Mali mainly, 2012 coup, drugs & more

[davidbfpo]

Kingjaja,

Then there was Zimbabwe, which imported the North Koreans to train the 5th Brigade, when "Super-ZAPU" appeared in Matabeleland in the mid-1980's; a unit that became the by-word for brutality.

Not to overlook the use of private and government assistance from Israel.

[M-A Lagrange]

Canada just announced that Mali was on the way to turn like Iraq or Afghanistan. Canada position, which is non fully decided yet, is echoing the “fear” of several experts across the Atlantic Ocean.
Mali threatens to become another Afghanistan: Canada

"I am very cautious about sending in potentially thousands of Canadian troops to Malian soil ... to what is already is amounting to a counter-insurgency. We're not at the drop of a hat going to get into another Afghanistan," Baird told a parliamentary committee.

"On one side we have a military government that took power in a coup last year and on the other side an al Qaeda affiliate. I don't think they're going to sign on for a peacekeeping mission," Baird said.

"It's very much going to be an insurgency on the ground like we've seen in Iraq and like we've seen in Afghanistan."

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/...91B1CK20130212

It is difficult to deny the fact the risk exists and a failure in Mali would have greater strategic impact than actually foreseen. That said, it is important to consider the terrain and situation on the ground. Mali is not Afghanistan and the French lead coalition certainly not the US lead coalition in Iraq.

Why?

First of all, Mali is a well known country with well known opponent and radical armed groups. There is nobody new in that game. Unlike in Afghanistan, the nationalist Tuareg demands do not concur with the radical Islamist political agenda. In fact, it is AQ who seized the occasion to infiltrate the Tuareg rebellion. Just listen to the Tuareg youth reaction after AQ departure and you’ll understand. AQ Islam, which is driven by radical Arab Islam, has neither consideration nor respect for the West Africa Islam which integrates parts of the local believes. West Africa Islam, even radical, is deeply tainted by Sufism and local animist believes. There is a strong desagreement between radical Islamist and the population on what is Islam and what is Sharia, unlike in Afghanistan.

Secondly, Mali domestic political situation is not comparable to post Saddam Iraq or post Taliban Afghanistan. Regime change (for the best or the worst) was induced domestically, for domestic reasons, without external support. The French and Chadians, and US, in Mali did not defeat the Mali government but came to the rescue. The insurgency Canada is speaking of is just the attempt by a small number of radical combatants to get back what they once hold for several weeks: just the time needed to alienate the local population against their practices of Islam. But it is true that the Tuareg political agenda remains and is part of the solution.

[Fuchs]

It is difficult to deny the fact the risk exists and a failure in Mali would have greater strategic impact than actually foreseen.

Now that's an opinion.

What you call "fact" is impossible to prove for the time being, so where do you get the insight that it's a "fact" from?

[M-A Lagrange]

Now that's an opinion.

What you call "fact" is impossible to prove for the time being, so where do you get the insight that it's a "fact" from?

First:
The possibility of a failure exist: it is a fact. If you have 90% to win, it still remains 10% you loose. It's basic math...
The "fact: it will happen" is an opinion and is for the time being impossible to prove.

My insight is that asking the UN or/an the AU to conduct a war or a stabilisation mission is a receipy for failure. And to come to that opinion, I have several historical exemples in the subregion: Darfur is one of them.

Now my point was that Mali is not Afghanistan or Iraq. The context in Mali is far different from those 2 exemples. This to say that engaged troops in Mali, at the moment, do not face the same risk.

Second:
The impact of a failure is always bigger than expected. There is a tendency to lower the strategic impact of a failure. In the case of Mali this will open a new transborder and transcontinental space to armed groups that western and eastern powers are not really willing to allow to exist. This will impact the force equilibrium in the subregion and increase destabilization in other weakened countries... (the domino effect does exist despite the fact it is over rated).

