Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[davidbfpo]

From JMM's post in part:

Consider the other entities from John W's list where intervention did not occur: Darfur, Rwanda, CAR. How many Westerners with extensive/powerful kith and kin back home have chosen to live/stay there over the last century? And how powerful have those who have emigrated from those countries become, wherever they may now live?

Darfur before the internal conflict began, amongst 100% Muslim population, had very few Westerners visiting, let alone resident; nor was there a Darfur diaspora, unlike other parts of the Sudan. (I may get some insight from someone who was there before the conflict began).

Rwanda had a very small Western presence, before the conflict began; a mix of French nationals, maybe a few UN types and a scattering of mainly European missionaries (some from Italy & Spain, each sent SOF teams to ask them to get out). There was a diaspora, nearly all in Belgium - which IIRC was a factor in the Belgian military contribution to the UN contingent (which was withdrawn before the genocide began).

CAR (Central African Republic) I know little about. Wiki has two rather general comments:

The Central African Republic is heavily dependent upon multilateral foreign aid and the presence of numerous NGOs which provide services which the government fails to provide....The very presence of numerous foreign personnel and organizations in the country, including peacekeepers and even refugee camps, provides an important source of revenue for many Central Africans.

(Other ethnic groups)...4%, including Europeans of mostly French descent....There are many missionary groups operating in the country, including Lutherans, Baptists, Catholics, Grace Brethren, and Jehovah's Witnesses. While these missionaries are predominantly from the United States, France, Italy, and Spain, many are also from Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and other African countries. Many missionaries left the country due to fighting between rebel and government forces in 2002 and 2003. Many have now returned to the country.

Link:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_African_Republic

My question to American members is whether the policies of the USA, are affected by its changing population mix: more Asiatics (Korea & Phillipines come to mind), the large Hispanic minority; can we leave alone the Jewish community.

[TheCurmudgeon]

My question to American members is whether the policies of the USA, are affected by its changing population mix: more Asiatics (Korea & Phillipines come to mind), the large Hispanic minority; can we leave alone the Jewish community.

Sadly, I would say no, or at least not in the way one might think. American's don't really think about others unless it somehow ingratiates us. We have our private international relations which seem to be largely economically driven. Since the end of the Cold War we don't care unless there is a business interest. Then we have our public international humanitarian concerns which can be interest group based, but for the life of me I can't think of one national ethnic/diaspora based group (except for the pro-Israeli lobby).

Our humanitarian foreign policy concerns are all celebrity driven. I don't think many American's would know where Darfur was if it were not for George Clooney and Angelina Jolie.

There may have been a greater interest in Nicaragua and Honduras because of the refugees that came here during the war, and I think at least some of our concern for Haiti is based on the number of diaspora here (or because when things get bad there they try to float over here), but I have not noticed a large shift that can be clearly associated with the population change. Hispanics are probably the largest single group that have gained ground both in share of population and in political impact, but I have not noticed an increased interest in foreign policy south of our border. The people who come here are trying to escape whatever they were leaving. This is the home of the self-absorbed. We like those who want to be like us - who want to stay here (hence, an interest in immigration policy). When people do come here to better themselves and then go back to where they came we don't like them and so they don't garner much interest or support. We can't understand why anyone would wan to leave.

I am sure others will have a different take, but sadly that is the way I see it.

The only place I can think of where the diaspora population still influences foreign policy is Cuba. But I am not sure how much of that is the expats and how much is the fact that everyone associates Cuba with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Once more people think of Cuba in terms of cigars then do in terms of the Cold War, I am sure our position will soften.

[davidbfpo]

An interesting Australian comment by the Lowy Institute:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...-(part-2).aspx

The Syrian Army's performance also shows the folly of structuring for the war you think you're going to fight. The Syrian military saw itself fighting a land battle a la Golan Heights 1967, and spent decades lolling around in Lebanon while its senior officers enjoyed the financial benefits of such duties.

