20, 2.5m; Le Clerc: -8, +15, 2.9m; Leopard-2: -9, +20, 3m. So relative to western rear-engined MBTs, Merkava has a small reduction in its main armament depression.

In regard to elevation the modern MBT can be required to employ its main and especially its co-axial armament in close-range fire against built-up and high-rise targets. To enable that its armament must be mounted higher above the hull floor in either a flat-roofed or contour-roofed turret which encloses the armament, or above the hull in a remotely operated super-elevated and armoured gun mount. That last type of mount brings its own set of problems. For example in order to be fired broadside on it may - to reduce the overturning moment - demand the complication of variable recoil length. The practicable increase in elevation and in depression will be large for an externally mounted main armament, with lesser increases gained for an armament enclosed in a flat-roofed or contoured turret. Notwithstanding such applied considerations, the vital aspect is that a front-engine chassis does not intrinsicly compromise the functioning or use of mounts or turrets.

Back in the late-1960s the Israeli’s decided it made sense to adopt a front-engine configuration for the Merkava MBT. Their rationale was clearcut then and is even more applicable today. For generally similar reasons a front-engine is also preferable for the heavy ARV/recovery and AEV/combat engineer vehicles and also the HAG/assault gun. To assist forward and backward towing and pushing, dozing, excavating, lifting and ripping the ARV (which functions also as an auxiliary AEV) and AEV (which functions as an auxiliary ARV) are often ballasted down. Adopting a front-engine configuration would require different arrangements for ballast. However that might be fully offset against the utility of a rear doorway/ramp for their mechanics and engineers.

The one exception is the heavy AVLB/assault bridge which needs a counterweight to support the launch of a scissor or cantilever bridge. An alternative front-engine configuration would require a reversing manoeuvre toward the gap followed by ‘rearward’ launch of a bridge. For that the crew’s vision could be augmented - as is already common - by means of closed-circuit cameras, and the stern of the vehicle could carry ‘additional’ armour transferred from the bow. Alternate crew positions might even be provided at each end. With bridge(s) offloaded an AVLB is commonly expected to function as an auxiliary ARV or AEV. Providing a dozer blade/stabilizer at each end could result in a double-ended auxiliary ARV/AEV, always provided that a door/ramp was still readily accessible at one or other end.

Enough theorising. The short answer to the question is an unqualified yes it makes sense to go with a front-engine configuration for new MBT projects.

If - however unlikely it seems - more than two new MBT projects are commenced in the future then one of those three or more could be rear-engined or mid-engined.