Three succinct comments by Brian Jenkins from RAND
Part 1: The Motivations Behind the Amenas Terrorist Attack
This opens with a sharp caveat:Link:http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/01/the...st-attack.htmlIf the assault on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi held any lessons for government officials who must make immediate assessments, eager-to-be-interviewed experts, or critics ready to point fingers, it was this: What is initially known about a terrorist attack beyond the what, when, and where often turns out to be wrong. Many of the critical details may not be known for days, weeks, months—or ever. There will always be omissions and distortions. That lesson undoubtedly applies to the bloody terrorist attack on the Amenas natural gas facility in Algeria
Part 2: The Dynamics of the Hostage Situation at Amenas
A thorough review, including historical aspects like:Link:http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/01/the...at-amenas.htmlIn the 1970s, hostage situations accounted for about 20 percent of all terrorist incidents. (On the risk to hostages)... 79 percent of the hostages who died in hostage incidents were killed during a rescue operation, either by their captors or by their rescuers (Based on a 1977 RAND Study).
Part 3: What Does the Amenas Attack Mean for U.S. Policy in Africa?
This is very short, almost a "holding" action as France acts in Mali and the USA decides what to do next:http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/01/wha...policy-in.html
There is an very different point of view in a SWJ Blog piece today 'The Amenas Siege and the Growing Hostage Problem in Africa':http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the...blem-in-africa
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