Does that mean that an half success is not enough (military success for France and Chad but complete colaps of the State in Mali after the French withdraw)... Never said that. But I disagree with the idea that a complete failure (no complete military success part from freeing several cities during few weeks and reinforcement of the radical Islamists because of a repression against Tuaregs by Malian State) will have a limited impact that will not go out of Malian borders.

Finaly:
What is your opinion Fuch?

[Fuchs]

The impact of a failure is always bigger than expected. There is a tendency to lower the strategic impact of a failure.

(...)

Finaly:
What is your opinion Fuch?

I doubt the "tendency" and I'm sure the "always" is utterly wrong.
Evidence A: Domino theory # lost Vietnam war.
Case closed. "always" was by far over the top.


I personally believe the Salafism/Wahhabism/AQ thing is irrelevant in the epitome of a desert, and not much more relevant a slightly bit to the south. Moreover, the Christian majority (with regional/animism influence as well, no doubt) to the south of Mali means the maximum expansion of the crooks doesn't even reach to the South Atlantic.


In other words;
Mali may disappear or declare war on my country; I wouldn't have the slightest impact on my daily life.

Save for an uneasiness about heights I really don't have much fear, and I certainly wasn't infected by the hysterical hyping of Mali. The newspaper kiosk on the street corner with its tobacco wares is more of a problem.

[Bill Moore]

Not a new development, but this article goes in more depth than most.

http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2013/0....html?spref=tw

Jihadists and Latin American drug traffickers merge

He explains to the reporter: "During the last decade, Latin American cartels created new routes in Africa to transport cocaine and synthetic drugs to Europe and, to a lesser degree, to the United States. All of the continent is affected by drug trafficking, from South Africa to the Magreb countries. Independent research centers --like the CF2R and specialized institutions within the UN or in the European Union -- tried to alert the politicians. They weren't successful.

"It didn't take long to see the results. The drug trafficking gangrene infected the majority of the West Africa governments and established contact with radical Islamic groups. Today, we are faced with a new, very explosive phenomenon; "narco jihadists."

[davidbfpo]

This may indicate at least one African leader is impatient with other nations:

Chad's President Idriss Deby appealed to West African leaders on Wednesday to urgently speed up deployment of their forces to northern Mali where Chadian and French forces are locked in bitter fighting with al Qaeda-linked rebels. Chad's contingent of some 2,400 troops has borne the brunt of battles with die-hard Islamists holed up in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains..most African units remain in southern Mali...

Link:http://uk.mobile.reuters.com/article...30227?irpc=932

The Chadian military have been reported as being professional and well versed in fighting in such conditions - unlike some of the others who IMHO will prefer to remain in comfort.

How the ECOWAS contribution can become a UN mandated peacekeeping force is beyond me, this is an enforcement mission. ECOWAS want others to pay them, step forward the UN.

[KingJaja]

David,

Nigerian soldiers and their North Korean trainers:



Since the Nigerian Army has links with North Korea, some senior officers might think North Korean methods are better suited to dealing with Boko Haram than classical American "counter-insurgency".

Or maybe, they might be talking to the Algerians.

[davidbfpo]

A good review of the situation by Gregory Mann:http://africasacountry.com/2013/03/22/welcome-to-mali/

It ends with:

First, the French might be only ones who want France to leave Mali any time soon. Almost every other actor would seem to have a vested interest in having them stick around for a while. That fact in and of itself might provoke future violence. The second, more important, point, is this: France can make war in Mali; it has done so in more ways than one, and (counting Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency) more than once. But France can not make the peace. That will be up to the better angels of people in Kuluba, Kati, Kidal, and beyond. While waiting for those angels to appear, it is looking ever more likely that France will claim to win its war while Mali fails to win its own.

One wonders is France has a realistic exit plan, before acting and even more so now. Note France has had its fifth fatality in the north.

[davidbfpo]

A good film clip by a BBC reporter, who appears to be embedded with the Foreign Legion in the Tegharghar mountains of northern Mali; it can be viewed in the USA (thanks JMM):http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21921541

The accompanying, longer written report:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21919769

[Stan]

Nice clip, David !