Sedentary occupation duties do little for initiative, while a heavy reliance on mechanised forces with an equally heavy reliance on firepower to neutralise concentrations of enemy forces leads one to lean towards using a hammer to swat a fly.

I would differ from this. The Syrian Army in Lebanon (1976-2005) was not entirely on 'sedentary occupation duties', fighting a number of factions and I can recall some comments on how they adapted to street / urban fighting - with snipers, the use of artillery and 'political agents' aka intelligence officers talking to everyone. Some information is on:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_...ion_of_Lebanon

Quite plausible is that the Syrian Army has forgotten this, a not un-common phenomena in all armies. We also know that prior to the First Chechen War ( December 1994 to August 1996) the Russian Army had largely forgotten how to conduct urban operations and would have been an unlikely source of advice then. Having spoken recently to a SME on Chechnya the Russians have been harshly suppressing the insurgency for a long time - so the Syrians clearly may have absorbed the lessons learnt.

The rebels appear to have achieved some degree of coordination, as demonstrated by their focus on attacking Syrian air bases (in recognition of the threat these bases pose).

[Bill Moore]

I have been reading and hearing the so called experts saying Bashar Assad is going to fall in a matter of weeks for well over a year now. Now this article claims the Syrian Army isn't capable of fighting the rebels because it was training for the wrong war (terribly flawed observation on a number of levels), yet the Syrian military has been holding the line for two years now (more if you consider previous insurgencies in Syria) despite the expert claims they should have failed months ago. Do global liberals who embrace our COIN doctrine and the U.S. view on "The End of History" confuse wishful thinking with reality?

I suspect Assad will eventually fall, but has long has he has control of his military there is little risk that happening in the near term unless there is more foreign intervention. Armies composed of conscripts have been winning conflicts for years despite not being as well trained as professional forces. Put all the political theories aside to include legitimacy and look at the effective application of force and I don't see any side achieving a decisive advantage, and doubt the rebels can gain much more ground without more support, and/or Assad is effectively isolated from external support (Russia, Iran, others). That all changes is Assad loses control of his military much like Mubarak did.

Syria's military has suffered since the collapse the USSR, but it is still a relatively powerful military. The link below compares Syria to Iraq, but the date of the data is questionable.

http://www.globalfirepower.com/count...pare+Countries

Not a insignificant Army relative to the region or the threat.

http://www.voanews.com/content/syria...s/1212985.html

Experts said President Bashar al-Assad’s army - estimated at between 200,000 and 250,000 troops - is by regional standards a highly-capable military force.

"When you compare it to neighboring states such as Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt, it is one of the largest forces," said Aram Nerguizian, a Syria expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "It does have pockets of excellence."

then back in Sep 2011

http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn....er-than-libya/

Warning: Syria is much stronger than Libya

But Syria is an altogether different target in military terms, too.

First, it’s simply more powerful. Syria’s armed forces are four times the size of Libya’s, and its personnel per capita and total military spending are both one-third higher. President Assad can draw on thousands more tanks than could Colonel Gaddafi (including twice as many advanced T-72s) and a thousand more artillery pieces.

Libyan rebels were divided by tribe, region, ideology and ethnicity. But Syria’s rebels are even more fractured. Lebanon’s prolonged civil war – in which the US, Syria and Israel all intervened – is a cautionary tale: backing one party to a multifaceted conflict is more complex, and possibly counterproductive, than working with a rebel alliance like Libya’s which is at least loosely held together by a political structure and lacking sectarian divisions.

Finally, it is worth thinking through the implications of a loyal army. Syria’s elite units and officer corps are dominated by the Alawi sect, to which the Assad dynasty belongs. They have neither disintegrated nor turned on Assad. In Libya, a very large portion of the army, particularly in the east, melted away at the beginning of the conflict.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I have been reading and hearing the so called experts saying Bashar Assad is going to fall in a matter of weeks for well over a year now. Now this article claims the Syrian Army isn't capable of fighting the rebels because it was training for the wrong war (terribly flawed observation on a number of levels), yet the Syrian military has been holding the line for two years now (more if you consider previous insurgencies in Syria) despite the expert claims they should have failed months ago. Do global liberals who embrace our COIN doctrine and the U.S. view on "The End of History" confuse wishful thinking with reality?