Sadly, as the UN tags along behind the French some 600 clicks from Bamako, there are signs that the rebel's logistics were far better than expected and the Mali soldiers have little to nothing to include motivation.

If the French leave tomorrow there will be hell to pay !

[M-A Lagrange]

French soldiers in Mali: "These jihadists are there to die"

Tell them fighting and their eyes trun vague. For twelve days of fierce battle, the 2nd REP legionnaires (Foreign Parachute Regiment) mounted at the front in the rough mountains of the Adrar des Iforas in northern Mali to flush out Islamist AQIM ( Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). "We found ourselves facing an army trained and very clever," says Captain Clement.
In the lunar landscape of the valley Ametteta under a blazing sun, the soldiers conducted harsh combat. Sometimes within 3 m of their enemies, almost hand-to-hand combat. "We had not seen that from Algeria, said Gen. Bernard Barrera, the tactical commander of the operation Serval. In front of us the enemies agreed contact and rode into battle. "" In Afghanistan, it was very different compared Captain Clement. The Taliban often drop their weapons to blend in with the population and reappear under the disguise of a shepherd. Here, we fought against real warriors, able to develop a strategy and ambushes. They do not defiled, quite the contrary. " "They had food on them and also how to commit suicide"

http://www.leparisien.fr/internation...13-2678081.php

Becareful: google translate can be... weird at the best
Also there is a video but for French speakers only

[davidbfpo]

An interesting, if slightly off centre report by a journalist with Malian and French forces in Gao and suggests the "liberators" are not gretted by all the locals. Some grim photos too; there is a linked video but it failed to show here. He ends with:

A dozen jihadists, some of them children, had held off hundreds of Malian soldiers for a full day of fighting, until the French were forced to intervene. The city center was a smoldering ruin. For all the politicians’ talk in Paris of a swift end to their campaign in Mali, it seemed unlikely to me that the French would be going home any time soon.

Link:http://www.vice.com/en_au/read/al-qa...Contentpage=-1

Notable are the references to IEDs and stockpiles of weapons in the city.

[AdamG]

Not sure if this link was already posted and buried (quick search fails me), but
ten minutes of Urban Three-Stoogery with AKs is worth the repost.

Bonus hilarity at the 5.20 mark: Private Einstein, part of a team sent to the building where snipers are suspected to be on the roof, empties a magazine down towards his comrades. Said team has no direct commo with it's command group). This video so needs to be set to music.

Ground Zero - Mali was shot in Gao, Mali, on February 21, 2013. It's basically the first legitimate combat footage to come out of the war there. Normally the French ban journalists from the frontlines and film a sanitized version of the fighting themselves and then distribute it to the media.

In this case, the insurgents came to us: they slipped into Gao overnight on small boats and used suicide bombers to blast their way into government buildings. The French left the fighting to the Malian army for most of the day as a test of their combat abilities. Malian soldiers, while very brave, are almost completely untrained and had great difficulty fighting less than a dozen jihadists, some of whom were children. They fired wild bursts of automatic fire everywhere, destroying the city center. The Malians soon ran out of ammunition and had to wait for the French to show up and save the day.

http://www.vice.com/ground-zero/mali

[JMA]

As with the prey of South African snipers in the DRC recently pathetic excuses for soldiers such as these can be taken out systematically and can be held off indefinitely. Obviously these insurgents can't shoot either.

Moving down an open road is not bravery... is is idiocy

Not sure if this link was already posted and buried (quick search fails me), but
ten minutes of Urban Three-Stoogery with AKs is worth the repost.

Bonus hilarity at the 5.20 mark: Private Einstein, part of a team sent to the building where snipers are suspected to be on the roof, empties a magazine down towards his comrades. Said team has no direct commo with it's command group). This video so needs to be set to music.


http://www.vice.com/ground-zero/mali