I suspect Assad will eventually fall, but has long has he has control of his military there is little risk that happening in the near term unless there is more foreign intervention. Armies composed of conscripts have been winning conflicts for years despite not being as well trained as professional forces. Put all the political theories aside to include legitimacy and look at the effective application of force and I don't see any side achieving a decisive advantage, and doubt the rebels can gain much more ground without more support, and/or Assad is effectively isolated from external support (Russia, Iran, others). That all changes is Assad loses control of his military much like Mubarak did.

Syria's military has suffered since the collapse the USSR, but it is still a relatively powerful military. The link below compares Syria to Iraq, but the date of the data is questionable.

I have to agree that Assad is not going anywhere unless things outside his domain change (i.e. loss of support from Russia and Iran). Our interests here are containment, not intervention.

I will only disagree that legitimacy does not matter. I would argue that there is more than one type of legitimacy and Assad had done a very good job of cultivating a traditional ethnic Patron/Client system. He, is, for all intents and purposes, the King of Syria. This is a different tact then take by some self-styled leftist leaders who try to portray themselves as populists leaders in societies are still based on tribal/ethnic/religious ideas.

[Bill Moore]

I have to agree that Assad is not going anywhere unless things outside his domain change (i.e. loss of support from Russia and Iran). Our interests here are containment, not intervention.

I will only disagree that legitimacy does not matter. I would argue that there is more than one type of legitimacy and Assad had done a very good job of cultivating a traditional ethnic Patron/Client system. He, is, for all intents and purposes, the King of Syria. This is a different tact then take by some self-styled leftist leaders who try to portray themselves as populists leaders in societies are still based on tribal/ethnic/religious ideas.

Exactly, there are different types of legitimacy and one size doesn't fit all, especially in countries composed of competing tribes, ethnic groups, and religious ideas (we can add economic philosophies also). Mike from Hilo pointed this out on a recent post in the SWJ Blog where he corrected some folks who implied Ho was legitimate and the Gov of S. Vietnam wasn't. S. Vietnamese forces actually fought hard after we left because they didn't want to fall under the "legitimate" rule of Uncle Ho. My point is the ability to apply force matters, and if the government retains control of their military and police then the vague concept of legitimacy (legitimacy for who?) often takes a back seat. On the rebel side which group is legitimate? Those who are affilated with AQ? The fundamentalists who want to suppress the Shia? There is a reason the military isn't deserting in droves, they're scared to death of what will happen if these extremists take over.

[Dayuhan]

Mike from Hilo pointed this out on a recent post in the SWJ Blog where he corrected some folks who implied Ho was legitimate and the Gov of S. Vietnam wasn't. S. Vietnamese forces actually fought hard after we left because they didn't want to fall under the "legitimate" rule of Uncle Ho. My point is the ability to apply force matters, and if the government retains control of their military and police then the vague concept of legitimacy (legitimacy for who?)

Legitimacy is not an all-or-nothing construct; a Government is not 100% "legitimate" or "illegitimate". There's little doubt that Ho's successful expulsion of the French endowed him and his movement with a substantial perception of legitimacy. That perception was not universal, especially among those who had a personal vested interest in maintaining the dwindling perception of their own legitimacy, but it was sufficient to attract support and sustain his movement until those who opposed him saw their own perceived legitimacy dwindle (largely through their own actions) to an unsustainable level.

Certainly the capacity to apply force matters, but that capacity, as well as the ability to sustain that capacity through foreign and local support, depends largely on how the balance of perceived legitimacy shifts. That was true in Vietnam and it's true in Afghanistan or Syria.